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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study investigates the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in post-colonial Indonesian 
film adaptations, primarily focusing on Blood and Crown of the Dancer (1983) and The 
Dancer (2011), the two adaptations of Ahmad Tohari’s novel The Dancer (1982). The 
investigation is motivated by a series of problems in adaptation studies, namely, the 
hegemony of Anglo-American texts, the domination of former British colonies in post-
colonial adaptation, and the homogenising construct of the East versus the West in most post-
colonial criticism. The novel and the film adaptations recount the long, internal struggles 
between the military and civil society in the Dutch former colony after the independence. 
What is prevalent yet forgotten in those works and the domestic conflicts that they emulate is 
the practices of depoliticisation and politicisation, which have regularly been associated with, 
respectively, the denial of politics by the military regime and the corruption of ‘apolitical’ 
realms by its political enemies. This thesis aims to show that the depoliticisation and 
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politicisation in the novel and the adaptations are much more subtle and complex than 
imagined. Incorporating Flinders and Wood’s theory of depoliticisation, Foucault’s principle 
of discourse, and Bourdieu’s account of capital, the investigation attempts to capture the 
discursive depoliticisation and politicisation in the texts as well as the interrelated 
governmental, societal, and personal factors in adaptation.  
Although the thesis is structured by the three texts, each chapter draws equal attention 
to the contexts, subjects, and audiences of each work and scrutinises all of them through the 
lenses of depoliticisation and repoliticisation. The analysis shows that the depoliticisation and 
politicisation in the texts generally correspond with those in the governmental, societal, 
private arenas in their respective eras, particularly on the problems of politics, religion, and 
sexuality. The novel and the first adaptation embody the typical depoliticisation during the 
Indonesian military era (1966-1998) in which subversive discourses and practices could 
surface only as a pretext/justification for the regime’s suppression. The second adaptation, 
however, signifies the heavy politicisation in the early post-military era (1998-2004) and the 
subtle depoliticisation in the subsequent time in that it simultaneously interrogates and adapts 
‘faithfully’ the issues and the conflicting parties in the informing texts and contexts. 
Although the case studies are rather specific, the chosen texts and approach allow the 
thesis to deal with broader issues related to the socio-political history of Indonesia, the 
literary and filmic discourses and practices, and, in relation to the missing first film 
adaptation, the cultural status of adaptation studies and practices in the country. Despite their 
obvious focus on domestic affairs, there are traces of Hollywood’s depoliticising models in 
both adaptations due to the long, predominant influence of American cinema in Indonesia. 
This fusion of intracultural and intercultural elements, the transdisciplinary political 
approach, and the insight from the invisible post-colonial country are the major contributions 
of the thesis to adaptation studies and post-colonial adaptation.   
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Introduction 
The Empires, Problems of Our Own, and Depoliticisation/Repoliticisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis’s rationale, choice of texts, and theoretical model are explained in this 
introduction. Specifically, I will explore some shortcomings of adaptation studies and post-
colonial adaptation critiques, the invisibility of Indonesian adaptations, the unique position of 
the novel The Dancer and its adaptations in the Indonesian literary and film history, and the 
potential and compatibility of the theories of depoliticisation, discourse, and capital for the 
research. The final part of the chapter is devoted to the research questions, objectives, 
methodology, and structure of the thesis. 
 
0.1 Post-Colonial Literature and Films: The Indonesian Case 
The thriving field of adaptation studies has successfully showcased a remarkable range and 
diversity of topics. Yet, the subject of post-colonial film adaptation is yet to be explored. In 
his highly revered “Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Adaptation” (2005), Robert 
Stam acknowledges the limits of formalism and advocates the investigation of non-formal 
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properties. Nevertheless, he scarcely addresses post-colonialism either as an important 
context, a different attitude, or a distinctive technique in film adaptation, even in his specific 
section of ‘The Impacts of the Posts’. Deborah Cartmell, in “100+ Years of Adaptation, or, 
Adaptation as the Art Form of Democracy” (2012), states that “the field is still dominated by 
Anglo-American texts, the adaptations of which tend to fetishize their nationalistic features” 
(7). Anglo-American adaptations, both canonical and popular, monopolise the key 
publications in the field such as collections of essays, textbooks, monographs, and journals. 
For instance, by December 2016, of the 142 original articles published in the Oxford journal 
of Adaptation, only twenty-two (15,5 percent) investigate non-Anglo-American texts and 
only six examine non-European texts (4,2 percent). Correspondingly, it is equally challenging 
to find studies of adaptation in post-colonial publications, which have been dominated by 
literary studies and followed recently by film studies.  
 Furthermore, of the few available post-colonial adaptation studies, most still revolve 
around adaptations from India, Nigeria, South Africa and other former British colonies. 
Graham Huggan, in “The Neocolonialism of Postcolonialism: A Cautionary Note” (1997), 
dubs this kind of imbalance “the Anglocentrism of most contemporary post-colonial 
criticism” (20). This is related to, if not caused by, the past and present power of the British 
Empire. At its height, the British Empire colonised approximately a third of the world and 
therefore established ‘an empire where the sun never sets’. In terms of their sheer number and 
territorial reach, the former British colonies have easily dwarfed their non-British 
counterparts and this has resulted in the domination of the former in post-colonial studies. 
Although no longer an empire, it is hard to deny that the United Kingdom’s influence in the 
world remains strong to this day (see, for instance, McCourt). This means that its former 
colonies also gain prominence through patronage, association, and/or networks. Moreover, 
there have been relatively peaceful and positive relations between the United Kingdom and 
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its former colonies and among the ex-colonies themselves. This fact has been proven by the 
establishment and continued existence of the Commonwealth of Nations. Aside from the 
economic, political, and military alliance, this has created a powerful discursive network in 
the world, including, but not limited to, literature and films (Bratberg).  
Another important factor is the former colonies’ mastery of the English language, 
which, according to linguist David Crystal in 2003, has become the true global language due 
to the past British colonialism and the present American hegemony. The former paved the 
way and the latter has expanded the language to territories, both virtual and physical, that the 
former might never even have imagined. Using the language of the empires gives former 
British colonies a competitive advantage, particularly in terms of access to science and 
knowledge. Another linguist, Robert Phillipson (1992) calls this “linguistic imperialism” and 
condemns it as the “reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and 
other languages” (47). Artistic and academic works from British ex-colonies are relatively 
free from the mercy of translation, interpretation, and subtitling, which are not readily 
available and accessible in developing countries.  
Literature and films from non-British former colonies have not been paid as much 
attention, mainly because of the language barriers and the less hegemonic position of their 
former colonisers.  In many of those countries, English remains a foreign language even 
among the most educated class, albeit the most important one. Therefore, creative workers 
and scholars from those countries are struggling to compete with their English-speaking 
counterparts in terms of global production and the distribution of knowledge. As a case in 
point and the subject of the current study, post-colonial film adaptation has so far ignored 
Indonesia, the former Dutch colony in Southeast Asia. As a practice, the adaptation of literary 
works to films in Indonesia started as early as the late colonial era with the production of Njai 
Dasima (1929), a film adaptation of G. Francis’ novel Tjerita Njai Dasima (1896) (see 
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Appendix A for a timeline of Indonesian history, cinema, and adaptation). At its peak, the 
Dutch scale of colonialism was diminutive in comparison with other European empires. By 
the end of its colonial days, the Netherlands had only two major colonies: the Dutch East 
Indies (the colonial name of modern Indonesia) and Suriname. Its international influence had 
been diminishing since the Second World War, and likewise the Dutch language. Its 
relationship with the ex-colonies, particularly Indonesia, had never been strong and impactful 
as it remains today. Due to their geographical proximity, Indonesia cannot be said to have a 
close and dynamic relationship with Suriname either. As a result, Indonesia does not possess 
the strong discursive alliance or the linguistic passport to contribute to the world’s post-
colonial discourses that the former British colonies have so far enjoyed.  
During its early independence era, Indonesia drew the post-colonial world’s attention 
due to the international initiatives of the outward-looking President Sukarno. He co-founded 
the Non-Aligned Movement, hosted the Bandung Conference with its historic Bandung 
Principles, and established the UN-like ‘New Emerging Forces’. Those initiatives show that 
Indonesia and other newly independent countries were acutely aware that they were still 
facing two enemies on two fronts, namely, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The old empires 
apparently did not give up their control too easily; they wished to return to the pre-Second 
World War state and/or to control the newly independent countries in different ways. The 
Netherlands used both strategies with the young Republic of Indonesia with moderate success 
initially. It launched two military actions to retake the country from the Republicans. When it 
eventually failed to suppress the Republicans’ guerrilla resistance and international lobbies, 
the Netherlands agreed to decolonise Indonesia in 1949, provided that the unitary Republic 
transformed into the United States of Indonesia under the patronage of the Netherlands. As 
historian Merle Ricklefs posits, in 2001, it would have been easier to defeat the federal than 
the unitary Indonesia because of the primordial prejudices among the member states.  
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The situation during the early independence era is best represented by Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer’s early novels such as Kranji dan Bekasi Jatuh (1947), Keluarga Gerilya 
(1950), and Bukan Pasar Malam (1951). These portray the difficulties of the early 
independence without losing the revolutionary fervour of the era. As Krishna Sen identifies in 
Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New Order (1994), the early independence films focus 
more on popular themes such as love and family than the struggle between the Republic and 
the Netherlands. One of the possible reasons for this is that there was a strong possibility that 
the Dutch would rule Indonesia again after their two successful military actions. A Dutch 
government film unit was even established in Jakarta in 1946. This unit produced, among 
others, a film adaptation of Moliere’s drama entitled Harta Karun (1949) directed by Usmar 
Ismail, the father of Indonesian cinema. Private film companies played it safe while waiting 
for the turnout of the event. Hence, the films produced at the time “presented the image of a 
‘zaman normal’ (normal time), ignoring the war, conflict, and political change that was 
taking place in Indonesia” (Sen, Indonesian 19).  
To a certain extent, the bloody and bitter history of separation explains why Indonesia 
has never had a strong relation with its former master. More crucially, however, it is also 
related to the emergence of the new and stronger American and Russian empires. Unlike the 
old empires, they had little territorial ambition and direct control over post-colonial countries 
and preferred subtler “social, political, and ideological mechanisms” (Roberts 833). While he 
was fully aware of this brand-new colonialism, Sukarno also foresaw positive political 
prospects in building relationships with both the American and Russian empires (Vickers). 
With diplomatic and military backup from both empires, Indonesia eventually managed to 
free itself from the Netherlands by arbitrarily abolishing the federal state and returning to the 
unitary state in 1950.  
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Soon afterwards, the American and Russian empires competed to bring the patron-less 
Indonesia to their side. This competition of influence did not happen exclusively with 
Indonesia but also with other post-colonial countries such as, just to name a few, Vietnam 
(France’s ex-colony), Cuba (Spain’s ex-colony), and Korea (Japan’s ex-colony). A number of 
post-colonial countries flocked around the American empire but many more went to the 
Russian empire. Although at the beginning Indonesia projected a neutral stance and therefore 
benefitted from both empires, it could not stand the vortex of the age for long and slowly 
shifted to the left side.  
Not only did the struggle of influence take place in the economic, political, and 
military sectors, but it also extended to the fields of culture, literature, and films. This is 
widely represented in the literature and films of the time as a great cultural conflict between 
the left-wing Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (People’s Cultural Institute) and the liberal 
Manifes Kebudayaan (Cultural Manifesto). The most complete documentation of the conflict 
can be found in D. S. Moeljanto and Taufik Ismail’s Prahara Budaya (1995). The People’s 
Cultural Institute had significant access to the Russian empire and left-wing post-colonial 
countries. As revealed by Wijaya Herlambang in 2013, the Cultural Manifesto received 
financial and intellectual support from the American empire and other western powers, 
including the Netherlands. Although it enjoyed a discursive alliance with the Russian and 
left-wing countries, Indonesia still did not have the linguistic passport (this time Russian and 
Mandarin) and thus left no strong mark on post-colonial literature and film.  
In addition to the imbalanced exposure among post-colonial countries, post-colonial 
adaptation studies are also still limited in terms of topic coverage. With frequent overlaps, 
there are approximately three issues that dominate the subject. First of all, a substantial body 
of studies address the longstanding concerns about the (neo)colonial representations of the 
(former) colonisers and colonies. This tendency can be seen, among others, in the studies 
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done by Mark McCutcheon (2011), Tarek Shamma (2011), and Ricardo Guthrie (2012). 
Second, other researchers remain interested in the implications of (neo)colonialism for the 
identity of the subjects such as mimicry, hybridity, and indigeneity. Some notable studies 
have been conducted by Gawain Tickell (1998), Alpana Sharma (2012), and Kinga Földváry 
(2013). Third, ‘writing back to the empire’ has become a recent trend in the subject, as 
represented in the works of Mary Donaldson-Evans (2009), Jerod Hollyfield (2011), and 
Renate Brosch (2012).  
Nevertheless, Thomas Cartelli states, in 1999, that “the practice of post-colonial 
writers to write back has by now been exhaustively documented” and was “the configuration 
during the first stage of Third World postcoloniality” (106).  Radicalising Cartelli’s point, 
Eckart Voigts, in 2014, contends that this type of subversion has, to some degree, become a 
“stereotype” (55). Commenting on the adaptations of The Tempest (1611), he states that 
“attempts to ‘equalize’ the central text, to rewrite or perform a Caliban as good as Prospero, 
tend to reinforce its cultural status and thus the colonizer’s perspective”. The post-colonial 
subject is forever measured against the former master and, therefore, is forever under his 
shadow. 
Indeed, there are fewer post-colonial adaptation studies that deal with the ‘internal 
affairs’ of post-colonial nations. As stated by Arun P. Mukherjee in “Whose Post-
Colonialism and Whose Postmodernism?” (1990), post-colonial studies have relied too long 
on the homogenising construct of the Centre (the West) versus the Periphery (the East). Thus, 
they tend to fixate on what Eastern texts want to say to the Western audience and thus 
maintain the privilege of the latter. The fact is that post-colonial countries and adaptations 
have “their own internal centres and peripheries, their own dominants and marginal”, and 
their own conflicts (Mukherjee 6). However, it should be noted that, although cultural 
productions in post-colonial countries are created in response to their own needs, they are 
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never completely immune from the interests of the old and new empires. Even what 
Mukherjee calls “our own needs” could possibly be the empires’ needs in disguise or, at the 
very least, the results of power relations between the empires and the post-colonial countries. 
At any rate, post-colonial subjects cannot live outside their past experiences and influences in 
their present life. In today’s world, it is even less possible to live beyond the influences of 
other countries, particularly the dominant American empire. So, internal affairs, our own 
needs, or problems of our own, as they are referred to in this study, merely indicate a focus or 
a starting point for analysis, not a denial of the existing influences of the old and new 
empires.  
Hitherto the most prominent topic of ‘internal’ studies has been nationalism and its 
failure in post-colonial countries. This failure could possibly be attributed to the highly 
discursive and contested concept of nationalism itself. The English Oxford Living 
Dictionaries defines nationalism as, among other things, the “advocacy of political 
independence for a particular country”. Yet, as John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith observe 
in the Oxford Reader of Nationalism (1994), there has been no agreement among scholars or 
politicians with regard to the idea. Eric Hobsbawn (1990) and Ernest Gellner (1997) argue 
that both nation and nationalism are neither primordial nor inherently distinguishable. A 
number of theoretical works, such as those of Benedict Anderson (1983), Partha Chatterjee 
(1986), and Timothy Brennan (1990), have revealed how this highly discursive concept 
contributes to its challenges in post-colonial countries. Second, as pointed out by John 
McLeod in 2000, nationalism was and is the dominant anti-colonial discourse whereas this 
ideology was born in Europe, the home of the colonisers. In using nationalism, many anti-
colonial governments could not avoid perpetuating its undemocratic aspects such as gender 
discrimination, racism, and linguistic uniformity. These problems have been studied 
respectively by Kumari Jayawerdana (1986), Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein 
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(1991), and Emma LaRocque (1989). Third, nationalism was typically introduced and 
propagated in colonised and post-colonial countries by local western-educated elites 
(Chatterjee; Guha and Spivak). They received education from their colonisers, enjoyed the 
embedded prestige, and wished to maintain that superiority after independence. Thus, 
nationalism merely shifted the oppressive structure from the western masters to those local 
western-educated elites. It was often the case that the elites fought one another for power and 
failed to bring the promises of a better future to their subjects. Eventually, postcolonial 
subjects started feeling disenchanted, not only with the elites, but also with nationalism. This 
fairly universal development has been explicated in the works of Bruce King (1995) and 
Simon Gikandi (1996). It has also been portrayed in numerous post-colonial novels and films 
and scrutinised in adaptation studies, such as that by Lindiwe Dovey (2005) on post-apartheid 
South Africa and that by Ranjani Mazumdar (2015) on post-independence India. 
In Indonesia’s case, Indonesian subjects had to experience political turbulence, armed 
rebellions, and economic hardships immediately after Independence Day on 17 August 1945. 
In terms of state form, for instance, Indonesia had to go from a unitary (1945-9) to a federal 
(1949-50) and back to a unitary state again (1950-present). It also remodelled its government 
system from a presidential (1945) to a parliamentary (1950) and back to a presidential system 
(1959) again. Its constitution changed from the 1945 Constitution to the 1950 Provisional 
Constitution and back to the 1945 Constitution in 1959. Adrian Vickers, in A History of 
Modern Indonesia (2005), demonstrates how these constant changes were not caused just by 
the pressures of the Netherlands but also by the perpetual intra-elite conflicts. Defeated or 
marginalised elites declared their secessions from the Republic and started armed rebellions 
all over the country. The economy suffered from the unstable conditions and, later, Sukarno’s 
great armament and ambitious projects. As stated by Y.B. Mangunwijaya (1995), post-
colonial Indonesian subjects secretly missed the more peaceful and orderly time under Dutch 
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colonialism and hoped that the Republican era would be over soon. This hardship and 
discontent is portrayed in literature and films such as Korupsi (1954), Lewat Jam Malam 
(1954), and Twilight in Jakarta (1963). 
The emphasis on nationalism and its failure shows that the internal studies have so far 
focused on the early stage of the independence era. Despite its failure, nationalism has 
continued to play a major role in the increasingly global world (Gellner; Hobsbawn). Post-
colonial adaptation studies have not exhaustively addressed the later era, when post-colonial 
subjects’ disappointment with the western-educated elites’ nationalism was typically 
exploited by military forces. As J.E. Goldthorpe observes in The Sociology of Post-Colonial 
Societies (1996), a substantial number of post-colonial countries have fallen into the grip of 
military regimes. Eric Nordlinger (1977) defines military regimes as “states in which military 
officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of 
force” (2). This development took place, and is still taking place, on almost every continent 
(including Europe) and all regions of the world. John Gaddis, in The Cold War: A New 
History (2005), reveals how new military governments received assistance from either the 
American or the Russian empire, depending on their ideological orientation and/or interests.  
In some cases, particularly in the beginning, the regimes received popular support 
because they were seen as the saviour from the politicking western-educated elites and the 
unstable situation. As stated by Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell in Authoritarian Regimes: 
Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy, 1972-2003 (2006), military regimes 
characteristically “exercise political power either directly or indirectly (i.e., by controlling 
civilian leaders behind the scenes)” (6). Some military regimes abolished all of the political 
parties, such as in Niger (1983-8), Pakistan (1982-7), and Panama (1972-9). Several others 
allowed only one political party formed by the military, such as in Algeria (1977-91), Iraq 
(1980-2002), and Myanmar (1974-87). Some others allowed multi parties but with one 
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dominant party created and supported by the military, such as in Honduras (1980-2), Turkey 
(1983-5), and Indonesia (1971-1998). In Political Censorship (2001), Robert Goldstein 
describes how the political restrictions affected not only the area of real politics but also all 
sectors in life, including literature and cinema. Literary works and films were forbidden to 
take up political issues or voice political opinions that differed from those of the regimes. 
Censorship and censorship machines were an integral part of literary and cinematic life. 
Authors and filmmakers who broke the restrictions or the political line of the regimes could 
be jailed, tortured, or even murdered.  
Suffocated by the absence of freedom, non-state and non-market actors, which 
Antonio Gramsci calls “civil society”, resisted the military regimes and in several cases, they 
succeeded (qtd. in Beittenger-Lee 15). As seen by Richard Joseph (1998) in Africa, the post-
military era is often typified by a period of political revival. Free elections are held and new 
political parties are established. In some cases, this is followed by political, ethnic, and 
religious conflicts because the long-repressed differences under the military regimes begin to 
surface. These unfortunate developments have been witnessed in Latin America by Tony 
Karl (1990). There is also a great revival of political literature and cinema in the cultural 
sector as highlighted, for instance, in the works of Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat 
(2007) and Ariel Heryanto (2008). Political literature and cinema enthusiastically interrogate 
and criticise the discourses and practices of the military regimes. Censorship does exist but 
this time it is carried out by professionals and/or independent public figures.  
In Indonesia, the government of the western-educated elites under Sukarno was 
succeeded by the military regime under General Suharto through an indirect coup. This coup 
began with the assassination of six army generals on 1 October 1965 by a group of junior 
officers, whom Suharto accused as being infiltrated by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(Partai Komunis Indonesia, henceforth, the PKI), then the strongest political supporter of 
12 
 
Sukarno and the arch enemy of the military. Having the necessary pretext, Suharto 
orchestrated the systematic persecution and killing of about one million accused communists 
and Sukarno loyalists (Roosa). Unlike his left-wing, internationalist predecessor, Suharto was 
more complex and enigmatic. On the one hand, he appeared more inward-looking and 
focused more on domestic affairs. He regularly warned the country of ‘westernisation’ and 
censored western and ‘western-inspired’ readings and films (see, for example, Stanley; 
Garcia; Sen, Indonesian). Yet, he extensively liberalised the economy and opened the country 
widely to foreign capital. Suharto received strong international support from the western 
world, particularly the USA, the UK, and Australia, during the extermination of the accused 
communists and, as studied by Hilmar Farid in 2007, the invasion of East Timor. 
During the heyday of the military/Suharto/New Order era (1970s-80s), the local film 
industry experienced a boom never seen before and, perhaps, not surpassed up to now. The 
number of Indonesian film adaptations also grew significantly in that era. Most of the film 
adaptations were popular films derived from popular novels such as Cintaku di Kampus Biru 
(1976), Mencari Cinta (1979), and Kembang Padang Kelabu (1980). Following the cultural 
policy of the regime, Indonesian ‘serious’ literature seemed to turn their attention inward. 
They portrayed local cultures and local problems but not in relation to their colonial and neo-
colonial experiences. This can be seen from the works of Kuntowijoyo, Umar Kayam, and 
Ahmad Tohari. Others tried to transcend their post-coloniality by exploiting more universal 
themes and forms such as absurdism and surrealism, as in the works of Iwan Simatupang, 
Putu Wijaya, and Budi Darma. There were a few films about the anti-colonial struggles but 
most of them focused on the military’s role, particularly Suharto’s, in the war for 
independence, such as in Mereka Kembali (1972), Janur Kuning (1979), and Serangan Fajar 
(1981). Some others told stories about the pre-modern rebellions of the natives such as 
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November 1828 (1978) and Tjoet Nja’ Dhien (1986), but they all portrayed armed resistance 
and thus supported military glorification.   
Most literary works and adaptations, both popular and ‘serious’, during the military 
era were apolitical in the sense that they posed no challenge to the political lines of the 
regime. It was related to the spirit of the military government, which championed economic 
growth while at the same time subduing political freedom. The government’s censorship 
machine banned political literature and films or cut parts and scenes in which any perceived 
political messages were present (see, for instance, Garcia; Heryanto, State; Sen, “Language”). 
Concurrently, as discussed by Michael Vatikiosis in Indonesian Politics under Soeharto 
(1998), the military government mobilised its ideological state apparatus to propagate the 
importance of economic growth and ‘the evil of politics’. The regime worked together with, 
if not steered, the professionals such as big-time artists, writers, and directors, who set the 
aesthetic standard of the day: the liberal ‘art for art’s sake’ (Herlambang, Kekerasan).  
The military government was toppled in 1998 by a popular strike following the great 
Asian monetary crisis, and the post-military, post-Suharto, or Reformation era, as it is known 
locally, began. For a period of time, there was a resurgence of political novels and films to 
quench the thirst of the politically repressed public. Intellectuals and creative workers, 
including literary and film communities, have enjoyed greater freedom ever since. Indonesian 
cinema, which experienced a decline in the last days (1990s) of the military era, has been 
experiencing a revival in terms of production and audiences, and so have film adaptations. 
Some of the famous adaptations are Laskar Pelangi (2008), Sang Penari (2011), and 
Tenggelamnya Kapal van der Wijk (2013). 
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0.2 The ‘Exceptional’ Literature and Films 
There is always an exception to the rule. Although few and mostly implicit, there were 
political novels as well as political films during the military era. One of the most famous 
political novels at the time was Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s This Earth of Mankind (1980). 
Narrating the story of an early freedom fighter and his growing nationalistic consciousness, 
this tetralogy has attracted numerous post-colonial readings worldwide. This Earth of 
Mankind won many international awards and the author was regularly nominated for the 
Nobel Prize. Unfortunately, the novel was and still is officially banned in Indonesia by the 
Office of the Attorney General for ‘spreading the communist teachings’ mainly due to the 
status of the author as an ex-communist prisoner. No filmmaker has so far dared to adapt this 
famous tetralogy into a film, not only due to the official banning but also because of the 
current pressure from Islamic fundamentalist groups. There was also a political novel that 
was adapted into a political film, Max Havelaar (1860) to Max Havelaar (Saijah dan Adinda) 
(1975). The original adaptation did not even see the light of day because of censorship and 
was only circulated among political activists. How censorship is manifested in the country 
will be discussed in detail in 1.1 and 2.1. 
There was also a political novel that was adapted into a non-political film, and that is 
one of the subjects of this research. The Dancer was written by Ahmad Tohari and first 
published as a trilogy of novels, namely, Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk (The Dancer of Paruk 
Village, 1982), Lintang Kemukus Dini Hari (A Shooting Star at Dawn, 1985), and Jantera 
Bianglala (The Rainbow’s Arc, 1986). The trilogy is set immediately before, during, and 
shortly after the killing and persecution of the accused Indonesian Communist Party 
supporters (1965-1966). The story of The Dancer revolves around the life of a ronggeng or a 
traditional erotic dancer from Paruk village named Srintil, who performs in political rallies of 
the PKI. Following the aborted coup on 01 October 1965, the military accuses the PKI of 
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being the mastermind behind the coup and launches a manhunt for the communists 
throughout the country. Srintil is implicated, captured, and imprisoned without trial. She 
survives the great ordeal but must continue her life with ex-communist status, which is the 
worst stigma one could have during the military era (1966-1998) in Indonesia. Alexandra 
Pironti describes it best when she says, “if the caste system existed in Indonesia”, the accused 
communists would surely be “the untouchables: for decades, they and their families have 
been banned from jobs and access to education and, until 2005, their identity cards marked 
them as former political prisoners” (par. 1). 
After writing this trilogy, Ahmad Tohari reportedly had to face a long, ‘ideological 
interrogation’ by the military, and the work went through some censorship. This should not 
be surprising since the trilogy is the first literary work to address the subject of the PKI and 
1965 conflict. Yet, the fact that the censored version could be legally circulated at all 
indicates that the military sensed that in the 1980s “enough time had passed since the killings 
of 1965 that the spectre of a re-emergent PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had begun to 
lose some of its currency” (Barker, “State” 10). Another possible factor is that the political 
line of the author and his work was not considered to be against that of the regime, which will 
be addressed in Chapter One. Aside from the intrinsic qualities of the work, it is its double 
status as the pioneer of 1965 stories and a victim of censorship that has put The Dancer on 
the national and, eventually, the international map. Tohari himself has written other short 
stories and novels and, in fact, also won due recognition and awards for those works. Yet, 
none has attracted as much attention from laymen and scholars as The Dancer.  
As an indicator of public interest, the censored version of the trilogy was reprinted 
more than four times. The first and second books were translated into Japanese by Shinobu 
Yamane in 1986, Dutch by Monique Sardjono-Soesman in 1993 and 1998, and German by 
Giok Hiang Gornik in 1996 and 1997. The reason why the trilogy was translated and 
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published in those three countries, instead of others, is that at that time they had the closest 
business and cultural relationship with Indonesia and, therefore, the strongest interest in the 
country. The uncensored version of the trilogy was eventually published in a single volume in 
2003 following the collapse of the military regime and has been reprinted nine times, 
including the one with a new cover taken from the poster of its second film adaptation in 
2011. This testifies the public’s great enthusiasm for the previously forbidden subject of the 
PKI, the 1965 massacre, and the military’s atrocities.  
 
Fig. 1. The unabridged, single volume of the Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk trilogy (2003). 
Also in 2003, Rene T. A. Lysloff translated the unabridged version of the trilogy into 
English for international readers under the title The Dancer. As the translator explains in his 
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introduction, he began translating the book as early as 1986 for his personal use, as a 
researcher of rural performance traditions. The reason why his translation was only published 
in 2003 is not clear. It might be related to the post-9/11 global interest in Islam, which is 
another important topic in the novel that the translator is keen to address in the introduction. 
The English translation was revised and republished in 2012, following the release of the 
second film adaptation one year earlier. Perhaps for the same reason, Sarjono-Soesman 
followed suit with the publication of the single-volume Dutch translation entitled Dansmeisje 
uit mijn dorp: trilogie in 2012.  
 
Fig. 2. The book cover of The Dancer, the English translation of the Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk 
trilogy. 
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Another indicator of the positive public reception is the number of news articles on 
the novel in magazines and newspapers, both in online and offline formats. Furthermore, 
Tohari’s The Dancer has also attracted the interest of scholars both from the country and 
abroad. This novel has been studied numerous times, in various forms, and with different 
approaches. Most of the studies address a rather obvious subject matter of the novel i.e. the 
persecution and killing of the accused communists in 1965-6.  Keith Foulcher, in 1998, 
credits The Dancer as one of the first Indonesian novels written during the military era that 
are “returning to the Indonesian novel’s traditional concern with realist narrative and social 
criticism”, and states that, “it does not shy away from the events of 1965 and 1966” (par. 18). 
Yoseph Taum (2003) seeks to relate the content of the novel to the notion of collective 
memory as a starting point for a wider national reconciliation. Michael Garcia (2004) writes 
that the greatest contribution of the book and the reason why it was censored is its “portrayal 
of local deprivation following Suharto’s rise to power” (122). Anna-Greta N. Hoadley (2005) 
takes this novel, along with a few others, to explain the tragedy of 1965-1966 from the 
viewpoint of the victims, and thus to provide a counter version to the official history from the 
military regime. In response to Hoadley’s book, Michael Bodden (2006) calls The Dancer 
“the best known . . . of memorable works recounting the events of 1965-1966 and the effects 
of their aftermath” (660-1). In contrast, John Roosa, also in 2006, considers Tohari and his 
colleagues “anti-communists . . . [who] tended to depict the communists as being aggressive, 
violent, and irreligious . . . [and] considered the mass killings and arrests in 1965-1966 an 
understandable . . . measure of popular self-defense” (“Indonesian” 685-6). All of the studies 
above can be categorised into New Historicist analyses, as they “insist upon the historical 
particularity” and the “social and political function” of a literary work (Martin 152-3). They 
collectively represent The Dancer “not simply as a product of history” because “it actively 
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makes history” by redefining individual victims, the Javanese community, and Indonesian 
society (Bertens 156).   
The second group of studies of The Dancer belong to the school of Structuralism as 
they appear to be interested in “the internal structure” and “the formal properties” of the 
novel, especially the language and the narrative (Martin 96 & 106). Employing the semiotic 
and genetic-structuralist framework, Taufik Dermawan (1992) seeks to reveal the coherence 
of the semiotic structure of the trilogy and the socio-cultural structure of the society in which 
the author lives. Using the stylistic and semiotic approach, Ali Al Ma’ruf, in 2010, 
demonstrates the intertextuality of The Dancer, The Holy Qur’an, and Javanese local 
wisdoms. Khristianto (2013), with the assistance of the Levi-Straussian method, describes 
how Srintil becomes the centre of relations between the characters in the novel and how each 
character occupies his/her unique position within the structure of the story.   
Javanese culture has indeed become another major area of interest in the study of the 
trilogy. This culture of the ethnic majority is one of the most important elements in 
contemporary Indonesian novels due to its national hegemony during the government of 
Suharto, a Javanese. This cultural element is ever more important in the case of Tohari’s 
(himself a Javanese) The Dancer, which tells the story of a Javanese dancer and her 
community. Nancy I. Cooper, in 2004, tries to see the link between Javanese culture and 
gender discourse. Cooper powerfully describes how The Dancer represents complex Javanese 
cultural ideologies and gender practices in transition from a local and simple lifestyle to a 
more international and modern existence. This might be the only study that relates The 
Dancer to Post-Colonialism, although the relation is rather implicit.  Eka Kurniawan (2012), 
a young Indonesian novelist and critic, explores how Tohari, in The Dancer, sees the tragedy 
of 1965-1966 as a failure on the part of the characters as Javanese subjects to read signs of 
20 
 
nature (“Tragedi”). Nurpaisah, Martono, and Sesilia Seli (2014) discuss the novel’s Javanese 
values in terms of three relational areas: man-to-man, man-to-nature, and man-to God.  
It might be not surprising that a number of scholars of gender studies are also 
interested in the novel, as Srintil and her characterisation promise a rich source for gender 
analyses. One of the most comprehensive studies of the representations of women in 
Indonesian literature is done by Tineke Hellwig (1994). She chooses The Dancer as one of 
the major works for her analysis and reveals how the male author tends to portray women in a 
favourable light. Ria Yunitha, Christanto Syam, and Agus Wartiningsih further reveal, in 
2013, the three modes of gender discrimination being criticised in the trilogy, namely, 
marginalisation, stereotype, and violence. Dance researcher Felicia Hughes-Freeland, in 
2008, expresses a rather different opinion from that of Hellwig and Yunitha et al. She argues 
that Ahmad Tohari’s novel conforms to the “New Order representational patterns of female 
experience by portraying the female dancer as a victim who can only be ‘saved’ by the 
agency of males” (145).  
There are a few studies that discuss the translations of the novel to other languages. 
The first is conducted by Julia Rini (2005) who analyses the efforts of the English translator 
to bring the readers of his translation into the culture of the story. Sugeng Priyadi (2007) 
evaluates the author’s own translation to the local dialect of Banyumas by applying 
Newmark’s theoretical framework. Ajeng Kusumastuti, in 2008, offers a linguistic analysis of 
the translation of the first person personal pronouns in the Indonesian to the Japanese version. 
Indah Bumi (2011) analyses the translator’s techniques and method in translating the novel’s 
cultural terms to English. Puspita Purbasari and Khristianto (2014) examine the 
untranslatability of cultural terms in the translation of the Indonesian version to the English 
version.  
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In an attempt to capitalise on the success of the first book of the trilogy, a year later 
Gramedia Film produced its cinematic adaptation under the title Darah dan Mahkota 
Ronggeng (Blood and Crown of the Dancer, my trans.). The directing was entrusted to a then 
unknown young director Yazman Yazid, who had directed only one film previously. Starring 
an Indonesian ‘bombshell’ Enny Beatrice as Srintil and a popular actor Ray Sahetapy as her 
boyfriend Rasus, the film starts with the story of a small girl in Paruk village named Srintil, 
who is thought to have the blood of a ronggeng dancer. The village shaman Kartareja and his 
wife train Srintil physically and mentally to be a ronggeng dancer. Approaching puberty, 
Srintil must undergo the Buka Klambu ceremony, which involves giving up her virginity to 
the highest bidder. Rasus, Srintil's boyfriend, attempts to take his girlfriend away but is 
stopped by a local gangster Sulam, who also desires Srintil's virginity. The failed attempt 
leaves them separated, as Rasus is thrown into a ravine and the Buka Klambu ceremony 
proceeds. Rasus escapes the ravine and reattempts to free his beloved, this time successfully. 
Soon after Rasus and Srintil both flee to a nearby area.  
There is no available data on the reception of Blood and Crown of the Dancer by its 
contemporary audience and actually the film is still missing. There have been virtually no 
popular or critical commentaries on this adaptation. The screening of the second adaptation in 
2011 revived its name although from that moment the first adaptation has consistently 
received unfavourable and dismissive comparisons to the second adaptation. Tohari claims 
that he has never and will never watch the film (Soebagyo; Krismantari, “Return”; 
Kurniasari, “Ronggeng”). Writing for The Jakarta Post, Ika Krismantari (2011) calls it “a 
cheap pseudo-porn flick” (“Return” par. 4). Another film critic Triwik Kurniasari (2011) 
states that, “the film maker moved too far and turned the film into X-rated material, while 
failing to capture the real message of the book” (“Ronggeng” par. 2). These negative 
judgements might partly have been caused by the misled belief that, unlike the second 
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adaptation, the first adaptation only narrates the early parts of the novel which focusing on 
the making of Srintil into an erotic dancer, and ignores the latter parts where she encounters 
the PKI. The fact is that the first book, on which the first adaptation was based, does not have 
any material regarding the PKI, which only appears in the second book, published two years 
after the release of the first adaptation. 
 
Fig. 3. The film poster of Blood and Crown of the Dancer, the film adaptation of Ahmad 
Tohari’s novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk. 
The Dancer was adapted for the second time into a film entitled Sang Penari (also 
translated into The Dancer) by a young and famous director, Ifa Isfansyah. According to 
Isfansyah, the plan to readapt the novel started as early as 2000 with the purchase of the 
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book’s copyright (“Aku”). As highlighted previously, at the time the public were still highly 
politicised and curious to know about forbidden subjects during the military era. For various 
reasons, this plan could only materialise a decade later, when the situation was quite different 
(see 3.1). Nevertheless, this second adaptation makes Ahmad Tohari’s The Dancer practically 
the only Indonesian political novel to have been adapted twice. More importantly, the novel 
was adapted in two different eras in post-independence Indonesia: the military and the civil 
society eras.  
 
Fig. 4. The film poster of The Dancer, the film adaptation of Ahmad Tohari’s Ronggeng 
Dukuh Paruk trilogy. 
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The second adaptation is more politically charged than the first. It follows the spirit of 
the new era: talking about or interrogating the policies and actions of the military regime. As 
with Yazid’s adaptation, Isfansyah’s The Dancer also narrates the making of Srintil as a 
ronggeng. Nevertheless, far from stopping at that point, this serves only as a background to 
the real confrontation. Frustrated by Srintil’s determination to be a ronggeng, Rasus runs 
away from Paruk village and works as an office boy at a local army base, where he befriends 
and wins the trust of Sergeant Binsar, who teaches him to read and recruits him as a soldier. 
Meanwhile, the villagers of Paruk begin to support the PKI under Bakar's influence despite 
their ignorance of politics. Following the failed coup in the capital, Srintil is seized, 
imprisoned in a hidden concentration camp, and raped by a militia man. Rasus hurries back to 
his native village only to find her dagger and Sakum, the blind percussion player. Rasus 
continues his search and arrives at the concentration camp just as Srintil is being transported 
to another camp. Years later, Rasus sees Srintil and Sakum performing in a traditional 
market, and returns her lost dagger.  
In the eyes of film critics, The Dancer is considered a new milestone in the 
Indonesian film history. It secured nine nominations at the 2011 Indonesian Film Festival, 
winning four of them, namely best film, best director, best actress in a leading role, and best 
actress in a supporting role. Kurniasari praises the film’s cast and crew, who are a mixture of 
seasoned film professionals and young talented newcomers. Her final “verdict” on the film is 
that it is “an artistically stunning piece depicting cross-border love, the hardships of rural life 
and the grisly carnage of the bloody September, 1965, massacre” (par. 21). Labodalih 
Sembiring (2011) is no less generous in his praise of Isfansyah’s The Dancer: “critics can 
dissect any movie, but only great films are worthy of deep analysis. As a film that aims to 
shine light on a sliver of national history, “Sang Penari” begs for the audience’s critical eye. 
Itcontains an eye-opening narrative, especially for people who were only ever taught just one 
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side of the story it deals with” (“Gripping” par. 1). Similar to Kurniasari, Sembiring applauds 
the cast, who “relate admirably to the socio-cultural elements that wrap each of an ensemble 
of characters befitting a Shakespearean tragedy” (par. 11).  He also admires the 
cinematography and the art direction, which are “reminiscent of great pictures from 
Indonesian cinema’s golden period” (par. 13).  The aspects of which he disapproves are the 
precarious acting of Priska Nasution and the music. On the contrary, Lisa Siregar, also in 
2011, commends the acting of the leading actress, who is able to speak the local dialect 
naturally in spite of the fact that it is not her mother tongue. Like the previous critics, she also 
compliments the cinematography of the film. 
The adaptation has received a warm welcome from the author of the novel as well as 
film critics. In stark contrast to his reaction to Blood and Crown of the Dancer, the author 
asserts:  
“Ifa has succeeded in grasping the spirit of the novel,” . . .. The bespectacled 
man even confessed that Ifa had made him cry with scenes that exposed the 
mass killing of innocents by the military because of their alleged connection 
with communism. (Krismantari, “Return” par. 6-7) 
Kurniasari states in another report: 
This time, the flick has the author practically weeping with joy. A big smile 
finally flashes on his face, and he says he considers it a sublime adaptation of 
his writing, without losing the heart and soul of the core idea. 
Tohari gave Sang Penari positive remarks, saying that the movie really 
represented the idea of his novel. (“Ronggeng” par. 4 & 20)  
Besides his positive response, what is fairly interesting in the reports above is the fact that 
Tohari does not applaud the film because it is a faithful adaptation of his novel, in the sense 
of what Geoffrey Wagner in The Novel and The Cinema (1975) calls “transposition, in which 
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[the] novel is given directly on the screen, with a minimum of apparent interference” (222). It 
is agreeable to Tohari because it “grasps the spirit of the novel”; it is “a sublime adaptation”, 
“represent[ing] the idea of the novel”.  
Echoing Tohari, the critics jointly praise the indirect adaptation of the novel for the 
second film. Kurniasari highlights the achievement of the director who “smoothly translates 
the sinister moment and the vicious attempts taken by the military in handling possible 
traitors, sending a swift quiver to your spine, emotionally scrambling your heart when all 
contentment and tranquillity in the hamlet are gone in a blink of an eye” (“Ronggeng” par. 
19). Sembiring defends Isfansyah’s omissions of several unimportant details in the novel and 
points out how the film pays attention to more crucial details:  
Historians may be disappointed with several unsubstantiated details 
surrounding the introduction, the sway and the obliteration of the Communist 
Party in this film — for example, the missing significance of a caping hijau, or 
green peasant hat, in a major scene at Eyang Secamenggala’s tomb. 
But Indonesians as a whole should be grateful that a movie that pays minute 
attention to the circumstances surrounding the 1965 killings has finally been 
made. That some teenagers who were laughing and giggling at the beginning 
of the film left the theater with a puzzled look, and started small discussions, is 
surely a good sign. (“Gripping” par. 14-5)  
Siregar considers the adaptation successful in keeping with the main theme of the novel i.e.  
“about normal people who are naive about the country’s complex political situation” 
(“Dancing” par. 17). However, this time she gives the credit to the screenwriter Salman 
Aristo, who:  
went through 12 drafts for ‘Sang Penari’ before settling on a plot, a process 
that took about two years of research and discussions.  
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“This is a rural point of view about the 30 September Movement, and I had to 
make a few changes from the book to support this perspective,” Salman said. 
(par. 18-9)  
The only dissenting opinion on the adaptation comes from Rz Soebagyo (2011): 
If there is a small weakness, it is because the film is an interpretation of the 
director on the novel. Those who have not read the book version will be 
confused in following the scenes which change so fast with no 
complementary, explanatory scenes.  
Those who have read the book will protest because Ifa has made changes in 
his film so that it deviates slightly from the novel.  
"In the last part of the film it is written that the film is “inspired by The Dancer 
the novel”, so I am not filming the novel but am taking inspiration from it” 
explained Ifa. (par. 23-5, my trans.) 
It appears that the director understands ‘the danger’ in filming such a well-respected novel. 
Calling his film an inspired work rather than a work of adaptation could be his effort to avoid 
questions regarding its fidelity from the public and the media. His understanding of this 
danger is also shared by the screenwriter, who does not miss his opportunity to express his 
admiration for the novel. Aristo states “[t]his novel is a brave one . . . It is important not only 
for Indonesian literature, but also for our history” (Siregar, “Dancing” par. 20). 
Furthermore, the critics also praise the second adaptation for its portrayal of the 1965-
6 massacre. While the novel describes the massacre only implicitly and the first adaptation 
avoided it altogether, the second film makes the tragedy of 1965-6 the centre of its narrative 
and narration. In Sembiring’s account:  
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That the book addresses the events of 1965, no matter how curtailed, is in 
every respect courageous, but the film goes further, revealing the horror that 
Ahmad witnessed but could not write about . . . 
Few other films have even dared take on that content, either misrepresenting or 
ignoring the massacres and contributing to a conspicuous void in the national 
dialogue. [The Dancer] could have done the same and stayed true to the book 
by only offering mere glimpses of what really happened, but the movie’s fresh 
story line was adapted with a sharp eye. (“Gripping” par. 3-4) 
Ahmad Tohari himself acknowledges the courage of the film director: “I like that this film 
visualizes what the poor were going through, and it shows the killings I witnessed at the time 
but couldn’t write about in my novel” (Siregar, “Dancing” par. 3). Yet, he does not forget to 
highlight the context in which his novel was written: “[The Dancer] was first published in the 
1980s, when Suharto’s anti-communist New Order regime was still in power. Had I written 
about the killings, I probably would have been shot by Suharto” (par. 4). 
Although the film has garnered much attention from film critics and the media, it has 
not fared well in the market. According to Yan Wijaya, a senior observer of Indonesian films, 
by December 2011, the film had been watched by less than 300,000 people, which is a small 
number even by Indonesian standards, despite the awards and the media’s attention (Fahrul). 
It was surpassed easily by its contemporary Arwah Goyang Kerawang (Karawang Dancing 
Spirit, 2011), which drew more than 720,000 people and resembles Blood and Crown of the 
Dancer in its alleged focus on sex and sexuality. Furthermore, the number and variety of 
studies on the film are much less than expected.  The critiques that I have just reviewed are 
all from the most respected newspapers in the nation but only two pieces of academic writing 
have so far been identified. Lucky Prahesti, in 2013, investigates the changes in the intrinsic 
properties (theme, characterisation, plot, and setting) of the narrative in the adaptation of the 
29 
 
novel to the script of the second film adaptation. Ariel Heryanto, in Identity and Pleasure: 
The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture (2014), calls this film “a domestically produced 
commercial film that poses the most politically critical stance to the official ideology so far” 
while it “does not take the next step of challenging or transcending the New Order’s overall 
ideological framework” (102). Heryanto makes an honourable mention of The Dancer rather 
than discussing it as a key work in his investigation of Indonesian screen culture.  
 
Fig. 5. The new book cover of the Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk trilogy, following the screening of 
Isfansyah’s The Dancer. 
Taken together, Ahmad Tohari’s The Dancer and its film adaptations occupy a unique 
position in the history of Indonesian literature and cinema. The novel is set in the early 
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independence era, written and first adapted in the succeeding military period, and adapted 
once again in the current post-military time, thus covering all the eras in the post-
independence Indonesia. Moreover, the book and the films encapsulate the long, internal 
struggles between the military and civil society, which are typical in post-colonial nations but 
still wanting in post-colonial criticism. Together they also reflect the longstanding issue in the 
history of the country and the history of Indonesian literature and cinema: the practices of 
depoliticisation (usually associated with the government’s political opression) and 
politicisation (the civil society’s attempts to promote political issues). This important issue 
has not been properly addressed in the existing literature on the novel and the adaptations, 
adaptation studies, and post-colonial studies. In the following section, I will discuss the issue 
of depoliticisation and politicisation further under the guidance of relevant theories. 
 
0.3 Depoliticisation/Repoliticisation  
Power relations between military regimes and civil societies in post-colonial countries 
regularly involve what political scientists term ‘depoliticisation’ and ‘repoliticisation’. There 
have been numerous definitions of these political processes and some are rather conflicting 
due to different applications in different eras. Writing in 1992, Jacques Ranciere states that 
“depoliticisation is the oldest task in politics” (19) and politics is basically a competition 
between two essential activities: depoliticising and repoliticising. Matthew Flinders and Matt 
Wood, in “Depoliticisation, Governance and the State” (2014), define depoliticisation as 
“attempts to stifle or diffuse conflict” and repoliticisation as “the emergence and 
intensification of friend-enemy conflict” (139). Depoliticisation and repoliticisation apply to 
both obviously politically biased arenas (such as state, governance, and parties) and 
ostensibly politically neutral realms (such as culture, literature, and cinema).  
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Flinders and Woods observe that scholars in the past have associated depoliticisation 
with “the denial of politics or the imposition of a specific (and highly politicised) model of 
statecraft” (136). It may represent the general political situations in post-colonial communist 
countries such as Cuba, North Korea, and China, where people have been denied political 
choices and voices. The governments typically impose a single political belief, party, and 
governance, that is, Communism. Ironically, post-colonial anti-communist countries, mostly 
governed by military regimes, have also implemented the same authoritarian approach, such 
as Chile (1973-1990), Taiwan (1949-1987), and Indonesia (1966-1998) (Hadenius and 
Theorel). The difference is that in the latter countries anti-communism became the main 
political line. Here conflicts were discouraged and even repressed with coercion because they 
were considered communistic and/or the enemy of ‘stability’. Within this perspective, 
repoliticisation, as the anti-thesis of depoliticisation, refers to the re-allowance and 
encouragement of politics and multi models of statecraft. Conflicts are seen as a healthy part 
of life and therefore are encouraged rather than discouraged. Repoliticisation typically takes 
place when the civil societies try to free or have successfully liberated themselves from the 
authoritarian regimes. 
Nevertheless, more and more scholars these days associate depoliticisation with “the 
narrowing of the boundaries of democratic politics”; “the transfer of functions away from 
elected politicians”; or “the removal of politics” (Flinders and Wood 135-6). The present-day 
depoliticisation is characterised by the transfer of power from democratically elected 
politicians to unelected professionals and technocrats. Policy making and enforcement are no 
longer the exclusive domains of governments and parliaments but are given to and/or shared 
with independent committees, commissions, or boards. Thus, the contemporary 
repoliticisation involves the returning of power from those professionals to politicians and/or 
the returning of political choices to the once professionalised and technicalised domains. The 
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current depoliticisation and repoliticisation are not always enforced by governments on 
people and individuals (top-down) through coercive measures. They can be multi-sources and 
multidirectional, started by any political agents from any political arenas and followed by 
other agents in other arenas. These types of depoliticisation and repoliticisation mainly 
operate through hegemony or soft power, though in some cases are still enforced by violence. 
Yet, this time the violence may come from societies or even individuals as political pressure.  
Typically, the latest depoliticisation gains prominence in advanced democratic 
countries (the old and new empires) but it also resonates in relatively young democracies 
(post-colonial countries). As with nationalism, post-colonial countries, particularly the 
democratic ones such as India, South Korea, and Indonesia, appear to follow the 
depoliticisation trend in the empires. There is a significant amount of literature, particularly 
in Sociology, that links depoliticisation to neo-liberalism and/or neo-colonialism such as the 
works of Robert McChesney (2001), Hans-Martin Jaeger (2007), and John Roberts (2010). 
McChesney defines neoliberalism as “the set of national and international policies that call 
for business domination of all social affairs with minimal countervailing force” (2). To avoid 
internal crises, the old and new empires seek to open new markets in post-colonial countries. 
The soft depoliticisation in post-colonial countries is the latest weapon of the empires to re-
colonise their former colonies because it can effectively overcome political resistance from 
local stakeholders and deregulate economic sectors. McChesney further describes how “the 
combination of neoliberalism and corporate media tends to promote a deep and profound 
depoliticisation” in post-colonial countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (15). As 
with McChesney, Jaeger states that “practices of depoliticization are . . . part of the political 
logic of (neo-) liberal global governance” (257). He concludes that the emerging global civil 
society fails to promote “bottom-up politics to international decision making from outside 
formal political institutions” but actually depoliticises global relations and absorbs them into 
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the existing international system. Meanwhile, Roberts describes how international 
humanitarian programmes turn into a depoliticising tool in the post-colonial countries, that is, 
by neutralising the political struggles of the poor.  As an integral part of neo-liberalism and/or 
neo-colonialism, depoliticisation and its theory should be a valuable addition to the field of 
post-colonial studies.  
As suggested above, depoliticisation is not just a form of statecraft or a technique of 
governing people and individuals. As a matter of fact, that is merely one of the multiple faces 
of depoliticisation that have been identified by Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders in 
“Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental” (2014). Governmental 
depoliticisation refers to “the withdrawal of politicians from the direct control of a vast range 
of functions, and the rise of technocratic forms of governance” (156). It focuses on “the 
transfer of issues from the governmental sphere to the public sphere through the delegation of 
those issues by politicians to arm’s length bodies, judicial structure or technocratic rule-based 
systems that limit discretion” (165). At best, governmental depoliticisation is the tip of an 
iceberg or a recognised symptom of deeper phenomena.  
There is a range of cross-disciplinary literature that focuses on quite different, yet 
equally important, pressures in the wider public and private spheres of society. Wood and 
Flinders call those pressures “societal and discursive depoliticisation” (152). Lois Harder, in 
1996, defines societal depoliticisation as “the process by which the social deliberation 
surrounding a political issue gradually erodes to the extent that . . . the existence of choices 
concerning that issue are no longer debated” (qtd. in Wood and Flinders 159). It also signifies 
the transition of issues from “the public sphere to the private sphere and focuses on the 
existence of choice, capacity deliberation and the shift towards individualised responses to 
collective social challenges” (165). Finally, this type of depoliticisation involves “the roles 
played by the media, special interest groups, and corporations in shifting issues off the 
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agenda of public deliberation” (152). “The ‘speech acts’ of individuals in the private and 
public arenas that make certain issues appear normal or natural” are called discursive 
depoliticisation (Wood and Flinders 152). This occurs when “the debate surrounding an issue 
becomes technocratic, managerial, or disciplined towards a single goal, and hence changed 
content” (161). It also refers to the transfer of issues by means of language and discourse 
from the private sphere to “the realm of necessity in which ‘things just happen’ and 
contingency is absent” (165).  
Wood and Flinders argue that “any analysis of depoliticisation that focuses solely on 
institutions and a narrow concept of ‘the political’ will ultimately produce only largely 
cosmetic or shallow analyses” (152). Social and discursive acts frequently shape and 
reinforce institutional reforms and governmental decisions. The three faces of depoliticisation 
are fluid, interrelated, sometimes mutualistic, and at other times parasitic. In fact, as Greta 
Krippner (2011) contends, “another dimension of depoliticisation is concerned less with the 
social location of decisions than with their content” (146).  
In “Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools” (2006), Matthew Flinders and Jim 
Buller state that the theory of depoliticisation and repoliticisation has penetrated as many as 
13 disciplines (294). The issue has evidently appeared in post-colonial studies, literary 
studies, and film studies, none of which make it into Flinders and Buller’s list. In addition to 
the fact that the list was created ten years ago, another possible reason for this exclusion is 
that the discussions of depoliticisation in those disciplines are rather implicit and sporadic. As 
far as the current study is concerned, there has not been a post-colonial film adaptation study 
that explicitly addresses the issues of depoliticisation and repoliticisation and/or explores 
their intricacies and complexities. A study of this topic might be found wanting not only in 
the particular subject of post-colonial film adaptation but also in the general field of post-
colonial studies.  
35 
 
The most relevant category to the study of literature and film is perhaps the discursive 
type. First of all, it deals with “ideas and languages”, which are the main business of 
literature and film (Wood and Flinders 161). Second, discursive depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation concern with the speech acts or political acts of individuals, which 
automatically include those of authors and filmmakers. Third, literature and cinema are the 
time-proven media to express individual concerns as much as demoting them into normalcy 
or fate. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, they do not stand alone but interrelate with 
governmental and societal ones. Governmental and societal politics have traditionally served 
as the ‘contexts’ for the discursive practices in literary and filmic ‘texts’. In the following 
part, I will discuss the three faces of depoliticisation and repoliticisation and their 
interdependencies in a more detailed manner and relate them to specific Indonesian 
situations, literary works, and films.    
Colin Hay, in Why We Hate Politics (2007), creates a mental model to reveal the 
interdependencies between the three primary forms of depoliticisation and repoliticisation 
(Fig. 6). This model represents the latest understanding of the nature of depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation, which involve not only the displacement and replacement of decisions from 
politicians, but also the exercise of power by non-politicians, including authors and 
filmmakers. 
36 
 
 
Fig. 6. Hay’s model of depoliticisation and politicisation. Source: Hay 79. 
The model above shows that both depoliticisation and repoliticisation operate as a 
mirror-image development across a political arena spectrum. The most basic form of 
politicisation involves promoting an issue from the realm of fate or necessity (“Politicization 
1”). This may involve the questioning of religious taboos or sacrosanct cultural assumptions 
or the finding of scientific and technological research by individuals that were previously 
thought beyond human control. For example, a post-colonial Indonesian author begins to 
challenge the hegemonic notion that civilians are innately inferior and unable to lead 
themselves and are therefore naturally subjugated by the superior military forces. This issue 
becomes further politicised when it develops into a public issue of systemic injustice by the 
military through, for instance, consciousness-raising activities of pro-democracy activists or 
any other groups (“Politicization 2”). The issue eventually moves into the governmental 
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sphere as it becomes the focus of legislative debates, new laws, and governmental processes 
(“Politicization 3”).  
According to Hay, depoliticisation is carried out mainly through a combination of 
delegation (“Depoliticization 1”), privatisation (“Depoliticization 2”), and denial 
(“Depoliticization 3”). Delegation refers to the transfer of functions away from elected 
politicians towards extra-governmental organisations. Political issues or functions are 
transferred to less obvious political actors. One of the best examples from the Indonesian 
post-military era was the transfer of broadcasting authority from government officers to 
independent professionals in the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission in 2002. Privatisation 
involves “a function or issue being displaced from the public (non-governmental sphere) to 
the private sphere” (155). A social issue is demoted into a matter of private/consumer choice. 
In Indonesia, this has been widely represented by a growing discontent and unruliness among 
once-all-powerful soldiers, which the military consistently dismisses as individuals’ acts (see, 
for example, special reports by Liputan 6; Kompas “TNI”). Denial revolves around “placing 
issues back within the realm of fate, and in so doing denying the existence of contingency 
and choice” (155).  It is best represented by the recent ‘overproduction’ of religious novels, 
TV series, and films in Indonesia. One of the common themes in those works is that bad 
individuals and bad actions will eventually be avenged by God, which reflects the frustrations 
of Indonesians with regard to the endless corruption, collusion, and nepotism despite the 
reforms.   
Building on Hay’s model, Wood and Flinders offer an organising perspective of 
depoliticisation (and, correspondingly, repoliticisation) (Table 1). This perspective helps pull 
together an eclectic and often disconnected range of debates and publications on the subject. 
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Table 1 
Wood and Flinders’ Three Faces of Depoliticisation  
 
Source: Wood and Flinders 157.  
The philosophical standpoint of governmental depoliticisation is Weberian in that it 
represents the spirit of Max Weber’s legal-rational bureaucratic model. There are three 
categories of tools of governmental depoliticisation. The first tool is the creation of quasi-
autonomous bodies (bodies, agencies, boards, and commissions) through which the decision 
making is placed at one remove, which has been discussed by, among others, Peter Burnham 
in 2001. Returning to the case of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, although this 
new body is meant to be independent from the interests of the government and capital, its 
commissioners are screened and appointed by the parliament. Political and business interests 
can therefore still influence this commission through their influences in the parliament.  
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The second tool refers to the introduction of new rules and regulations that are set to 
control the government’s influences, as studied by Kenneth Dyson (2005) and John Hasnas 
(2008). In Indonesia’s broadcasting case, it manifests in the amendment of Act No. 24 Year 
1997 (the final year of the Suharto regime) and the introduction of Act No. 32 Year 2002. 
The new act explicitly forbids government officers, parliament members, and judicial 
members (the trias politica) from becoming commissioners of the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission. The studies by Yannis Papadopoulos (2007) and Catherine Needham (2009) 
reveal the third tool, that is, the diffusion of responsibility across a range of interdependent 
actors as a way of blurring the accountability space and distancing their own personal 
responsibility. With the depoliticised broadcasting authority, it is harder to tell the real power 
behind the decisions of the commission.  
The philosophy behind societal depoliticisation can be regarded as Tocquevillian 
because it deals with Alexis de Tocqueville’s concept of engaged/disengaged and 
active/passive citizenship. Due to its wide scope, societal depoliticisation emerges within a 
range of disciplines and sub-fields beyond political science. Wood and Flinders have 
identified three major strands of societal depoliticisation and their corresponding strategies: 
the evolution, role, and capacity of political parties. Several studies, such as that by Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair (2009), reveal the narrowing in the base, scope and activity of political 
parties. Ingolfur Blühdorn, in “The Third Transformation of Democracy” (2007), argues that 
as societal depoliticisation emphasises efficiency, practice, and output, it tends to neglect 
many of the founding ideals and values that inspired the political organisations. In 
Indonesia’s case, the first post-military election was fought by forty-eight political parties, 
which was a fantastic development compared to the three-party system during the military 
era. However, the winning parties have been gradually making it harder for smaller or new 
parties to participate in the subsequent elections. As a result, only twelve parties participated 
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in the last general election in 2014. The number of voters has also consistently declined 
except in the last election for a reason that correlates with ‘valence politics’.    
The second and larger pool of literature on societal depoliticisation is concerned with 
political choices. Depoliticised political parties result in “valence politics, in which electoral 
decisions by the public are increasingly made not on the basis of different political 
ideologies, but on the assessment of individual and party competence vis-à-vis specific issues 
(notably the economy)” (Wood and Flinders 160). A depoliticised democracy is therefore a 
democracy without choices, in which the only decision revolves around who to elect to 
manage a predestined political project. Suk-Fang Sim (2006) and Ana Langer (2010) 
demonstrate how substantive policy debates have generally been replaced by personality-
based debates, depoliticising policies while politicising persona. The latest example in 
Indonesia was the candidacy and eventual election of Joko Widodo as the sixth president of 
the nation in 2014. Jokowi’s popularity was far higher than that of his political party, and his 
candidacy was able not only to increase the vote to his party by thirty percent but also the 
total participation in the legislative election by four percent.  
The third group refers to a more distinctive approach to the issue of societal 
depoliticisation, that is, the analysis of policy failures and blame games. Annika Brändström 
and Sanneke Kuipers, in “From Normal Incidents to Political Crises” (2003), state that 
actions and events in public space become politicised when powerful figures in the society 
successfully portray them as violations of important social values. Political interests increase 
depending upon the success of political actors to “name failures and assign blame” (280), and 
hence “politicise incidents as policy failures” (281). Correspondingly, the depoliticisation of 
political failures occurs when influential actors effectively define those events as a problem 
of the market or the private sphere. This type of societal depoliticisation sheds light on the 
growing influences of many Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Indonesian post-military 
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era. Whenever there are moral scandals in the society, these groups portray them as a serious 
violation of Islamic values and blame them on Liberalism, Communism, and/or Zionism. 
However, when their own members are involved in similar scandals, the groups attribute 
them to ‘irresponsible individuals’ and insist that they do not represent the groups (see, for 
example, Gatra; Kurniawan). A similar tactic has also been carried out by the military, which, 
although no longer in formal power, still wields extensive and strong influences in the 
country. The only difference is that the military blames social unrest consistently and 
particularly on “the latent danger of communism” (Sen, “Language” 210-1; Taufiqurrohman).   
The philosophical spirit of discursive depoliticisation is identified as Gramscian 
because it emphasises radical thinking and the role of language and culture in relation to 
political debates. Analyses of discursive depoliticisation stemmed from radical theoretical 
literature during the post-Cold War period. Radical theories criticise how the dominant ‘anti-
political’ culture transcends the existing political divisions, thereby creating the illusion of 
‘consensus’. Scholars within this approach tend to be social and political theorists who 
challenge Francis Fukuyama’s theory of the end of history (1992) and attempt to highlight the 
continued existence of antagonism, conflict, difference and choice. This can be seen in the 
works of, to name a few, Juergen Habermas (1996), Pierre Bourdieu (2003), and Slavoj Žižek 
(2002). 
The critical theorists are concerned with the fact that depoliticisation has successfully 
demonised politicians and political parties. It is easier to detect the interests of elected 
politicians and political parties than those of unelected professionals and technocrats. 
Professionals and technocrats, in good faith, may believe that they are neutral and following 
best practice in their respective fields whereas they may have been swayed by the dominant 
system and ideology. Furthermore, the critical theorists also analyse how language and a 
careful approach to the framing of issues can make any opposition seem irrational. In 
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contemporary Indonesia, the resistance towards the apolitical culture was carried out by a 
number of left-wing literary circles such as Bumiputera (The Indigenous), Jaringan Kerja 
Kebudayaan Rakyat (People’s Culture Working Network), and Indoprogress. They jointly 
criticised the aesthetic hegemony of the late Cultural Manifesto and its contemporary 
ideological disciples such as Teater Utan Kayu (Utan Kayu Theatre), Komunitas Salihara 
(Salihara Community), and Freedom Institute (see Herlambang, Kekerasan). 
There are at least three dominant strands of analysis in discursive depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation. The first and possibly most obvious strand is on the ideological content of 
political discourse and the use of technical or managerialist language and terminology to 
conceal or deny the subjectivity and contestability of political debates or decisions. This topic 
has been studied by, for example, Laura Jenkins in 2011. The second and related strand of 
research draws upon Habermas’ problematisation of the use of scientific discourse and how 
expertise or scientifically determined solutions have changed the nature of public debate. 
Herbert Haines (1979), for instance, points out how drunkenness is now seen not as a social 
problem but as an illness or ‘addiction’ that can be treated using scientific treatments. At once 
a social problem is demoted to an individual problem, to be treated on a personal rather than 
collective level.  
About Indonesian literature and film, this specific function has been performed much 
less by the use of science, as in the West, than religion. Trending religious novels and films 
regularly portray the rampant poverty or, in a more general sense, the widening gap between 
the haves and the have nots as a fate of individuals instead of a social injustice. This different 
condition might be caused by the fact that science has not penetrated and steered the society 
as significantly as religion. It should be mentioned here, however, that there are a few young 
Indonesian authors who have experimented with scientific discourses in their works, 
particularly Dee Lestari with her novel Supernova: Kesatria, Putri, dan Bintang Jatuh 
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(2001). Lestari’s Supernova has been very well received by young readers, as shown not only 
by the publication of the four sequels but also by the adaptation of the first novel to a film in 
2014.  
In recent years, there has been a distinct pattern of discursive depoliticisation that 
tends to involve the identification of an existential threat that requires emergency executive 
powers. One of the most popular examples is the alleged existence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq, which made America unilaterally go to war. When people accept this kind 
of securitising move, the issue is depoliticised and is considered a ‘security’ issue outside the 
rules of normal politics. This has become the main focus of the studies done by Thierry 
Balzacq (2008) and Mark Salter (2008). As such, security studies often regard the 
repoliticisation of an issue as a form of ‘desecuritisation’, which can be seen, for instance, in 
the work of Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2010). Such an interpretation goes 
against the influential view of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde in Security 
(1998), that securitisation represents a form of hyper-politicisation because it creates 
heightened public attention around a social issue. Wood and Flinders offer a way of 
reconciling these positions through the theory of moral panic and the concept of a ‘folk 
devil’. The creation of an intense political controversy (that is, hyper-politicisation) is a way 
to impose a definitive position that closes down political debate (thereby depoliticising the 
issue). The most important insight from the securitisation debate is, however, “the manner in 
which the discursive depoliticisation must engage with different types of audience that each 
require a specific language type (generally identified as popular, elite, technocratic and 
scientific)” (Wood and Flinders 164). The depoliticising process of securitisation is rarely 
passive or static, but is generally a repetitive process between speaker and audience. This is 
relevant to most cases of discursive depoliticisation, including those in literature and films.  
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Issues of national security still exist in post-military Indonesian novels and films 
although they might not be as prevalent as in the past. The latest perceived security threats 
come from terrorism and local rebellions, particularly in West Papua. Although the military 
forces still treat terrorism and West Papua exclusively as security issues, the majority of 
scholars, novelists, and filmmakers have tried to see these issues and therefore politicise them 
as problems of structural and territorial injustice. Some of the repoliticised cinematic 
examples on West Papua are Denias (2006), Melody Kota Rusa (2010), and Di Timur 
Matahari (2012). The novels are Mawar Hitam Tanpa Akar (2007), Dua Perempuan (2013), 
and Papua Berkisah (2014). With regard to the social injustices behind terrorism, ex-
combatants have produced, to name a few, Demi Allah Aku Jadi Teroris (2009), Kabut Jihad 
(2012), Pedang Rasul (2013). So far, no filmmaker has made a film based on this highly 
sensitive theme.  
Based on the discussion of the theory and practices above, especially the discursive 
type of depoliticisation and repoliticisation, I propose the following working definition of the 
key concepts in the context of adaptation and this research. Depoliticisation can be 
understood as the use of various narrative and semiotic strategies to reinforce silence or 
particular representations in the informing texts and contexts and/or to suppress conflicts or 
new debates in the new media. Conversely, repoliticisation refers to the application of the 
textual strategies to break silence in the informing texts and contexts and/or create different 
representations of issues and characters and new debates in the new platforms. It should be 
noted that I use the plural form of text in the definitions because the adapted text is not 
necessarily the single source of material in the process of adaptation. As it should become 
clearer later, the second film adaptation of The Dancer also incorporates and repoliticises the 
military regime’s propaganda film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (1984). Likewise, the specific 
time and place in which the adaptation is produced are not always the only concern of 
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depoliticisation and repoliticisation. Chapter Three will reveal how the second film 
adaptation depoliticises both the Cultural Islamism of the military era and the post-Islamism 
of the post-military era. Therefore, context is also expressed in plural form in the definitions.    
The theory of depoliticisation and repoliticisation, as just discussed, usefully serves as 
a general framework for the study of post-colonial situations and textual adaptations. It offers 
a general map on how the texts depoliticise or repoliticise issues as well as how they are 
being depoliticised and repoliticised by the respective governments, societies, and 
individuals. However, being a compilation of diverse studies in politics, this theory may not 
be specific/practical enough to operate on the textual level or, in the case of the current 
research, to analyse the literary and cinematic texts. The bridge and tool come from two 
renowned theorists in both political science and adaptation studies: Michel Foucault and 
Pierre Bourdieu. Not only do Foucault and Bourdieu provide the field-tested tools for 
analysing the texts, some of their works also relate closely to, and even inspire, the studies of 
post-colonial contexts.  
Foucault’s theory of discourse will be used extensively in this study because it helps 
define the discursive depoliticisation in the novel, screenplay, and film. It exposes in detail 
how certain issues are repressed and depoliticised in the texts by means of internal and/or 
external mechanisms. As stated earlier, the discursive face is the most relevant type of 
depoliticisation and repoliticisation in studies of literature and cinema. The term ‘discursive’ 
and its root concept of ‘discourse’ have been popularised by Foucault and his works. Deborah 
Lupton (1992) defines discourse as “a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking which can 
be identified in textual and verbal communications, and can also be located in wider social 
structures” (145). In turn, William Hanks, in 1996, construes discourse analysis as “the study 
of language produced in action”, which is highly influenced by non-linguistic factors, not the 
language in isolation. There are several types of discourse analysis but, recently, two have 
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been most influential: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis (FDA). While CDA draws inferences from close attention to the structural and 
linguistic parts of texts, FDA does not pay as much attention to those attributes because, as 
Derek Hook (2001) states, it focuses on “what cannot be said” and “what is impossible or 
unreasonable within a certain discursive location” (12). Discourse analysis should not focus 
merely on “the search for a plenitude of meaning, but rather on a search for the scarcity of 
meaning, with what cannot be said, with what is impossible or unreasonable within a certain 
location” (12). The latter relates closely to the realm of necessity or fate in Hay’s model (Fig. 
6) and Wood and Flinders’ organising perspective of depoliticisation and repoliticisation 
(Table 1).  
In “The Order of Discourse” (1970), Foucault argues that the production of discourse 
in every society is selected, managed, and distributed through ‘inclusions’ (what is said) and 
‘exclusions’ (what is not said). Here I argue that these key processes correspond to, 
respectively, politicisation and depoliticisation, as the former transfers an issue to the realm 
of deliberation while the latter to the realm of fate. Inclusion and exclusion are generally 
controlled by two sides, namely, the exterior (the society) and the interior (the discourse 
itself).  
The external control includes prohibition, opposition between madness and reason, 
and division between truth and falsehood. Prohibition refers to “the taboo on the object of 
speech, and the ritual of circumstances of speech, and the privileged or exclusive right of the 
speaking subject” (Foucault, “Discourse” 52). It is probably the most obvious type of 
exclusion because, as Foucault states, “we know quite well that we do not have the right to 
say everything, that we cannot speak of just anything in any circumstances whatever, and that 
not everyone has the right to speak of anything whatever” (52). He further identifies politics 
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and sexuality as the regions where the social pressures of prohibition are most dominant. In 
his own words:  
at the present time the regions where the grid is tightest, where the black 
squares are most numerous, are those of sexuality and politics; as if discourse, 
far from being that transparent or neutral element in which sexuality is 
disarmed and politics pacified, is in fact one of the places where sexuality and 
politics exercise in a privileged way some of their most formidable powers. 
(52) 
The next external discursive procedure is the opposition between madness and reason. 
Since the Middle Ages, Foucault says, “the madman has been the one whose discourse cannot 
have the same currency as others” (“Discourse” 53). His words are deemed “null and void, 
having neither truth nor importance, and worthless as evidence in law” (53). Conversely, the 
madman’s speech is attributed with strange powers: “the power of uttering a hidden truth, of 
telling the future, of seeing in all naivety what the others’ wisdom cannot perceive” (53). As 
Foucault outlines in History of Madness (1961), as the definition of madness has been 
constantly changing over time, the madman may refer or extend to anyone who does not 
conform with the established logic and common sense at a given time. One of the current 
examples of the madman is perhaps a rock star. He might be lauded for his ingenuity and 
imagination but at the same time he is not taken too seriously by the public, or at least not as 
seriously as men of science and men of politics.      
The third external control is the division between truth and falsehood, which is no less 
historically constituted and ever shifting. It is a by-product of what Foucault called “the will 
to know” which is innate in human beings (“Discourse” 54). He points out how for centuries 
Western literature has grounded itself on constantly changing ‘true’ discourses.  For the sixth-
century Greek poets, for instance, a true discourse was:  
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. . . the one pronounced by men who spoke as of right and according to the 
required ritual; the discourse which dispensed justice and gave everyone his 
share; the discourse which in prophesying the future not only announced what 
was going to happen but helped to make it happen, carrying men’s minds 
along with it and thus weaving itself into the fabric of destiny. (54) 
Yet, just a century later, truth was “displaced from the ritualised, effective and just act of 
enunciation towards the utterance itself, its meaning, its form, its object, and its relation to its 
reference” (54). Fast forward to the modern era, modernism has promoted science with its 
rigorous methodology as the ultimate method to discriminate truth from falsehood. True 
discourses are thus those that ground themselves on the scientific language, which has been 
mentioned in the discussion of the second strand of discursive depoliticisation. Similarly, 
Edward Said observes, in 1983, that “[t]he will to exercise . . . control in society and history 
has also discovered a way to clothe, disguise, rarefy and wrap itself systematically in the 
language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge” (World 216). The 
division between truth and falsehood also rests upon an institutional support; it is 
strengthened as well as renewed by institutional practices such as schooling, publishing, and 
professional associations.  
As Foucault says, “discourses themselves exercise their own control; procedures 
which function rather as principles of classification, of ordering, of distribution” (“Discourse” 
54). Commentary, author, and discipline are the internal mechanisms of discursive control. 
Paraphrasing Foucault, Hook defines commentary as “the discourses based on the major 
foundational narratives of a society and the interchange between these primary texts 
(foundational religious, juridical, literary, and scientific texts) and their derivatives” (9). Each 
form of commentary follows a simple guideline: “each gives the opportunity to say 
something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered” 
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(Foucault, “Discourse” 58). Geoffrey Wagner identifies commentary, “where an original is 
taken and either purposely or inadvertently altered in some respect”, as one of his three 
categories of adaptation (224). 
The second internal control is the author, who Foucault unorthodoxly defines “not, of 
course in the sense of the speaking individual who pronounced or wrote a text, but in the 
sense of a principle of grouping of discourses, conceived as the unity and origin of their 
meanings, as the focus of their conference” (“Discourse” 58). Foucault is less interested in 
authors as ‘special’ individuals than what he calls “author-function” (59). Individual authors 
are not authorities who determine a discourse - they merely function to fulfil the needs of that 
discourse. He points out that there are many discourses that operate without deriving their 
value from their authors, such as everyday remarks, business contracts, and technical 
instructions. Even in discourses where it is a must to attribute things to authors such as 
science, philosophy, and literature, authors merely serve the discourses in different manners 
and roles. For example, starting from the seventeenth century, the function of scientific 
authors has been shifting from giving a guarantee of truthfulness only to “giv[ing] a name to 
a theorem, an effect, an example, a syndrome” (“Discourse” 58). In literary discourses, since 
the same era, authors have been asked to account for the unity, meanings, and connections of 
their writings (hence, forewords, opportunities to meet authors, and book events).  In “What 
is an Author?” (1969), Foucault suggests to critical readers to enquire into not only what 
authors give to discourses but also what discourses give to authors; and, as importantly, not 
only what discourses get from authors but also what authors get from discourses.  
Discipline is the last internal control of Foucauldian inclusion/exclusion. A 
proposition that does not conform to the internal requirements of a certain discipline will be 
marginalised or completely excluded from that discipline. In contrast, an idea that fits the 
requirements will be accepted in that discipline. For instance, from the seventeenth century, 
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for a proposition to belong to the botanical field, it must “deal with the visible structure of the 
plant, the system of its close and distant resemblances or the mechanism of its fluids” 
(Foucault, “Discourse” 60). The loose equivalent of discipline in literature and films might be 
found in the concept of ‘genre’. Although it entails complex and heavy requirements, 
discipline is “a principle which [is] itself relative and mobile; which permits construction” 
(59). To be accorded the status of a political film, in the past a film had to deal with political 
issues/events/figures and/or offer a different political line from the establishment whereas 
now any film can potentially be considered political.  
Robert Young (1995) maintains that Foucault’s works have been a central theoretical 
point for post-colonial analyses. They provide the theoretical basis for the founding text of 
post-colonial theory: Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). Inspired by Foucault, Said argues 
that Orientalism is a discursive construction rather than a body of objective scholarly 
knowledge. It is a form of ideological representation with an indistinct relation to the real 
cultures of the East, and is a system of knowledge about the East but in which the people are 
ironically never allowed or invited to speak. Foucault’s History of Madness serves as a 
founding analytical model for this discursive repression of the East. As he explains in The 
Order of Things (1966), “[t]he history of madness would be the history of the Other—of that 
which, for a given culture, is at once inferior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to 
exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness)” (xxvi).  
It must be noted here, however, that in The History of Sexuality (1976) Foucault 
grows wary about the over-application of inclusion/exclusion as a binary opposition. 
Influenced by Jacques Derrida’s theory of Poststructuralism, he states:  
We must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose 
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not 
imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and 
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excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; 
but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various 
strategies. (100) 
Influenced by Foucault’s new stance along with his own Derridian spirit, Homi Bhabha, in 
“The Other Questions” (1986), criticises Said’s overreliance on the binary opposition 
between the East and the West as well as his attempts to introduce discourses that have been 
suppressed by Orientalism. For Bhaba and Foucault, the attempts constitute a conceptual 
error because every discourse carries its own destabilising power. In Foucault’s words: 
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance, and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, 
but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it. (Sexuality 101)      
Just as hyperpoliticisation can precipitate depoliticisation, inclusion can become a starting 
point for exclusion. Furthermore, Foucault and Said also part company on the question of 
authors. Said, for example, takes the influence of individual authors far more seriously than 
Foucault. He believes that in the case of Orientalism, and “perhaps nowhere else”, individual 
authors are not a mere vessel but the authority of the discourse (23). Individual explorers, 
social historians, philologists, and others who have written on the Oriental world, steer the 
discourse, deciding what is true or false.  
Wood and Flinders’ theory and Foucault’s model resonate well in the field of 
adaptation studies, particularly in the work of Julie Sanders’ Adaptation and Appropriation 
(2006). Juxtaposing the two textual processes, Sanders states that “an adaptation signals a 
relationship with an informing source text or original” while an appropriation does not 
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always indicate or acknowledge this (26). As Wagner suggests three broad categories of 
adaptation, namely transposition, commentary, and analogue, Sanders proposes two broad 
categories for appropriation, embedded text and sustained appropriation. Both adaptation and 
appropriation are parts of the important practice of intertextuality. The concept of 
intertextuality is naturally attributed to Julia Kristeva’s “Word, Dialogue and Novel” (1969), 
which has demonstrated that “all texts invoke and rework other texts in a rich and ever-
evolving cultural mosaic” (Sanders 17). Adaptation and appropriation are also heavily 
influenced by theoretical movements such as Post-Structuralism, Post-Modernism, and Post-
Colonialism.  
In parallel to depoliticisation/repoliticisation and exclusion/inclusion, Sanders argues 
that adaptation and appropriation are “frequently, if not inevitably, political acts” (95). The 
academic studies of these processes have, in part, been encouraged by “the recognised ability 
of adaptation to respond or write back to an informing original from a new or revised political 
and cultural position, and by the capacity of appropriations to highlight troubling gaps, 
absences, and silences within the canonical texts to which they refer” (98). As discussed 
earlier, they are all the main concerns of the FDA. Furthermore, many appropriations have “a 
joint political and literary investment in giving voice to those characters or subject-positions 
they perceive to have been oppressed or repressed in the original” (98). With regard to Post-
Colonialism, which is the concern of the current study, Gayatri Spivak argues, in 1990, that it 
is intrinsically appropriative because “in post-coloniality, every metropolitan definition is 
dislodged. The general mode for the post-colonial is citation, re-inscription, re-routing the 
historical” (“Reading” 41).  
Using Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) and J.M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), Sanders 
demonstrates how appropriation can provide a non-white character from a canonical work of 
colonial literature with a powerful history and a voice. Rhys writes back to Charlotte Bronte’s 
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Jane Eyre (1847) by giving a voice to and telling the story of Bertha Rochester, the creole 
madwoman in the attic, who is supressed in the original story. This writing back reveals that 
“for all the liberatory potential Brontë represents in her identity as a published female author, 
she remained in her political attitudes a product of an imperial culture” (Sanders 103). 
Appropriating Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), Coetzee is aware that history is often 
an imperial narrative in which the voices of those defeated by colonialism are frequently 
silenced. In Foe, he revisits the story of Friday, the Caribbean native, who shares that 
castaway experience but whose voice is entirely silenced in the original story. In contrast to 
Rhys’s desire to give Bertha a voice in Wide Sargasso Sea, Coetzee maintains Friday’s 
silence until the end of his novel. In the ending of Foe, the narrator enters a London property 
and finds Foe, presumably dead, in a bed and Friday barely alive in an alcove. Pressing his 
ear close to the door, the narrator hears an inexplicable set of noises emanating from behind 
it: “From his mouth, without a breath, issue the sounds of the island” (Coetzee 154). Friday 
now becomes “a semantic signifier of the island, and all that was suppressed, oppressed, or 
repressed in Defoe’s master text” (Sanders 112).  
As Foucault’s 1978 study of the repressive Victorian discourse on sexuality indicates, 
the process of revisiting can be a potentially liberatory movement as well as merely recursive. 
In Sander’s words: “counter-discourses, in seeking to challenge the values on which a canon 
is established, cannot help but re-inscribe the canon” (105). Just as Post-Colonialism, by its 
very designation of being post-, depends on an understanding of the operations of colonialism 
to derive its full force as a movement, so Wide Sargasso Sea and Foe are forever tied to the 
texts they seek to rewrite. Yet, as these novels do this in new and critical ways, they have 
become canonical in their own right. 
Sander’s division of adaptation and appropriation is based on degrees of intentionality 
or on the way a film presents itself. As the theory of depoliticisation has shown, there are 
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powerful factors other than simply individual novelists and filmmakers with political 
motivations. Additionally, as the current study will show, there is no reason why an 
adaptation cannot have what Sanders calls “the capacity of appropriations” or why an 
appropriation cannot perform “the recognised ability of adaptation” (98). Furthermore, as 
with many other post-colonial analyses, Sander’s post-colonialism seems to continue the 
homogenising, binary opposition of the East and West, which the current study wishes to 
avoid, if not challenge. 
Although Bourdieu’s works are not widely revered in post-colonial studies, Julian Go 
in Decolonizing Bourdieu (2013) argues that his early work on Algeria entails “insights on 
the limits and promises of colonial reform, anticolonial revolution, and post-colonial 
liberation” (49). The works of Bourdieu that are most relevant to the discussion of 
depoliticisation and repoliticisation are “The Forms of Capital” (1983), Language and 
Symbolic Power (1991), and Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2 (2003). In 
“The Forms of Capital”, Bourdieu expands and revolutionises the concept of capital, which 
was traditionally understood and propagated by classic Marxist scholars as an economic 
power. He contends that it is not possible to grasp the constellation and mechanism of the 
world unless one understands capital in all its manifestations. Depending on the fields and 
transformations, capital can manifest itself in three basic ways:  
as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money 
and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, 
which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be 
institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social 
capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in 
certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the 
forms of a title of nobility. (Bourdieu, “Forms” 243)  
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Furthermore, cultural capital presents itself in three forms, the first of which is “the embodied 
state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” such as intelligence, 
knowledge, and skill (243). This cultural capital sometimes combines “the prestige of innate 
property with the merits of acquisition” (245). The second form is the objectified state, which 
usually manifests in cultural goods (such as paintings, books, dictionaries, and machines). 
The institutionalised state is the third type of cultural capital and traditionally refers to 
academic credentials as bestowed by academic institutions.  
 Cultural capital can further function as Bourdieu what calls “symbolic capital”, that is, 
it can be recognised as competence rather than capital in culture, with art collections and/or 
cultural foundations, as well as in social life, with generosity and gift. In Language and 
Symbolic Power, Bourdieu expands his discussion of symbolic capital to the language field. 
He argues that linguistic utterances or expressions should be seen as the product of the 
relations between a “linguistic market” and “linguistic habitus” (37). When people use 
language in a certain manner, they deploy their accumulated linguistic resources (the 
linguistic habitus) and adjust their discourses to the demands of the society and market that 
are his audience (the linguistic market). Thus, every linguistic interaction, however private or 
unimportant it may appear, has the traces of the societal construction that it both represents 
and helps to reproduce. 
Other forms of capital may be acquired through economic capital, but only after an 
enormous effort at transformation, which is required to create the kind of power that is 
effective in the new arena (Bourdieu, “Forms”). Indeed, there are many goods and services 
that money can easily buy. Others, however, can only be obtained through a social capital of 
relationships, which takes a subtle approach lest it is considered a false relationship. Different 
from economic exchange, social exchange is ambiguous, involving misrecognition of the true 
economic intent as well as self-deception. Conversions from one capital type to another 
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cannot be fully grasped unless two opposing but equally biased perspectives are overcome. 
The first view is “economism”, which believes that every type of capital is reducible to 
economic capital and tends to ignore the particularities of the other forms of capital (252). 
The second perspective is “semiologism (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic 
interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduces social relations to mere phenomena of 
communication” (253). Semiologism often overlooks the brutal fact that many actions, if not 
all, are motivated by economic interests. 
The relevance of Bourdieu’s account of capital for the current study is particularly 
strong. For one thing, the theory of capital can help explain the underlying factors behind 
adaptation. Filmmakers often adapt literary works due to the cultural status of literature 
(cultural capital), economic rewards (economic capital), and social acceptance in cultural 
elites (social capital). More importantly, the transformation of one form of capital to another 
embodies and, therefore, helps clarify further the process of depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation. The conversion of economic capital to cultural capital, for example, is 
remarkably similar to the practice of depoliticisation. When economic capital transforms into 
cultural and, further, symbolic capital, it is no longer seen as capital (acquired, unnatural, 
transformative) but as competence (innate, natural, long-lasting). As far as the thesis is 
concerned, this sheds a light on the everlasting hegemony of the military in Indonesia and its 
cultural products (including film adaptations) inspite of the 1998 reform. Conversely, the 
conversion of cultural capital to economic capital frequently invites condemnation, criticism, 
and debates, which is the essence of repoliticisation, that is, “the re-emergence or 
intensification of friend-enemy conflicts” (Flinders and Wood 139). This helps explain the 
critical and commercial failure of overtly commercial adaptations of critically successful 
novels like Blood and Crown of the Dancer.  
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Finally, the theory of capital helps explain the socio-cultural elements in the stories 
themselves. It would be hard, for instance, for non-Javanese readers and audiences to 
understand fully the importance of the dancer, the head of the dancing troupe, the leader of 
the community in Javanese society without the assistance from this theory. 
The theory of capital has inspired scholars of adaptation studies, although none, in my 
view, has discussed it comprehensively. Linda Hutcheon, in her seminal work A Theory of 
Adaptation (2006), enlists cultural capital as one the four main motives for adaptation. In her 
own words: “given the perceived hierarchy of the arts and therefore media . . . one way to 
gain respectability or increase cultural capital is for an adaptation to be upwardly mobile” 
(91). Unfortunately, Hutcheon does not go further with the other types of capital and their 
conversions although they could have enlightened her discussion on both cultural capital and 
the other motives for adaptation. They could have explained, for instance, what she sees as “a 
sort of reverse form of cultural capital accreditation [in which] classical music performers 
sometimes aspire to become popular entertainers” (91). “The economic lures”, her first 
proposed motive for adaptation, are also closely related to economic capital as well as the 
conversion from cultural capital to economic capital (86).    
Despite several diffences, the three theories previously discussed are highly 
compatible and even complementary. As implied in his concept of author-function, Foucault 
is more interested in the question of ‘how’ power functions in the society and texts than that 
of ‘who’ has, gets, or uses the power. In Discipline and Punish (1975), he argues that power 
is neither a possession nor a capacity of individuals or groups; it is not a commodity that can 
be bought and/or taken. Instead, it runs through the entire social organism and is exercised 
through extensive and productive networks. On the contrary, Wood and Flinders have shown 
that there are active, powerful agents who depoliticise or repoliticise an issue/function. 
Bourdieu’s theory describes several resources of power and at the same time reveals that 
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power can be possessed by individuals. However, these differences should be seen as a matter 
of focus. The three concepts are compatible because all of them operate far from the 
traditional concept of power by offering the microanalysis of power. Power is mutually seen 
as dispersed throughout all areas of life, not just economy and politics. As Douglas Kellner 
argues, “we are currently in a transitional non-synchronic social situation in which we live in 
many worlds at once, and thus need a multiplicity of viewpoints to make sense out of various 
domains of our social experience” (142). Therefore, sometimes we still encounter the 
accumulation and concealment of power, as Bourdieu as well as Wood and Flinders portray; 
“at other times we are confronted with the more subtle forms of disciplinary or normalising 
power or the panoptic powers of surveillance which Foucault describes so well” (142).  
 
0.4 The Research   
To sum up the whole discussion and at the same time provide a setting for the current 
research, this introduction has identified a series of shortcomings in the field of post-colonial 
film adaptation, namely the underrepresentation of non-British former colonies, the 
underexposure of domestic conflicts in post-colonial countries, and the absence of theoretical 
approaches to those tensions other than ‘the failure of nationalism’. To fill these gaps, the 
current study attempts to analyse the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in post-colonial 
Indonesian film adaptations, focusing primarily on Blood and Crown of the Dancer and The 
Dancer, the two adaptations of Ahmad Tohari’s novel The Dancer. In particular, the study 
aims to answer the following overarching questions:  
1. What are depoliticised or politicised in the novel and adaptations? How are they 
done?  
2. Why are they depoliticised or politicised?  
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3. Who are involved in the depoliticisation and politicisation in the texts? What do 
they gain or lose from them?  
4. How do the readers/spectators respond to the depoliticisation and politicisation in 
the texts? 
The questions above deal with, respectively, the texts, contexts, subjects, and 
readers/spectators of the novel and adaptations, following rather loosely the structure of 
analysis proposed by Linda Hutcheon (2006). The texts here include the content and the form 
of the novel and the adaptations or, to be more precise, their narratives and narrations, which 
Brian McFarlane (2007) defines, respectively, as “a series of events, sequentially and/or 
consequentially connected by virtue of their involving a continuing set of characters” and “all 
the means by which the narrative has been put before reader or viewer” (19). The contexts in 
this thesis cover the domestic and global political and economic situations, the literary/film 
communities and the religious/political groups, and the dominant ideologies and the 
influential novels/films during the military and post-military eras in Indonesia. The subjects 
represent not only the novelist and the filmmakers but also the producers, screenwriters, 
casts, and crew. Due to the time constraints for a proper study of reception and the lack of 
documented fan culture in Indonesian literature and cinema, the readers/spectators in this 
study refer mainly to the critical and academic audiences of the book and and the films.  
The research’s inclusion and expansion of the contexts and the subjects will draw 
attention to the rather neglected areas in most studies of film adaptation. As Deborah 
Cartmell and Imelda Whelehan state, in 2007: 
extra-cinematic factors (current trends, historical events) are vital to film 
adaptations but are curiously absent from most studies of the subject. 
Production values, technological changes, commercial considerations – in 
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short, the film and television industries themselves – are a sixth and vital 
dimension of literature on screen studies. (“Synoptic” 4) 
A similar yet more optimistic call has been made by Cartmell in her latest article “Adaptation 
as Exploitation” (2017): 
The most exciting work in adaptations studies, I believe, is taking a historical 
turn, looking at how adaptations are shaped by the period in which they are 
produced and how they define their audiences, through production, marketing 
and other commercial pressures. 
To answer the research questions above, the study proposes the following research 
objectives: 1) to identify the discursive depoliticisation and politicisation in the novel and its 
adaptations; 2) to explore the contexts in which those works were respectively produced, in 
relation to the governmental, societal, and discursive depoliticisation and politicisation within 
and beyond the country; 3) to investigate the backgrounds of the subjects and their strategies 
in dealing with those external factors in the writing and production of the novel and the 
adaptations; and finally 4) to determine the impacts of the depoliticisation and politicisation 
on the readers and spectators. 
In terms of contribution to knowledge, the study will give insight from a largely 
unknown former Dutch colony into post-colonial studies and demonstrate that ‘post-
colonialism’ should not necessarily mean the overstretched conflict between the East and the 
West. It addresses the conflicts between the military and civil society and the longstanding 
issue of depoliticisation, which are prevalent in post-colonial nations but still lacking in post-
colonial criticism. With regard to post-colonial adaptation, the thesis will deepen the 
understanding of the political dimensions of adaptations directed at non-Western consumers. 
Although this research is situated within the field of post-colonial adaptation, it also attempts 
to respond to the broader need for sensitive, multifaceted political approaches in adaptation 
61 
 
studies. In addition to the theory of depoliticisation and repoliticisation, the study is 
supported by the Foucauldian principle of discourse and the Bourdieusian account of capitals. 
Indeed, depoliticisation, repression, and capital have been mentioned in passing, separately, 
and respectively by Krishna Sen, Linda Hutcheon, and Julie Sanders in their politically-
charged works but they are all not yet explored in a thorough, unified manner. The 
integration of these transdiciplinary theories will contribute a dynamic and comprehensive 
political approach to film adaptations as it captures the discursive depoliticisation and 
politicisation in the texts as well as the interrelated governmental, societal, and personal 
factors in adaptation. Finally, the inclusion of the transcultural elements in this study of 
Indonesian adaptations (as indicated by the phrase “beyond the country” in one of the 
research objectives) will not only counterbalance the unwanted ultra-nationalistic sentiment 
but also enrich the discussion of the interaction between intracultural and intercultural 
elements and textual questions still wanting in the field of adaptation.  
The thesis is divided into five chapters including the current Introduction which 
explores the various areas of critical work relevant to my investigation of depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation in post-colonial Indonesian adaptations and how my thesis will build upon 
them. The following chapters are structured by the texts and, therefore, chronologically: the 
novel (1982), the first adaptation (1983), and the second adaptation (2011). They respectively 
make Chapter One, Chapter Two, and Chapter Three. The reason why I structure them as 
such is that this thesis discusses three different media: a novel, a screenplay, and a film. It is 
not possible to discuss them all in one chapter using point-by-point comparison without 
sacrificing important elements unique to each medium. In addition, the chronological 
structure may help the readers to understand the historical contexts, which are no less central 
in this study, more easily. 
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Each chapter consists of two parts, that is, the exposition of the contexts and the 
analysis of the texts. Each part is equally examined from the point of view of depoliticisation 
and repoliticisation. The first parts rely heavily on the governmental, societal, and discursive 
depoliticisation and politicisation while the second mainly the discursive one. In most cases, 
the investigations of the contexts can be as extensive as the discussions of the texts as I am 
aware that that non-Indonesian readers, the target readers of this thesis, are still unfamiliar 
with the country and its literature and cinema. The contexts expositions generally consist of 
the general political and economic overviews, dominant discourses in literature and cinema, 
and influential literary/film institutions in the military and post-military eras. Typically, each 
text analysis takes into account the narrative and and the narration of the text. They are 
further supported by the discussions of the subjects and specific contexts (reinforcement or 
supplement of what I already described earlier in the expositions of the contexts).  
There are inevitable structural differences between one discussion of the contexts and 
another due to the data availability and institutional characteristics. I do not, for instance, 
discuss the literary institutions separately from the literary discourses in Chapter One because 
there is not much known about the former to deserve a specific section. The literary 
communities in Indonesia are far less official, regulated, and, therefore, documented than the 
film institutions. While I separate the discussions of the film institutions and cinematic 
discourses in Chapter Two, I deliberately merge them together in Chapter Three. As I 
managed to collect lots of research regarding the film institutions in the military era, I found 
just a few on the film organisations in the post-military period, possibly and understandably, 
because the period is now still on-going and the present-day film institutions are not as 
powerful as they used to be.  
For the reasons of data availability, medium specificity, and effectiveness, the 
structural discrepancies between one text analysis and another are equally inescapable. While 
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I examine the narratives and narrations rather simultaneously in the analyses of the novel and 
the recovered screenplay, I discuss them consecutively in the analysis of the second film 
adaptation because the narration deals with lots of visual language, which will be 
overwhelming if discussed together with the narrative. Regarding the filmmakers and crew, I 
discuss them separately from the discussion of the famous second adaptation in Chapter 
Three but concurrently in Chapter Two because little is known regarding the people of the 
missing film. I conjoin the discussion of the novelist and the novel in Chapter One for a 
slightly different reason. This structure is far more effective because I can relate each unique 
element of the novel to the specific statement of the novelist. In Chapter One and Two, I add 
some specific background information directly into the discussion of the text and the writers. 
As the analyses of the film and filmmakers are already lengthy in Chapter Three, I present the 
specific contexts separately. 
In a nutshell, Chapter One will investigate the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in 
Ahmad Tohari’s novel The Dancer. The investigation will start from the political, economic, 
and aesthetic conditions during the military era (1966-98), that is, the military regime and its 
ideological apparatus enforced the traditional form of depoliticisation and repoliticisation in 
all sectors. Then, I will explore how the novelist skilfully incorporated both depoliticisation 
and repoliticisation in the novel and how he benefitted politically, culturally, and 
commercially from his strategies. Chapter Two will discuss the depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation in the screenplay of Blood and Crown of the Dancer, the first adaptation of 
the novel. I will start my analysis by examining the impacts of the political, commercial, and 
aesthetic demands in the military era on the contemporary film institutions and cinematic 
discourses. In addition, this chapter will suggest the relative position of film adaptations and 
adaptation studies in Indonesia and the reasons why Blood and Crown of the Dancer has been 
marginalised and forgotten, and is now missing. Having set the contexts, I will then analyse 
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how the screenwriters responded to those external pressures, including their use of what I call 
‘double depoliticisation’ in the script. In Chapter Three, I will first survey the political, 
societal, and economic transformations in the post-military era (1998-present) and their 
influences on cinema, all of which began with a strong wave of repoliticisation but ended up 
with a new type of depoliticisation. I will then discuss the outward repoliticisation and the 
hidden depoliticisation in this film and trace them back to the internal factors of the 
filmmakers and crew and the external factors of the government, society, and Hollywood. 
The final chapter will draw upon the entire research, highlighting the original findings of the 
study and identifying its potential and limitations. 
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Chapter One 
The Novel: “The upheaval . . . is narrated elsewhere” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, there have been several political readings of Ahmad 
Tohari’s novel The Dancer (for example, Foulcher; Hoadley; Hellwig). The common line in 
those studies is that they all believe that The Dancer is critical of the tragedy of 1965-6 and 
the rise of the military regime. One of the few dissenting voices comes from Roosa, who 
argues, in response to Hoadley’s book, that the novel is anti-communist and pictures the mass 
killings as an understandable measure of popular self-defence. Using the framework of 
depoliticisation and politicisation, I would argue that The Dancer is 1) critical but largely 
supportive of the military regime, 2) influenced in complex ways by other powers besides the 
government, and 3) more than a novel about the tragedy of 1965-6. I shall begin my argument 
by reviewing the political, economic, and aesthetic contexts in which the novel was written. 
Then, I shall explore how Tohari incorporates both politicisation and depoliticisation in the 
novel and how he negotiates his way through the pressures from the government, market, and 
communities.  
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1.1 Cold War, Military Regime, and Total Depoliticisation 
In this section, I shall review the depoliticisation and politicisation during the military era, 
which serve as the contexts for the writing and publication of the novel. As an outline for the 
review, I shall use Pancasila or the Five Fundamental Principles of the nation. The first 
reason for this is that the military regime was built on a grand promise that it existed as a total 
correction towards the violation of these principles by the Sukarno regime. The new regime 
prided itself on implementing the Five Principles and the 1945 constitution (as its derivative) 
‘secara murni dan konsekuen’ (purely and accordingly). The military’s depoliticisation and 
politicisation were mainly carried out under that pretext.  
The Five Fundamental Principles are: 
1. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in the One and Only God) 
2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (Just and civilized humanity) 
3. Persatuan Indonesia (The unity of Indonesia) 
4. Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan 
perwakilan (Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among 
representatives) 
5. Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social justice for all of the  
people of Indonesia)  
Each of the principles refers to a specific area of state-subject affairs, respectively, religion, 
humanity, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. Each of the areas was largely freed 
from the social and individual deliberations, controlled in diverse manners by the military 
regime, and at times pulled into the realm of fate, leaving the social and private arenas 
thoroughly depoliticised. This fits Wood and Flinders’ description of traditional 
depoliticisation in which the government enforces “the denial of politics or the imposition of 
a specific (and highly politicised) model of statecraft” (136).  
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Fig. 7. President Sukarno and his successor General Suharto. 
Belief in the One and Only God: To begin with, the military regime under General 
Suharto accused the Sukarno administration of betraying the first principle of belief in God 
because Sukarno allowed the existence and growth of the atheistic Indonesian Communist 
Party or the PKI. This was by far the most effective accusation that the military regime ever 
mounted against the Sukarno government and the PKI. As highlighted by Roosa in Pretext 
for Mass Murder (2006), in 1965 the PKI was the third largest communist party in the world 
after China and Russia and arguably the strongest and largest political party in Indonesia. If 
there was one reservation that religious Indonesians still had about the popular party, it was in 
regard to the party’s atheistic ideology. The PKI understood this political liability only too 
well and consistently projected to the public its secularistic position. Its political opponents, 
including the army, however, regularly warned the public about the party’s atheism.  
When the army and religious organisations began eliminating the PKI after the 
allegedly communist-inspired coup on 01 October 1965, there were widespread rumours 
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about how the ‘ungodly’ Communists had tortured and killed the military generals (Heryanto, 
Identity). As reported by Hermawan Soelistyo in Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu (2003), the 
rumours were soon followed by allegations that religious leaders would be the next target, 
which immediately provoked the wrath of the religious society. With these rumours, the coup 
was no longer seen simply as a politico-military move but rather as a ‘satanic’ attack. The 
Communists were thus no longer treated as political actors but portrayed as the unbelievers or 
the enemies of God. Seeing how effectively this discursive depoliticisation turned people’s 
sympathy to antipathy, the military regime repeatedly used it to neutralise any left-wing 
tendencies throughout its rule with a high degree of success. So successful was it that this 
satanic association continues to this day and has arguably made the left-wing movements in 
Indonesia incapable of gaining popular support despite their initiatives in toppling Suharto. 
In its thirty-two years of rule, the military regime effectively depoliticised existing 
religions by not allowing them to present themselves as a governmental model, political 
power, and, to some extent, private affair. Starting from 1966, every citizen was required to 
have a religious belief and forbidden not to have one. Even the freedom to have a religion 
was further depoliticised by the government in 1978 through the official acknowledgement of 
only five major religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. If 
people happened to have another belief other than one of these five, they were required to 
choose the ‘closest one’ for the official documentation. Therefore, there were many non-
practising Muslims who called themselves Muslim KTP (the ID-card Muslims) and whom 
Clifford Geertz, in The Religion of Java (1976), famously calls Islam Abangan (the Red 
Muslims). At the same time, political parties were not allowed to state a particular religion as 
their political ideology. Even the Islamic Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United 
Development Party) did not use an Islamic name and state Islam as their official ideology. 
There was only one ideology for every party, that is, the state ideology of the Five Principles.  
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Literature was allowed and, to some extent, encouraged to deal with religious issues 
to counter the imagined danger of atheism. Yet, religion was not to be represented in 
literature as statecraft, a social force, or in some cases an individual choice. It was believed 
that to project one religion as a model of governance and/or a social power might provoke the 
other religions and jeopardise the imposed interreligious harmony. Religion was portrayed 
either as a private affair or a matter of fate. As a private matter, religious stories were to 
address only such themes as inner conflicts inside individuals regarding whether or not to 
carry out a forbidden act in a particular religion. As a result, the storylines of the religious 
literature at the time were rather formulaic and predictable. They normally told of a character 
who broke a religious creed, suffered consequences, and decided to repent. Many times, 
Satan appeared in this individual, spiritual battle, either as an evil whisperer in religious 
dramas or as a scary ghost in horror stories, conveniently pushing the individual affair to the 
supernatural realm.  
There was a notable religious literary movement, comprised, in particular of poets, in 
the 1980s in the city of Yogyakarta, which Aprinus Salam, in 2004, calls ‘sufistic literature’. 
Sufism is the inner, mystical dimension of Islam as opposed to its outer, formal 
representation, which is probably best signified by the Wahabism of Saudi Arabia. Sufism 
and sufistic literature are as old as the presence of Islam itself in Indonesia, and the 
Yogyakarta sufistic literature was a revival of this mystical literary tradition (28). Salam 
argues that the sufistic literature, far from being escapist, was actually a political opposition 
towards both the government and the dominant literary groups in Jakarta. Yogyakarta has 
long been considered the centre of Javanese culture because there exists the last Javanese 
sultanate. While Jakarta epitomises republicanism, modernism, and cosmopolitanism, 
Yogyakarta represents monarchism, traditionalism, and localism. In addition, the sufistic 
literature resembles what Heryanto, in State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: 
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Fatally Belonging (2006, calls “hyper-obedience as subversion”, that is, when people obey 
the government to the extent that it embarrasses the latter (State 135-58). The poets followed 
the government’s depoliticisation of religion to such an extreme that it created a public 
awareness and discourse of the ridiculous extent of the government’s censorship.   
 Just and civilised humanity: Furthermore, the Suharto regime also accused the PKI 
of violating the second principle, “just and civilised humanity”. The torture and killing of the 
military generals by the accused communists again served as a grand example of this 
violation. So important was this narrative that in the early 1980s the regime instructed the 
film production of Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (1984), which graphically pictures the torture 
and killing of the generals (see also 2.1.2). The regime required every student to watch it in 
school or at a theatre (Heryanto, State). This film was also screened on all TV channels on 30 
September every year until the collapse of the regime in 1998. According to a national survey 
cited by Heryanto, ninety seven percent of the respondents stated that they had watched the 
film and eighty seven percent stated that they had watched it more than once. Most believed 
that the story was largely faithful to historical fact.  
 Nevertheless, the military regime itself had a hard time covering its own violations of 
human rights. Whereas the killers of the army generals remain a mystery to this day, the 
killers of the accused communists bragged publicly about their actions mainly because they 
believed that it was a holy war against the unbelievers. The persecutions and killings did not 
stop with the accused communists. As Geoffrey Robinson records in “Rawan is as Rawan 
does” (1998), the New Order regime also put to death thousands of suspected rebels in Aceh 
(from 1976), East Timor (from 1975), and Papua (from 1971). Joshua Barker, in “State of 
Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order” (1998), also reports that 
from 1983-5, the regime kidnapped, murdered, and publicly displayed thousands of suspected 
criminals without trial as a form of “shock therapy” (8). The army’s special forces kidnapped 
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and never released students and pro-democracy activists at the end of the military rule (1997-
1998) (Kontras). 
 The regime usually justified its repression by politicising the actions of its victims and 
at the same time depoliticising its own reactions. It accused its victims of being pihak-pihak 
yang tidak bertanggung jawab (irresponsible political actors) who wished to destroy the 
stability of the nation. The regime also defended its killings in the name of objective law and 
order, which were simultaneously put in contrast with the subjective nature of politics. The 
rebels were militarily destroyed because it was against the law to demand a separation from 
the republic. It shot the suspected criminals without trial because they posed a threat to the 
order. All in all, they used what Wood and Flinders identify as ‘securitisation’, which is a 
distinct pattern of depoliticisation that tends to involve “the identification of an existential 
threat that requires emergency executive powers” (164).  
Another strategy of the regime was to emphasise the importance of the ‘just’ and to 
discount the significance of ‘civilised’ humanity. Torture and killing could be justified so 
long as it was for a ‘just’ cause. What constituted justice was arbitrarily determined by the 
military regime. When it eventually allowed the teaching of human rights in schools and the 
establishment of the National Commission of Human Rights in the 1990s, the government 
ensured that the teaching and the Commission also paid attention to what it called kewajiban 
asasi (human obligations) (see Widjojo and Noorsalim). The regime claimed that western 
countries unjustly overemphasised human rights at the expense of human obligations. 
Accordingly, the regime justified its violations of human rights by claiming that the victims 
had betrayed their human obligations. 
When it came to the literary field, the ruling ideology of the day was Liberal 
Humanism. This was a ‘repackaging’ of Universal Humanism that the anti-communist 
Cultural Manifesto group brought forward to challenge the Socialist Humanism of the left-
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wing People’s Culture Institute at the end of the Sukarno era (Kurniawan, Pramoedya). 
Liberal Humanism claims that it does not subscribe to any religious or political school of 
thought, but to all humanity. This cultural philosophy was held either explicitly or implicitly 
by a number of literary groups and publications. The most influential ones were Horison 
Literary Magazine edited by a number of ex-Cultural Manifesto supporters, who dominated 
the literary scene from 1970-1980, and the Kalam Journal run by the Utan Kayu Community, 
which gained prominence in the 1990s (Herlambang, Kekerasan). The most dominant genres 
of expression at the time were surrealism and, later, (the revival of) realism (Foulcher). As 
Liberal Humanists, these groups, especially the Utan Kayu, were quite critical of the human 
rights violations of the military regime. Yet, they were later considered conciliationist and 
elitist by the returning right and left-wing groups because they seemed to deny the existence 
of the religious depoliticisation and class struggles in the military era.  
The unity of Indonesia: A rather harder case for the military regime was to do with 
the violation of the third principle: “the unity of Indonesia”. Inside and outside the country, 
Sukarno was always associated with his strong nationalism, which unfortunately earned him 
the nickname of ‘Little Hitler’. Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in 1999, says that while the Dutch 
colonial government successfully united the archipelago administratively, Sukarno succeeded 
in making it one political entity almost without bloodshed (Ismail, Chamim, and Zulkifli). 
There were times when Sukarno had to send military forces to subdue separatist movements 
and maintain the territorial integrity of Indonesia (see Kartasasmita). These operations were 
not without atrocities but these were committed in the field by the military forces, and this 
made it awkward for the military regime to highlight the atrocities. Moreover, Suharto 
himself also sent troops to Aceh, Papua, and East Timor to pacify the separatist movements, 
which led to even greater atrocities. It should be noted here that, at least initially, the 
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occupation of Papua and East Timor by Indonesia was backed up by the American Empire 
and Australia in the interest of de-litigation (Vickers; Farid).  
What the military did instead was to blame the economic failure of the Sukarno 
regime as the root cause of the rebellions (see Kartasasmita). By doing so, it rendered the 
rebellions against the Sukarno government understandable, if not commendable. It concealed 
the facts that most of the rebellions in the 1950s were financially and militarily supported by 
the old Dutch and the new American empires (Ricklefs). Not only did the military regime 
forgive the anti-Sukarno rebels, it also recruited their top leaders into the new government 
and placed them in key positions. The rebellions were thus seen as an economic necessity and 
therefore depoliticised. On the other hand, the military government politicised the rebellions 
during its own rule because it claimed that it had succeeded in making the country 
prosperous. Thus, the rebels did not have the same economic urgency and therefore the only 
reason they rebelled must have been political. As a matter of fact, all the rebellions during the 
military era were related to economic and cultural injustices that people outside Java, the 
ruling island, felt deeply (Robinson, “Rawan”).  
It was easier for the military regime to attack the PKI with this issue of unity because, 
aside from the killing of the military general in 1965, this party had been responsible for at 
least two major cases of rebellion since its birth. The first resurrection took place during the 
colonial era (1926) and was recorded in the history as the first modern rebellion against the 
Dutch colonial government. Normally, any kind of disobedience against the colonial 
government would have been deemed as a heroic activity by the Republic although it might 
have been very personal and even criminal by the colonial standard. Yet, the rebellion by the 
PKI against the colonial government was depicted by military historians Nugroho 
Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, in 1993, not only as premature but also as disadvantageous 
because it provoked the colonial government to strangle the infant nationalist movement. The 
74 
 
second rebellion, the Madiun Affair of 1948, took place early in the Sukarno era. Being 
inconsistent, the military did not portray this as an economic necessity as it did with the other 
rebellions during the Sukarno era. The Madiun Affair was framed as a political and military 
betrayal to the young republic, which was still struggling against the return of the Dutch (see 
Kartasasmita).  
The Suharto regime perceived and practised unity as synonymous with uniformity. 
Although it regularly invoked the national slogan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, “Different but One”, 
the regime despised differences and worshipped one-ness. It virtually ‘uniformised’ all 
aspects of life, from the official interpretation of the Five Principles to the colour of students’ 
socks. Culturally, the regime forced the extremely diverse cultural backgrounds into one 
national culture. Niels Mulder, in Inside Indonesian Society: Cultural Change in Java (1996), 
observes that the imagined national culture was an assimilation of other cultures to the 
dominant Javanese culture or ‘Javanisation’. Java had become the centre of governance from 
the colonial era due to its strategic location and number of inhabitants, and the complexity of 
the society. Javanese people were the ruling officers from the colonial era, perhaps only 
second after the Dutch. They were among the first educated natives and were sent to other 
islands to fill colonial administrative positions. Sukarno and other founding fathers, many of 
whom were Javanese, tried to end this colonial practice: by choosing, for example, a variant 
of Malay, instead of Javanese, to be the national language of Indonesia (see Sneddon).  
Suharto also came from a Javanese background and gained cultural capital by 
marrying a princess from the old Javanese kingdom of Mangkunegaran. Suharto disrupted the 
founding fathers’ initiatives of de-Javanisation by revitalising the colonial practice. He filled 
the bureaucracy and military forces with Javanese officers and modelled his governance on 
the Javanese leadership and philosophy (Mulder, Inside). He also sent not only Javanese 
officers to other islands but also hundreds of thousands of Javanese farmers under the 
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program of transmigration. Suharto also employed many Javanese symbols and terminologies 
for the state’s programmes and ceremonies. The separatist movements outside Java were not 
provoked merely by the economic injustice but also by this perceived cultural hegemony. For 
many people outside Java, this was a new type of colonialism, a ‘brown colonialism’.   
The Javanisation also penetrated the realm of literature and the arts. Andries Teeuw, 
in Modern Indonesian Literature (1967), notes that during the colonial and Sukarno eras, the 
literary scene was dominated by authors and poets from Sumatra, the native speakers of 
Malay. Yet, Javanese men of letters began dominating the literary scene in the Suharto era 
due to their physical and philosophical proximity to the power centre as well as better access 
to education and resources. This resulted in the integration of Javanese vocabularies, styles, 
and stories in Indonesian literature (Teuuw). Ahmad Tohari, the author of The Dancer, is an 
excellent representative of this generation of authors. Another strategy of uniformisation in 
literature and the arts was the depoliticisation of literary and artistic communities through the 
formation of a single community of authors and artists from the national to the district levels. 
Dewan Kesenian (Board of Artists) received financial and other support from the government 
but also bore monitoring and interventions. The presence of other communities was 
discouraged, spied on, and even repressed by the regime and its apparatus.  
Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives: The 
Suharto regime then strongly accused the Sukarno regime of violating the fourth principle: 
democracy. Following the failure of the parliamentary democracy (1950-9), Sukarno 
dissolved the parliament and created a provisional legislative body and a cabinet representing 
the diverse political orientations in Indonesia in 1959. Responding to the failure of the 
discharged parliament to create a new constitution, he also decreed a return to the 1945 
constitution and reintroduced a stronger presidential system that he called a guided 
democracy. The guidance naturally came from Sukarno and his popular conceptions, which 
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he claimed to be legitimate interpretations of the Five Principles and the 1945 Constitution. It 
was held as a democracy because it involved all political parties and ideological streams in 
the parliament and the cabinet (Vickers). There was no general election and Sukarno was 
appointed president for life by the provisional parliament.  
During the Suharto era, there was a general election every five year. Nonetheless, as 
described by Stefan Eklof, in Power and Political Culture in Soeharto's Indonesia (2003), the 
winning party and winning candidate had been structurally and systematically pre-designated 
and were made permanent for more than thirty years. In 1973, the regime forced the many 
political parties from the Sukarno era to merge into three parties: Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, Golongan Karya, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic 
Party). They respectively represented the Islamic supporters, the professionals, and the 
nationalists. The designated winner was Golongan Karya, which literally means ‘a group of 
professionals’. This group of professionals officially claimed not to have any political 
ideology and interests but to be building the country professionally, bearing a strong 
resemblance to the societal depoliticisation of the political parties as identified by Katz and 
Mair as well as Blühdorn. The president was not elected directly by the people but by the 
parliament. There was no presidential candidate other than Suharto and all three parties 
unanimously elected him for six terms (32 years). 
In the Suharto democracy, there was no such thing as an opposition party because this 
was condemned as a feature of western liberal democracy. The losers in the general elections 
were not to oppose but to help the winner because the country was like one big family, which 
is another example of the regime’s obsession with one-ness. There was no such thing as 
voting in the parliament because that was also deemed a feature of western liberal democracy 
and against “the wisdom of deliberations among representatives”. When conceived by the 
founding fathers, the principle was meant to encourage Indonesian subjects to ‘strive’ for a 
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consensus but the Suharto regime pushed it further by ‘requiring’ people to reach a consensus 
on any affairs (Vatikiotis). In short, the existence of political elections and parties was a mere 
tool to legitimise the military rule under Suharto. This was the Suharto-styled depoliticisation 
of the social arena. 
On a personal level, individuals were discouraged from becoming formal members of 
a political party, particularly the two non-ruling parties. Although created and steered by the 
military regime, occasionally the parties harboured some individual dissenters. After the 1971 
general election, the government formulated a political concept of a “floating mass” in which 
people were not committed to a political party but focused more on helping the regime 
develop the country (Vatikiotis 94; Eklof 54). Individuals, including authors, were to keep 
their political perspectives to themselves and not voice them publicly because they might 
cause social disorder. The print media were under the supervision of Dewan Pers (the Board 
of Press) and the control of Departemen Penerangan (the Department of Information). 
Literary works were monitored and controlled directly by Kejaksaan Agung (the Office of the 
Attorney General). Editors in media and publishing houses ensured that writers would not 
challenge the government’s politics, or at least not explicitly. Usually, writers would self-
censor their works so as not to provoke trouble with their media/publishers and the 
government.  
Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia: The last violation that the military 
regime accused the Sukarno regime of was social justice. Sukarno and his government were 
proud socialists. In the final years of the Sukarno regime (1958-1965), western companies 
and capitals, especially those that were Dutch-owned, were nationalised and the government 
started to launch a socialistic land reform (Ricklefs). This programme was naturally 
supported by the PKI but opposed by the western powers. During the Sukarno era, western 
media regularly juxtaposed the poverty of common people and the mega projects and the 
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dandy lifestyle of Sukarno. In his 1965 autobiography, Sukarno claimed that the projects and 
his lifestyle were to bluff and deter the colonial and neo-colonial powers from attacking the 
country as well as to give Indonesians pride. Suharto never explicitly accused Sukarno of 
personal corruption because the latter apparently left only modest wealth to his family. Yet, 
Suharto, in his autobiography My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds (1991), implies and dismisses 
it at the same time by uttering an apologetic Javanese saying “mikul dhuwur, mendem jero” 
(lift the good deeds, bury the bad deeds).  
In contrast, the Suharto regime was pro-market or, more precisely, pro his cronies, 
although the regime officially stated that it wisely combined the virtues of both a market and 
a guided economy. Continuing in what was now a familiar pattern, it called this hybrid 
economic system the Five Principles economy. Unlike a pure market economy, the regime 
provided subsidies and protection for people, particularly for their basic needs. Nevertheless, 
the subsidies and protection were not purely used for the benefit of the people but for pre-
empting political protests (Vatikiotis). The subsidies were widely corrupted by government 
officers and politicians at virtually every level of governance. Another dark side of the 
Pancasila economy was that it enabled Suharto to extort investors and private businesses for 
his family, military, and cronies. In the name of nationalism, foreign investors were required 
to recruit local partners, who were none other than his family and cronies. The military forces 
were legally permitted to have businesses with the excuse of improving the welfare of the 
soldiers. As the economy was growing significantly, the disparity between the rich and the 
poor was also widening substantially.  
The military regime denied the irreconcilable political and economic interests of the 
bourgeoisie and the workers. Continuing its obsession with unity, the regime denied the 
existence of classes and class struggles and stated that they were all members of the same 
family and must help each other. Metaphorically, the government was the parents, the 
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business owners were the older children, and the workers were the younger children. 
However, the older siblings apparently exploited the younger siblings, not only with 
indifference to, or permission from, the parents but also with their active help. Whenever the 
younger children protested to the older children, the parents punished the former. Thus, in 
many respects this economic perspective resembled Adolf Hitler’s belief about classless 
working relations. 
In the heyday of the regime (1970s-1980s), social injustices went relatively 
unchecked by the literature. Herlambang, in his 2014 interview, argues that there were only 
three authors who filled the gap, Yudistira Ardi Nugraha, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and 
Ahmad Tohari (“Salihara”). In the early 1990s, the print media began criticising the 
government albeit very implicitly (Heryanto, State). The government’s reaction was as 
expected; it banned three magazines Tempo, Detik, and Editor all at once. Unprecedentedly, 
the media this time fought back by filing a lawsuit against the government, and there were 
solidarity strikes by journalists throughout the country. Although the lawsuit failed, this case 
led to the establishment of Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (the Alliance of Independent 
Journalists) as a counter organisation towards the state’s Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (the 
Indonesian Journalist Organisation), which supported censorship. Seno Gumira Ajidarma, a 
renowned literary author and journalist, made a famous manifesto: “when journalism 
silenced, literature speaks!” This manifesto coincided with if not sparked the return of 
resistance literature in the country. One of the notable figures was a legendary poet Wiji 
Thukul, who was kidnapped and even now has not been found (2017). 
In this sub-chapter, I have reviewed the depoliticisation and politicisation during the 
Suharto era, which served as the context for the writing and publication of The Dancer. The 
regime and its repressive and ideological apparatus surrounded, deterred, and influenced 
many of the affairs of the citizens, including the creative process of literary workers. 
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However, rather than being passive victims, literary authors helped, ignored, and at times 
fought back, as Ahmad Tohari did with The Dancer.  
 
1.2 The Dancer the Novel: Religions, Politics, and Professionalism 
This sub-chapter will present a political reading of Ahmad Tohari’s trilogy Ronggeng Dukuh 
Paruk and its English translation The Dancer. The primary aim of this analysis is to explore 
how the contexts, as exposed in the previous sub-chapter, interact with the narrative and 
language of The Dancer. The Dancer is less a story of an oppressed victim than a narrative of 
power relations and capital between Srintil and the powerfuls. What I mean by the powerfuls 
here are the groups that Srintil encounters in the story, that is, the community of belief, the 
political party, and the civilian/military professionals. With the military professionals being 
omnipresent, the other three groups interact with Srintil in the three parts of the novel, 
respectively, “Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk” (“The Dancer of Paruk Village”), “Lintang Kemukus 
Dini Hari” (“A Shooting Star at Dawn”), and “Jantera Bianglala” (“The Rainbow’s Arc”). 
The power relations in the text signify those between the author, government, market, and 
communities in the Suharto era. Those relations influence the depoliticisation/repoliticisation 
of certain discourses in the text, namely, religion, politics, and professionalism.  
 
1.2.1 The Dancer and the Cultural Islam  
In “The Dancer of Paruk Village”, Srintil is closely involved in power relations with her own 
community in Paruk village. The type of power that the community exerts is what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls “cultural capital”, which signifies “long lasting dispositions of the mind and 
the body” (the embodied state), “cultural goods” (the objectified state), and “educational 
qualifications” (the institutionalised state) (“Forms” 243). In The Dancer, the cultural capital 
is embodied by the elders of the community with their mastery of local traditions and rituals. 
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The first elders are Kartareja and his wife, who are introduced in the early part of the novel as 
“dukun ronggeng”, the leaders of the dancing troupe (Tohari, Ronggeng 16). Kartareja 
possesses what Bourdieu identifies as “the embodied cultural capital . . . [which] combines 
the prestige of innate property with the merits of acquisition” (“Forms” 245). He is believed 
to have the ability to talk with the spirit of Ki Secamenggala, a former bandit and the first 
patriarch of the village, and this kind of quality is seen as ‘innate’ in Javanese society 
(Magnis-Suseno). Nonetheless, due to his long experience, he also acquires the more profane 
skills to train and manage a ronggeng. A similar cultural capital resides in the hands of 
Srintil’s own grandfather Sakarya, a “kamitua” or the leader of the village (Tohari, Ronggeng 
15). He is the direct descendant of Ki Secamenggala and inherits the leadership quality of the 
first patriarch. Yet, at the same time Sakarya has earned the respect of the villagers because 
of his long experience, knowledge, and sense of justice.  
 
Fig. 8. A ronggeng troupe. 
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The politicisation of Kejawen: The elders control the tradition and rituals in Paruk 
village. It is the tradition in Paruk village to have a ronggeng and actively involve her in the 
cultural and spiritual life of the villagers. On the surface, a ronggeng is just a female 
entertainer who sings for, dances (and sometimes sleeps) with, and receives payment from 
her audience. On the other hand, the ronggeng occupies a central position in the spiritual life 
of Paruk (Tohari, Dancer 10-11). No ceremonies, for instance, can be considered spiritually 
acceptable without a performance by a ronggeng and her troupe since only a ronggeng 
dancing can satisfy the spirit of Ki Secamenggala. The fact that Paruk village is experiencing 
a long drought (and other misfortunes) is attributed to the patriarch’s disappointment at the 
long absence of a ronggeng from his dominion. In addition, having a ronggeng can increase 
the socio-cultural prestige of a village in that region (11).  
The problem is that the tradition dictates that the villagers cannot just appoint and 
train any girl to be a ronggeng. It is believed that a ronggeng is not made but chosen by 
indang, a blessing spirit. Little Srintil is believed to be possessed by the spirit for she can sing 
and dance without anyone teaching her (Tohari, Dancer 11). The tradition is reinforced by an 
elaborate set of rituals and ceremonies. To be a full ronggeng, Srintil must undergo three 
rituals: finding a ronggeng kris, a bathing ceremony, and a deflowering ceremony. Kris is a 
Javanese-styled dagger that does not really have a practical function in a real battle but has 
symbolic and spiritual power because it is normally made by a Javanese sage (Yuliandini par. 
11). Srintil receives her kris from Rasus, her childhood boyfriend. It was previously owned 
by Rasus’ father and, according to Kartareja and Sukarya, is part of the long-lost heritage of 
Paruk village. Thus, Srintil now has in her hand the precious objectified cultural capital of 
Paruk. It should be noted that she is portrayed in the novel as passively receiving the kris 
rather than actively searching it out. This underlines once again the effortlessness of the 
chosen one, which is central to the Javanese belief (Magnis-Suseno). 
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The second ceremony is a bathing ritual performed in front of the tomb of Ki 
Secamenggala. Its main purpose is to pay respect to the first ancestor of Paruk village. After 
the bathing has been completed, the village shaman Kartareja is possessed by what Sakarya 
claims to be the spirit of Ki Secamanggala. Accordingly, he declares to the spectators that 
Kartareja’s possession is clear proof that the patriarch has given Srintil his blessings. What 
happens here is what Bourdieu describes as the hereditary transmission of embodied cultural 
capital: 
. . . the initial accumulation of cultural capital, the precondition for the fast, 
easy accumulation of every kind of useful cultural capital, starts at the outset, 
without delay, without wasted time, only for the offspring of families endowed 
with strong cultural capital . . . It follows that the transmission of cultural 
capital is no doubt the best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital. 
(“Forms” 246) 
As Srintil is Sakarya’s only offspring being endowed with the strong cultural capital, it is 
easy for him to publicly legitimise her cultural capital through the possession. It is not 
revealed whether Kartareja merely pretends to prove Srintil’s messianic credential. As 
Bourdieu says, the transformation of cultural capital regularly involves “self-deception” 
(“Forms” 252). There is a possibility that Sakarya and Kartareja are deceiving themselves due 
to the hegemony of the tradition to which they have been subjected.   
The last ceremony is the ritual of Buka Klambu, which literally means ‘opening the 
curtain’. This is by far the most controversial ritual in the novel and it has received a great 
deal of attention from inside and outside the novel (see, for example, Al Ma’ruf; Hellwig; 
Hughes-Freeland). In this ritual, Mr. and Mrs. Kartareja publicly offer the virginity of the 
new ronggeng to anyone who can meet the set price of one gold coin, which is equal to the 
price of a fine water buffalo. As her boyfriend says: “Srintil was born as a ronggeng dancer, a 
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woman who was possessed by all men”, and the ritual symbolises Srintil’s total surrender to 
the public (Tohari, Dancer 51). There are two men who manage to meet the price, namely 
Dower and Sulam. Mrs. Kartareja tricks them, and each pays and thinks that he is the first to 
deflower Srintil. The Kartarejas effectively control and employ Srintil for their economic 
gain so that they have enough money to buy a rice field, which was the most important means 
of production in the then non-industrialised Javanese society. This ‘cashing in’ of cultural 
capital represents what Bourdieu calls “the transubstantiation whereby . . . cultural capital . . . 
is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital” (“Forms” 242). 
Up to this point, the novel pictures Srintil as a passive and innocent object of the 
Paruk elders’ cultural power. Yet, the novel reveals that Little Srintil is genuinely happy and 
proud to be a ronggeng and never considers herself to have been abused and exploited. After 
all, she is seen as the saviour of the village and treated accordingly. Furthermore, this 
seemingly innocent young woman has cleverly given up her virginity to her boyfriend Rasus 
before she sleeps with Dower and Sulam. Therefore, not only does she deceive Sulam and 
Dower, but she also manipulates her grandfather and The Kartarejas. This event marks the 
beginning of her resistance towards her own community as well as showing another 
characteristic of power, that is, the power relation is consistently “multidirectional” (Kelly 
37). It is not always top-down; it can flow from the bottom-up or even in any direction. 
Power relations are not necessarily about the powerful dominating the weak; they can be 
about the weak resisting and winning over the powerful.  
Srintil’s resistance grows stronger as she realises her exploited state and at the same 
time her true power. She begins to understand that the village belongs to her as much as she 
belongs to them. Without her, Kartareja and Sakarya will lose their wealth and power over 
the community. So strong is the admiration of the Paruk women for Srintil that they compete 
to send their husbands to have sex with her because that may signify their husbands’ wealth 
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and virility. With this strong cultural capital, she does not, however, openly challenge the 
authority of the elders. Occasionally she just refuses to dance, which is her style of passive 
resistance. This is enough to set Kartareja, Sakarya, Paruk village, and other villages into a 
panic. As stated in the novel: “[t]o the disappointment of Mr. and Mrs. Kartareja, and 
especially of her sponsors, Srintil had already cancelled two dance performances, offering 
only a lame excuse: she felt lazy!” (Tohari, Dancer 123). This character development is a 
representative example of Foucault’s notion of the human individual as an active subject of 
power rather than a passive object of it. In Power/Knowledge (1980), he states: 
But there is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and 
individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, 
something which is by no means a docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a 
centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge. (137-8)   
This also signifies one of the characteristics of power as extrapolated by Mark Kelly in The 
Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (2009), which is that it is “not concentrated on a 
single individual or class” in a community (37). Power is decentred to the elders and the 
youth alike, the leaders as well as the dancer. Srintil’s story with the elders of Paruk further 
demonstrates that power is exerted and contested in daily mundane life. It does not have to 
manifest in a “social contract”, “law”, and the “penal system”, but it can occur in dancing, 
singing, and sex, as in Paruk (Power 140-141).  
Through the story of Paruk, Tohari gives a voice to a repressed local belief and its 
community of believers in the public and governmental discourse at the time. The belief in 
question is a Javanese religion generally known as Kejawen, which Robert Cribb and Audrey 
Kahin, in 2004, define as “encompass[ing] many non-Islamic elements, especially mysticism 
and respect for local spirits” (1). It is still widely practised but seldom discussed in both 
arenas because, officially, it is not a ‘religion’ but a ‘belief’, which mean two different things 
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in Indonesia. A religion typically has a scripture and a rather strict organisation and occupies 
a higher position in the governmental and social arena, while a local belief only has oral 
teaching and a far looser organisation and occupies a lower position. As portrayed by Andrew 
Beatty in Varieties of Javanese Religion (1999), people inside and outside the Kejawen 
usually associate this belief with innocence and disinterestedness. In the novel, however, the 
Kejawen community is projected as a vibrant community with its sophisticated political 
manoeuvres. In other words, Tohari has repoliticised the long-depoliticised Javanese belief 
and its community.  
Through the character of Srintil, Ahmad Tohari has given a voice to the triple 
repressed subject in the societal and governmental discourse. In addition to being a member 
of the ‘backward’ community of belief, she is a woman. In Javanese Ethics and World-View: 
The Javanese Idea of the Good Life (1997), Franz Magnis-Suseno contends that women 
occupy a third-class position in Javanese society after men and children. A woman from a 
backward community was thus in a much worse position than Indonesian women in general. 
Moreover, Srinthil is a prostitute among the female members of the backward community. 
There was therefore hardly a worse position in the social structure of Indonesian society than 
that of Srintil. Not only does the story of Srintil and her resistance give the triple repressed 
subject a voice, but it also subverts the triple repression altogether.  
Paruk’s politics generally revolves around the control over Srintil’s sexuality, which 
constitutes the second discourse of importance in the trilogy. Paruk’s sexuality is portrayed as 
being extremely different from the rest of the region and the country. Rasus, the second 
narrator of the first book, realises this difference when he moves out of the village and works 
at Dawuan Market: 
I found out that the values of the wider world were not the same as those I had 
learned in Paruk. My experience with Siti would prove this. And Siti also 
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taught me, indirectly, that women were not best represented by someone like 
Srintil . . . 
Every morning I waited on Siti, and had grown to like her. One time I couldn’t 
stop my bold hand pulling away the veil that covered her head . . . Without 
hesitating, I pinched her white cheek. 
I felt absolutely no shame at doing this. When I had lived in Paruk, pinching a 
girl’s cheek wasn’t by any means considered a social taboo, let alone a sin. 
Even the word “sin” I learned only after I had left Paruk . . .  
I was shocked when she ran off, throwing away the cassava she had bought. 
(Dancer 87-8) 
The values that Rasus talks about are apparently the village’s free sexuality, which is an 
acceptance and a practice of sexual relations outside of marriage. Pre- and extramarital sexual 
relations are still a big taboo today, let alone in the 1960s (the setting of the novel) and the 
1980s (the time when the novel was written). Rasus also realises that Srintil, with her free 
sexuality, is not an ideal type of woman, as he and the other Paruk villagers had thought thus 
far.  
There are at least three sexual practices and beliefs of Paruk village that Rasus 
describes in The Dancer. First of all, Paruk is not against prostitution. As Rasus says about 
his own mother: 
Momma was a woman of Paruk . . . So, Momma, like the women of Paruk, 
was not against prostitution. Although she lived only in my imagination, she 
was not really one of those pure women I read about in storybooks. Yet, 
because her womb once enveloped me, I could not bring myself to imagine 
Momma as the kind of woman who would be friendly with men, who would 
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not slap away the hands of a man who groped at her. No matter what, I still 
could not imagine that. (86-7) 
In the passage above, not only does Rasus describe Paruk’s attitude towards prostitution, but 
he also suspects his own mother of being a prostitute. The belief and practice of prostitution 
are naturally in direct conflict with the general teaching of Islam as represented by Dawuan 
Market. Textually speaking, although it does not apply in the Indonesian context, where the 
majority are moderate Muslims, prostitution in Islam is a crime punishable by death.  
Second, the Paruk community challenges the common discourse on prostitutes as in 
the characterisation of Srintil. By common definition, Srintil can be easily considered a 
prostitute, since she sings, dances, and sleeps with men for money. Yet, as mentioned earlier, 
her position in Paruk is much more complex than that and to some extent even ‘arcane’. For 
example, she does not always expect money for sex. As Rasus testifies: 
During that year, Dawuan Market became an occasional rendezvous place for 
Srintil and me. Sometimes she would invite me to a house not far from the 
market. Although Srintil hated being called a prostitute, she nevertheless knew 
every house that could be rented for illicit behavior. She remained true to her 
words that she didn’t expect money from me. (Tohari, Dancer 92)  
It can naturally be argued that Srintil does not expect money because it is Rasus, the love of 
her life, who sleeps with her. Yet, the other passage shows that this is not the case. For 
Srintil, sex could be a ‘social service’ to the community and, therefore, could be free: 
In Paruk, however, Srintil did not present a danger to domestic tranquillity. 
None of the married woman there felt threatened by her beauty. Perhaps they 
felt that they still had blood ties with her, being descendants of a common 
ancestor. Or, perhaps they were conscious of being connected by common, 
uniquely local, customs, and social norms. It was not unusual for a pregnant 
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woman, or a woman who had recently given birth, to tell her husband to ask a 
special favor from Srintil. A midwife often gave similar advice to the husband. 
“Be careful not to have sex with your wife before a hundred days has passed 
after the birth. Ask Srintil to help you if you can’t hold out.” (246-7) 
Prostitutes are generally considered a menace to the household as they separate husbands 
from their wives and fathers from their children. Yet, as the passage above informs us, those 
are not the qualities that the Paruk villagers see in prostitutes like Srintil. Srintil is an integral, 
necessary, and even welcome part of married life in the village.  
Third, the village has known and practised for years so-called open marriage, which 
sociologists Curtis Bergstrand and Jennifer Williams, in 2000, define as “non-possessive love 
and tolerance of infidelity in their spouses” (par. 2). This phenomenon arose in the western 
world only after the sexual revolution of the 1960s. Yet, it has existed in Paruk from the days 
of its first patriarch, Ki Secamenggala. As reported by Rasus: 
There, for example, a husband wouldn’t even get upset if he found his wife 
sleeping with his neighbor. The husband would know that the practical way of 
taking action was to go to the neighbor’s wife and sleep with her. All the 
problems would then be resolved! 
Paruk, that tiny place of my birth, had given me a social understanding: but 
one without any morality. For instance, the fact that people did not know for 
sure which child belonged to whom never caused problems. I also knew of a 
treatment for childless women which was common in the village . . . 
neighbor’s penis. And this treatment was, in the spirit of Ki Secamenggala, not 
considered taboo or even strange. (Tohari, Dancer 88). 
Open marriage would be considered morally worse than prostitution in Islamic Indonesia 
because the latter could, supposedly, be kept separated from married life. The former brings 
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no separation as such because it operates exactly at the centre of married life. In addition, 
prostitutes are generally considered a hopelessly sinful class of women and therefore bear no 
moral expectation from society. Wives, on the contrary, are considered honourable women 
and the main pillar of Indonesian society. They are also mothers who are strongly expected to 
teach moral values to their children.  
 The representation of Paruk as a politically alive and sexually free community does 
not necessarily mean that Tohari condones this community of belief and its unique ways of 
life. As the following section will show, Tohari politicises Paruk’s sexuality and the politics 
around it only to discredit them. By contrast, he offers a depoliticised side of the village and 
condones it. The politicisation and depoliticisation of Paruk reflect his idea of an ideal 
society: an apolitical but moral Islamic society.    
The depoliticisation of Islam: Garcia notes that the recent objection aimed at the 
novel is less about its politics than its sexuality. The objection was provoked or at least 
coincides with the revival of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia after the collapse of the secular 
military regime in 1998 (Lysloff). Some Islamic people of Banyumas have expressed their 
objection towards Tohari’s description of ronggengs’ sexuality because they consider it a lie 
and an embarrassment to the region. Ironically, The Dancer has arguably suppressed free 
sexuality regardless of the objection from Islamic radicals. What the people criticise is 
actually the very sexuality that Tohari exposes to a certain extent only to reject it as a 
primitive belief and practice. In the Heideggerian tradition, this writing technique is known as 
“under erasure”, which roughly means to manufacture and nurture a stigma so that it can be 
rejected (Heryanto, Identity 142).  
Despite the general description of Paruk’s free sexuality, there are hardly any explicit 
sexual scenes in the novel. The controversial Buka Klambu ceremony, for instance, 
culminates in the following asexual scene: “Later, Srintil told me that she was awakened by 
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Dower, huffing like a horny bull. She didn’t say anything about the rape that followed, only 
commenting that the requirement to become the ronggeng of Paruk Village were truly harsh” 
(Tohari, Dancer. 78). The same textual repression also happens to Sulam, the other winner of 
Buka Klambu (80). It can naturally be argued that this is not a deliberate suppression because 
it is narratively logical that the female character fails to recall such a traumatic experience to 
Rasus, her lover. Nonetheless, Tohari does not picture any explicit sexual act either when it 
comes to the first sexual contact between Srintil and Rasus. Their relation is apparently based 
on mutual love and the two parties mutually consent to perform sexual intercourse. 
Moreover, it is their first lovemaking; writers would perceive it as a very romantic, fine 
material to highlight. Yet, the whole event takes place as follows: 
I couldn’t say a word. I felt a lump in my throat. Since it was dark, I couldn’t 
see clearly, but I felt Srintil release her hold on me and was aware of her 
taking off her clothes. 
It was not unlike my experience that afternoon in the cemetery. Only now 
something happened in the dark. I couldn’t see Srintil’s body, but I knew the 
moment she was naked. 
I believe that one’s sense of virtue changes in the dark. A person thinks more 
primitively when there is no daylight. And something primitive happened 
between Srintil and me there in the darkness. No vision of Momma appeared 
to me that time. Something profound happened during which Srintil and I were 
instructed by nature alone. It may have been that Srintil felt pleasure, but who 
knows? All I knew was that I had experienced something strange. 
The experience didn’t last very long. I helped Srintil dress, then I accompanied 
her to the door. Peering through the hole in the bamboo wall, I could see 
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Srintil open the mosquito netting and lay down to sleep. I went home with my 
heart in turmoil. (Tohari, Dancer 78) 
It should be noted that at this point in the story Rasus, as a narrator, has not been enlightened 
by the new values from Dawuan Market. He is Rasus of Paruk village who he himself 
describes “one without morality” (88). It can be argued, however, that this is Rasus’ first 
experience of sexual intercourse and therefore it is logical that he finds it embarrassing to 
describe it in detail. Nonetheless, the next sexual encounter between Srintil and Rasus 
indicates the same sexual suppression. The whole of the sexual intercourse is reduced into 
one concise, symbolic statement “[t]hat night Srintil had sweated too much” (111). There are 
several other instances in which Tohari ‘teases’ and then skilfully avoids exposing the 
anticipated sexual acts.  
In addition to suppressing the scenes altogether and using figurative language, there is 
another method that the author uses extensively throughout the novel: he makes the men 
unable or unwilling to perform sex. Once, Srintil is asked to be a gowok, “a woman hired by a 
father for his son when he reached a marriageable age” (Tohari, Dancer 218). The most 
important duty of a gowok is to prepare a young man so that he will not disgrace himself on 
his honeymoon. When Srintil serves as a gowok to Waras in the second part of the novel, it 
turns out that the young man is mentally challenged and completely innocent about sex (238-
245). In the same part of the novel, Marsusi, her stubborn chaser, suddenly takes a pity on 
Srintil despite what he has done and been through to have a chance with her. Bajus, a man 
who offers her to his boss, is also told to be sexually impotent and all of a sudden his boss 
also takes pity on Srintil in the third part of the novel.  
Finally, Paruk’s sexuality is treated as backward and inferior. Because of his different 
sexual values, Rasus receives reproaches and scorn from the society outside his native 
village. One example is as follows: 
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“Look around if you want to tease a girl, Rasus!” somebody else said. “This is 
a market. The women who come here to shop aren’t all from Paruk. Even a 
prostitute, if she’s not from Paruk, is going to get mad if you touch her cheek 
in front of a lot of people, even though she may only be pretending. Yet, that’s 
the way it is.” (Tohari, Dancer 88) 
The attitude of Dawuan Market towards Paruk’s free sexuality reflects the Foucauldian 
exclusionary procedure of prohibition, as the former deems the latter “taboo on the object of 
speech” (Foucault, “Discourse” 52). By reporting the taboo, Tohari seems to challenge the 
external exclusionary force of the government and the society. Nevertheless, he merely shifts 
the problem to another Foucauldian arena, that is, the opposition between madness and 
reason, with Paruk representing the former and Dawuan the latter. It can even be said that 
Tohari exposes the taboo only to underline the madness of its practitioners.  
The suppression of sex here might be influenced by the political pressure from the 
government and the socio-cultural demands of the predominantly Islamic society at the time. 
Ironically, the very act of presenting the free sexuality of Paruk, be it as a madness or a 
reason, made this novel very attractive to the sexually hungry market. In general, works with 
sexual content, no matter how implicit they are, sell well in the predominantly Muslim 
country, as is evident from the consistently high sales of sexual novels and films in the past 
and present (Heryanto, Popular). The liberal humanist literary circles found Tohari’s 
treatment of sexuality agreeable to their sexually liberal yet ‘anti-vulgar’ taste. All of these 
only confirm Foucault’s conclusion in The History of Sexuality that sexuality is a discourse of 
power and one that is never separated from politics. The supposedly personal matter has been 
very much regulated by different powers from time to time. 
It is equally possible that the sexual suppression was motivated by Tohari’s own 
religious belief. As depicted in Rasus’ reflection at the end of the novel:  
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My little homeland had never really tried to develop its ability to reason and, 
as a result, it never knew that it could prevent the ringworms and lice from 
infesting its children, as well as the ignorance that perpetuated misery from 
generation to generation. Because it had never tried to develop its ability to 
reason, my village had never tried to find harmony with God. Like my mother, 
it remained asleep dreaming its naïve dream: naivete that gave birth to the 
tradition of ronggeng dancers. By itself, ronggeng would not be wrong it it 
were in line with the larger scheme of things. However, the ronggeng tradition 
that had developed in Paruk was one that exploited primitive desire. And 
because of that, it did not enjoy God’s mercy. (Tohari, Dancer 451-2) 
In this final paragraph, Tohari points out the differences between the local religion and his 
own belief. He sees that the sexuality concepts and practices of Paruk are not in “harmony 
with God” and “in line with the larger scheme of things” (452). Paruk’s sexuality, as 
symbolised by its ronggeng tradition, is “one that exploited primitive desire”; it stands for 
nature rather than culture (452). Affirming the binary opposition of nature and culture, 
Tohari, however, challenges the modern antagonism between God and reason. He does not 
see God and reason as two antagonistic entities; in fact, they are in the same camp. He even 
sees reason as a valid medium to achieve harmony with God because God is the source of 
wisdom and, therefore, the creator of reason.   
It is necessary to identify more precisely the author’s religious belief and its relative 
position against the belief of the majority, the government’s politics on religion, and the 
dominant literary circle’s ideology. Ahmad Tohari was born and raised in Banyumas, Central 
Java. His physical existence and intellectual orientation were arguably far from Jakarta with 
its cultural hegemony. The closest orientation that he might have is towards Yogyakarta with 
its sufistic literature (see 1.1). Although in his study of the sufistic poets Salam does not 
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single out Tohari and his works, the Banyumas novelist fits easily into this group of poets, 
particularly in regard to their shared rejection of the modern and formal kind of Islam. In an 
interview with the English translator of The Dancer, Tohari explicitly expresses this 
rejection: 
“I have serious reservations about religion being used as a model for social 
progress. From what I can see around me, it is obvious that religion has 
become little more than a system of laws. Meanwhile, the general 
understanding of religion is so shallow that its very essence is completely 
absent. 
I advocate a return to the kind of Islam that was first brought to Indonesia, one 
that is inclusive, not just of a set of rules. Islam when it came here was not a 
commitment to formal procedures; instead, it emphasized ethical and moral 
teachings. The ancients who brought Islam to these shores put the ethical and 
moral at the forefront and made dogma and ritual duty secondary. This gets at 
the basis of my own ideas. I believe that I must establish an understanding of 
Islam that is holistic: one that embraces existing forms of culture. Not only 
should Islam tolerate these existing cultures but it should also nurture them.” 
(Lysloff xi-ii) 
Tohari calls his kind of Islam “a post-modern Islam” because he “advocates not the modernist 
orthodoxy of many Indonesian Muslims today but a more tolerant form that places an 
emphasis on moral and ethical behaviour over the formal aspects of Islamic practices” (x). 
However, Tohari’s post-modern Islam was stated after the collapse of the military regime and 
long after the writing of the novel. Thus, it did not necessarily inspire the novel. I argue that 
The Dancer was more inspired by the military era’s Traditionalist and/or Cultural Islam, 
which respectively refer to a religious practice and a political orientation but often represent 
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the same group of people. As defined by Marcus Mietzner in Military Politics, Islam, and the 
State in Indonesia (2009), traditionalist Islamists represent those who “often blend local 
influences into their religious practices leading to forms of syncretism that the modernists 
view as deviations from the true Islam”, while Cultural Islamists “appear [ ] to mark the 
departure from Islamic politics” (70). Local influences are certainly not the only influence in 
‘loose’ Traditionalist Islam for there is also Sufism along with its syncretism with local 
mysticisms. The traditionalists used to be under the banner of political Islam but most of 
them have depoliticised themselves and, since the 1970s, they have co-founded Cultural 
Islam.  
Theoretically, post-modern Islam is similar to, if not the same as, what Asef Bayat, in 
2007, calls “post-Islamism”, which is “neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular” (19). 
While Islamism strives for the implementation of Islam in governmental and societal life, 
post-Islamism tends to promote the Islamic piety of individual Muslims. 
Traditionalist/Cultural Islam bears certain similarities with post-Islamism, particularly in 
regard to the rejection of Islamic politicisation but they also have at least one significant 
difference. Due to the political pressures of the Suharto regime as well as its own 
traditionalist nature, the former adopted a more essentialist position where they repressed 
their Islamic identity and focused on Islamic values. By contrast, post-Islamism pays a lot of 
attention to Islamic identity as opposed to the secularistic outlook of the late Suharto regime. 
Here one can find a parallel between Islamism and the governmental and societal 
politicisation of religion on the one hand, and between post-Islamism as well as Cultural 
Islam and the multi-level depoliticisation of religion on the other.  
As a traditionalist, Tohari did not have any problems in using the story of the 
Kejawen community to instil his apolitical Islamic principles in spite their different identities. 
Through the characters of Srintil and Sakarya, Tohari powerfully propagates several sufistic 
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teachings such as predestination, moderation, and tolerance. The controversial concept of 
predestination is certainly in conflict with formal Islam, which believes in actively collecting 
pahala (rewards from Allah when one does good deeds) to save oneself from hell. All of the 
Paruk villagers, including Srintil, believe in the vanity of fighting against their predestined 
fate. As described by the narrator: “living in Paruk all her life had taught her that existence 
was like a shadow puppet tale; that humankind consisted of characters controlled by a 
puppeteer” (Tohari, Dancer 166). Srintil’s worldview is apparently inspired by the leader of 
the village, Sakarya: 
If one was to live, one had to assume the role of a wayang puppet in a story 
whose plot has already been determined. This belief didn’t leave Sakarya for 
even a moment. To attempt to protect himself against an unhappy fate when 
the times were against him would be useless. Sakarya had lost not just his 
nerve; he believed that the power of the times couldn’t possibly matched by 
the strength of the will of one individual. (264) 
Second, The Dancer also promotes the sufistic principle of modesty and moderation. 
Living in modesty and doing everything in moderation are important in Islam and central to a 
sufistic life (Gulen). Using an extended metaphor, the omniscient narrator of The Dancer 
describes the upholding of this principle in Paruk:  
Sakarya, the elder of the little hamlet, might have been the only person there 
who never stopped reading natural omens. From them he gathered that the 
days ahead would be savage. Days when people left their places of 
employment to gather in open fields. Days when roads would be filled with 
humanity, raising clenched fists and screaming shrilly. As the wind blew, it 
would lean to the south. When the wind stopped, the tree didn’t simply return 
to its upright position. Instead, it first swung back to the north. For Sakarya, 
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the jubilation outside of the village was a strong wind that was sweeping 
through their lives. Like the coconut tree, before their lives found their former 
calm, something else would happen first. (Tohari, Dancer 198) 
In the excerpt above, Sakarya is describing the excessive politicisation of Paruk, as will be 
discussed in the following section. This excessive politicisation would soon bring an equally 
excessive depoliticisation. In addition, the metaphor above cements Sakarya’s position as the 
main voice of Sufism in The Dancer. His words are always considered true and dutifully 
heeded by the villagers. Sakarya and his people might remind the readers of the Greek poets 
and society of the sixth century that Foucault describes in “The Order of Discourse”. Sakarya 
achieves this ‘discursive’ domination through his active participation in Paruk’s rituals in 
which he holds an influential position as the elder. Moreover, his words regularly carry a 
vision and help make it happen, as in the making of Srintil as a ronggeng. When his words 
are not heeded, he dispenses justice and gives everyone, including himself, a fair share. As 
Sakarya says when the persecution of the Communists is looming: 
“I repeat what I said before. Everything we do in our lives must be with the 
bounds of appropriateness, because safety lies between two extremes. What 
we’ve been witnessing is a kind of life that is at one of these extremes, one that 
is not natural and has gone beyond acceptable limits. Such a life won’t return 
to a balanced state without us first experiencing the consequences of its 
unnaturalness. My children, my grandchildren, we too have lost our way.” 
(Tohari, Dancer 260). 
Finally, the novel also encourages the sufistic practice of tolerance in dealing with and 
helping people in error. This is the ethic behind the author’s creative process and it partially 
explains why Tohari writes about and sympathises with the ‘sinful’ ronggeng despite his 
religiosity. As the omnipresent narrator says: 
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Historical evidence of compassion manifests itself through the wisdom of a 
simple people who often quote the traditional expression, “aja dumeh maring 
wong sing kanggonan [emphasis added] luput,” don’t look with contempt 
upon people ensnared in wrongdoing. (Dancer 330) 
Tohari’s stance towards moral errors is essentially not a holier-than-thou, condescending one 
because, as just discussed, he believes in predestination. When an individual sins, it is beyond 
his or her own power. It is reflected by the Javanese word “kanggonan”, which means hosting 
a guest or an event, signalling that error is an external entity; that it comes from outside the 
person. Tohari thus rejects modern Islam’s notion of man as a subject who can determine his 
own life and future. He does not see the world with the modern lens of a binary opposition: 
right or wrong and holy or profane. Instead, Tohari sees each pair as merely two different 
manifestations of the same substance.  
Not only does the Sufism dominate the religious discourse in Paruk, but it also 
effectively dominates the philosophical discourse in the first part of the novel. The reason for 
this discursive domination can be traced to the Foucauldian external inclusionary mechanism 
of “the opposition between true and false” (“Discourse” 54). Sakarya’s sufistic discourse is 
made dominant because it represents the truth held by the author, the Javanese as the 
dominant ethnic group, as well as the Cultural Muslims as the religious majority in Indonesia. 
What is ‘false’ is political Islam and, as will be discussed in the next section, Communism. 
Furthermore, Sakarya’s prominence at the same time reflects the internal inclusionary 
mechanism of “commentary”, that is, “discourses based on the major foundational narratives 
of a society and the interchange between these primary texts (foundational religious, juridical, 
literary, and scientific texts) and their derivatives” (Hook 9). His discourse is covered 
intensely because it is based on The Holy Quran as the foundational religious book of the 
Indonesian Muslims.  
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Tohari’s Sufism in The Dancer may indicate a strong other-worldly orientation. One 
might accuse it of being a form of escapism because this was a logical consequence of the 
limited political and artistic freedom. In this situation, many authors found a creative channel 
in the Sufi world. The government would not imprison them or ban their works because this 
literary orientation was certainly not atheistic. In addition, Sufism is a personal rather than a 
collective type of Islam so it did not endanger the military government, which happened to be 
hostile to both the right-wing Muslims and the Communists.  
Furthermore, Tohari and his Sufism shared, if not supported, the interests of the 
government and the literary communities of Jakarta. The Dancer ideologically fits the 
government’s contemporary programme of deradicalisation of formal and political Islam. In 
the 1980s, when The Dancer was written, there was a growing radicalisation of formal Islam 
as represented in the hijacking of Woyla (1981) and the bombing of Borobudur (1985). 
Cultural Islam, as advocated by Tohari, has been the strongest antithesis of the formal and 
political Islam in Indonesia. As can be deduced from the discussion above, political Islam is 
totally repressed in the novel. There is neither debate between sufistic Islam and political 
Islam nor a mouthpiece for the latter. In this respect, the liberal humanist literary circles did 
agree with the government and Tohari because highly political Islamic radicalism was 
naturally against the supposedly apolitical liberal humanism.  
The textual operations above show that the inclusion of a discourse does not 
necessarily mean the politicisation of that discourse. Sakarya and his Sufism are included in 
the novel to reinforce the ongoing depoliticisation of Islam at the time rather than to 
challenge it. This is in line with Tohari’s statement that Islam is “little more than a system of 
laws”, which indicates governmental depoliticisation (Lysloff xi). He pushes the issue further 
by rejecting Islam as “a model for social progress”, thus signifying a societal depoliticisation. 
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The author prefers the kind of Islam that “emphasized ethical and moral teachings” of 
individuals, which practically depoliticises the religion into a private domain (xi).  
Nevertheless, Tohari’s Sufism at the same time represented a discursive challenge to 
the government and the liberal humanist literary circles of Jakarta. The sufistic mysticism 
was in direct contrast to the economic-oriented government. Tohari’s Sufism also portrays a 
post-colonial, traditional attitude that was in a sharp contrast to the surrealist, cosmopolitan 
spirit of the dominant liberal humanist literary circles at the time. In addition, it exists as an 
antidote towards the perceived excess of economic and cultural liberalism: free sexuality, 
which is also represented by Paruk.   
 
1.2.2 The Dancer and Military Politics 
The invitation to dance at the celebration of Independence Day marks the beginning of 
Srintil’s and Paruk village’s contact with the most controversial party in Indonesian history, 
the PKI. The party is personified by Bakar, “a man from Dawuan who was a very clever 
orator and always gave fiery speeches” (248). Bakar is apparently an educated person. Unlike 
the villagers, he accumulated his cultural capital from formal education institutions rather 
than hereditary traits and auto-didacticism. This institutionalised cultural capital is considered 
by Srintil and the Paruk elders to be superior to their own cultural capital, which makes them 
feel somewhat anxious when they meet and talk with Bakar (Tohari 248-50). As Bourdieu 
says of the autodidact in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (1979):  
because he has not acquired his culture in the legitimate order established by 
the educational system, the autodidact constantly betrays, by his very anxiety 
about the right classification, the arbitrariness of his classifications and 
therefore of his knowledge—the collection of unstrung pearls, accumulated in 
the course of an uncharted exploration, unchecked by the institutionalized, 
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standardized stages and obstacles, the curricula and progressions which make 
scholastic culture a ranked and ranking set of interdependent levels and forms 
of knowledge. (328) 
In addition, Bakar also holds and exerts social capital, which, according to Bourdieu, is:   
the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in 
a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectivity-owned capital . . . they may also be socially instituted or 
guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a 
class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.). (“Forms” 247)  
Bakar is a member of the PKI, which was “the largest party in Indonesia”, and is its regional 
leader in Dawuan district (Roosa, Pretext 207). As the strongest party in the country, the PKI 
enjoyed a close relation with the leftist President Sukarno and therefore the government’s 
bureaucracy at all levels. This is the very network that Bakar uses to seduce Srintil and the 
Paruk community to support the party.  
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Fig. 9. President Sukarno and D. N. Aidit, the leader of the PKI in a political rally. 
The depoliticisation of the Communists: Srintil and her community need Bakar 
because, with his extensive network, he can make it possible for Srintil and her ronggeng 
troupe to perform regularly at the party’s political rallies as well as the government’s 
celebrations. Aside from the financial benefits, Srintil and the villagers of Paruk need that 
wide exposure to show other villages in the region that Paruk has a new ronggeng dancer. 
Bakar also showers Srintil and her ronggeng troupe with lavish gifts. To begin with, “Bakar 
presented Srintil and her troupe with the gift of a complete sound system, the first electronic 
equipment to enter Paruk Village, and it became a source of great pride among its 
inhabitants” (Tohari, Dancer 249). He also gives the ronggeng troupe complete outfits, as 
reported: “he had come to the hamlet with a fatherly attitude, giving them a sound system, 
even presented the musicians with complete outfits” (250). The complete sound system and 
outfits effectively put the ronggeng troupe of Paruk village far above the other troupes in the 
region and thus help to fulfil Paruk’s collective aspiration to win back its socio-cultural 
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prestige. Srintil herself finds in Bakar “a perfect father figure. He was friendly, and seemed to 
understand many things, including her personal feelings” (248). This personal touch certainly 
fills a gap in the psyche of the fatherless dancer.  
On the other hand, Bakar needs this traditional dancing troupe with its famous mascot 
Srintil to attract and gain support from the working class in Dawuan district. With her 
popularity and charisma, Srintil can easily gather a thousand people in a field to watch her 
dancing and, more importantly, to hear the party’s political speeches afterwards. As the 
narrator says: “all he wanted was to use Srintil and her troupe as a means to draw masses and, 
at the same time, to put him in a position of authority” (Tohari, Dancer 251). Thus, the party 
apparently exploits Srintil’s sexuality to achieve its political goal. This further shows that the 
PKI’s attitude towards sexuality is ambivalent, if not hypocritical. Exploiting female 
sexuality is naturally against every known principle of Communism. 
The power relations between Srintil and Paruk village and Bakar appear to be mutual, 
if not equal. Nevertheless, as Foucault explicates in Discipline and Punish (1995), power 
relations are full of “instability” and “inversion” (27). The balance of power starts to swing in 
Bakar’s favour despite the impression that he spends a great deal more than Srintil and her 
ronggeng troupe can pay back. Yet, there lies Bakar’s ingenious strategy. He deliberately 
makes Srintil and Paruk unable to pay him back and therefore they fall into one of the 
strongest Javanese values: indebtedness (Magnis-Suseno). Despite Sakarya’s complaint, 
Srintil and the Paruk elders allow Bakar to include political slogans in Srintil’s songs and 
adorn each entrance to the village with party symbols. In addition, Srintil and the villagers are 
willing to modify their sacred ritual to please the philosophically materialist Bakar. It is the 
ritual of the ronggeng troupe to pray on stage for Ki Secamenggala’s blessing before they 
start a ronggeng performance. Bakar disagrees with this superstitious practice supposedly 
because it is the antithesis of materialism in which he believes. Srintil and the elders come up 
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with a solution: “There’s a way out of this though. What about this. Before we leave for a 
performance, let’s make the offerings here first. Or at the grave of Ki Secamenggala. I think 
it would do just as well” (Tohari, Dancer 250).  
The villagers’ compromise accurately exemplifies Bourdieu’s transformation of 
economic capital to social capital, and the effect of this subtle strategy is profound. It is said 
that Srintil understands that her ronggeng performances are merely a sideshow to Bakar’s 
political rallies. The shows are always overcrowded but somewhat different; they are noisy 
but meaningless. However, “Srintil frequently wondered why all these new thoughts had 
come to her only at the time Bakar’s favours had accumulated to a point where she could not 
avoid feeling deeply indebted to the man” (Tohari, Dancer 253). Srintil also tries to resist 
Bakar’s power by refusing to dance, which is the same strategy she uses very effectively with 
the elders of Paruk. Yet, as the narrator points out, “once, she wanted to try refusing to 
perform at an event but, when Bakar’s envoy came to pick her up, she found she was unable 
to say anything. She could not bring herself to say no” (253). Bakar’s subtle domination is 
too difficult even for the already sophisticated Srintil to detect and match.  
Nevertheless, the villagers’ ‘cultural adaptation’ also marks at least three aspects of 
power relations. First, power resides “in the interstices between individuals since if it resided 
in individuals, they would possess it” (Kelly 38). Even when Bakar appears to effectively 
control Srintil and Paruk village, power does not reside in him because Srintil and Paruk 
village still resist his power, albeit secretly. At the same time, it also confirms the second 
principle of power, that is, as Foucault famously says, “where there is power, there is 
resistance” (Sexuality 95). The adaptation constitutes a resistance because it resists the total 
control of the stronger power. Third, it also indicates that power is productive. Foucault 
suggests, in 1980, that one must go beyond the idea that power is oppression, because 
oppressive measures are also productive, causing new behaviours to emerge. Bakar’s 
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disagreement with the ritual on stage results in Srintil and the Paruk villagers’ new cultural 
practice. 
Nevertheless, Srintil and Paruk village eventually become one entity with the PKI due 
to Bakar’s manipulation of the villagers’ deeply sacred belief. He secretly has the tomb of Ki 
Secamenggala, the most respected site in Paruk, vandalised and destroyed. As described in 
the novel: “[n]ever before had the people of Paruk felt so deeply insulted. The hamlet was 
gloomy and quiet with restrained rage. The inhabitants were all of one mind, ready to pay 
back with interest the insult they had received” (Tohari, Dancer 257). Furthermore, Bakar 
also uses this incident to stir up political animosity between the villagers and his political 
enemy. He has a green hat, a political icon of Nadhlatul Ulama, the PKI’s political 
competitor in Central and East Java, left near the vandalised tomb. This is enough to make 
the politically ignorant villagers of Paruk actively hate the Islamic party. Srintil and her 
ronggeng troupe, who begin to feel uncomfortable performing at the political rallies, now 
wholeheartedly give their consent to the red hats.  
This last incident demonstrates further the complexity of the power relations in the 
society. It is complex because it involves a few parties (Srintil, the elders, Bakar, and 
Nadhlatul Ulama) rather than two binary forces. It has been discussed earlier how Srintil and 
the elders exert their cultural power over each other. This time, however, they exercise and 
eventually give up their power to Bakar. Together with Bakar, they then politically attack 
Nadhlatul Ulama. On the other hand, both Nadhlatul Ulama and the PKI oppose the 
‘superstition’ of Srintil and the elders while at the same time the two political parties oppose 
each other on account or theism/atheism and land issues. As underlined by Foucault, power 
“circulates . . . or . . . functions in the form of a chain . . . and is employed and exercised 
through a netlike organisation” rather than working in a linear manner (Power 98). 
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Despite their initial resistance, Srintil and her community are gradually suppressed 
and depoliticised in the story of their contact with the party. They are not given as much 
political voice and power as in the first part of the novel. The villagers are portrayed as 
uncritical victims of the manipulation and propaganda of the PKI. The possibility that they 
are intellectually stimulated by and attracted to the programmes of the Communists is also 
thoroughly repressed whereas, as Rhoma Yuliantri dan Muhidin M. Dahlan reveal in Lekra 
Tak Membakar Buku (2008), many traditional performers at the time were very attracted to 
the progressive programmes of the PKI. The only possibility that is expressed is that they are 
just manipulated and deceived by the party. Gone are the sophisticated Paruk community and 
Srintil.  
Tohari seems to give a voice to the then absolutely banned political party but, 
different from Srintil and her community, the PKI is given a strongly negative voice and role 
in the story. It is portrayed as a cunning political party, doing everything it can to achieve its 
political end. What is being expressed of the party in the novel is merely its manipulation and 
propaganda. The Dancer thus only reinforces what has been believed about the party and 
removes the possibility of new perspectives. Simultaneously, Tohari represses the PKI’s 
critical discourses, which attracted millions of people to join its rank and file.  For a novel 
considered ‘political’ by the public and scholars (see 0.2), The Dancer does not really offer 
markedly political discourses. It might be logical not to have them in the first part of the book 
because Srintil and the Paruk villagers have not yet encountered Bakar and the PKI but the 
two parties interact intensively and extensively in the second part. Curiously, the party itself 
is never named throughout the novel and is only distinguished by its attributes of “red hats, 
red banners, and red letters” (Tohari, Dancer 220).  
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The omniscient narrator, who does not show any inhibition in commenting on the 
characters and events in the first part, suddenly becomes less ‘talkative’. The only rather 
explicit political discourse in the novel is as follows: 
On one occasion, a party organizer came to the village and handed out party 
posters. On them were pictures of what the man called “the downtrodden 
proletariat” [emphasis added]. 
At first Sakarya had been interested, because people who came to the village 
often mentioned the word “proletariat” [emphasis added], which he 
interpreted the word to mean “subjects”. Everyone in Paruk thought of 
themselves as subjects, but he became confused when the man began to speak 
of “the miserable proletariat [emphasis added] being victims of the evil 
oppressors”. 
“Who are these ‘victims of the oppressors’,” he asked the man. 
“You yourself, and all the inhabitants of this village,” the man answered. 
“Your blood is being sucked dry so that all that’s left is what you see now: 
misery! On top of this you can add ignorance and all kinds of disease. It’s time 
for you to stand up with us.” 
Wait a minute. You say we’re oppressed. Are you sure? We don’t feel 
oppressed. Honestly! We’ve always lived here peacefully. . .. 
“But who are these ‘oppressors’?” 
“The imperialists, capitalists, colonialists, and their lackeys [emphasis added]. 
There’s no mistaking them.” (Tohari, Dancer 196-7) 
The comparison between the English and Indonesian versions reveals that the latter is more 
politically repressed than the former. To start with, there is no explicit political jargon in the 
Indonesian dialogue. What Lysloff translates into “the downtrodden proletariat”, 
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“proletariat”, and “the miserable proletariat” (Tohari, Dancer 196) are actually two 
Indonesian lexical items of “rakyat” and “rakyat yang tertindas” in the original version 
(Tohari, Ronggeng 183). They respectively mean “people” and “oppressed people”, which do 
not actually carry Marxist connotations that are as strong as the English translations. The 
translator appears to highlight the Marxist discourse in the text for western readers, who are 
arguably more familiar with the jargon as well as the referents in their daily life.  
The real-life PKI created other political jargon for the ‘imagined’ class they were 
fighting for. Other examples are ‘proletar’ (proletariat) and ‘kominis’ (communists); none of 
this jargon is mentioned by Tohari in the story. Only once does the PKI’s popular jargon 
‘buruh’ (worker) appear in the novel but it is used as a verb that in Indonesian has a very 
general meaning (to work). However, when it comes to how the party refers to its enemies, 
the Indonesian version generously reproduces the jargon: “kaum penindas, kaum imperialis, 
kapitalis, kolonialis, dan para kaki tangannya penindas” (Tohari, Ronggeng 183), which 
respectively translate in the English version to “[t]he oppressors, imperialists, capitalists, 
colonialists, and their lackeys” (Tohari, Dancer 197). Thus, Tohari represses how the PKI 
represented itself and its imagined class but explicitly exposes how the party cursed its 
enemies. With this representation, the PKI emerges as a negative political force, the political 
party that constantly curses and blames others; not the one that can identify itself and its 
programmes. It offers noisy but empty propaganda but lacks genuine liberatory programmes 
for the masses. 
A similar strategy is further applied when Tohari describes the political rallies and 
demonstrations of the PKI. There are five occasions on which he reports the rallies and 
demonstrations (Dancer 193-5, 201-3, 251-2, 253-4, and 258). Only once, however, does he 
explicitly express the contents and words of the speeches. Those contents and words are once 
again specific curses to the enemies of the party (202). In regard to other events, the speeches 
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are reported indirectly with the same dismissive manner that is used to describe Sakarya’s 
first encounter with a man of the party. They are reported as “incomprehensible to the simple 
people from Paruk” or “difficult for simple villagers to understand” (251). In addition, Bakar, 
the orator, is portrayed as an ambitious man of politics, who “manipulates [people’s] 
emotions” so as “to put him in a position of authority”, which was how the Suharto regime 
typically depicted the Communists (251).  
Tohari prefers to describe the atmosphere and effect of the speeches on the masses 
instead. The situations and outcomes are consistently portrayed as “noisy, unruly affairs” 
(Dancer 251). One example is as follows: 
One night, after a rally in which she had danced, hundreds of the spectators 
went berserk. As if possessed, they rampaged through rice paddies, plundering 
the ripening crops. The situation became violent as the owners arrived to 
protect their fields. By the time the police had arrived, seven bodies lay on the 
ground covered in blood. 
The first brawl was followed by a second a month later, and another the 
following month. During the third riot, the situation was particularly tense. It 
took place in the daytime, and involved hundreds of aggressors fighting the 
owners of fields. A full-scale war of hoes and sickles was avoided only 
because of the timely arrival of the police. (253-4) 
In the passage above, the PKI’s rallies are not only pictured as “noisy and unruly affairs” but 
also bloody and deadly. The party are called the “aggressors” while the owners are the 
rightful protectors of their own fields. The established class is also represented by the police, 
who are pictured as the saviour of the situations.  
It is thus apparent that the novel represses the political discourse of the PKI and 
promotes the ruling discourse of the military. In other words, Tohari agrees with, if not 
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supports, the military politics vis-à-vis the subject of Communists and, further, political 
parties. On this account, this finding is in line with Roosa’s allegation that: 
All three authors [including Ahmad Tohari] were anti-communists whose 
writings tended to depict the communists as being aggressive, violent and 
irreligious in the years before 1965. These authors considered the mass killings 
and arrests in 1965-1966 as understandable, if excessive and gory, measures of 
popular self-defense. (“Indonesian” 685-6)  
Repression of the communist discourses, as practised by Tohari, was not completely 
motivated by what Foucault identifies as the exclusionary procedure of “prohibition” because 
the novel was still legally published and the Communists still appear in the story 
(“Discourse” 52). It refers to another external exclusionary mechanism, “the opposition 
between madness and reason” (53). The Communists’ speeches are portrayed as ‘madness’ 
while their enemies (the field owners and the policemen) are framed as ‘reason’. By 
extension, the madness was further associated with mass politics and political parties in 
general, signifying the Suharto regime’s suspicion towards both.  
There are several possible explanations for the repression of the political discourses in 
the novel. First, Tohari might have been forced by the regime to do this because the latter was 
hypersensitive to political discourses in general and paranoid about the Communists in 
particular. This theory is supported by the fact that Tohari was interrogated by the military 
and some parts of the novel were censored. In addition, considering the dangerous 
atmosphere at the time, authors would consciously or unconsciously perform self-censorship 
to avoid future trouble with the government, which managed to ban about two thousand 
books (Stanley). It is also worth mentioning here that the regime exiled and impoverished the 
Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer for 14 years without trial for his writings, and 
imprisoned university students for photocopying his works (see Heryanto, State). The 
112 
 
political problems with the government could further manifest in economic difficulties 
because their books would be banned from the market. The threat of political imprisonment 
and economic impoverishment were effective in making most authors either treat political 
discourses implicitly or abandon them completely.  
Nevertheless, there are several limitations to this theory. First of all, if Tohari was 
forced to repress Communism and the PKI in his novel, he should have restored and 
published the ‘unrepressed’ manuscript after the collapse of the military regime in 1998. 
Shortly after Suharto’s forced resignation, there was a period of euphoria in which the public 
sought anything banned or censored by the last regime, including novels (Garcia). Yet, as 
reported in On the Record: Indonesian Literary Figures (2004), Tohari only combined the 
trilogy into a single novel and added the censored pieces from the third part, “The Rainbow’s 
Arc”, which tells of the aftermath of the 1965-6 tragedy and has less to do with the PKI. 
Second, Tohari has never been allergic to the subject of politics and treats it quite explicitly 
in his other works. The Dancer is merely one of his many politically engaged novels. It is not 
the only novel in which Tohari deals with the subject matter of Communism, nor was it the 
first time he did so. In 1980, two years before the first publication of The Dancer, Tohari 
launched a novel entitled Kubah (The Dome, 1980), which mainly narrates the story of a 
repentant communist and exposes far more explicitly Communism and the PKI. Curiously, 
Kubah did not provoke the government to interrogate Tohari or censor the work; he even 
received an award from Yayasan Buku Utama, a government foundation for book publication.  
Hitherto the strongest possibility is that Ahmad Tohari himself does not agree with 
Communism and the PKI. This is consistent with his theistic and non-materialistic belief, as I 
have discussed in the last section. Moreover, it is also in agreement with his own political 
manifesto: 
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I’m not a communist and I’m certainly not an atheist. Perhaps I am what you’d 
call a socialist, but one who honors humanistic liberalism, which is bound up 
in my sense of social responsibility. 
My beliefs go back to childhood experience. I was born in a very poor 
agricultural community. There was no irrigation, no agricultural technology, 
no chemical additives for fertilizers, there was nothing. Farming depended 
entirely on rain fall and during times of drought many of my friends and 
neighbors suffered from malnutrition and its effects. 
Fortunately, because my father worked for the government, my family had 
enough to eat, but many of my friends went hungry. And when I looked into 
their eyes, I saw a great wrong. I had to ask myself how this could be. 
The answer I saw, could be traced to ignorance, which was frequently fostered 
by religious leaders who wrongly said that the poor had no work ethic. In fact, 
the problem was in the system of production. The agricultural system wasn’t 
fair and the government administration was feudalistic. The factors combined 
to keep people poor. (Lysloff x-xi) 
His socialist sympathy goes to the ignorance and poor being wrongly accused of and unfairly 
punished for Communism. It is evident that Tohari sympathises with Srintil and the Paruk 
community as innocently accused communists, but not with Bakar, as the conscious, self-
confessed communist. The novel sees the Paruk villagers as the victims of the PKI, not its 
conscious supporters, which happened to be the political stance of the liberal humanist 
literary circles. Even Tohari, in the above quotation, identifies himself with the “humanistic 
liberalism”. It is no wonder that The Dancer received critical acclaim from the literary 
communities at the time. Interestingly, the mere exposition of the Communists, be it negative 
or positive, also attracted the politically starved market of the Suharto era. Metaphorically, 
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reading The Dancer was like riding a roller coaster. There was an element of danger for the 
contemporary readers but they knew that it was safe.    
The repression of the communist discourses was an area of convergence of Tohari’s 
personal belief and the Suharto regime’s ruling ideology. Nevertheless, I am not saying that 
the author was a passive object of the dominant ideology of the Suharto regime, nor do I wish 
to project Tohari as a lackey of the regime. Tohari obviously criticises the Suharto regime 
elsewhere, such as in Di Kaki Bukit Cibalak (1986), Belantik (2001), and Orang-orang 
Proyek (2002). The Dancer also questions the hypocrisy of the civilian professional class as 
the important pillar of the regime, as the next section (1.2.3) will show.  
The depoliticisation of the military: The PKI is not the only representative of 
Dawuan in the novel. Dawuan is also epitomised by the army, the historical arch enemy of 
the Communists, stationed in that city. If the party represents the negative side of Dawuan, 
the military stands for the positive face of the city. The main representative of the military is 
Rasus, who is originally a villager and Srintil’s first love. Frustrated by the prospect that 
Srintil will give up her virginity in the Buka Klambu, Rasus runs away from Paruk village 
and works as an office boy at a local army base. There he befriends and wins the trust of 
Sergeant Slamet, who teaches him to read and eventually recruits him as a soldier.  
While exposing the Communists’ actions, Tohari represses the exploits of the military 
as the main pillar of the Suharto regime. The story of Rasus and Sergeant Slamet shows that, 
unlike the Communists, the military does not politicise and exploit the villagers but educates 
them. And what a fine man the military makes of Rasus! The novel is filled with Rasus’ 
sophisticated reflections about himself and his surroundings. This can be seen from his 
reflection below: 
The longer I lived away from my tiny homeland, the more I was able to 
critically [emphasis added] evaluate life in Paruk. I realized that the poverty 
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there was maintained in perpetuity by the ignorance and laziness of the 
inhabitants. They were satisfied with just being farm workers or with small-
scale cultivation of cassava. Whenever there was a small harvest, liquor could 
be found in every home. The sounds of the calung ensemble and the singing of 
the ronggeng dancer were the lullabies of the people. Indeed, Sakarya had 
been correct when he said that, without calung and ronggeng, life was dreary 
for the people of Paruk. Calung and ronggeng performances also provided 
people with an opportunity to dance socially and drink ciu to their heart’s 
content. (Tohari, Dancer 89) 
Rasus’ retrospective and critical discourse might remind readers of Marx’s famous statements 
in “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right” (1844): 
The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest against 
real wretchedness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the 
people. (131) 
Ronggeng practically functions as a religion to Paruk village; it is said in the novel that the 
Paruk villagers do not follow any organised religion (Tohari, Dancer 252). Ronggeng, in 
Rasus’ critical opinion, is “the lullabies of the people” or, in Marx’s terminology, “the opium 
of the people”; it consoles as well as subdues the Paruk villagers. Another critical and 
historical reflection of the military man can also be found in the conclusion of the novel, as 
discussed in the last section.  
Stylistically, Rasus frequently uses calques or loan translations, which are the 
Indonesian urbanites’ way of signalling their high level of education. Calques and loan words 
come from many sources but, with the recent cultural hegemony of the English-speaking 
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countries, they have become increasingly English. Besides “critically” in the last passage, 
another example of Rasus’ calques can be found in the following reflection:   
I stood near the front of the crowd, thinking. If there had been people in the 
village who could discuss things like artistic appreciation [emphasis added] or, 
even better, a means to evaluate it, whose appreciation [emphasis added] of 
Srintil’s performance would have been the most profound? I arrogantly 
believed that my admiration was the deepest. (Tohari, Dancer 47) 
The calques in the original version are “kritis” and “apresiasi” (Tohari, Ronggeng 86; 47), 
which are respectively derived from the English words “critically” and “appreciation”, as 
emphasised above. Even in today’s democratic atmosphere those two words would still be 
exclusively used by Indonesians with at least a tertiary education. The words and the syntaxes 
are also, respectively, too low-frequency and complex for the uneducated Rasus.  
The stylistic strategies above embody the Foucauldian opposition between truth and 
falsehood as well as discursive depoliticisation. As observed by Foucault, Wood and 
Flinders, and Said, modernism and modern subjects ascribe the ultimate truth to science and 
knowledge (see 0.3). Truthful discourses are those which ground themselves on scientific 
language or, in Rasus’ case, intellectual language. Rasus’ intellectual register signifies the 
truthfulness of his assertions and, by association, the military’s discourses. This truthfulness 
of assertions is supported by the exclusion of the military’s sexual abuse and atrocity.  
In contrast to the PKI’s sexual exploitation for politics, the military is portrayed as 
asexual or, at worst, not sexually exploitative. There is no instance in which the military 
officers, except for Rasus, do anything related to sex and sexuality. That Rasus is an 
exceptional case is understandable because he is originally from the immoral village and 
therefore is pictured as more sexual than the other soldiers. Nevertheless, Rasus’ sexual 
immorality declines after his contact with the city and the military. As he gratefully admits: 
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“Dawuan Market provided me with wider horizons on many fronts. Previously, my only 
world had been Paruk with all its cursing and swearing, its poverty, and its sanctioned 
indecencies” (Tohari, Dancer 87). His moral restraint gets stronger after his appointment as a 
military officer. Although he still has sex with Srintil once after the appointment, this is done 
out of love rather than lust or political motivation.  In his next meeting with Srintil, Rasus 
rejects her altogether:  
“The problem is that, until now, I hadn’t even thought about marriage or about 
whom I might marry. Not even about you, Srin. I only just learned that you’d 
returned when Sakum told me this morning.” 
“I never dreamed to presume that I’d be the reason for your coming back here. 
This, here, means nothing to you.” 
“Ah, Srin. You really needn’t talk like that. Time have changed. Let’s leave 
the past alone. We should be happy with the way things are. We’re safe and 
we’re back home, both of us. Now, Srin, I’d like to take my leave. I haven’t 
bathed since yesterday afternoon.” (390) 
Last but certainly not least, The Dancer also supresses the persecution and killing of 
the suspected communists by the military, which is supposed to take place in the second part 
of the novel. For a novel that is regularly related to the event and was made famous by this 
association, The Dancer, curiously, does not say much about the massacre of the 
Communists. Out of the three parts and 478 pages of the novel, Tohari devotes only a few 
pages to the event and narrates the persecution and killings very implicitly. To begin with, the 
houses in Paruk are burnt to ashes but the actors are not identified at all (264-7). It is reported 
that “[O]fficials . . . came to Paruk afterwards”, implying that the military officers were not 
involved in the torching at all. It therefore reiterates the Suharto regime’s statement that it 
was common people who had got sick and tired of the Communists that committed the 
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atrocity (Soeharto). Moreover, none of the Paruk villagers are reported killed or missing. It is 
said that everybody goes home safe and sound (Tohari, Dancer 277-8). The ordeals that 
Srintil experiences are explicitly repressed in the name of time and maturity: 
That the upheaval in Srintil’s life had just begun the day she was first jailed is 
narrated elsewhere. That story begins with the story of a beautiful ronggeng 
twenty years old, who was physically imprisoned and held psychologically 
captive within the walls of history, walls that had risen out of selfish greed 
and misadventure [emphasis added]. 
To enable us to open the pages of that story, specific conditions must be met. 
One of these is the passage of time, which has the power to dissolve all 
sentimentality [emphasis added]. The conditions also demand a maturity of 
character and a certain degree of honesty in the reader which would provide 
the courage to acknowledge historical truth. Only if these conditions are met, 
can the story of Srintil be told. If they are not met, the story will disappear 
forever to become a part of the secret that surrounds Paruk. (267) 
Besides the fact that “the upheaval . . . is narrated elsewhere”, the novel blames Srintil’s 
imprisonment on “selfish greed and misadventure”, which have been intrinsically associated 
with the Paruk villagers and intrinsically and extrinsically with the PKI. The military is 
totally out of the picture. The narrator also mentions the power of time to dissolve all 
sentimentality, which certainly refers to the victims of the persecution rather than the 
perpetrators.  
Although he is specifically assigned to monitor and clear the village from the 
Communists, Rasus, the main representative of the military in this novel, is portrayed as 
innocent, as can be seen from the following confession: 
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 Perhaps it was because of this vow that I had often felt inner conflict when I 
was stationed in Central Java immediately after the upheaval of 1965. I often 
had to fire mortar shells on bunkers that were probably filled with human 
beings [emphasis added]. Fortunately, I never saw with my own eyes the 
people who fell [emphasis added], cowering under the onslaught of bombs that 
I had fired. But, I once found myself in a critical situation where I had only 
two choices, to kill or be killed [emphasis added]. I chose the former. My 
opponent was a young man swinging a machete. He was the one that collapsed 
in death because my bayonet was faster than his machete. I saw him just 
before he died, gasping for breath, his eyes wide and staring, his chest torn 
open by my bayonet. Aside from the political motivations that drove him to 
join the rebels, he was just a man like myself. And I murdered him. (Tohari, 
Dancer 433). 
There are several narrative strategies that the author uses above to repress Rasus’ killing of 
the Communists. First, it is implied that there is a possibility that Rasus does not kill anyone 
at all. After all, Rasus never sees with his own eyes the people who die because of his shells. 
The bunkers were only “probably filled with human beings”. Second, when he eventually 
kills, it is because he must protect himself, not because of a political difference. The killing of 
the Communists is not a matter of choice and is thus depoliticised. By extension, the same 
argument has been widely used by the military forces to justify the massacre. They killed the 
Communists because they were attacked first and had to defend themselves (Notosusanto and 
Saleh). Third, Rasus and the other military officers are pictured as feeling deep guilt about 
the depoliticised killing. This practically makes him and his colleagues as much the victims 
as the killed communists, whereas the real culprit is the situation or, in Wood and Flinders’ 
term, “the realm of fate” (155).  
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From the analysis above, the exclusion of one discourse always brings about the 
inclusion of another and an inclusion consistently precipitates an exclusion. Aside from the 
role of agent, this finding is in line with the premise of Foucault in The History of Sexuality 
and Bhabha in “The Other Questions”, as discussed in 0.3. This destabilisation of discourse 
can happen with the same or different subjects, like for example when The Dancer represses 
the Communists’ critical discourses but exposes their manipulations and when the inclusion 
of the Communists’ manipulation brings about the exclusion of Paruk’s cultural beliefs and 
the military’s killings. The reason why the author excludes and depoliticises the military’s 
exploits will be explored further in the following section. 
 
1.2.3 The Dancer and Professionalism 
“The Rainbow’s Arc” is the last part of The Dancer and it tells of the life of Srintil and the 
Paruk villagers after the massacre of the Communists in 1965-6. Srintil and Paruk enter a new 
epoch in the history of post-colonial Indonesia, known as the Suharto era or the military era 
(see 1.1). In this new constellation, the ruling classes were the military, business owners or 
the bourgeoisie, and professionals or, in Karl Marx and Frederich Engels’ The Communist 
Manifesto (1848), “the new class of petty bourgeoisie … [which is] fluctuating between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois 
society” (70). The military needed the business owners to financially support their rule while 
the business owners needed the military to provide stability, to safeguard the capitalistic 
economic system, and to pacify the working class. The professionals, however, gave a 
political legitimacy to the Suharto regime, ran the bureaucracy, and supported the private 
businesses. Besides the military forces and business owners, Suharto’s rise was also helped 
by the support of a civilian organisation of professionals named Golongan Karya (Vickers 
161; see also 1.1). Golongan Karya participated in the general election but officially refused 
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to call itself a political party, highlighting its supposedly ‘apolitical’ nature. It conveniently 
won all of the six general elections during the Suharto era, dominated the parliament, and 
elected Suharto as the president six times. It is this civilian professional class that Srintil is 
now set against in the last part of the novel.  
 
Fig. 10. Golongan Karya, or the Functional Group, the civilian pillar of the Suharto regime. 
The politicisation of the civilian professionals: The civilian professionals in the 
story are represented by two male characters: Marsusi and Bajus. Marsusi runs a state-owned 
rubber plantation in Wanakeling while Bajus works for a private contractor company from 
Jakarta. Although not as wealthy as the bourgeois masters, the professionals hold a 
considerably large amount of economic capital. Bourdieu states that “economic capital is the 
root of all the other types of capital” despite his efforts to identify the other types of capital 
(“Forms” 252). Although it is not always the case, economic capital can alter someone’s 
social and cultural position, as in the case of Marsusi and Bajus. With their wealth, they 
achieve cultural and social acceptance among the poor, uneducated, and freshly 
122 
 
excommunicated Paruk village. They exert their economic, social, and cultural power to win 
Srintil, who is now stripped of all her capital due to her past involvement with the PKI. 
Marsusi, the rubber plantation manager, already appeared in the second part of The 
Dancer. There he is described as an uncultured but well-off man. He wants to sleep with 
Srintil but his method is rather crude, that is, by showing off his money and other material 
possessions. Marsusi thinks that the most respected capital in a poor community like Paruk 
village must be material wealth. To some extent, the narrative justifies his presumption. 
Kartareja and his wife fall too easily to the lure of Marsusi’s wealth: “Knowing that it was 
likely that Marsusi had brought a gold necklace with a diamond pendulum, Mrs. Kartareja 
rallied all her powers to influence Srintil” (Tohari, Dancer 150). Srintil understands 
Marsusi’s strategy and the weakness of her mentors. As stated in the story: “[s]he had heard 
the roar of a motor cycle entering the village, and knew that Mrs. Kartareja would soon come 
for her” (150). A motorcycle in that era functioned not only as a medium of transport 
(economic capital) but also as what Bourdieu terms: “symbolic capital, that is . . . the 
acquisition of a reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honourability” 
(Distinction 291). He elaborates this definition elsewhere:  
a symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognized as capital and recognized as 
legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition, e.g., 
in the matrimonial market and in all the markets in which economic capital is 
not fully recognized, whether in matters of culture, with the great art 
collections or great cultural foundations, or in social welfare, with the 
economy of generosity and the gift. (“Forms” 245) 
Marsusi’s motorcycle symbolises his modern culture and high social class in the backward 
Paruk village. The owner of the motorcycle believes that it will bring recognition in the 
“matrimonial market”, or, in other words, that it will attract the attention and appreciation of 
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women, particularly Srintil. Later, this old playboy also offers his motorcycle to Srintil, 
which testifies his “economy of generosity and gift”. 
Marsusi evidently has economic capital but apparently does not show the traits of a 
gentleman in regard to his possession of cultural and social capital. After winning The 
Kartarejas’ consent, he throws a gold necklace with a diamond pendulum on the table, and 
directly says to Srintil: “Take it” (Tohari, Dancer 154). Apparently, he has not realised that it 
is Srinthil at the peak of her glory that he is facing. It is Srintil who has developed her own 
theory of men:  
Firstly, there were men who acted like randy bulls and harassed or abused 
women, like most of the men who came to her. They snorted and roared like 
tigers after successfully pouncing upon a deer . . .  
The other kind of men she disliked were those who were weak. They grinned 
sheepishly, were easily dominated, and had no strength when confronted by a 
beautiful ronggeng like herself. They willingly gave everything they had, but 
then whined to her afterwards, almost begging. If she had wanted, Srintil could 
have commanded them to do anything. She treated them like servants. Men 
like these were gossipers revealing the worst about their own wives to Srintil, 
hoping to get her sympathy, and so create greater intimacy with her. Srintil 
especially hated men like this.  
Another kind of male she liked, though, were men like Rasus, and he was her 
only example. He was as agile as a young deer, his self-confidence almost 
approaching his arrogance, and he would never beg or whine. (Tohari, Dancer 
152) 
The categorisation above testifies how Srintil has evolved from ‘an ignorant little ronggeng’ 
into a sophisticated, powerful woman. Her experiences with a number of powerful men have 
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brought her a degree of consciousness of her own existence vis a vis men as her constant 
pursuers. The passage above also foretells that Srintil will never bow down to Marsusi, who 
conveniently falls into her first category of men.  This is a power relation between an 
uncultured rich man and a culturally sophisticated, socially experienced, and economically 
well-off woman. In addition, it also shows that economic capital does not always transform 
into cultural and social capital successfully, particularly if the owner of the capital projects 
too much “economism” (Bourdieu, “Forms” 252). 
It is not difficult for Srintil to face and exert her power over Marsusi. Srintil starts her 
encounter with Marsusi with a silence. By doing so, Srintil places herself above Marsusi and 
provokes him to beg for her attention. Only after that point does Srintil start to talk and, once 
again, she humiliates Marsusi:  
You want to give me the necklace not as a payment for performing dance with 
you, but for something else. Oh, Mr. Marsusi, I can understand why you are 
doing this, because what of I’ve done in the past with a number of men. But, 
sir . . . 
You see, I don’t want to do that again. (Tohari, Dancer 160) 
What Srintil is really putting forward is the idea of professionalism. She is a dancer and will 
receive a payment for dancing, not for sex.  This is quite a new development because Srintil 
has been taught by Kartareja and his wife in the first part of the trilogy that sex is an integral 
part of her ‘job description’. Furthermore, Srintil is actually humiliating Marsusi on his own 
ground as she gives a lecture on professionalism to Marsusi who is, by trade, a professional.  
The second encounter between Srintil and Marsusi takes place in the last part of The 
Dancer. Her situation is totally different now. The only thing that Srintil still possesses after 
the tragedy of 1965-6 is her beauty. As Mrs. Kartareja says to Srintil, “no matter where, no 
matter when, a beautiful woman is always better off than an ugly woman” (Tohari, Dancer 
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321). Nevertheless, in Srintil’s case this beauty becomes a curse rather than a blessing. 
Without her economic, cultural, and social power, Srintil’s beauty becomes a mere object, an 
easy target for adventurous men. In contrast, Marsusi remains a rich man, probably richer, as 
symbolised by his new motorcycle. He is still obsessed with Srintil and uses the same display 
of wealth to win her over. Through Mrs. Kartareja, he promises to give Srintil his new 
motorcycle if she is willing to have a date with him.  
Seeing that Srintil remains unmoved, Marsusi learns his lesson and tries a more 
cultured approach. He starts talking about the possibility of Srintil marrying him, as he is now 
a widower. Furthermore, he finds out what Srintil fears and needs the most in this difficult 
time: security. For the first time in the story Marsusi displays his social capital, that is, by 
contacting an officer who receives Srintil’s biweekly parole report. The officer in turn signals 
to Srintil his comradeship with Marsusi and asks her to obey the playboy. This time Srintil 
genuinely fears Marsusi because she does not fully comprehend the system and network of 
the bureaucracy. She does not understand the differences between a policeman, a military 
officer, and a plantation manager (Tohari, 2012). In her mind, every officer is the same, the 
hand of power. Srintil eventually surrenders to Marsusi’s wish. Ironically, in the end it is told 
that Marsusi takes pity on Srinthil and does not sleep with her, which is related to the 
repression of sexuality as discussed in 1.2.1.  
If the PKI exploits sexuality for politics, and Marsusi plays politics for sex, Bajus, the 
second petty bourgeoisie, uses both sexuality and politics for business. He is a contractor sent 
directly from Jakarta to lead a government project near Paruk village. This introduction 
carries a high degree of similitude with the dawn of the Suharto era, which was characterised 
by new projects countrywide that were funded by the pro-Suharto western powers (see 
Weinstein). Furthermore, the introduction directly reveals Bajus’ forms of capital. As with 
Marsusi, Bajus looks rich and is the leader of a state-sponsored project. He drives a car and 
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this fact is highlighted by the narrator, signalling the superiority of his symbolic capital over 
Marsusi’s motorcycle. It is no coincidence, in fact, that Tohari pictures the petty bourgeoisie 
in the novel as frequently showing off their symbolic capital.  As Bourdieu postulates, in real 
life, a petty bourgeois “deploys prodigious energy and ingenuity in ‘living beyond its means’ 
. . . not to mention all the forms of ‘imitation’ and all the things that can be made to ‘look 
like’ something they are not, so many ways in which the petit bourgeois makes his home and 
himself look bigger than they are” (Distinction 321). This class essentially wants to be 
recognised as the big bourgeoisie despite lacking the means.  
In addition to his economic capital and its symbolic power, Bajus also seems to have a 
good network in the bureaucracy, perhaps even better than Marsusi, who only knows the 
local bureaucracy. The most significant description, however, is of his cultural capital. A 
contractor signifies a higher degree of learning and sophistication than the manager of a 
rubber plantation. Furthermore, there is a reason why the author mentions Jakarta as his place 
of origin. In the rural countryside, Jakarta is not merely seen as the capital of the country. It 
also has a great deal of cultural significance in the post-colonial country, being seen as the 
most modern, the most learned, and the most powerful place (Paramadhita 500).   
At the beginning, Srintil shows respect to Bajus as reverentially as she does to the 
other government officials in the story. She dares not reject Bajus’ wish to visit her. Due to 
his cultured approach, Bajus begins to attract Srintil’s attention. While Marsusi directly 
discloses his sexual intention to Srintil, Bajus says he just wants to pay a visit:  
I really just want to get to know you. Don’t worry, I’m not married and my 
intentions are honorable. What do you say? . . . 
That’s alright. Well, that’s all for now. Tomorrow or the next day, I’d like to 
come to Paruk and visit you. Would that be okay? (Tohari, Dancer 366) 
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He keeps his promise, treats Srintil respectfully, and even offers her a serious relationship. As 
reported, “Bajus politely visited Srintil, his behavior steadfast and apparently lacking in 
ulterior motives. Sometimes he came with friends, and sometimes he invited Kartareja to 
accompany him. Everything was open and correct” (406). Srintil, seeing herself as a former 
prostitute and communist prisoner, cannot help feeling elevated by this young, unmarried, 
rich, cultured and powerful, or in other words, ‘perfect’ man. This time her first reaction is 
the same as he reaction to Marsusi earlier in the story: a silence. Nonetheless, the meaning of 
the silence is very different now. It is a cultural silence that a Javanese girl typically gives 
when she agrees with an idea (Mulder, Individual). At the same time, it is also a silence of 
fear due to uncertainty, as Srintil is not certain whether it is socially possible to have a proper 
relationship with a ‘government officer’.  
Using both cultural and social capital, Bajus slowly but surely leads Srintil out of her 
fear. He asks the local administrator to pay Srintil fairly for her land, which is taken by the 
state-sponsored project. He helps Srintil find and rebuild a house. He visits Srintil regularly 
as a boyfriend normally does. Bajus also takes Srintil on a real vacation, the first one that she 
has ever had in her life. Thus, “Srintil had to admit that he was flawless in behavior; he only 
spoke as needed and his words were simple and direct” (Tohari, Dancer 408). More 
significantly, Bajus’ social capital protects and makes Srintil feel safe as he provides her with 
‘absolution’ from her past mistakes. As the narrator explains, the people of Dawuan district 
(where Paruk is located) have simple minds. As Bajus is a contractor in a government-
sponsored project, he is seen as a government officer although actually he is not. When Bajus 
becomes closer to Srinthil, that means that Srintil has already been absolved by the 
government. As a result, Srintil feels deeply indebted to Bajus as she once felt towards Bakar.  
As Bakar leads her to a great tragedy, so does Bajus. It is revealed near the end of the 
story that Bajus is as morally questionable as Bakar. While Bakar manipulates Srintil’s 
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sensuality and political ignorance for a political ambition, Bajus exploits her sexuality and 
her nature as a political pariah for business gain. He approaches Srintil because he wants to 
give her to a bigger contractor from Jakarta so that he gets a share of a contract. Last but not 
least, he never shows any intention of having a sexual relationship with Srintil because he is 
sexually impotent due to an accident in a previous project. The fact that Bajus is made 
impotent in the story signifies the same repression of sexuality that has been discussed in 
1.2.1.  
While repressing their sexual acts, Ahmad Tohari critically exposes the sexual 
exploits and financial greed of this class of civilian professionals. The civilian professionals 
are portrayed as a cunning class, justifying every means to achieve their end. By so doing, he 
politicises the ostensibly apolitical class and undermines its claimed disinterestedness. Tohari 
has thus drawn a parallel between the professionals and the Communists. Both the communist 
Bakar and the professional Bajus possess the institutionalised cultural capital of higher 
education. Bakar ruthlessly brings Srintil and the Paruk villagers to a political tragedy and, 
later, only worries about his own safety and does literally nothing to save the villagers. 
Similarly, Bajus manipulates Srintil’s sincere trust and drives her to insanity. Not unlike the 
Communists, the professionals also represent ‘madness’ in the framework of the Foucauldian 
discourse. I argue that it is this very comparison that provoked the wrath of the regime and 
made the author and the book respectively interrogated and censored. It was not about the 
exposition of the Communists, who are negatively portrayed, or the 1965 massacre, which is 
substantially repressed in the novel. This is supported by the fact that the government allowed 
the second part of the book to be published but withheld the publication of the third part (see 
1.2.2). It is also consistent with Garcia’s observation that the highest contribution of the book 
and the very reason why it was censored is its “portrayal of local deprivation following 
Suharto’s rise to power” (122).   
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The depoliticisation of the military professionals: Unable to cope with this latest 
trial, Srintil experiences a severe psychological breakdown. She is confined in a room, where 
she eats and defecates. Srintil’s confinement echoes the close link between madness and 
power, as detailed by Foucault in History of Madness. In the Age of Reason, according to 
Foucault, insanity was considered a moral error rather than a psychological problem, and the 
insane were put in the same category as prostitutes and blasphemers. They were seen as 
having freely chosen to be, respectively, eccentric, immoral, and blasphemous as, in a similar 
manner, the novel perceives a ronggeng like Srintil. Not only was she portrayed as a hopeless 
victim of the Communists and the professionals, but she was also cursed as a victim of her 
own doing. Ironically, similar to both the Communists and the professionals that have 
destroyed her life, Srintil also represents the side of madness in this Foucauldian scheme. The 
treatment of the insane was to exclude them from society, as Srintil is confined to her room.  
Rasus, her childhood boyfriend, saves Srintil from this confinement only to bring her 
into a more modern confinement, the mental hospital. Modern confinement started at the end 
of the nineteenth century with the establishment of mental institutions under the supervision 
of professionals (Foucault, Madness). Foucault argues that the more informed and gentle 
treatment of the insane in these new institutions is as just as inhumane as the confinement in 
the Age of Reason. It is because “modern man no longer communicates with the madman . . . 
there is no common language: or rather, it no longer exists” (xxviii). In addition to portraying 
the banishment of Srintil to the mental institution, this observation further symbolises how 
the Suharto regime refused to talk and listen to the dissidents or the others. The story ends 
with the stream of consciousness of Rasus, the modern man, not Srintil, the mad woman, 
despite her pervading presence throughout the novel.  
While the Communists and the professionals jointly epitomise the notion of madness, 
Rasus and his military background represent the side of reason. Exposing and politicising the 
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civilian professionals, Tohari once again represses and depoliticises the exploits of the 
military as the main pillar of the Suharto regime. Rasus, the military officer, is again 
portrayed as a gentle and noble man who does not seek revenge on Marsusi and Bajus, 
despite their abuse of Srintil. He cold-headedly focuses only on the well-being of Srintil and 
the Paruk community instead. As a matter of fact, this was highly unthinkable during the 
military era. Nobody would dare touch anybody close to a military officer, let alone his lover, 
because everyone was afraid of the inevitable reprisals. Almost at the end of the story, Rasus 
shows a complete disinterestedness by promising to marry Srintil in the future.   
The Dancer therefore de-professionalises the civilian professionals while at the same 
time professionalising the military officers. The latter was in line with the Suharto regime’s 
propaganda that the military was apolitical and acted only for the benefit of the state. The 
problem here is not just whether the military officers are professional but also the deceptive 
concept of professionalism. If professionalism merely means independence from political 
processes and parties, the military officers of the Suharto era were indeed professional 
because they are neither elected by the people nor steered by political parties. Yet here lies 
the danger of depoliticisation that Wood and Flinders and other critical theorists have warned 
about (see 0.3). The Indonesian military cannot be held accountable by anyone but itself, and 
it did steer the political parties rather than being steered. Still on the concept of 
professionalism, Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (1957), states that professional militaries focus on “the development 
of technical expertise and the fulfilment of their institutional responsibilities” (121). They are 
likely to follow regulations made by civilian authorities, maintain their neutrality and 
distance themselves from the temptations of political interference. Nevertheless, as Marcus 
Mietzner says in his 2009 book, “[Huntington’s] ‘professionalism’ does not exclude the 
possibility that militaries acquire professional skills that may encourage intervention in 
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politics” (15). As a matter of fact, they may use their technical expertise to subjugate civilians 
as the Indonesian military used their training from the country’s western allies to suppress 
political dissidents in the country. 
Similar to the case of Sufism in 1.2.1, the professionalisation of the military shows 
that the inclusion of a discourse does not always constitute a politicisation of the discourse. 
Rasus and the military are there only to reinforce the dominant narrative about the apolitical 
military. This military depoliticisation saved the author from the worst retribution of the 
regime’s ideological policing. Although Tohari had to undergo an interrogation by the state 
apparatus for his criticism of the civilian professionals as the supporting pillar of the military 
regime, he saved himself by not attacking the main pillar of the regime and even put the 
military in a positive light. This ‘hedging’ fundamentally represents the Foucauldian 
inclusionary mechanism of ‘commentary’. Paraphrasing Foucault, Said says: “over and above 
every opportunity for saying something, there stands a regularizing collectivity called a 
discourse” (World 186). Tohari might have flirted to a certain extent with the discourses of 
resistance, but, in the end, he conformed to the demands of the grand narrative of the regime. 
Furthermore, the commentary also signifies an act of depoliticisation because the political act 
of the military in the novel is transferred into the allegedly apolitical, official history of 
Indonesia by the military.   
The politically starved market at the time was also enthusiastic about this ‘illusion’ of 
resistance. The fact that this part of the novel was censored by the government gave a strong 
credential to the illusion and made the market even more curious about it. As a result, Tohari 
has enjoyed a wide readership as well as having his novel adapted twice, which is an 
extremely rare case in Indonesia. Last but not least, he also received critical acceptance from 
both the liberal humanist literary circles and, later, the left-wing circles. They both applaud 
Tohari’s bravery in criticising the ruthless regime. It does not seem to matter to them that 
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Tohari only politicises the civilian professionals but depoliticises the military professionals. 
The fact that he dares to problematise the regime in the novel at all is considered a significant 
achievement, considering the oppresive situation at the time of its writing.   
 
1.3 Conclusion 
The Dancer is a narrative of power relations and capital between Srintil and the powerfuls, 
namely the Kejawen community, the PKI, and the professionals. The struggles in the novel 
signify the power relations between the author, the government, the market, and the 
communities in the Suharto era, particularly in regard to the issues of religion, politics, and 
professionalism.  
In the first part of the novel, Tohari repoliticises the long-depoliticised Javanese belief 
and its community. Through the character of Srintil, the author has given a voice to and even 
subverted the triple subjugated subject in Indonesia: a female prostitute of a backward 
community. There are at least three deviant sexual practices and beliefs in Paruk, namely the 
normalcy of prostitution, prostitutes, and open marriage. The representation of Paruk as a 
politically alive and sexually free community does not necessarily mean that Tohari condones 
this community of belief and its unique ways of life. The author politicises Paruk’s sexuality 
and the politics around it only to discredit them in the end. Simultaneously, he offers a 
depoliticised side of the village, particularly through the portrayal of sufistic principles, and 
condones it. The sufistic discourse prevails because it represents the truth held by the author, 
the dominant ethnic Javanese, and the majority Traditionalist/Cultural Muslims. Tohari’s 
Sufism also shared, if not supported, the Islamic deradicalisation by the government and the 
literary communities of Jakarta. Yet, the sufistic mysticism and traditionalism were in direct 
conflict with the economic-oriented government and the cosmopolitan literary circles. Above 
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all, the politicisation and depoliticisation of Paruk reflects his idea of an ideal society: an 
apolitical but moral Islamic society.    
In the second part of the novel, Srintil encounters the largest and strongest political 
party in the Sukarno era: the PKI. Srintil and her community this time are not given as much 
political voice and power as in the early part of the novel. They are portrayed as uncritical 
victims of the manipulation and propaganda of the PKI. The Dancer also depoliticises the 
PKI in that it only reinforces what has been believed about the party and removes the 
possibility of new debates. By means of stylistics, Tohari represses how the PKI represented 
itself while highlighting how the party condemned its enemies. The repression of the 
communist discourses was driven less by the demand of prohibition than the dominant 
ideology. Beside his theistic and non-materialistic belief, the author’s political sympathy goes 
with the ignorance and poor being wrongly accused of and unfairly punished for 
Communism, which was the political stance of the liberal humanist literary circles. As for the 
market, the mere exposition of the Communists, be it negative or positive, attracted the 
politically starved society of the Suharto era.  
While the PKI signifies the negative side of Dawuan, the military, as represented by 
Srintil’s boyfriend Rasus, stands for the positive face of the city. Rasus dramatically changes 
from an innocent into a reflective and eloquent man due to his contact with the military. His 
intellectual register embodies a Foucauldian truth as well as a discursive depoliticisation. In 
contrast to the PKI’s sexual exploitation, the military is portrayed as asexual or, at worst, not 
sexually exploitative. The Dancer also suppresses the military’s persecution and killing of the 
suspected communists by the pretexts of time and maturity. There are three narrative 
strategies that the author uses to repress Rasus’ killing of the Communists, namely, 
ignorance, self-defence, and guilt, which have been widely used by the military to justify and 
depoliticise the massacre.  
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In the third part, Srintil is pitched against one of the new ruling classes in the Suharto 
era, the civilian professionals, who are represented by Marsusi and Bajus. Using their capital, 
they try to manipulate the now politically pariah Srintil for a sexual exploit and economic 
benefit. Here, Tohari politicises the ostensibly apolitical class and undermines its claimed 
disinterestedness, thus drawing a parallel between the professionals and the Communists. 
While de-professionalising the civilian professionals, Tohari professionalises and hence 
depoliticises the military professionals. This military depoliticisation fundamentally 
represents the Foucauldian inclusionary mechanism of ‘commentary’. The novelist might 
have flirted with the discourses of resistance, but, in the end, he conformed to the grand 
narrative of the Suharto government, which saved him from the worst retribution of the 
regime’s ideological policing. The politically starved market at the time was also enthusiastic 
about this ‘illusion’ of resistance. The novel also received critical acceptance from both the 
liberal humanist literary groups and, later, the left-wing circles. As a result, not only has 
Tohari enjoyed a wide readership but his novel has also been adapted twice, which is 
extremely rare in Indonesia. All in all, The Dancer is an extended metaphor of the author 
negotiating his way through the pressures from the government, the market, and the 
communities.  
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Chapter Two 
The First Adaptation: Blood, Sex, and Money 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, so far there has been no academic study of Yazman 
Yazid’s film Blood and Crown of the Dancer (henceforth, Blood and Crown), the first 
adaptation of Ahmad Tohari’s novel The Dancer. This film has been mentioned only in the 
reviews and studies of the critically acclaimed second adaptation of the novel and it has 
usually been negatively compared with the latter. Part of the problem is that Blood and 
Crown has not been considered as a serious/interpretive/political film and, therefore, it has 
not been considered worth analysing. It is consistently dismissed as a film that only exploits 
sexuality and does not faithfully represent the content of the political novel (see 0.2). In this 
chapter, I argue that Blood and Crown, as far as its surviving screenplay is concerned, is as 
serious, interpretive, and political as the novel and the second adaptation. The film 
powerfully represents what Krishna Sen has called “the politics of depoliticisation” as 
propagated and practised by the Indonesian military regime (Indonesian 6). I will begin my 
analysis by examing the impacts of the military regime’s political, economic, and cultural 
136 
 
policies on the contemporary film institutions and discourses. I will then continue with the 
discussion of specific factors behind the disappearance of the film, ranging from the base and 
superstructure of the film archiving to the cultural status of film adaptation. The final part 
will demonstrate how the depoliticisation and politicisation of Indonesian cinema correspond 
with the content of the surviving script of the missing film. 
 
2.1 Film Institutions and Discourses in the Military Era 
In this sub-chapter, I will present a historical survey of Indonesian cinema during the 
Suharto/New Order/military era (1965-98). Among the few available studies of Indonesian 
cinema, there are two monographs that have attracted most attention from scholars, namely, 
Karl Heider’s Indonesian Cinema: National Culture on Screen (1991) and Krishna Sen’s 
Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New Order (1994). There are at least three reasons why 
these two works have gained their prominence. First of all, they were written by scholars 
from English-speaking countries with all of the privileges previously discussed in 0.1. The 
fact that the two researchers were ‘outsiders’ also gave them certain freedom and detachment 
that their Indonesian counterparts, such as Misbach Yusa Biran and Salim Said, could not 
possibly afford at the time. Thomas Barker, in 2012, even considers Biran and Said as “key 
ideologues . . . [who were] heavily invested in the maintenance of New Order ideology” (17). 
Second, these books are relatively new compared to similar works such as Biran’s Indonesian 
Cinema: A Glance of History (1982) and Snapshots of Indonesian Film History and Non-
Theatrical Films in Indonesia (1987), and Said’s Shadows on the Silver Screen: A Social 
History of Indonesian Films (1991). There have been a few publications on the military-era 
cinema since 1994, but they are all articles about specific films and topics. So far, these two 
books are the most comprehensive literature on the subject. 
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In addition to those common strengths, there are deeper similarities between the two 
monographs. First, they both agree that Indonesian cinema generally emphasises the 
importance of ‘order’. Heider argues that, while Hollywood cinema focuses on “good/evil” 
and “good guys/bad guys”, Indonesian films are concerned about “order/disorder” and 
“agents of order/agents of disorder” (29). Sen goes further by stating: “I would argue almost 
every film produced in New Order Indonesia has a narrative structure that moves from order 
through disorder to a restoration of the order” (159).  The different orientations between 
Hollywood and Indonesian cinema represent the different ways in which they look at 
individuals and society. While the realisation of ‘goodness’ in Hollywood cinema 
necessitates an individual resisting a society, ‘order’ in Indonesian films requires an 
individual submitting to a society. The third similarity is that both books recognise the 
powerful influences of the state on Indonesian cinema. This includes the roles of 
governmental institutions and policies in the film industry, films, and audiences.  
Nevertheless, there are several differences between the two studies and I will discuss 
only those directly relevant to my topic. First of all, Heider’s book is based on an 
anthropological study that attempts to understand Indonesian people from their films and vice 
versa. Sen’s book, however, is derived from a ‘proper’ film study, covering technical, 
substantial, historical, and theoretical aspects of Indonesian cinema. This difference seems to 
influence their selection of research subjects. While Sen tends to focus on avant-garde or 
auteur films, Heider deliberately deals with formula or genre films. As he states: 
There is an irony in all this for an anthropologist: The most useful films for a 
cultural analysis are the genre films, while the best films from a 
cinematographic standpoint are the auteur films which have been deliberately 
distanced from their cultural roots . . . a list of the Ten Best Indonesian Films 
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would not be the same as a list of the Ten Most Indonesian Films. And here, as 
anthropologist, I am looking for Indonesian-ness in cinema. (6) 
Finally, Sen disagrees with what she calls Heider’s “universalist” and “nationalist” arguments 
concerning the representation of women as passive objects in Indonesian cinema (135). 
Heider contends that that kind of representation is not uniquely Indonesian but universal; 
there are many strong images of women in Indonesian films. Being an anthropologist, Heider 
tries to describe the representation of women ‘as it is’, while Sen, being a feminist, appears to 
go further by asking ‘why it is so’.  
The following historical survey will be based mainly on those two important studies. 
However, I will try to relocate their findings in the contexts of depoliticisation and 
politicisation as well as to give more attention to a subject barely discussed in either work: 
Indonesian film adaptation. Unlike my historical survey in Chapter One, I will first discuss 
Indonesian film institutions before examining what and how specific discourses were 
depoliticised and politicised in Indonesian cinema because, unlike Indonesian literature, 
Indonesian cinema has been intensely controlled and influenced by state and private 
institutions. 
 
2.1.1 Depoliticised Institutions 
Heider does not have much to say about Indonesian film institutions although he 
acknowledges their powerful influence over films. By contrast, Sen does and further 
classifies those institutions into four groups, namely, 1) corporate and professional bodies, 2) 
production, import, and distribution, 3) government censorship, and 4) audiences. They 
respectively correspond with the communities, market (including audience), and government 
in my own division of external factors in Indonesian literature and cinema. It is my 
contention that all of the institutions played a significant role in the depoliticisation and 
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politicisation of Indonesian films. The much feared and talked about government censorship 
is just part of the whole story. 
Film communities: The film communities comprise Dewan Film Nasional (the Film 
Council), Festival Film Indonesia (the Indonesian Film Festival), and professional 
organisations. The first Film Council aimed to “facilitate productions of quality films which 
would function as models to commercial producers and raise audience appreciation of 
Indonesian cinema” (Sen, Indonesian 52). The productions were funded by a flat levy on 
imported films as regulated through the Ministerial Decree No. 71 Fund by the Minister of 
Information B. M. Diah (Biro Hukum, 1964). The Council was thus an attempt to provide a 
forum and an organisation for filmmakers that would be independent from bureaucratic and 
financial interests.  
This spirit of independence was well-reflected in the Council’s membership 
composition and criteria. The Council consisted of nine members who were selected based on 
their “expertise, experience, education and dedication to national cinema, from . . . the private 
and the government sector, not representing organisations nor because of official position” 
(Biro Hukum, 1964, my trans.). This composition and criteria clearly represent the advanced 
governmental and societal depoliticisation, as discussed by Wood and Flinders. The 
Council’s policy making was being liberated from the control of the government and existing 
political parties. This action was more typical of advanced democratic countries than military 
states like New Order Indonesia. 
The advanced depoliticisation, however, only lasted for a year. Air Marshall Budiarjo, 
the new Minister of Information, restructured the Council by almost doubling its 
membership, with seven members from government departments (Biro Hukum, 1964). The 
Council’s role was now reduced to advising the Minister on matters of policy. The next 
minister, Mashuri revoked the Ministerial Decree No. 71 Fund, the raison d’etre of the 
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Council. Its advisory function was also taken over by another institution. The Council was 
eventually revived from limbo by General Ali Murtopo, the fourth Minister and a very 
powerful figure in the military’s intelligence activities. It now had forty-nine members with 
the Minister as its ex-officio chairperson (Biro Hukum, 1979). Six of its members were from 
the Department of Information and there was one from each of six other government 
departments. The remaining eighteen were representatives of religious and social 
organisations, including Golongan Karya (the ruling party)-affiliated groups, and individual 
intellectuals and academics. The Council’s policies and guidelines “increasingly echoed the 
same instructions from other institutions”, particularly the censors (Sen, Indonesian 54). Very 
little changed under the next Minister of Information, Harmoko. In 1986, the minister defined 
its function simply as making recommendations to the minister about promoting the film 
industry—all of these developments show how in the military era governmental politicisation 
worked simultaneously with societal depoliticisation. The Council was effectively taken over 
by the government and concurrently freed from political parties, except the ruling party 
Golongan Karya. The existence of social and individual entities in the Council was merely 
for the purpose of legitimising the preconceived policies of the government. 
The next film institution is the Indonesian Film Festival, which was a regular annual 
event during the military era. The festival was mostly held in the national capital and 
sometimes in different provincial capitals. Critics saw it merely as a publicity campaign for 
the successive information ministers and provincial governors (Sen, Indonesian 53). The 
festival was also the single biggest publicity event for Indonesian cinema itself. It drew 
enormous media attention to Indonesian cinema and was the only occasion when major 
theatres in the city where it was held showed Indonesian rather than foreign films. The jury 
members were selected by the festival’s organising committee and appointed by the Minister 
of Information (Biran, Snapshot). In general, the jury’s opinions were very similar to those 
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expressed in the film reviews of national publications such as Kompas and Tempo because 
journalists from those media regularly sat among the jury (Sen, Indonesian 54).  
Although appointed by the government, the intellectuals were sometimes not in 
agreement with the bureaucrats and financiers. According to Sen, the award can be seen “to 
represent the values, ideals, and interests of the urban intelligentsia, of which Indonesian 
filmmakers were a part” (Indonesian 55). The festival award system operated not by 
censorship (as the bureaucrats performed) or exclusion (as the financiers did), but through 
privileging certain films and their makers and, by extension, “certain perspectives on art and 
society” (55). Therefore, a state-produced film did not necessarily win a Citra (the 
Indonesian Oscar) as in the case of Janur Kuning (1974), a film about the heroic role of 
General Suharto in the War of Independence and a Citra did not necessarily make a film 
popular in the market. Nevertheless, there were state-produced films, still on the heroic role 
of the supreme leader of the regime, which were considered ‘artistic’ by the jury and hence 
won several Citras, such as Serangan Fajar (1982) and Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (1984). It 
is quite clear that the “certain perspectives on art and society” above refer to Liberal 
Humanism’s ‘art for art’s sake’, which has been discussed in the previous two chapters. 
Despite their occasional differences, the regime found this apolitical perspective on art and 
society generally harmless and agreeable. 
Due to the poor film database and lack of adaptation studies, I have only identified 
two film adaptations that won the best film category during the Suharto era. Those films are 
Pacar Ketinggalan Kereta (1988) and Taksi (1990). There should be many more victorious 
film ‘appropriations’ because there were many literary authors writing and/or directing 
winning films such as, just to name a few, Usmar Ismail (the father of Indonesian cinema), 
Asrul Sani, Teguh Karya, and Putu Wijaya. If the two film adaptations above can represent 
the privileged perspectives in Indonesian film adaptation in the military era, they clearly 
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belong to the art for art’s sake camp. Neither the source texts nor the adaptations could be 
considered ‘political’ even in the broad sense of the term. In addition, all of them were based 
on contemporary literature rather than writings from the previous eras. A possible reason for 
this is that literature from the previous eras, including the pre-independence era, usually had a 
strong social commitment, if not a political one (Foulcher).  
Ikatan Karyawan Film dan Televisi Indonesia (the Union of Film and Television 
Employees) became the only organisation for the artistic, technical, and unskilled staff of the 
film industry. The Union was set up to speak for ‘employees’ rather than ‘workers’, which 
had two very different political connotations in the anti-communist state (Sen, Indonesian 
55). Membership of the Union became compulsory for anyone wishing to work with film 
studios or production units. Aside from the political screening, this coercive measure was the 
embryo of the professionalisation or the advanced depoliticisation of the film industry in the 
post-military era (see 3.1). Consisting mainly of technical and unskilled staff, the Union was 
organised by the most highly paid and highly skilled professionals (Said). In 1976, five other 
organisations were officially endorsed as the only lawful organisations for specific sectors of 
cinema: the Indonesian Film Artists’ Union, the Indonesian Film Producers’ Union, the All 
Indonesian Association of Film Theatre Companies, the Indonesian Association of Film 
Studios, and the Indonesian Association of Subtitlers (Biro Hukum, 1979). Not unlike the 
Union’s case, no-one could take any part in the making of a film without the prior approval of 
the functional organisation of which he or she was a member. Sen concludes that those 
organisations generally failed to influence government policies that affected films and/or 
their members (Indonesian 56). 
Film market: Most film producers in the military era were small-scale entrepreneurs 
(Sen, Indonesian 65). Their financial insecurity made them highly sensitive to the slightest 
hint of government disapproval since they could not afford to have their films rejected by the 
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censors. As David Hanan highlights in “Innovation and Tradition in Indonesian Cinema” 
(2010), the fact that most of them were of Chinese or Indian descent certainly did not help 
their case. Therefore, these private producers generally played it safe and avoided producing 
films that provoked the censors, particularly political films. What I mean by ‘political films’ 
here are those which showed critical and/or different political views from those of the 
military regime. Sen posits that all Indonesian films of the military era were essentially 
political because they represented and supported the politics of depoliticisation of the military 
regime (Indonesian 6). Seemingly apolitical films of the military era were in fact highly 
political films in the same way that depoliticisation is the highest form of politicisation 
(Wood and Flinders).  
In the early 1970s, two companies closely associated with the government were set up 
(Sen, Indonesian 65). The first was Safari Sinar Sakti Film Corporation, which grew out of a 
group of performers who supported the political rallies of the government party. Metro 77 
started as a film unit of the Jakarta Metropolitan Police to educate the urban masses. In the 
late 1970s, the Minister of Information appointed General Gufran Dwipayana, a former 
personal assistant of the President for media affairs, as the head of Perusahaan Film Negara 
(the State Film Corporation). Liya Mendrawati, in 2008, describes how, under Dwipayana’s 
leadership, the Corporation transformed itself from a maker of newsreel and documentaries to 
a producer of the three big budget feature films on the heroic role of General Suharto. Given 
the small size and financial weakness of private companies, film making by the state and 
affiliated groups became a significant factor in Indonesian cinema. The three most expensive 
films made in Indonesia in the early 1980s, for instance, were all produced by these two 
entities.  
In terms of import, the military regime abolished the heavy restrictions against film 
imports that had been implemented by the Sukarno government and supported by the PKI. 
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The number of foreign films skyrocketed to about seven hundred in the late 1960s (Biran, 
Glance). So strong was the association of the anti-import with the condemned PKI that no-
one dared to question this new policy. However, direct sales of foreign films remained 
forbidden probably because of security and censorship concerns, particularly with regard to 
communist ideas, as well as the economic interests of the family and cronies of the new 
President. Yet, not long afterwards several factors forced the government to intervene on 
behalf of the local film industry. In its early years, the military regime had been generally 
responsive to the demands of local intellectuals and professionals to win their support. Even 
before 1965, film critics and professionals had started arguing against the unrestricted 
imports (see Biran, Glance). Sjuman Djaya, the appointed head of the Directorate of Film and 
a legendary filmmaker himself, pushed hard for the protection of the local film industry (Sen, 
Indonesian 57). The Minister B.M. Diah, a long-time cultural nationalist, was sympathetic to 
these demands and produced Ministerial Decree No. 71, which imposed a flat levy for each 
imported film as discussed previously. That money was then made available to local film 
productions and the funding import company credited as a co-producer. Due to this policy, 
local film production began to rise from only twenty-one in 1970 to eighty-four in 1974 
(Biran, Snapshot).  
The politico-economic development also forced the regime to show a greater gesture 
of nationalism. In January 1974, university students, secretly supported by prominent civilian 
and military figures, went on strike. This quickly turned into a great riot, in protest against the 
apparent domination of foreign capital in Indonesia (see Aspinall). Responding to the 
nationalistic sentiment and the sustained demand of local film professionals, the next 
Minister of Information, Mashuri decided to drastically cut imports by 100 each year (Biro 
Hukum, 1964). It also imposed a requirement on importers to fund the production of at least 
one Indonesian film for every three films they imported. In addition, it was now obligatory 
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for every theatre to show at least two Indonesian films every month. As a result, a record-
breaking number of 124 Indonesian films were produced in 1977 (Biran, Snapshot).  
However, at the same time the government was taking steps to increase the bargaining 
position of local film importers against foreign film sellers. The reason was no less 
nationalistic than the import restriction: that is, to build ‘national giants’ to counterbalance 
the power of ‘foreign giants’ and related political and cultural influences (Sen, Indonesian 58; 
see also Robison, Rise). As I argued in Chapter One, the Suharto government was, in many 
ways, fascistic rather than liberal. It bred and protected national capitalists, most of whom 
were the President’s cronies and family, at the expense of both local film professionals and 
multinational investors. Mashuri asked film importers to form four consortia to better 
negotiate with foreign film dealers (Sen, Indonesian 59). Nonetheless, over the years, imports 
were eventually monopolised by the Subentra Group, owned by Sudwikatmono, the foster 
brother of the President. The import monopoly was driven by the same businessman’s control 
of film theatres. With this dual power, Sudwikatmono could dictate to other importers and 
eventually acquired them into his growing empire.  
In 1979, when the regime and the consortia had consolidated their power, the next 
Minister, General Ali Murtopo, abolished the funding obligation and required importers just 
to pay a flat levy for every imported film (Biro Hukum, 1979). The levy was only a tenth of 
the average film production cost at the time. Keeping the import quota, Murtopo raised the 
permissible copies of every foreign film from two to six. This means that imported films 
could now play in six theatres at the same time and/or preserve better copies to penetrate 
smaller towns and second-run theatres. Thus, imported films now occupied a greater share of 
the market than in the pre-restriction era. Sudwikatmono, the import and theatre king, also 
began constructing theatres with multiple screens or multiplexes. The multiplexes practically 
rendered the obligation to screen two Indonesian films every month meaningless because 
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local films now received proportionately less screen time. As a consequence, the number of 
local films decreased drastically from 124 in 1977 to fifty-two in 1982 (Biran, Snapshots). 
The question is, why did the government demote local productions after what it had done to 
promote them? Christine Hakim, in “Indonesian Cinema as Seen by Christine Hakim” 
(2005), argues that this was “because domestic films in Indonesia already had the ability to 
attract large audiences and had the capacity to influence the Indonesian masses” (9).  
In the late 1980s, the power relations were no longer just between the local importers 
and producers but also involved the direct hand of the American empire. Motion Pictures 
Export Association of America (MPEA), representing all major Hollywood studios, openly 
entered into the power struggle. The MPEA blamed the import monopoly for the reduced 
prices of their films and their shrinking market share compared to Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
films, which were Sudwikatmono’s favourite imports (Sen, Indonesian 64). The resentment 
among Indonesian producers and directors of Sudwikatmono was so deep that these ‘post-
colonial’ subjects were willing to make an alliance with the ‘neo-colonial’ agent of the 
American empire. Some contacted MPEA officers in Singapore to give them information 
about how to deal with the Subentra group (Robison, Authoritarian). Others created a public 
discourse in favour of the MPEA’s demand for the right to distribute directly to the cinemas 
without a middleman.  
In 1991, after years of negotiation, the MPEA dropped its demand to distribute 
directly and agreed to work through two of Sudwikatmono’s subsidiaries with some 
concessions (Sen, Indonesian 64). This development indicates that the history of Indonesian 
cinema has never been a purely domestic problem but a typically post-colonial affair. In the 
early independence era, the Sukarno government and film professionals agreed to restrict and 
eventually ban Hollywood films and their sales agent American Motion Pictures Association 
in Indonesia (AMPAI) (Said). In the subsequent era, however, film professionals had to ally 
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themselves with the MPEA against the government and its import cronies. Nonetheless, when 
the empire had to choose between the fascistic regime and its cronies on the one side and the 
professionals on the other, history repeated itself. As in other countries, such as Thailand and 
Chile, the empire pragmatically opted for the former and abandoned the latter.   
Audiences are not an organised unit like the other institutions discussed in this 
section. During the military era, there were no reliable statistics about the audiences of 
Indonesian films. Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics) could collect data from 
regular theatres in the cities and larger towns but could not capture those from cheap, 
bamboo-fenced, seasonal theatres, popularly known as ‘misbar’ (the acronym of gerimis 
bubar, literally meaning disperse when it rains), which were mostly in rural areas. It also 
failed to estimate the audiences of bioskop keliling (mobile cinema) and layar tancap 
(literally meaning screen stuck in the ground), which were very popular in small towns and 
villages. The mobile shows were usually held for free by the government for programme 
dissemination, industries for product marketing, or individuals for celebrations (weddings, 
circumcisions, and birthdays). The programmes and products were usually advertised at 
intervals during the show. The audiences of seasonal and mobile cinema probably made up 
the biggest part of Indonesian audiences. 
The statistics therefore do not correspond exactly to the government’s and film 
industry’s construction of audiences at the time. Their shared construction was that foreign, 
particularly American and European, films sold well in prosperous and well-educated parts of 
big city populations, while Indonesian films were preferred by the working classes of big 
cities, small towns, and rural areas (Said). With this in mind, the government required mobile 
cinemas to only screen Indonesian films. This policy was devised to protect the ‘illiterate’ 
and ‘unsophisticated’ villagers from foreign ideas, particularly the latent danger of 
Communism. It should be stated here that the biggest supporters of the PKI were the rural 
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working classes. The government understood that, with the elaborate depoliticisation of 
Indonesian films, those working classes would watch only apolitical or depoliticised films. In 
addition to the government’s pressure, the film industry was self-motivated to produce non-
political films due to the same belief that the lower classes did not favour political films.  
The area in which the statistics and the construction of the government and film 
industry fairly match is on the age group of the audiences. The Bureau’s figures for 1984 
indicate that the largest segment of the audiences for all films was made up of 15-24 year 
olds. The figures for 1987 show that the 15-24-year-old group still topped the chart but this 
time were rivalled by the 30-plus group. Similarly, producers and censors believed that the 
largest section of the Indonesia film audience was made up of teenagers, which resulted in 
many adaptations of successful teen literature into films. This construction seems fairly 
accurate because these teen-lit film adaptations sold very well, if not dominated, the 1980s 
market of Indonesian films (see Tjasmadi). Their domination did not continue in the Festival, 
however, perhaps because of the popular and thus less ‘artistic’ appeal of the adaptations and 
the source texts. Furthermore, this construction also enhanced the ongoing depoliticisation 
because the filmmakers believed that teenagers were as politically disinterested as the 
working classes. It also gave another moral justification for government censors, who saw 
teenagers as just as unsophisticated and easily influenced as the rural residents and therefore 
in need of protection from the ‘evil of foreign ideologies’. 
Film censorship: There were marked differences between books (particularly, 
novels) and film censorship with regard to the position of film as a more popular and, 
therefore, more controlled medium. The government justified this discriminatory control with 
the assumption that “cinema reaches the non-reading, illiterate, and therefore unsophisticated 
and easily influenced, masses” (Sen, Indonesian 71). Book censorship was carried out by the 
Office of the Attorney General whose job was more than just dealing with books. Generally, 
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the Office would start paying attention to a specific book only after a public controversy or a 
tip-off from another state apparatus such as the intelligence service. There was no elaborate 
official requirement or procedure to which a book author or publisher had to adhere before, 
during, and after the writing or printing of a book. Thus, most of the time the Office worked 
rather passively, and censorship was mainly self-imposed.  
In contrast, the government established and empowered a very comprehensive and 
intricate system of film censorship. This system worked solely for the purpose of monitoring, 
changing, and making decisions about films. It also evolved based on the developments in 
society and the needs of the regime. Badan Sensor Film (the Board of Film Censorship) was 
officially the only agency of film censorship. In general, every film produced in or imported 
into the country had to be presented to the Board and seen by a committee of three members. 
If this committee could not arrive at a common decision on a film, it would be presented to 
the full membership of the Board. The producer or importer of the film could also propose a 
reassessment by the plenary board if it had been rejected by the committee. As a matter of 
fact, the Board was only part of the comprehensive mechanism of film censorship. In general, 
censorship was carried out in four stages. Even before the shooting of a film, the script had to 
be approved by the Directorate of Film of the Information Department (Heider 22). Upon 
completion of the filming, the unedited prints had to be sent to the Directorate for advice 
about what needed to be changed and/or deleted. The result was then submitted to the Board 
for acceptance, rejection, or change (Sen, Indonesian 66). Provincial governments could stop 
the accepted film from being screened in their provinces due to ‘local concerns’.  
The depoliticisation and politicisation of Indonesian cinema can also be seen from the 
evolving membership composition of the Board (see Sen, Indonesian 67-9). The first Board 
under the military regime consisted of twenty-four government representatives and nine from 
the political parties. This composition was a legacy of the highly-politicised Sukarno era. In 
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1968, Minister Budiarjo replaced this large group with a much smaller team with a 
substantially reduced government representation. In 1971, consistent with their forced 
mergers and decreasing power, the political parties were totally excluded from the Board and 
replaced by professionals, that is, film intellectuals and artists. Similar to the case of the Film 
Council, this move actually reflects the advanced governmental and societal depoliticisation, 
which do not normally take place in militarised countries. The government and political 
parties were replaced by seemingly independent professionals.   
This anomaly did not last long and the regime soon adopted a more authoritarian 
mode of control. In 1973, there was a large-scale return of government representatives with 
two each from seven government departments. The artists and intellectuals were replaced by 
three non-governmental groups that had less to do with film, namely the journalists’ union, 
women, and freedom fighters. The representation of government departments, especially the 
security agencies, was further increased by Minister Ali Murtopo, the intelligence general, in 
1979. The security agencies were from the intelligence coordinating body, the Office of the 
Attorney General, and the police. Government departments made up two-thirds of the Board, 
and over a third of those were from its security agencies. In addition to the simultaneous 
governmental and societal depoliticisation, this also reflects what political scientists call 
“securitisation”, one of the strategies of discursive depoliticisation (Wood and Flinders 164). 
A political affair was treated as a security concern and thus the true political nature of the 
matter was concealed. 
With the numerous institutions and long processes involved, it might be surprising 
that film censorship was generally less strict than book censorship. When it came to books, 
there was no pre-publication censorship except the self-censorship done by authors, editors, 
and publishing houses themselves. Yet, once a book created a governmental or public 
controversy, the authority would just ban it and instruct the publishing house to withdraw the 
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copies from the market with a minimal chance of re-publication. The long censorship 
mechanism provided filmmakers with opportunities to receive feedback, change their films, 
and/or negotiate with the censorship institutions. As observed by Sen: 
Despite the constant complaints of Indonesian film-makers about the odious 
restraining powers of the BSF, there are relatively few cases where the powers 
of the BSF need to be directly exercised in the form of either excising sections 
of a film or banning films. The overwhelming majority of films are formed by 
the prescriptions of other institutions rather than the proscriptions of the BSF. 
(Indonesian 50)   
There are several underlying reasons behind this leniency. First of all, film making involved 
large capital in the production and distribution line. The military regime, after all, was the 
protector of national and international capitalism. Moreover, film production, import, and 
distribution were thoroughly controlled by the close associates and family members of 
General Suharto. That was why there were two pre-censorhip stages, involving the approval 
of the scenario before and after the shooting took place. This protected the financiers against 
investing in a film that would ultimately be held or banned by the Board. 
Second, the financiers did not have any interest in the production of political films, 
which were one of the major targets of the censorship. In general, films are more capitalised 
and commercialised than literature and therefore fall more easily to the market’s demand. 
Film making is costly, and was much costlier in the pre-digital and internet era of the 1980s. 
It was still a business of companies and not of individuals. The financiers would make sure 
that their big investment paid off and the surest way to do that was to produce what the 
market demanded. As mentioned earlier, they believed that the high-class audience were 
more interested in western movies while the lower classes preferred local comedy, horror, 
and erotic films. Political films would therefore only attract the middle class or, to be more 
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precise, a tiny section of this class, because the majority preferred watching either foreign 
films as the higher class did or non-political films as the lower class did.  Moreover, the 
political films could always run into the danger of being substantially cut, which thus 
prolonged the production process. Even worse, they could be completely rejected by the 
censorship and thus generate no return on investment at all.   
  Third, most of the time the filmmakers performed self-censorship or ‘self-
depoliticisation’ even before submitting a first script. This self-censorship continued 
throughout all of the stages as described. The censorship system worked in a panopticon-like 
manner. Although it was impossible for the censorship institutions to observe all of the 
filming processes at once, the fact that the filmmakers did not know when they were being 
watched compelled them to act as if they were being watched at all times, effectively 
controlling their own behaviour. The financiers might directly threaten the filmmakers 
because censored or banned films meant a capital loss to the former. The filmmakers had to 
obey so that they could keep their jobs in the constantly shrinking job market. Finally, the 
self-censorship was also influenced by the ‘artistic taste’ of the filmmakers themselves. This 
taste had been shaped by socio-cultural factors such as education, community, and religion. 
With the depoliticisation of those factors, as discussed in the previous chapters, the 
filmmakers consciously or unconsciously internalised a distinctly apolitical taste.  
 
2.1.2 Depoliticised Discourses 
The depoliticisation of and by the film institutions resulted in the repression and 
representation of certain discourses in Indonesian cinema at the time. This repression was 
carried out as much by government institutions as by the filmmakers themselves. In addition 
to the demand from the film industry for clear standards, the censorship rules were written 
and published to minimise overt depoliticisation and to maximise self-depoliticisation. In 
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1977, the Department of Information announced the implementation of Pedoman Sensor (the 
Censorship Guideline). Further guidelines were produced in 1980 by the Board of Film 
Censorship in Kode Etik Badan Sensor Film (the BFC Code). This code was also supported 
by the Film Council’s 1981 Kode Etik Produksi Film Nasional (the FC Code). According to 
Sen, there were at least two common targets of the three guidelines: social conflicts and 
criticisms of the government (Indonesian 70). By Act No. 8 Year 1992, the government 
changed the name of Badan Sensor Film to Lembaga Sensor Film (the Institute of Film 
Censorship). In 1994, coinciding with the publication of Sen’s book, all of the guidelines and 
codes were integrated, updated, and upgraded into Government Regulation No. 04 Year 
1994. 
 In this section, I will discuss the repression and inclusion of discourses, once again, 
under the framework of the Five Fundamental Principles of the Nation or the Pancasila. The 
reason remains the same as in the last chapter: the military regime claimed that their acts of 
depoliticisation were for the sake of implementing the Pancasila ‘purely and accordingly’ and 
for correcting the violations of the same principles by the Sukarno administration. In 
addition, by using this wide framework, I can add a few more discursive practices that Heider 
and Sen have not discussed, but that were equally existent and significant in Indonesian 
cinema at the time. 
Belief in the One and Only God: Both the Censorship Guideline and the BFC Code 
ruled that films were to be banned if they could “destroy the unity of religions in Indonesia” 
or “exploit sentiments of ethnicity, religion, race, or group or incite social tensions” (Sen, 
Indonesian 69). The FC Code required films to portray “the harmonious co-existence of 
religions” and “mutual respect for the practice of faith in accordance with the religion and 
belief of each person” (70). Furthermore, films were not allowed to “project scenes which 
show the conflict of one religion with another” (70). Accordingly, the Board also prohibited 
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films from projecting one religion as a model of statecraft because that could provoke other 
religions and endanger the interreligious harmony. Films were also discouraged from 
narrating stories of religious movements and/or their leaders. That is why Di Bawah 
Lindungan Ka’bah (1981), a film adaptation based on a novel by an Islamic leader Buya 
Hamka, was not allowed to be circulated before the general election in the same year because 
the novel and the adaptation were considered pro-political Islam.  
Sexuality was another important aspect of the religious-related area of censorship. 
Erotic or sexual films were very popular in Indonesia in the 1980s-1990s. Even Indonesian 
‘auteurs’ made sexual movies or inserted sexual scenes into their ‘serious’ works to meet the 
market demand. Nevertheless, what constituted sexuality in Indonesian films at the time was 
very different from that in Hollywood cinema. The BFC Code devoted a special section to 
this matter and what was accordingly not permissible. It forbade, for instance, “birth scenes 
of human beings or animals which can create lust” and “showing contraception methods” 
(my trans.). In terms of presentation, sex and sexuality were not to be pictured explicitly on 
the screen regardless of the target audience. In addition, sex was not to be portrayed as a 
pleasurable activity between two or more consenting adults, not even as a lawful expression 
of love between a husband and a wife.  
This resulted in what Heider calls “an elaborate pattern of narrative conventions” in 
Indonesian cinema (66). He observes that sex had to be presented in films in the form of 
“sadism or rape” (66). Sen adds another common representational form of sex and sexuality: 
prostitution, which will be discussed later (Indonesian 144-7). Indonesian filmmakers 
developed these conventions to “satisfy a wide variety of desires and expectations while not 
offending another range of contradictory norms” (Heider 66). The conventions met the 
expectations of the religious communities in that sexuality was not depicted as a pleasurable 
experience but more as a sinful act, which was in line with the dominant belief. 
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Simultaneously, they fulfilled the demand of the market for adult entertainment, albeit not 
fully, and the need of the government for a mass diversion from politics. The conventions 
were thus the common ground between those different interests.  
 
Fig. 11. Dalam Pelukan Dosa (In the Embrace of Sins), a 1984 film whose title and picture 
indicates how sexuality was represented in Indonesian cinema. 
 Just and civilised humanity: Still related to erotic films, the film institutions shared 
a set of discourses regarding the representation of women in Indonesian films. First, the ideal 
or civilised woman should be reproductive, not productive. A typical conflict in family drama 
began when a husband lost his job and his wife had to work and, accordingly, the conflict 
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was resolved when the husband found a new job and the wife returned to her traditional role 
as a housewife. Second, the ideal woman must be inwardly and outwardly feminine, not 
masculine or boyish because the latter was considered a mental problem that must be cured. 
In Guruku Cantik Sekali (1979), Dina, a strict school teacher, hates men and will not allow 
her female students any contact with male students. It is revealed in the end that she had a 
traumatic experience with the man she loved. The flashback shows that her arguments about 
equality throughout the film are mere expressions of a psychic disorder resulting from the 
past trauma.  
Next, the ideal woman should be silent, not vocal or loud. This idealisation can be 
seen in two auteur films by two different generations, namely, Apa yang Kau Cari, Palupi? 
(1969) by Asrul Sani and Rembulan dan Matahari (1979) by Slamet Raharjo. In each film, 
there is one female character who listens, loves, and serves in total silence, and one female 
character who questions, rebels, and rejects men. Both films championed the former, albeit in 
a different manner. Besides Sen, there are other scholars who attribute this idealisation to the 
colonial representation of native women as opposed to Dutch/European women, such as Peter 
Carey and Vincent Houben (1987). This colonial legacy was apparently continued by the 
Javanising Suharto regime (brown colonialism). Indeed, vocal heroines have been abundant 
in non-Javanese narratives such as Acehnese, Balinese, and Ambonese. 
 Many genres of Indonesian cinema placed women only in secondary roles so that 
their words and deeds made up an insignificant and/or inconsequential part of the story. Sen 
admits that there were quite a few films in the military era in which female presence 
dominated the screen, but they were “emphatically presented to be seen” so that the films 
sold (Sen, Indonesian 134). In fact, many Indonesian films were exactly about seeing the 
women, but not about the women speaking or thinking. There was a space for women to be 
productive, man-like, and vocal, that is, in films centred on prostitution such as Noda Tak 
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Berampun and Bernafas dalam Lumpur, both of which were produced in 1970. As Sen 
explains, “the popularity of prostitutes as subjects was understandable. It allowed films to use 
images of the female body in ways that would be difficult when films only had good girls and 
wives in them” (Indonesian 145). Thus, prostitution films, so to speak, were similar to, and 
sometimes indistinguishable from, erotic films of this vintage. Yazid’s Blood and Crown can 
be located at the intersection of these two genres. In addition, prostitution was normally 
portrayed in films as a social (poverty) or personal (betrayed by men and far from religious 
guidance) tragedy, indicating both governmental and societal depoliticisation. 
 Another film genre that exploited the female body but did not really attract the 
attention of either Sen or Heider was sex comedy. Indonesian sex comedies typically 
combined slapstick, adult humour, and sexy women. Unlike prostitution films or Hollywood 
sex comedies, they rarely contained sexual scenes. The selling point was more the female 
body’s sensual parts although these were never fully exposed. This genre achieved its highest 
popularity in the late 1980s through films by a comedian trio named Warkop DKI although it 
started much earlier with other comedian groups such as Kwartet Jaya, Surya Grup, and 
Bagio CS.  
While women and, by implication, men were being ‘disciplined’, non-
heteronormative genders were either repressed or marginalised on screen. In Genders and 
Sexualities in Indonesian Cinema (2013), Ben Murtagh reveals that at least thirty films were 
made during this period that presented characters that might be easily recognised as of non-
normative gender or sexuality (excluding the minor cross-dressing characters that routinely 
appeared in many sex comedies). Despite Murtagh’s efforts to interrogate both affirmative 
and negative portrayals of homosexuality, there is a strong sense of the pervasiveness of 
heteronormativity running through those films. Most of the films presented male 
homosexuality as coming from active yet sinful same-sex desire. Lesbianism was imagined to 
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result from the absence of men, or as a temporary reaction to their violent behaviour. At the 
end of almost all of the films, gay and lesbian characters converted/reverted to 
heterosexuality, or suffered a tragic death.  
The next repressed discourse in relation to the second principle of the nation was 
violence. The Board of Film Censorship targeted any on-screen criminal acts that “may 
encourage the audience to sympathise with the perpetrators and the crimes themselves” (my 
trans.). The Board would also cut parts that showed “executions by any means” and 
“presentations of violence and cruelty and/or their impacts, which create the impression of 
sadism” (my trans.). Furthermore, it would reject films “whose narrative and narration feature 
violence, cruelty, and crime for more than 50 percent, which create the impression that 
goodness can be defeated by evil” (my trans.). Nevertheless, the Board had to betray their 
own regulations to release the state-produced film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (1984), in spite 
of the obvious sadistic material that it contained.  
 
Fig. 12. A scene in Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI when the daughter of General Ahmad Yani 
washes her face with the blood of her murdered father.  
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The film was passed, the Board argued, because the graphic torture and execution of 
the army generals by the Communists was not to incite the sympathy of the audience towards 
the torturers but to do exactly the opposite. Moreover, the good military forces eventually 
defeated the evil Communists in the ending.  In other cases, this kind of gory violence would 
not pass the pre-censorship stages, let alone the later stages. 
Furthermore, films were not to portray any weaknesses of the hand of justice. The FC 
Code pointed out the responsibility of films to exclude “any statements which may lead to the 
decline of the community’s trust in the organisation of justice” and specifically forbade 
mocking of “the upholders of law and order” (Sen, Indonesian 70). Military and police 
officers could not be corrupt or killed at the hands of criminals in films. Crimes could only be 
depicted if they were shown to be punished. In films involving kidnapping, for instance, the 
victim has to be returned unscathed by the end of the film.  
The unity of Indonesia: The unity of Indonesia was mainly reinforced by not 
allowing any portrayal of social conflicts, as already discussed under the first principle. This 
anti-conflict attitude applied to contemporary tensions as well as historical conflicts, 
immediate or far. Historical films in the military era generally ignored the pre-Dutch history 
of the Indonesian archipelago (Sen, Indonesian 81). Discussion of the immediate past, the 
Sukarno era, was also absent from the New Order cinema. At the beginning, there was almost 
a total silence about the events of 1965, which seemed surprising amid the extensive anti-
communistic rhetoric in other mass media such as the press and television. Aside from 
filmmakers’ fear of making a ‘wrong’ representation of the event, another reason for this 
silence was the concern of the government not to depict ‘family quarrels’ (Indonesia Raya).  
That was why the pre-Dutch history was a very rare subject matter in Indonesian 
cinema, for it was a history of conflicts, defeats, and conquests of one local kingdom by 
another. Even if the setting was in the Dutch colonial era, so long as the story depicted a 
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conflict between local people, that film would not be allowed to continue. Perang Padri, a 
planned film about the history of the Islamic religious wars in West Sumatra during the 
Dutch colonial era, was stopped at the pre-censorship stages in 1981, for this very reason. 
The film took its name from the war of the Padri (the Minangkabau Islamic reform 
movement) against the traditional Minang rulers assisted by the Dutch. If only the script had 
focused on the later period when the reformers and the rulers eventually aligned themselves 
against the Dutch, the outcome could have been very different.   
Another example of this sentiment can be found in the case of Max Havelaar (1976), 
a Dutch-Indonesian film adaptation of Multatuli’s 1859 novel. The novel was frequently 
praised by freedom fighters for raising people’s early consciousness of the evil Dutch 
colonial system (see Toer). The film tells the story of Lebak, Java, after Max Havelaar, a 
Dutch officer, has been appointed as the assistant resident. As in the novel, the idealistic 
assistant resident tries to fight the abuse of power by the bupati (the highest native official 
under Dutch rule) as well as his Dutch superior. The film created quite a controversy in 
Indonesia, and the Censorship Board refused to release it. Arguably, the main problem is that 
the adaptation portrays how a feudal native exploits peasant natives. There were also post-
colonial concerns in the public debate and the review of the Board at the time. Some critics 
saw the film as a persistent colonial representation of Indonesia. The head of the Board stated 
that Max Havelaar “gives the strong impression that the real cruelty was from the bupati of 
Lebak and the Dutch came to protect people” (Sen, Indonesian 87).   
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Fig. 13. Max Havelaar, a Dutch-Indonesian film adaptation whose screening in Indonesian 
was held by the Censorship for 10 years due to the negative portrayal of a native leader. 
 The 1965 massacre was also seen as a family quarrel as opposed to the War of 
Independence when the Communists and non-Communists together fought other nations (The 
Netherlands and other Allied nations). When the State Film Corporation decided in 1981 to 
make the first and only film about the event, General Dwipayana was convinced that this 
subject matter had to be filmed under close government supervision. When the result was 
released in 1984, it was quite obvious that the film tried to blame foreign powers for the 
family quarrel. The first culprit was the People’s Republic of China who allegedly 
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encouraged and armed the PKI. The other culprit was Marxism-Leninism, a foreign ideology 
that poisoned the originally good members of the Indonesian family.  
  Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives: The 
Censorship Guideline’s politics section listed political ideologies that were not to be 
expressed in any form. These included Colonialism, Imperialism, Fascism, and all 
representations of Communism. It also stated that films would be banned if they were 
regarded as harmful to “Indonesia’s internal or foreign politics” or “in conflict with policies 
of the government” (Sen, Indonesian 70). Here the political interests of the ruling regime 
were discursively depoliticised as the security of the state and nation. Hence, any political 
criticism towards the government equated to a threat to the security of the state and nation. 
The BFC Code further prohibited anything that could cause damage to “persons or 
institutions associated with the state” or, in other words, government officers (70).  
 Mass politics was consistently repressed in cinema because it was deeply associated 
with Sukarno’s and the PKI’s populism. Highlighting the word ‘representatives’ in the fourth 
principle of the nation, the military regime strongly advocated and implemented a full 
representational democracy in which people could never directly choose leaders and 
agree/disagree with policies. For rural settings, mass action was also seen as misguided, and 
related to irrational mystical beliefs that usually caused harm to innocent individuals. The 
visualisation of mass action was quite typical in every film (Sen, Indonesian 121). The action 
took place in the middle of the night, with a mob of men in dark clothes carrying lit torches. 
Most frequently these scenes were followed by those of death and destruction. Ironically, this 
kind of representation has been widely associated by the public with, and in some cases 
reported by the survivors of the anti-communist campaign as, how the military and anti-
communist militia attacked the Communists’ dwellings in 1965-6 (see Tempo).  
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In more ‘serious’ films dealing with social problems, the solution usually came from 
professionals from big cities (see 1.2.3). The professionals were pictured as non-partisan and 
their actions were motivated more by a moral/humanitarian sense than a political interest, 
which was the same political jargon of the ruling party Golongan Karya. This tendency can 
be seen in films like Dr. Siti Pertiwi Kembali ke Desa (1979) and Perempuan dalam 
Pasungan (1980). In the first film, Dr. Siti Pertiwi, a medical graduate from Jakarta, goes to a 
transmigration area in Sumatra to help people with health problems and superstition. In the 
second film, an investigative journalist finds and saves an insane woman locked in chains, 
which was a common practice in ‘backward’ Javanese communities.  
 
Fig. 14. Perempuan dalam Pasungan, which portrays the backwardness of the rural lower 
class and at the same time the political disinterestedness of the urban middle class. 
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In horror films about witch-hunts, the resolution of the slander that led to mass amok 
and demobilisation of the masses usually came from a religious teacher from inside or outside 
the village. Mass power was thus defeated by a superior individual and overcome by religious 
knowledge. Using the language of Wood and Flinders, a social force was neutralised through 
a societal and discursive depoliticisation. In both films, the solution came from the top down 
and not from the masses themselves. It was about ‘instruction’ from the professionals/Islamic 
teachers to the masses and not ‘deliberation’ between the two parties or the masses 
themselves. This was consistent with the government’s discourse on rural audiences; that 
they were illiterate, unsophisticated, and apolitical.  
Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia: In the early years of the Suharto 
era, the film industry was preoccupied with the promises of economic prosperity and western 
lifestyles that had been denied during the Sukarno era (Hakim). Many films showed an 
excessively luxurious lifestyle and cosmopolitanism as represented by titles like Jakarta-
Hongkong-Macao (1968) and Honey, Money and Jakarta Fair (1970). Yet, throughout the 
1970s, the concern with continuing poverty and a widening economic gap asserted itself in 
student politics and film aesthetics. Audiences and filmmakers were both tired of romantic 
dramas and films picturing “women in nightclubs” (Hakim 8). Successive Indonesian Film 
Festivals highlighted their hope for a realist depiction of social problems. Soon afterwards, as 
noted by Gunawan Mohamad in 1974, there was a sharp rise in the number of films that 
contained some description of the conflict and contrast between the rich and the poor. At the 
same time, the censorship became increasingly explicit about the exclusion of social conflict. 
Caught between the censorship and the realist aesthetics, filmmakers developed narrative 
conventions for representing and correcting the social injustice as they had done earlier with 
regard to sexuality. 
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First, the protagonists lived in poverty until their fortunes changed either because they 
were discovered by rich and generous relatives or they made good on their merit and 
impressed rich and generous people. Examples of this formula can be found in Yatim (1973), 
Ratapan Si Miskin (1974), and Nasib Si Miskin (1977). The second convention looked more 
realistic but no less pro-establishment than the first. This time poor protagonists remained 
poor and even died at the end, which is somewhat more ‘realistic’. Yet, the poor were denied 
a space from which they could either understand or speak for their situation. As in the case of 
Si Mamad (1973), a civil servant Mamad commits small-time corruption such as stealing 
office paper when he must prepare for the expense of the birth of his seventh child. This 
tortures his conscience and he tries to confess and explain to his superior, who is actually far 
more corrupt. But the opportunity always seems to elude him and he takes his regret and 
sadness to the grave. Before and after his death, he has to be represented and absolved by a 
concerned Dr. Budiman. The poor were thus the objectified heroes; they were only spoken 
about. The designated heroes were social activists, usually middle-class intelligentsia and 
professionals.  
When the designated heroes failed, God intervened and punished the ‘individual’ (not 
systemic) oppressors. This divine intervention can be seen in Perawan Desa (1978), a film 
about the rape of a village virgin by a group of rich and well-connected young boys. In the 
pre-censored version, the rapists are acquitted of the charge and the victim faints in court. 
The Board of Censorship rejected this ending and asked the filmmaker to change it. The 
filmmakers then added a seven-minute scene in which the rapists are involved in a terrible car 
crash, and the film passed the censor. That was the third formula for setting the social justice 
and an excellent example of discursive depoliticisation.  
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Fig. 15. Perawan Desa, an example of how social and individual injustice is solved in the 
realm of fate (discursive depoliticisation).  
In this sub-chapter, I have reviewed the depoliticisation of the film institutions and 
discourses in the military era, which became the contexts of the first film adaptation of 
Ahmad Tohari’s novel. It can be deduced from the discussion that all of the film institutions 
were depoliticised as well as self-depoliticised. This depoliticisation resulted in the repression 
and representation of certain discourses in films and adaptations such as religious tensions, 
women’s emancipation, local conflicts, political ideologies, and socio-economic gaps. In 
addition, the issues of post-colonialism regularly appeared in the debates of the film 
institutions and discursive repressions. In the next section, I will analyse how these contexts 
influenced the adaptation of the novel.  
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2.2 Finding Blood and Crown of the Dancer 
Hitherto, I am still unable to locate and acquire a copy of Blood and Crown despite my 
persistent search and numerous communications with relevant parties such as, to name just a 
few, Indonesian film researchers, film centres, film communities, TV stations, the parent 
company of the defunct film company, the family of the late director of the film, and the 
filmmaker of the second adaptation. The documentation of my written communications can 
be seen in Appendix B. This situation is, of course, nothing new. David Pierce finds, in 2013, 
that “only 14% of the feature films produced in the United States during the period 1912–
1929 survive in the format in which they were originally produced and distributed” (vii). In 
“Film Riches, Cleaned Up for Posterity” (2010), Dave Kehr says that “50 percent of 
American sound films made before 1950 appear to have vanished forever” (par. 4). These 
circumstances often compel researchers to reconstruct missing films based on the available 
secondary resources. In Indonesian Cinema, for instance, Sen discusses the missing works of 
Bachtiar Siagiaan, a left-wing film director during the Sukarno era, based on the surviving 
script, reviews and interviews, and the director’s theoretical writings. Worse than the fate of 
left-wing books, left-wing films were thoroughly wiped out by the military apparatus.  
One of the immediate problems with reconstructing Blood and Crown was, however, 
the scarcity of secondary data. What I had in the beginning was only a JPEG-formatted poster 
of the film given to me by a film enthusiast from Medan, Sumatera and passing remarks from 
the critics of the second film adaptation (see 0.2). Nevertheless, on 03 March 2016, I read 
about the launch of Indonesia OneSearch, a digital library network portal that interconnects 
25,000 libraries in Indonesia, run by the National Library of Indonesia. Still hoping to find 
the film, I typed in the title and found one result from the database of the National Library. 
To my delight, it turned out to be the screenplay of Blood and Crown in microfiche format. 
The script had been freshly photoduplicated, published, and donated by the Library of the 
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Congress Office in Jakarta for I found another copy in the catalogue of the Library of 
Congress in Washington. With the help of a deputy at the National Library, I managed to get 
a pdf-formatted file of the script without having to travel to Indonesia or America and hand-
copy or convert the microfiche myself. 
It turns out that the disappearance of the film and the subsequent discovery of the 
script reveal much about attitudes to Indonesian cinema within a national context. The fact 
that the film is missing despite its relatively recent production and the absence of government 
banning makes this a very worthwhile case in terms of further understanding the 
depoliticisation and politicisation of Indonesian cinema in general and film adaptation in 
particular. The analysis of the screenplay reveals the ‘inner process’ of adaptation and, with 
regard to this thesis, depoliticisation and repoliticisation. This probably could not be achieved 
only by comparing the novel (raw material) and the films (finished products). The subsequent 
analysis of the screenplay will show that the script is responsible for much, if not most, of the 
depoliticisation in the film. Nevertheless, the same analysis will also reveal that 
depoliticisation takes place at many levels, involving many parties other than the 
screenwriters.    
In this sub-chapter, I will try to reconstruct and analyse the first adaptation of Tohari’s 
novel based on the surviving script and other relevant sources. In preparation for that, I will 
first suggest several possible reasons why Blood and Crown has been marginalised and 
forgotten, and is now missing. This involves an investigation of the archiving and restoration 
of Indonesian film (adaptation), particularly in terms of their base and superstructure.  
 
2.2.1 Archiving Indonesian Film (Adaptations)  
Film archiving and restoration have largely been ignored by scholars of Indonesian film, 
including, but not limited to, Heider and Sen (see also Hanan; van Heeren; Murtagh; 
169 
 
Heryanto, Identity). If they are discussed at all, archiving and restoration are just mentioned 
as ‘problems’ and have not yet been discussed as ‘factors’. It is my contention that both have 
played as significant a role as other film sectors in the impasse of Indonesian adaptations and 
studies. In this section, I will analyse Indonesian film archiving in terms of, adapting the 
Marxist terminologies, its infrastructure (such as institutions, finance, and collections) and 
superstructure (ideology, taste, and knowledge). I suggest not a single, determining base and 
a passive, determined superstructure as classic Marxists posit. Rather, as Raymond Williams, 
in 1982, proposes:  
Now already in Marx himself, in the later correspondence of Engels, and at 
many points in the subsequent Marxist tradition, qualifications have been 
made about the determined character of certain superstructural activities. The 
first kind of qualification had to do with delays in time, with complications, 
and with certain indirect or relatively distant relationships . . . The second 
stage was related but more fundamental, in that the process of the relationship 
itself was more substantially looked at. This was the kind of reconsideration 
which gave rise to the modern notion of ‘mediation’, in which something more 
than simple reflection or reproduction—indeed something radically different 
from either reflection or reproduction—actively occurs. In the later twentieth 
century there is the notion of ‘homologous structures’, where there may be no 
direct or easily apparent similarity, and certainly nothing like reflection or 
reproduction, between the superstructural process and the reality of the base, 
but in which there is an essential homology or correspondence of structures, 
which can be discovered by analysis.  (4-5) 
Base structure: The following analysis of the base structure of Indonesian film 
archiving and restoration is based on articles, special reports, and interviews in Indonesian 
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mass media. There are so far two notable institutions for archiving and restoring Indonesian 
films, namely Sinematek and Jakarta Prima Digital. Sinematek is situated in the Haji Usmar 
Ismail Film Centre in the Kuningan area, Jakarta and run by the Usmar Ismail Foundation 
(Saraswati). As of March 2012, Sinematek had approximately 2,700 films in its archive, 
mostly Indonesian (Setiawati). This included 548 negatives for colour films and eighty-four 
negatives for black-and-white films (Pasaribu, “Restoring”). The archive obtained films 
partly from producers and partly from theatre owners, who had gone bankrupt and sold old 
Indonesian films or donated their collections (Saraswati). The library also held over 15,000 
reference works such as books, screenplays, newspaper clippings, and government 
regulations (The Jakarta Post). Other collections included film posters and equipment 
(Saraswati). The majority of its visitors are researchers and university students but the archive 
also lends their collections for public events such as film festivals (Saraswati). 
Sinematek was established by Misbach Yusa Biran, a film researcher, and Asrul Sani, 
a film director, on 20 October 1975 (Krismantari, “Memoriam”). Biran had previously set up 
a similar archive at the Art Institute of Jakarta in the early 1970s (Sembiring, “Saving”). He 
modelled Sinematek on archives he had visited in Holland while the name itself was inspired 
by Cinémathèque Française in Paris (Setiawati). Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin provided 
regular funds from the city’s budget and helped the archive to obtain a financial support from 
the Ministry of Information. Sinematek was the first film archive in Southeast Asia and the 
only one in the country until just recently. In 1977, it became a member of the International 
Federation of Film Archives (FIAF) (Lutfia).  
The archive was formally taken over by the Usmar Ismail Foundation, also headed by 
Biran, in 1995 (Setiawati). Unfortunately, a 2001 regulation prohibited the government from 
allocating funds for non-profit organisations; foreign funds also stopped coming in. This led 
to the archive becoming underfunded and its FIAF membership was threatened (The Jakarta 
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Post). Sinematek received only Rp 17 million (roughly GBP 850) monthly allowance from 
the National Film Board and the Film Center Foundation (Saraswati). Although the 
Indonesian government allocated Rp 10 billion (approximately GBP 500,000) to build a new 
building in 2008, Adi Pranajaya, the head of Sinematek, said “it would be useless to have a 
new building without the proper management and a solution to the operational problems” 
(Lutfia par. 10). As of 2012, Sinematek continued to struggle with financial problems; of the 
estimated Rp 320 million (GBP 16,000) needed to properly store the films in its care and 
repair damaged reels, it only received a budget of Rp 48 million (GBP 2400) (Goan). Its 
seventeen staff were paid under Rp 1 million a month (around GBP 50). The operation at the 
archive slowed down to the point that the founder urged the government to take it over 
(Setiawati par. 29). This might explain the slow response of the staff to queries, which I 
myself experienced. Although it had proper temperature and humidity control, the new 
building’s storage room had poor lighting and, in some places, was covered in mould (The 
Jakarta Post).  
Sinematek focuses more on archiving than restoration because the latter needs more 
skilled staff and a lot of financing. Film restorations, such as of Usmar Ismail's Lewat Jam 
Malam (1954), were entirely funded and carried out by foreign institutions (Siregar, 
“Restoring”). The archive has also had the legendary director’s 1956 film Tiga Dara restored 
in the Netherlands (Goan). Coinciding with the screening of the restored film in June 2012, 
Sinematek launched the Sahabat Sinematek (Friends of Sinematek) programme to promote 
the archiving and restoration of local films (Siregar, “Restoring”). 
The history of Sinematek offers an interesting case of depoliticisation and 
politicisation. It started as Biran’s private project (a discursive politicisation) and later 
developed into a social project when it became part of the Usmar Ismail Foundation (societal 
politicisation). When Biran asked for the blessing of the government, what he was actually 
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trying to do was to promote the issue of archiving and restoration to the governmental level 
(governmental politicisation). Interestingly, the government helped but at the same time kept 
it at arm’s length (governmental depoliticisation) perhaps because the sector is considered not 
too important to be directly controlled. When the post-military government decided to 
prohibit Sinematek from receiving government funds, this was a governmental 
depoliticisation par excellence, which could be further traced back to the requirement of the 
IMF, the accused hand of the western empires, to liberalise the once protectionist post-
colonial country. While this depoliticisation threatened and many times killed off non-profit 
organisations, it helped private businesses to thrive.   
There are now a few Indonesian private companies competing for film archiving and 
restoration, one of which is Jakarta Prima Digital (henceforth JPD). JPD was founded in 2012 
but its owner has been in the film industry for more than thirty years (Harahap, “Cerita”). As 
a business, it has a competitive edge over Sinematek Indonesia as well as their direct 
competitors. It began with seven people in the Fatmawati Area, Jakarta and moved to a six-
story building in the Kebayoran Lama Area. As of 2016, it employed thirty skilled staff 
working in several departments such as Repair, Scan, Audio Repair, Preset-Plugins, Manual 
Repair, Subtitle, Quality Control, and Mastering. At the beginning, all of the machinery was 
purchased from one Swedish vendor but this has now been combined with equipment made 
by JPD themselves. It also started with a work flow from Europe and other countries until it 
found its own model.  
Not only does it claim to have the most complete equipment in the country, JPD also 
believes that it is now ready to compete with foreign companies in terms of speed and 
quality. To begin with, foreign companies might feel reluctant to do the job. According to 
Edwin Theisalia, the Technical Manager, foreign companies are used to working with films 
with approximately twenty percent damage whereas most Indonesian films suffer from ninety 
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percent damage (Harahap, “Indonesia”). Andre Blackham, the Production Manager, adds that 
there is no proper celluloid storage facility in the country whereas Indonesia is a fungi-
friendly environment (Harahap, “Tak”). To put this into perspective, Catatan Si Boy (1987) 
and Saur Sepuh (1988), the most famous films of the military era, are the most damaged 
collections that they have (Harahap, “Indonesia”).  If the famous films are in such bad 
condition, one can assume the worst about much less well-known films such as Blood and 
Crown. 
Producers tend to be cautious when JPD expresses its wish to restore their films. They 
prefer to sell out rather than restore their assets (Harahap, “Cerita”). In addition to producers, 
JPD also searches for films from from former mobile cinema owners in the countryside, who 
became bankrupt after the introduction of private TV stations in the 1990s (Harahap, “Tak”). 
The condition of the celluloids is naturally worse than those they purchase directly from 
producers. Usually, the ex-mobile cinema owners only have the positive prints of the films 
and most of them have been carelessly cut. As a result, there are duration lags that JPD must 
fill in from other sources.  
In total, there are around seven hundred films in JPD’s archive, four hundred of which 
are fully owned by the company, while the rest are licensed from the producers (Harahap, 
“Tak”). As of March 2016, eighty films had been fully restored. Their oldest collection is 
Ketemu Jodoh (1973) while the newest is Surat dari Praha (2016). It might be surprising that 
relatively newer films also badly need restoration. Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002), the 
undisputed symbol of the Indonesian film revival in the 2000s, has been undergoing 
restoration due to poor storage.  If the new, critically acclaimed, and popular film suffers 
from negligence, Blood and Crown would have no better chance.  
 JPD has just signed a contract with Flik TV, a channel under paid Indihome TV, to 
screen the restored films so that they can be enjoyed by the wider public (Harahap, “Tak”). 
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This has given the company even more of a competitive edge over Sinematek and its direct 
competitors because the latter do not have as wide access to the public. This contract has 
naturally generated a large amount of revenue for JPD, which will enable them to find, 
archive, restore, and distribute more films. Every month they introduce around twenty new 
titles in thirty films being screened on Flik TV. Following the government’s regulation, 
restored films must undergo the scrutiny of the Institute of Film Censorship again because 
they are now being screened for TV consumption. 
From the comparison between Sinematek and JPD above, it can be seen that 
governmental depoliticisation in a developing country like Indonesia threatens non-profit 
organisations like Sinematek simply because the public is not ready to financially sustain a 
societal asset. At the same time, this brings great opportunities to private enterprises. This is 
not necessarily negative because ‘capitalism’, as JPD has demonstrated, can provide better 
service and wider access than government-owned institutions and non-profit organisations. 
The classic problem is, however, that people must pay for the service and access and not 
everyone can afford this, as only a few people in Indonesia can afford pay-TV. 
Although there has been progress with the existence of private archiving and 
restoration companies, there is still a lot to catch up. The poor base structure of film archiving 
and restoration is one reason why film adaptations are rarely re-adapted in Indonesia. As I 
stated in Introduction, The Dancer is one of very few novels to have been adapted more than 
once and perhaps the only political novel to have been adapted twice in Indonesia. If a 
filmmaker never watches or hears about a film adaptation, the possibility of a re-adaptation of 
that work is understandably very low. When a re-adaptation materialises, there are 
inexplicable discontinuities between that adaptation and the earlier version because the 
second adapter basically works from scratch. This in turn does not help Indonesian adaptation 
studies and researchers.  
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Superstructure: In History Goes to the Movies: Studying History on Film (2007), 
Marnie Hughes Warrington succinctly concludes “preservation is not determined solely by 
the longevity of media. More important, arguably, are human decisions” (191-2). I will now 
shift my attention to the superstructure of Indonesian film archiving, particularly the 
dominant perspectives on popular films and film adaptations, the categories to which Blood 
and Crown is discursively grouped. As I mentioned earlier, the superstructure is not 
necessarily a direct reflection of the infrastructure but is related, mediated, and 
corresponding. Just as in the West, there has been a great, continuing debate concerning 
popular and non-popular arts in Indonesia although it started relatively late, in the late 1980s. 
As usual, it began in Indonesian literary circles (see, for instance, Heryanto, Perdebatan) and 
much later was continued by Indonesian film communities. In general, the debates in both 
disciplines are fairly similar. While literary critics struggle with the issue of Indonesian 
canons and popular literature, film critics debate the issue of Indonesian auteur and genre 
films.  
Nevertheless, there are several differences between the two debates. First, the 
participants in the film debate are much fewer and less diverse because the country is still 
lacking film scholars and critics. Second and relatedly, the debates are less well-known 
because they rarely come outside of film circles. What comes out in mass media are mostly 
film reviews. Literary debates, however, have been dominating the ‘cultural pages’ in 
Indonesian newspapers and magazines since the pre-independence era. Third, at least judging 
from the available academic writings, foreign critics such as Heider tend to advocate the 
significance of popular films whereas Indonesian critics such as Salim Said and Misbach 
Biran are inclined to maintain that the dichotomy of popular and non-popular films is 
unproblematic, and continue it. 
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   Problematically, Biran is the same Misbach Yusa Biran who founded and led 
Sinematek for a long time. This, I argue, has significantly influenced the base structure of 
Indonesian film archiving. Once a director, Biran quitted that job in the 1970s and focused on 
scriptwriting and archiving because he was disappointed with what he saw as the 
commercialisation of Indonesian cinema (Krismantari “Memorian”). He also rejected films 
made by Chinese Indonesians in the colonial and early Independence eras as pioneering 
Indonesian films because he believed that they were only focused on making money (Sejarah 
45). One can only imagine what kind of collections he and his staff have preferred to search 
for and store in Sinematek. The institution proudly claims on its website that it does not 
discriminate between popular and non-popular films: 
Unlike film archives in general, which merely aim to preserve quality works, 
Sinematek Indonesia was deliberately created as a medium for the 
development of national films. Therefore, its priority is domestic films and on 
gathering information and data useful to that purpose.  
Therefore, types of film collections and their related documentation become 
different from general film archives in the world. Sinematek Indonesia will 
keep any acquired Indonesian films without selection because, no matter how 
bad a film is, it still has value as research material for national film interests, 
even for different disciplines. (Sinematek Indonesia, my trans.)  
The passage above apparently contains a paradox. On the one hand, Sinematek seems to be 
very open-minded but, on the other, it still maintains the dichotomy of high- and low-quality 
films. This might not be a major problem if the institution had abundant resources because, in 
that situation, it could acquire both (what it deems to be) good and bad films. Yet, when 
resources are limited, as Sinematek has been experiencing for years, it is compelled to 
prioritise and its priority evidently is what it considers good films. Therefore, it proposes to 
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restore Lewat Jam Malam, a film made for a festival by Usmar Ismail, the father of 
Indonesian Cinema, rather than popular films from the same era.   
 The attitude of the brand-new JPD is markedly different from that of Sinematek. This 
can be detected, for instance, from the mission statement on the company’s website:  
For our love of Indonesian Cinema, our initiative here at JKT DIGITAL is to 
Archive, Restore, Produce and Distribute Film. 
The first Indonesian film was produced in 1926. Since then Celluloid has been 
a popular form for producing film or even documentation. May it be 
documentation during the war or even a presidential speech. All film produced 
has Cultural and Historical values that need to be safeguarded. 
It is the responsibility of government and private bodies as well as individuals 
that are involved with audiovisual materials to preserve the history and culture 
of the Indonesian nations before they decay and are lost forever. Those 
materials need to be shared and distributed to the public for information, 
education as well as entertainment. (Jakarta Prima Digital) 
There is no paradox or implicit dichotomy of good and bad films in the statement above. JPD 
goes even further and challenges genre dichotomies such as “film or even documentation” 
and “documentation during the war or even a presidential speech”. This anti-hierarchical 
attitude also resonates in its interviews with the media. In one of these interviews, the 
Production Manager argues that the popular films of the 1980s were seriously made, with 
professional actors and actresses, and better stories (Harahap “Zaman”).  
The dichotomy of popular and non-popular arts passes down to the realm of 
Indonesian film adaptation. Below I will outline the cultural status of film adaptations and 
adaptation studies in Indonesia relative to literature and films and their respective studies. 
This scheme is of course arbitrary and is very much influenced by the ‘pop’ factor. As it is 
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arbitrary, the scheme is full of flaws and can be easily challenged. For instance, what 
constitutes popular and non-popular is very problematic, let alone literature, adaptation, and 
film. Yet, their impact is real and powerful on the success and continued existence of film 
adaptations. This can help identify the position of Blood and Crown as a film adaptation and 
an object of adaptation studies.  
 
Fig. 16. The arbitrary status of literature, film adaptation, and film in Indonesia. 
At the top are literature and literary studies. They can be divided further into non-
popular and popular literature. This division is important because it will eventually affect 
critical and lay judgements on their film adaptations. At the bottom are film and film studies, 
which can also be divided by their popular orientation. The middle area is occupied by film 
adaptations and adaptation studies, also with their commercial and non-popular dichotomy.  
The more popular they are, the closer they are to the masses and the further they are from the 
elites. The less popular they are, the closer they are to the elites and the further they are from 
the masses. The status of film adaptations and adaptation studies is in-between, and, as usual, 
it is not the lowest that tends to be overlooked but the ‘mediocre’.   
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As a practice, the adaptation of literary works to films started as early as the late 
colonial era with the production of Njai Dasima (1929). From the very beginning, there was a 
close relationship between film and literature because most Indonesian filmmakers had 
literary backgrounds. Teeuw argues that Indonesian men of letters “were fascinated by this 
new medium which promised so much-especially in a land where . . . contact with the (not 
yet) reading public proved to be such a great problem” (143). Another factor is the lack of 
formal film training at the time, while literary education had already been established. 
Although there are quite a few formally trained filmmakers these days, the number of literary 
authors who are involved in film making remains significant. This symbiosis has given a 
cultural legitimacy to films, particularly film adaptations, and wider audiences and larger 
finance to literary authors. The former represents the issue of cultural capital while the latter 
deals with the business of economic capital, both of which are outlined by Bourdieu and 
discussed by Hutcheon in their respective works.  
The post-independence era saw a growing number of film adaptations, especially 
during the heyday of Suharto’s regime or the military era (the 1980s). Local film industry, as 
well as movie theatres, experienced a boom never seen before and not yet surpassed even 
now (see Tjasmadi). The number of Indonesian film adaptations also grew significantly 
during this period. Most of them were popular films based on popular novels, including the 
award-winning film adaptations that I mentioned in the first sub-chapter. Along with the 
collapse of national cinema in the 1990s, the number of film adaptations also plummeted. The 
revival of Indonesian cinema in the 2000s has also revived the production of Indonesian film 
adaptations and, just as in the 1980s, most of them are adaptations of popular novels. 
As far as I am concerned, I have not found any Indonesian adaptation that is 
considered to have surpassed the cultural status of its source text, that is, from a popular 
literary work to a non-popular film. When a non-popular book is adapted into a non-popular 
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film, it usually garners a critical reception but never to the point that the adaptation is 
considered better than the book. Usually, this type of adaptation also does poorly in the box 
office, which can be seen, for instance, from the cases of Atheis (1974), Max Havelaar 
(1975), and Sang Penari (2011). When a popular literary work is adapted into a popular film, 
it may or may not receive a critical reception but it will typically succeed in the market. This 
can be seen from Pacar Ketinggalan Kereta (1989), Taksi (1990), and Laskar Pelangi, which 
won many awards as well as public attention. Due to their critical and/or commercial success, 
these adaptations can easily be found in Indonesian film centres and sellers.  
In both cases, adaptation is seen as a quite ‘tolerable’ bastardisation and therefore 
does not create uproar. Uproar usually takes place when a non-popular literary work is 
adapted or depoliticised, so to speak, into a popular film. This can be seen, for instance, from 
the case of Roro Mendut (1982), a film adaptation of Y. B. Mangunwijaya’s novel with the 
same title. The novel is based on an old Javanese folk tale in which Roro Mendut and her 
lover Pronocitro commit suicide as their love is thwarted by Tumenggung Wiroguno, a 
Javanese lord who defeats the Pati region and takes away Roro Mendut as one of his war 
spoils. Mangunwijaya created a different ending in his novel in which the lovers die together 
on Wiroguno’s dagger as a sign of optimism and resistance to power. The filmmakers 
preferred the folk tale ending, which created a hot debate with the novelist who saw it as a 
commercialisation.  
Another example is Tenggelamnya Kapal Van der Wijck (2013), which created a 
controversy simply because of its poster. The Minang ethnic group accused the poster of rape 
against Hamka’s novel because the character of Hayati is a strongly religious Minang girl and 
thus would never wear an open dress as on the poster. This kind of adaptation is normally not 
as successful in the Indonesian Film Festival. Nevertheless, these black sheep of Indonesian 
film adaptations can easily be found and/or purchased due to their commercial success. Blood 
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and Crown, another black sheep, has also attracted condemnation like Roro Mendut and 
Tenggelamnya Kapal Van der Wijck, but it did not succeed commercially like its 
counterparts. While a successful black sheep tends to be forgiven and celebrated, a failed 
black sheep is totally forgotten.  
The fate of adaptation studies in Indonesia is no better, if not worse, than that of film 
adaptations. The discipline is less well-known than film studies, which has currently become 
the darling of arts and humanities faculties. At the same time, it is far less established than 
literary studies, which has been around since the Dutch colonisers introduced education to 
indigenous people in the late nineteenth century. Institutionally, adaptation studies along with 
its teachers and researchers belong to departments of literature or departments of film. Based 
on my research, there is no research centre and/or resource centre focusing on this hybrid 
discipline. Nor are there any journals, conferences, seminars, or other academic forums.  
Relatedly, it is still difficult to find this subject when one browses books, theses, and 
dissertations in Indonesian universities, including the top colleges in humanities. 
Accordingly, it is far more challenging to find Indonesian adaptation studies in the 
international arena. Out of the few available studies, most of them still deal with formal 
rather than historical aspects of adaptation, which can be seen in my review of The Dancer in 
the introductory chapter, as well as studies of other adaptations such as those by Umilia 
Rokhani (2008), Diki Mutaqin (2016), and Ayu Wardhani (2013). The attention to formal 
aspects itself is not a matter of individual preference or expertise but rather reflects a general 
impasse in Indonesian adaptation studies. Last but most relevant, most of them still focus on 
critically acclaimed or commercially successful adaptations and none discusses a critical and 
commercial failure such as Blood and Crown, which I attempt to do in the following section.    
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2.2.2 The Recovered Script: Double Depoliticisation 
The following section will present a political reading of the film script of Blood and Crown, 
the first adaptation of Ahmad Tohari’s novel The Dancer. The main aim of this section is to 
explore how the politicisation and depoliticisation of Indonesian cinema as previously 
discussed affect the adaptation script. There are three important subject matters in the 
screenplay, namely, religion/tradition, crime/juvenile delinquency, and social 
discontent/reform. These subjects traverse the three-stage script as well as embodying the 
depoliticisation and politicisation in the text. I will also show that the script contains several 
cases of what I call ‘double depoliticisation’.  
The screenplay consists of 121 scenes while, per its filmography, the film lasts for 96 
minutes. The narration of the script is omniscient while the narrative is linear and 
chronological. The script is well-written and arguably better-written than the script of the 
second adaptation. What I mean by ‘better’ here refers mainly to the intrinsic properties of 
the story. The language flows almost without awkward interruptions from foreign/loan words 
as in the script of the second film. The story can stand on its own, meaning that readers can 
enjoy it even without reading the novel or watching the film. The same thing can hardly be 
said about the script of the second film because the latter contains lots of montages, which are 
more meaningful when watched than read. Furthermore, the screenplay of the first film is 
also more focused because it covers only the first book of the trilogy whereas the script of the 
second film attempts to narrate all three books. Edwin Theisalia, the film restorer, has a more 
or less similar impression of the narratives of military-era films (Harahap, “Zaman”).  
The fact that the screenplay only covers the first book of the trilogy, Ronggeng Dukuh 
Paruk (The Dancer of Paruk Village), is because the film was produced in 1983, two years 
before the publication of the second book, Lintang Kemukus Dini Hari (A Shooting Star at 
Dawn) and four years before the publication of the third book Jantera Bianglala (The 
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Rainbow’s Arc). As a result, the narrative focuses on the relations between Srintil and her 
community and has no account of the Communists, the military, or the professionals. This 
immediately dismisses the common criticism mounted against the film that it shied away 
from the forbidden content on the Communists and the anti-Communist campaign (see 0.2). 
As with the second film, the narrative of the first film can also be divided into three stages, 
namely, 1) Srintil’s and Rasus’ childhoods, 2) their resistance towards the tradition 
exploitation, and 3) their liberation.  
 The first stage: What seems missing immediately from the first stage of Blood and 
Crown is the background story of Srintil’s and Rasus’ families. It is not explained why Srintil 
is living only with her grandfather, Sakarya. As for Rasus, it is only mentioned that he comes 
from another area. Thus, the film suppresses what unites and at the same time disunites these 
two children. As the novel tells us, Rasus’ parents were killed by a poisonous tempe bongkrek 
(a coconut presscake) unknowingly made and sold by Srintil’s parents, who also ate it and 
died to prove their innocence. It is not immediately clear why this is missing in the film but 
this might be related to the infamous case of coconut presscake poisoning in Java throughout 
the 1970-1980s, in which hundreds of people were killed (see Shurtleff and Aoyagi). 
Although this kind of poisoning has been recorded since the colonial era, and the poisoning in 
the story actually takes place in the pre-military era, the military regime might have been 
concerned that this story would be associated with the more recent tragedies.  
This case seriously embarrassed the military regime because it showed that the people 
were still poor and took their chances by eating this dangerous food, thus undermining the 
military’s claim to have brought prosperity and equality to all people of Indonesia. This kind 
of exclusion or self-exclusion is perhaps the most traditional act of depoliticisation because it 
is based on fear, a primordial force, and relies on official state apparatus. The traditional 
depoliticisation is most prominent in non-democratic countries like New Order Indonesia. 
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This begins with a rather oversensitive assumption that the issue being censored is political 
whereas that might not be the case, as in the case of the coconut presscake.   
In general, the script does not contain as much religious content as the novel but is 
less secular than the second film. Kejawenism occupies an important, if not central, place in 
the film. In a nutshell, this film tells about how Kejawenism is exploited by some strong 
persona within and without the community of belief for their personal benefit at the expense 
of the weak members of the community. In the script, Sakarya and Srintil, the voice of true 
Kejawenism in the novel, are characterised as weak and obedient to the whims of the 
Kartarejas, the face of the corrupt Kejawenism in the book. Although criticised by Rasus, no 
alternative discourse to that of Kejawenism is offered. There is neither mention of Islam nor a 
subtle reference to it. This is not surprising because at the time Islam, even the novelist’s 
moderate brand of it, was still considered the second biggest threat after Communism by the 
government. Kejawenism, on the other hand, was generally considered apolitical and 
harmless. So, the film was a warning against the politicisation of Kejawenism and at the same 
time a further marginalisation of the community.  
Despite its focus on a local culture, the language spoken in the film is 
overwhelmingly standard Indonesian. It does not bother to insert Banyumasan words here 
and there as the novel and the second film adaptation do. This phenomenon is not unique 
because most military-era films also implemented the same monolingual approach, partly 
because of a business motive to reach as many Indonesian viewers as possible, and partly due 
to the government’s policy. As described by Heryanto in “Then There were Languages” 
(2006), in line with its uniformity spirit, the regime actively campaigned for the use of 
standard Indonesian many times at the expense of foreign and local languages. The 
marginalisation of local languages and the promotion of standard languages were both an act 
of depoliticisation. In the former case, the languages were deemed improper to be used in 
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governmental and social spaces because they were backward and divisive. In the latter case, 
Bahasa Indonesia was promoted as progressive and uniting whereas, as Phillipson shows in 
Linguistic Imperialism, any language choice is fundamentally political because there is no 
intrinsically or extrinsically superior language. 
The Srintil of the first film is closer to the Srintil of the second film than to that of the 
novel. She perfectly fulfils the archetype of ‘damsel in distress’ and, to some extent, goes 
further than that. To start with, she is too beautiful for her surroundings just as a princess in 
the middle of a forest (Snow White) or in the kitchen (Cinderella). The character of Srintil is 
played by a famous Indonesian bombshell of the 1980s: Enny Beatrice. Beatrice is only one 
of many Indo-Eurasian actresses who have become the standard of beauty and dominated 
Indonesian films and television shows. This standard has transcended any demand of any 
genre and story. Srintil, for instance, is supposed to be Javanese-looking. This Indo-Eurasian 
standard of beauty is not exclusive to females, but is also found in male casts. Rasus, the 
main male character in the film, is also played by an Indo-Eurasian-looking actor: Ray 
Sahetapy.  
Several critics have discussed this phenomenon in relation to post-colonialism such as 
Virginia Hooker (1993), Laurie Sears (1996), and Rosalind Hewett (2015). The casting of 
Indo-Eurasian players reflects the ambivalent attitude of the Indonesian post-colonial subjects 
to the old and new western empires. On the one hand, the military government, followed by 
the public, regularly talked about the importance of the national identity as opposed to the 
‘evil and danger of westernisation’. On the other hand, they seemed to have no problem in 
receiving financial and military support from the western powers and adopting many western 
standards, including in regard to beauty. The fact that the government and society accepted 
rather than actively debated this ambivalence is in itself a clear symptom of depoliticisation.  
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The second stage: The turning point in the narrative is when Srintil is chosen by the 
elders as a new ronggeng. So passive is she that Srintil is completely unaware of her 
distressful situation. It is Rasus, a male character, who makes her realise her situation as well 
as initiating and executing her liberation. Far more than the novel, the first adaptation fits 
what Hughes-Freeland calls the “New Order’s representational patterns of female 
experience” in that it pictures “the female dancer as a victim who can only be saved by the 
agency of males” (145). Furthermore, Srintil also convincingly fulfils a common 
representation of women in military-era cinema as identified by Sen: 
Dozens of films in which female presence dominated the screen were drawn to 
my attention. My point, however, is not that women are absent, but indeed that 
they are emphatically presented to be seen, and so that the film is seen (sold). 
Some genres of Indonesian films are precisely about seeing the woman, but 
not about the woman seeing or speaking. (Indonesian 134).  
What Sen proposed was ground-breaking at the time because for the first time she drew the 
attention of Indonesian film critics to the ‘quality’ rather than the ‘quantity’ of female 
characters in Indonesian cinema. Although her presence, or to be precise her sensual body, 
dominates the screen, Srintil hardly speaks throughout the film. In that manner, her potential 
as a rebel in the novel is completely erased.  
Here the concept of ‘under erasure’ as discussed in Chapter One comes in handy 
again. Srintil’s under erasure implies a depoliticisation because it reinforces rather than 
challenges the ruling discourse on good Indonesian women as being reproductive rather than 
productive, feminine rather than masculine, and silent rather than outspoken (Sen, Indonesian 
131-156). Gatot Prakosa, a leading Indonesian filmmaker, suggests that this ruling discourse 
is a product of Western colonialism because “many traditional cultures of Indonesia accept a 
whole range of combinations of masculine and feminine characteristics” (Sen, Indonesian 
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136; see also Murtagh 6-7). What Prakosa criticises is the binary opposition that has 
characterised the western thought for ages, including the discourses of 
colonialism/orientalism, such as west versus east, western women versus eastern women, and 
outspoken versus silent. Ironically, post-colonial subjects like the Indonesian military regime 
and filmmakers continued these reductionist colonial discourses rather than opposing them 
because, as their ex-colonisers had found earlier, these discourses were useful for subduing 
the others, particularly women. This is a case of what I call ‘double depoliticisation’, wherein 
a similar issue is depoliticised consecutively or simultaneously by the empires and the post-
colonial subjects for a similar purpose. In this particular case, the issue is on women and the 
empires refer to the old western powers who consecutively colonised the archipelago for 
more than three-hundred and fifty years (the Portuguese, the British, and the Dutch). What is 
important here is the fact that the Indonesian subjects were not passively corrupted by the 
legacy of the past colonialism but actively did take advantage of it after the independence.  
 This presented-to-be-seen mode is most obvious in prostitution films, where 
filmmakers could safely expose and sell female sexuality. The Board of Film Censorship was 
lenient towards this kind of film because the exposed women were prostitutes and thus an 
example of what Indonesian women must avoid. Nevertheless, Blood and Crown is not a 
prostitution film par excellence despite the strong association between ronggeng and 
prostitution. The Srintil of the first film has not become a full ronggeng yet because she has 
not passed the Buka Klambu ceremony and slept with men outside marriage. She is still in 
the process of becoming a prostitute. Her body is exposed and sold in the film under another 
pretext, namely, a rape attempt.  
It is safe to say that the screenplay does not significantly embellish the sexual content 
of the novel as the critics suggest about the film (see 0.2). Aside from Srintil’s erotic dancing, 
sexual scenes only take place when Dower is about to rape Srintil, and when Sulam is having 
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sex with an unnamed married woman from Paruk. The former scene confirms Heider’s 
general hypothesis of sexuality in Indonesian cinema, that is, it should be framed as sadism or 
rape (66). Yet, the latter scene specifically reinforces the novel’s denigration of Paruk’s 
sexuality, as it portrays the open marriage practice in the community, which the novel 
condemns (see 1.2.1). As can be seen in Sulam’s scene with a woman of Paruk:  
Sulam is opening his clothes while there is a kebaya of a woman on the floor. 
Sulam is smiling at the woman sitting on the bed. The woman is releasing her 
corset, her body is supple and her gesture is provocative: 
Sulam   : Your husband is kind, letting her wife stay overnight  
       here.  
      But I don’t know if his wife is as kind . . . 
Paruk Woman  : All women of Paruk only have one wish, how to  
      satisfy herself and him who wants her. (Riyadi, 
                                      Atmowiloto, and Suhendro 32, my trans.) 
In general, the representation of sexuality in the script is depoliticising because, first, it 
merely supports rather than challenges the discourse of sexuality in the novel and the military 
era. Furthermore, as the critics suggest about the film, it helps divert attention from the more 
political content of the book.  
Judging by the low intensity of the sexual representations in the script, it is likely that 
the real diversion came from outside the scriptwriting division. The screenplay was jointly 
written by three screenwriters: Rachmat Ryadi, Satmowi Atmowiloto, and Eddy Suhendro. 
All of them were then young writers and Blood and Crown was either their first or second 
screenplay. Eddy Suhendro and Satmowi Wiloto turned out to be prolific writers and 
Suhendro won an award for the original screenplay for Suami (1988). Ahmad Tohari said in a 
seminar in 2016 that he was quite satisfied with the script and knew the writers personally. 
189 
 
Yet, he lamented that, in the film making, the director was the decision maker, thus implicitly 
accusing Yazman Yazid in regard to the sexualisation of the first adaptation. It is quite easy 
to agree with Tohari’s accusation because Yazid is known to have directed many sex 
comedies throughout his entire career. Nevertheless, if one looks at his filmography closely, 
he made those films long after the production of Blood and Crown, which was only his 
second film. In fact, his first film was an award-winning sex-less drama on child psychology. 
The director of cinematography, however, was a much more experienced figure in the film 
industry and a veteran of sex comedies. Before Blood and Crown, Anthony Depary had shot 
eight films, most of which were sex comedy flicks such as Inem Pelayan Sexy 2, Karminem, 
and Jalal Kawin Lagi (1977). Similarly, Bambang Trilaksono was a seasoned artistic director 
with sixteen films under his belt by 1983. His Kutukan Nyai Roro Kidul (1979) was one of 
the most sexual films of that era. Before Blood and Crown, he was involved in the production 
of a sex comedy entitled Hidung Belang Kena Batunya (1982). Josephus Adisubrata, a 
journalist turned film producer, might have played a key role in the sexualisation of the film. 
Before 1983, he produced one to two films a year and all of them consistently won national 
awards, which in Indonesia would not normally be given to sexual films. In 1983, however, 
he suddenly released four films with the same genre of prostitution, namely, Blood and 
Crown, Kadarwati, Johanna, and Yang. Moreover, he employed the same screenwriters for 
all four films. This production increase, genre selection, and labour efficiency indicate a 
strong commercialisation push by the producer and his production company, Gramedia Film. 
The now defunct company was owned by the largest media conglomerate in Indonesia, 
Kompas Gramedia Group, whose media have long been known as a ‘good boy’ of the 
military regime as well as the subsequent governments. 
Due to the absence of Communists and professionals, the other antagonists become 
more marked in the first adaptation. Sulam and Dower signify two less dangerous enemies of 
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the military regime. Sulam represents the thugs, known locally as preman, who live off 
small-time crime like extortion. As portrayed in the documentary The Act of Killing (2015), 
the regime used the thugs from the beginning of their reign, initially to kill the Communists 
and later to hit anyone critical towards the establishment. The end goal was to make the terror 
appear as a horizontal conflict rather as governmental suppression. The relations grew weary 
at the beginning of the 1980s because the thugs grew out control, “taking crime into a new, 
organized, and supra-local realm” (Barker, “State” 11).  
Joshua Barker, in 2009, postulates that “as the social distance between classes breaks 
down, the anxiety felt by members of the middle class about their changing status is manifest 
not in a discourse about class relations but indirectly in a discourse about crime” 
(“Introduction” 268). Citing James Siegel’s research, he notices a similar pattern in 1980s 
Indonesia, where fears about social revolution and a more general menace came to be 
displaced by fears of the thugs who came from the streets but were upwardly mobile. The 
military regime politicised the thugs as a threat to the national security just it had done earlier 
with the Communists, albeit with different purposes. While the politicisation of the 
Communists in the late 1960s was carried out to establish a new order, that of the thugs in the 
early 1980s was to reinforce the order. Apparently, this governmental politicisation of 
criminals did not occur only in Indonesia but also in many post-colonial countries such as, 
just to name a few, Colombia, South Africa, Afghanistan, and, very recently, the Philippines. 
The politicisation typically served as a prelude to a depoliticising response aimed at 
addressing the now political problem. Each of the countries had its own techniques and 
strategies for removing the threat; some were violent and others were not. In the case of 
Indonesia, the politicisation of the preman provided a pretext to a campaign of mysterious 
killings in which paramilitary forces hunted down and murdered recidivists and others 
considered by the state apparatus to be habitual criminals (Barker, State).  
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It should be noted that the scriptwriters felt it necessary to mention that Dawuan 
Market, Sulam’s domain of power, is far from the city and control of the police. As 
mentioned in the first sub-chapter, military-era films were not allowed to undermine the 
authority and capability of law enforcement. To show that blatant extortion took place while 
law enforcement officers were around would surely have betrayed this guideline. This can be 
seen from the following dialogue: 
Vegetables Seller : Doing business here is difficult . . . 
Chillies Seller  : But where else can we go? 
Vegetables Seller : Why is there no market other than this Dawuan 
                                      Market? 
Chillies Seller : How about moving to the city? It’s secure, the police   
    are there. 
Vegetables Seller : You’re crazy! It takes two-days-and-two-nights  
                                       walking to reach the city. My vegetables will  
         be rotten by the time I sell them. (Riyadi, 
              Atmowiloto and Suhendro 32, my trans.) 
In the novel and the second film, Dawuan is a city. Not only does it have the police but it also 
has a military headquarters, which not every city in Indonesia has. This village-isation of 
Dawuan reflects a particular attitude towards the city and village during the military era.  This 
is made clearer by the ending of the film. 
Meanwhile, Dower represents one of the illegitimate children of the regime. The 
regime’s materialistic developmentalism, combined with a lack of political channels, brought 
into being rebellious yet apolitical juveniles. Juvenile delinquency was one of the favourite 
themes of Indonesian films at the time, including film adaptations (Heider 43). In terms of 
perceived threats, rebellious teenagers were nothing compared to the Communists and thugs. 
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The regime concurrently politicised and depoliticised the issue of juvenile delinquency. In 
their comments in mass media, government officers regularly politicised it as a product of 
westernisation. At the same time, juvenile delinquency as a side effect of the regime’s 
capitalism and political repression was thoroughly supressed. Instead, government apparatus 
demoted the issue as a social or individual crisis and preached the importance of religion and 
family in facing this problem (Thong 135-7). This is governmental and societal 
depoliticisation, at once, because the supposedly governmental responsibility is being 
transferred to social and individual hands.  
The characterisation of the hero of the film is typical and unique at the same time. On 
the one hand, just like typical heroes in films during the military era, Rasus is an outsider. He 
is not a native son of the village. Therefore, he is criticising the sexual belief of the village 
from the very beginning, without having to experience an enlightenment from Dawuan as the 
same character in the novel and the second adaptation: 
Darsun   : You will never understand, Rasus, because you are not  
     the offspring of people from this area. Every offspring 
  of Kyai Secamanggala understands, including myself. 
  All people of Paruk respect a ronggeng, moreover his 
   spirit wants her . . . 
Rasus    : But Kyai is long dead. He won’t be able to do 
  anything again. 
Darsun   : He is dead, but his spirit still exists. His spirit still  
      protects this village. All his offspring believe in this, 
  Rasus. He was the patriarch of Paruk village. He will 
  always be here to protect his offspring. 
Rasus   : I don’t believe it.  (Riyadi, Atmowiloto and Suhendro  
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     20, my trans.) 
On the other hand, Rasus seems to be a different kind of social reformer of rural society in 
Indonesian cinema. Although from outside the village, Rasus is neither a preacher nor a 
professional. Yet, this is just a small variation rather than a subversion of widely-accepted 
social reformers. In general, Rasus is a depoliticised hero of the film.  
In many ways, Blood and Crown, particularly through the actions of Rasus, falls 
outside of the domain of political drama and falls into a local action genre called silat. In 
general, silat is “used for the Indonesian versions of the general East Asian martial arts” 
(Heider 39).  Normally, in silat films a distressed main character will be saved by a hermit 
and coached physically, mentally, and spiritually before he comes back for revenge. But this 
does not happen with Rasus in this script. He is already ‘made’ and preparing his revenge in 
the jungle all on his own. His exploits in the jungle might easily remind the spectators of the 
adventure of John Rambo in Rambo: First Blood (1982), which gained immense popularity in 
Indonesia and happened to be released one year before Blood and Crown.  As I stated in 0.1, 
although the cultural productions in post-colonial countries might be created in response to 
their own needs, they are never immune from the influences of the old and new empires. 
There is a fundamental homology or correspondence of structure between the Indonesian and 
American films.  
Rambo itself is a depoliticising film not only in that it portrays the Vietnam War as a 
theatre of American individual heroism instead of an international political conflict with ugly 
manoeuvres, but also because it represses the deep division and profound crisis within the 
American population. In their 1990 observation of Vietnam War films, Linda Dittmar and 
Gene Michaud assert, “the wish to uncover, to know, and to critique is clearly at work, but so 
also is the wish to rationalize, to repress, and to exorcise” (1). Juxtaposing these films and 
their Second World War predecessors, they find that many Vietnam War films repress 
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internal conflicts in soldier communities. While internal conflicts within a group of American 
soldiers under combat conditions were a constant element of Second World War filmic 
narratives, these differences were employed to “make the point that only by working together 
could Americans hope to defeat their common enemies” (5). In Vietnam films like Platoon 
(1986) and Full Metal Jacket (1987), working together is not presented as a realistic model. 
Internal divisions among American fighting men now cause violence and death, and this 
implies the lack of purpose about the war and the depth of social disintegration. Fighting 
alone, as Rambo does, becomes a viable option to obscure those challenges. In a similar 
fashion, Rasus must fight Sulam and his gang alone although he clearly has followers in 
Paruk, particularly the youngsters. The New Order government would not allow filmic 
representations of group conflicts because these might have suggested a social disorder rather 
than a mere crime.  
Dittmar and Michaud further identify certain types of films that appeared in the post-
Second World War era but are curiously absent from the post-Vietnam War period, including 
the ‘command level’ films. Those films were meant to explain ‘the big picture’ to American 
people; their task was to help audiences understand and accept the sacrifices of American 
soldiers within the larger context of overcoming the global ideological and territorial 
ambition of America’s enemies. Yet, precisely because this model would inevitably reveal 
America’s own global ambition during the period of the Vietnam War, the big picture 
remains off-screen. Many Vietnam War films, including Rambo, “place themselves squarely 
at ground level, focusing on the situation of men in combat” (6). Comparably, most 
Indonesian silat films like Blood and Crown focused on fighting scenes to avoid the bigger 
questions such as the government’s developmentalism, which created the materialistic 
Kartarejas, the thugs, and the delinquents and alienated the backward community.  
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Another American crisis being repressed by Vietnam films like Rambo is, as John 
Hellmann in 1991 and Frank Sweeney in 1999 identify, the crisis of identity. American 
society became overdependent on technology and saw it as both a guardian and saviour of 
American values. However, the Vietnam War showed that technology was, in the words of 
Rambo himself, “the god that failed” and an instrument of bureaucracy that betrayed 
American soldiers. Even with the extensive firepower that the American possessed, it could 
not overcome the Vietcong, who had much less. To deal with the painful loss of the war and, 
no less importantly, their identity, Rambo rekindles a more primordial American identity: the 
frontier heroes. Much of his lack of weaponry and survivalism underlines the film’s re-
appropriation of this myth. Blood and Crown and other 1980s silat films had to deal with a 
homologous crisis. The society understood that the government’s developmentalism had 
created excesses and, to deal with them, they revived the dying myth of pendekar or 
traditional fighters. 
When all of these Hollywood depoliticising discourses were appropriated into a 
depoliticising local film, what occurred was another instance of double depoliticisation. 
Unlike the previous case of double depoliticisation, this time the military regime and the 
filmmakers follow closely the depoliticising act of the modern American empire for the less 
obvious but similar reason: to suppress deep division within the society. The latest case 
further shows that double depoliticisation does not stop with just the repression of similar 
issues (internal division, government’s failure, and identity crisis) but goes as far as adopting 
the models or forms (fighting alone, men in field, and myth revival).  
It is noteworthy that the screenwriters suppressed the relation between this main 
character and the military although in the first book of the trilogy Rasus had already worked 
as an office boy in the military headquarters. Pointing this out in the film would have 
potentially created a set of unnecessary dilemmas for the filmmakers. An office boy, despite 
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being in a military office, was not good enough to be a main male character unless it was 
shown later that he became a successful figure in the society. The screenwriters had neither 
the basis (Rasus only becomes a military officer in the second book) nor the time to do so. 
Moreover, it would have been rather awkward to show an office boy who could perform 
Rambo-like actions in a non-fantasy film. Showing that he had been trained by the military 
was no less problematic because, at least, it compelled the filmmaker to include the military 
on-screen, not to mention the challenge of portraying Rasus as good enough but not as good 
as the military. In any case, for filmmakers at the time, it was always wise to avoid any 
representation of the military unless the military-controlled State Film Corporation made the 
film itself.     
The third stage: The most striking difference between the novel and the first film 
seems to rely on the final stage. In the script, the damsel in distress is successfully kidnapped 
and saved by the prince charming in the night of Buka Klambu so that she is free from the 
culturally sanctioned rape. Such a happy ending is not only given to please the audience but 
was also officially required by the government. The oversensitive government took a sad 
ending as a political challenge because, as in the case of the poisonous coconut presscakes, it 
undermined the happy life that the regime claimed it had created in the country. Furthermore, 
Srintil does not give her virginity to Rasus as she does in the novel and the second film. 
While filmmakers might still have filmed a rape under the pretext of educating people on 
what they must avoid, consensual sex, especially without negative consequences, was strictly 
forbidden on screen (Heider 66). 
The politicised Sulam and his gank are all killed by Rasus. Their fate is similar to that 
of small-time thugs and criminals in the 1980s. To teach its former protégés a lesson, in 1983, 
exactly the year of the film’s screening, the military regime started an anti-thug campaign, 
known locally as Penembakan Misterius or Mysterious Killings, by kidnapping and executing 
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thousands of thugs and leaving their corpses in public areas as “shock therapy” (Barker, 
“Introduction” 8). Just like the Mysterious Killings, Rasus’ extra-judicial killings are without 
any consequences. The role played by this fearful depoliticisation is “to shore up a particular 
political regime or a particular mode of production” (8). As with the fear of Communism and 
Islam, the fear of crime had the effect of weakening opposition while strengthening the 
military and the ruling party. The overwhelming strength of these latter groups resulted in an 
extremely long-lived political regime. Less directly, this coercive depoliticisation had the 
effect of promoting the integration of the Indonesian economy into the global economy. After 
all, foreign investments require order and efficiency, which the thugs seemed to threaten 
mainly through extortion. Elements of the Indonesian oligarchy and the military benefitted 
greatly from foreign investments in resource extraction, agriculture, telecommunications and 
industry.  
The end of the delinquent Dower is very different from that of Sulam and his men. In 
deus ex machina fashion, his father, the leader of Pecikalan village, finds out his intention 
and arrives at a critical moment when his son is about to rape Srintil. Almost at the end of the 
film, Kartareja is struck by lightning, which is portrayed as a punishment from Ki 
Secamanggala. There are several significances behind this framing. First of all, Kejawenism 
is true, including its superstition. So, it reinforces the (re) location of religion to the realm of 
fate, which is an act of discursive depoliticisation. Second, Kartareja is the betrayer of 
Kejawenism rather than its defender and, by contrast, Srintil and Rasus are the defenders of 
the religion rather than its betrayers. Kartareja’s Kejawenism is wrong because it is political 
whereas Srintil and Rasus’ Kejawenism is true because it is apolitical. Third, a superstitious 
religion lasts while a political religion ceases to exist. Unlike Kartareja, all of the 
representatives of the depoliticised Kejawenism survive, including his wife and Sakarya.   
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In the end, just as in many films in the military era, Blood and Crown champions the 
city over the village. The hero might not come from the city but he is bringing the damsel in 
distress to the city. By this point in the story, their enemies in the village have been 
completely defeated or even killed, so there is no reason to run away to the city. Not only 
does it reflect the common attitude of military-era films, but it also represents the regime’s 
discourse on city versus village. As described by Graeme Hugo, Terrence Hull, Gavin Jones 
in The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development (1988), the economic 
developmentalism of the military regime created many new cities and greatly expanded old 
ones. Cities were the symbol of its success and pride and at the same time the source of its 
headache. Internally, the regime had to deal with social problems typical of growing urban 
societies such as crime, social gaps, and slum areas. Externally, it also had to deal with 
increasing gaps between cities and villages. The gaps were not only economic but also 
political, cultural, and ideological. To close the gaps, however, villages were modelled on 
cities, not the other way around (Hugo, Hull and Hull).  
Intan Paramadhita, in “City and Desire in Indonesian Cinema” (2011), observes that 
idealistic filmmakers in the military era often portrayed the city as “a site of social/economic 
disjuncture and moral contradiction produced by Suharto’s developmentalist paradigm” 
(500). At times, the filmmakers used retuning to, and even telling life in, the countryside as a 
subtle criticism towards the regime’s developmentalism. By contrast, the State Film 
Corporation and commercial producers took the city as “a visual marker of national progress 
and modernity” (501). Going to/after the city thus signalled an agreement or at least a non-
hostile attitude toward the government. This kind of depiction was also often used in films to 
deal with traditional cultures which were deemed irrelevant and obstructive toward the 
progress of the era (Sen 1994: 121). The latter attitude is well represented in Blood and 
Crown of the Dancer, which was intended by its filmmakers and dismissed by its critiques as 
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a popular/commercial film. This representation is also closely related to the notion of 
discursive depoliticisation because it discursively suppresses the ugly faces of the military’s 
cities.  
 
2.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have first surveyed the major film institutions and discourses in Indonesia 
during the military era. It can be concluded from the survey that all of the film institutions at 
the time were highly depoliticised as well as self-depoliticised. This institutional 
depoliticisation co-existed with the depoliticisation of certain issues in films and adaptations 
such as religious tensions, women’s emancipation, and socio-economic gaps. The issues of 
post-colonialism appeared in the debates of Indonesian film institutions and discourses, and 
this indicates that the depoliticisation of Indonesian cinema at the time was not free from the 
hand of the old and new empires.  
Failing to locate the first film adaptation, I have gone further by reviewing the base 
and superstructure of Indonesian film archiving. By doing so, I have identified the reasons 
why Blood and Crown has been marginalised and forgotten, and is now missing. This 
involves the poor infrastructure of Indonesian film archiving, the mediocre status of film 
adaptation and adaptation studies, and the unfortunate status of a commercially unsuccessful 
popular film adapted from a commercially successful canonical novel.   
In the final section, I have offered my political analysis of the surviving script of the 
missing film, incorporating all of the contexts that I have previously reviewed. There are 
three important subject matters in the screenplay, namely, religion/tradition, crime/juvenile 
delinquency, and social reform, all of which embody the depoliticisation and the 
politicisation in the text. The script of the first adaptation does not present as much religious 
content as the novel but is less secular than the second adaptation. The Javanese belief, 
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especially the apolitical one, occupies a central place in the story. The Srintil of the first film 
fulfils the typical representation of women in military-era films. Her physical presence 
dominates the screen but her character hardly speaks or acts in the story. This reinforces the 
depoliticising discourses on good Indonesian women such as being passive rather than active, 
feminine rather than masculine, and silent rather than outspoken, which can all be traced back 
to colonialist/orientalist discourses. This is a case of what I call ‘double depoliticisation’ 
wherein a homologous issue is depoliticised by the empires, old and new, and post-colonial 
powers for a comparable reason.  
Although the script does not expose sexuality as significantly as the critics suggest, it 
still implies the exoticism of the village’s sexual practices and helps divert attention from the 
more political content of the book. The real diversion, however, probably came from outside 
the scriptwriting division. The casting of Indo-Eurasian performers in the film reveals the 
ambivalent attitude of the outwardly anti-western regime and society towards the old and new 
western empires. The fact that the regime and society silently accepted rather than actively 
debated this ambivalence is a clear sign of depoliticisation.  
With the absence of Communists, the other antagonists in the novel become marked 
in the first adaptation: the thugs and the delinquents. The government politicised the thugs as 
a threat to the state just as it had done with the Communists, and this representation is happily 
followed in the first adaptation. This politicisation helped provide the pretext to the 
depoliticised campaign of mysterious killings that coincided with the film’s release, in which 
paramilitary forces hunted down and murdered criminals and recidivists. Meanwhile, the 
delinquents in the story are concurrently politicised as the victims of westernisation and 
depoliticised as parents’ responsibilities, whereas in fact they were the by-products of the 
military regime’s own pro-economy and anti-politics policies.  
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Blood and Crown transforms the political drama novel into a local action film. The 
male protagonists’ adventure in the jungle bears a resemblance to that of John Rambo in 
Rambo: First Blood, which came and gained immense popularity in Indonesia one year 
before the production of Blood and Crown. The appropriation of the depoliticising 
Hollywood action film by the depoliticising local action film represents another instance of 
double depoliticisation. Finally, the adaptation also brings forward the issue of city versus 
village, particularly through the action of Rasus and Srintil leaving the village for the city. 
This kind of resolution is a standard ending of military-era popular films and is closely 
related to the issue of depoliticisation, as it represses the unpleasant sides of the military’s 
cities. 
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Chapter Three 
The Second Adaptation: The Revolution Betrayed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlike Blood and Crown, The Dancer, the second adaptation of Ahmad Tohari’s novel has 
generally received positive responses from the author and film critics. Critics claim that the 
second adaptation successfully represents the spirit and idea of the novel (see 0.2). Some 
even state that the film goes further than the novel, revealing the massacre that the author saw 
but could not express due to the oppressive situation in the military era. Yet, there are also a 
few dissenting opinions such as that of Heryanto, who states that The Dancer “does not take 
the next step of challenging or transcending the New Order’s overall ideological framework” 
(Identity 102). In this chapter, I argue that The Dancer powerfully represents the spirit of 
repoliticisation of the early post-military era (1998-2004) while concurrently offering a 
distinctive type of depoliticisation typical of more recent times. I will first explore the general 
political, societal, and economic developments in the post-Suharto era as well as their 
representations in Indonesian films, all of which started with an enormous wave of 
repoliticisation but ended with a reverse flow of depoliticisation. Having set the general 
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contexts, I shall then discuss the marked repoliticisation and the less obvious yet powerful 
depoliticisation in the text, subjects, and specific contexts of the adaptation.  
 
3.1 Post-Cold War, Post-Military, and Post-Islamism  
In this sub-chapter, I will review the politicisation and depoliticisation in the post-military era 
and its cinema. As in the last two chapters, I will use the Five Fundamental Principles of the 
nation as the outline of this survey. Unlike in Chapter Two, however, this time I will not 
dwell on the issues of film institutions but focus more on the questions of film discourses and 
representations. The main reason for this is that there is not yet a comprehensive study of the 
film institutions in the post-Suharto era on which I can base my discussion, as I did with 
Sen’s research in the last chapter. From what I have observed, many of the official film 
institutions from the Suharto era continue to exist although this time as semi-autonomous 
organisations. They are no longer given full authority or controlled by the new government 
but still enjoy several privileges from the latter. In addition, there have been many new 
unofficial and semi-official institutions in the new millenium such as, just to name a few, 
Cinema Poetica, Indonesian Motion Picture Associations, and Badan Perfilman Indonesia 
(Indonesian Film Board) (see Pasaribu, Alternative). Due to this governmental 
depoliticisation and its resulting diversity, the current film institutions, perhaps with the 
exception of the Institute of Film Censorship, do not distinctly steer cinematic discourses and 
representations as the past institutions did during the Suharto era. The factors that have 
influenced cinema the most since 1998 as well as uniquely revitalising the existence of the 
censors are the market and pressure groups outside of film institutions. Both will be covered 
in the following review and the last section (3.2.4).  
In terms of references, there are so far only three monographs on post-military films, 
namely, Katinka van Heeren’s Contemporary Indonesian Film: Spirits of Reform and Ghost 
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from the Past (2012), Ben Murtagh’s Genders and Sexualities in Indonesian Cinema: 
Constructing Gay, Lesbi, and Waria Identities on Screen (2013), and Ariel Heryanto’s 
Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture (2014). The following 
survey owes much to those important works while at the same time it tries to enhance the 
existing debates by presenting additional facts and arguments and providing more 
information on Indonesian film adaptations. 
Belief in the One and Only God: Political Islam was systematically repressed by the 
secular military regime in the 1970-1980s. Only in the early 1990s did the regime begin 
aligning itself with Islamic political activists due the erosion of its international and domestic 
support in the late 1980s. With the sudden collapse of the Russian empire, the American 
empire no longer needed the assistance of the Indonesian military regime to block the spread 
of Communism in Southeast Asia and began criticising the human rights abuses of its ex-ally. 
The domestic supporting pillars of the regime, such as the nationalist faction in the military 
forces, Chinese-Indonesian business owners, and liberal intellectuals, grew impatient with the 
growing corruption, collusion, and nepotism of the Suharto family (O'Rourke).  
The fall of the military regime in 1998 did nothing but increase the power of the 
Islamists, for example with the appointment of Vice-President B. J. Habibie, the former head 
of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), as 
the new president until the scheduled election in 1999. The new democratic era also 
encouraged the (re-)establishment of many Islamic parties whose alliance successfully 
defeated the winner of the 1999 election, the secular Indonesian Democracy Party of 
Struggle, in the parliament. Salim Arskal, in Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization 
of Law in Modern Indonesia (2008), describes how sharia laws steadily replaced the existing 
secular laws on the national, provincial, and municipal levels, particularly in the first half of 
the 2000s.  More radical Islamic activists chose an extra-governmental path by founding the 
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Al Qaeda-affiliated Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and its cells. These groups were responsible for 
many terrorist acts throughout the country, including the infamous Bali Bombings in 2002 
and 2005. There are also Islamic militia groups that, as Ian Wilson states in 2008, mainly 
consist of thugs who are actually far from pious and ideologically indifferent towards the 
political Islam. Martin van Bruinessen reports in “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-
Suharto Indonesia” (2002) that there have been strong suspicions that the militia groups were 
originally founded and supported by the army to fight the left-wing organisations 
(Bruinessen). When the army stopped its support in the early 2010s, the groups began 
terrorising ‘unIslamic’ and/or ‘foreign’ businesses and extorting financial contributions for 
their ‘protection’ (Wilson). The militia groups now serve any political party that needs their 
services and will protect them politically in return. 
The honeymoon of political Islam was quite short-lived. Aside from the internal 
divisions among the Islamic parties, the public was also disappointed with their poor 
performances and corruption. The introduction of sharia laws was in many places supported 
by politicians from secular parties from the military-era, thus “outmanoeuvring, co-opting, 
and marginalising the more consistently Islamist parties as well as the more progressive 
elements of the civil society” (Heryanto 43; see also Salim). The secular parties have 
consistently increased their share in the subsequent elections and taken over the parliament. 
Starting in 2010, a large number of provincial and municipal sharia laws have been annulled 
by the Department of Internal Affairs and newly proposed sharia legislation has been openly 
blocked by the secular parties. The Yudhoyono government (2004-14) sought and destroyed 
the JI cells but, curiously, allowed the Islamic militia groups to exist and even to mock the 
President publicly. This only strengthened the allegation that the groups were closely linked 
to the army and political parties.   
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All of this led to what Asef Bayat calls “post-Islamism”, which is “neither anti-
Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular” (19; see also 1.2.1). While Islamism strives for the 
implementation of Islam in governmental and societal affairs, post-Islamism promotes the 
Islamic piety of individual Muslims. In other words, post-Islamism is the new face of the 
governmental and, to some extent, societal depoliticisation of religion. As described by 
Heryanto in his 2014 monograph, post-Islamism finds its largest support in the youth 
population and strongest expression in popular culture, including, but not limited to, popular 
novels and films, including adaptations. The most financially and critically successful Islamic 
film in the post-military era is a film adaptation entitled Ayat-ayat Cinta (2008). The author 
of the novel was not pleased with the adaptation because it focuses on the inner conflicts of 
pious, young Muslims, which makes it less social and political than the book. Critics like 
Heryanto, however, praise the film because it is seen as more realistic, complex, and 
debatable than the novel. The success of the adaptation has encouraged the making of 
comparable films (adaptations) with similar degrees of success.  
The depoliticisation of Islam co-occurs with the politicisation of the marginalised 
backgrounds of Islamic terrorists. Although the security forces persistently treat Islamic 
terrorism as a security issue, the majority of scholars and authors have tried to explain this 
phenomenon and thus politicise it as a problem of structural injustices. This counter discourse 
can be seen, for instance, in Demi Allah Aku Jadi Teroris (2009), Kabut Jihad (2012), and 
Pedang Rasul (2013). However, at the same time, this societal politicisation can be 
considered governmental depoliticisation in that it reveals the flaws of political Islam, which 
regularly blames Muslims’ hardship on the successive secular administrations. So far no 
major filmmaker has made a film based on this politically sensitive and financially 
unrewarding theme. 
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Fig. 17. Ayat-ayat Cinta (2008), a story of a pious Muslim protagonist who overcomes all of 
the obstacles in life maintaining his purity. 
The post-military era has seen the production of religious-leader biopics, which the 
previous military regime strongly discouraged. None of the filmed leaders, however, was 
from Islamic political organisations. One of the most popular religious biopics is Sang 
Pencerah (2010), which narrates the life of Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, 
the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Despite the fact that many of its cadres 
have been working in practical politics, Muhammadiyah is officially a social and educational 
organisation. The biopic production of Ahmad Dahlan was soon followed by Sang Kiai 
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(2013) of Hasyim Asyari, the founder of the largest Islamic organisation in the country, 
Nadhlatul Ulama. Nadhlatul Ulama is officially a non-political institution and theologically 
very moderate. It is also well known for its consistency in defending religious minorities and 
opposing Islamic extremists. There is also Soegija (2012), a biopic of the first native Catholic 
bishop, who, surprisingly for Catholics and Muslims alike, is played by a Muslim actor.   
 
Fig. 18. Sang Pencerah (2010), the first biopic of religious leaders in the post-military era. 
Last but not least, post-Islamism co-exists with the production of more than thirty-five 
films exposing non-normative sexualities and genders in one way or another (Murtagh 3). 
While many of them still carry the Suharto era’s portrayals of homosexuality, there are a few 
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that offer fairly new representations. Nia Dinata’s film Arisan! (The Gathering!, 2003), for 
instance, has been widely applauded for its positive portrayal of gay life. Yet Murtagh shows 
that this affirmative portrayal is not necessarily any more liberating than the portrayal of gay 
life in the films of the Suharto era. Drawing on Lisa Duggan’s work on homonormativity, he 
reveals the process of desexualisation of gay and lesbian characters to make films such as 
Arisan! acceptable to the heteronormative majority. By emphasising the domestic, 
depoliticised private sphere, and the significant contribution that the homosexual characters 
make to society, those films are replacing homophobia with a stereotyped modern queer 
subject (107). Implicit in this representation is a hierarchy of worthiness derived from gender-
conformity models. Gay couples who act according to acceptable masculine behaviours, and 
who imitate the model of heterosexual monogamy in their relationships, are tolerated but at 
the price of marginalising other types of masculinity and same-sex sexuality (119). 
Furthermore, homonormative gay couples are contrasted with effeminate sexual characters 
such as male-to-female transvestites, making the latter and other queer subjectivities 
unwanted.  
Just and civilised humanity: The early post-military era began with a pronounced 
enthusiasm to investigate the human rights abuses committed by the military regime, 
rehabilitate the victims, and bring the perpetrators to justice. It took only a few years to 
realise that this would not be as simple as it seemed. First of all, the successive civilian 
governments have always been politically weak and have needed the military forces on their 
side in order to survive the relentless attacks of the non-governing parties. This has 
automatically increased the bargaining power of the military and its civilian supporters and 
discouraged the governments from investigating their precious allies. The governments have 
seemed convinced that the investigation would threaten the fragile peace between civilian 
groups, some of which also played a role in the atrocities. Second, there are many problems 
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at hand such as economic crises, political fights, and racial and religious conflicts (Heryanto, 
Identity). This makes the problems of the past, including the human rights abuses, seem 
irrelevant and less urgent. Last but not least, the public also miss the relative peace and order 
under the military regime and believe that the current chaotic situation has resulted from the 
civilian governments’ fear of supressing political actors and thus violating human rights.  
Out of the numerous human right abuses committed during the military era (1966-98), 
there are three that have attracted the most public attention. The first and most controversial 
of all is the anti-communist campaign in 1965-6. The National Commission on Human Rights 
has officially declared that heavy, systematic, and extensive violations of human rights were 
committed by the state apparatus during the campaign and has submitted the result of its 
investigation to the Office of the Attorney General. However, it seems that the governments 
and the parliaments have been leaning towards non-judicial solutions, such as fact-finding 
and reconciliations, which are also going nowhere. After pledging in his 2014 campaign to 
end the controversies once and for all, the current president Joko Widodo has not taken any 
major steps to fulfil his promise. The second and third cases are, respectively, the kidnapping 
and murder of pro-democracy activists in 1990s and the persecution and rape of Chinese 
Indonesians in 1998. The fate of these two cases is no better, if not worse, than the first one 
(see ICJT and Kontras).   
These three cases have been, in various ways, depicted in many literary works. They 
have also been portrayed in films, mostly in documentaries. Marsinah (2000) and Kutunggu 
di Sudut Semanggi (2004) tell about the repressions against the pro-democracy activists prior 
to the collapse of the military regime. The racial attacks and rapes in 1998 are depicted in 
feature films like May (2008), Babi Buta yang Ingin Terbang (2008), and Di Balik 98 (2015). 
Just as in the wider public space, it is the anti-communist campaign that attracts the most 
attention from authors and filmmakers. This ranges from a subtle reference to the tragedy to a 
211 
 
direct representation of the massacre, from a supporting narrative to the dominant discourse 
to a subversive response to it. In general, men and women of letters are more radical than 
filmmakers in their representations of the tragedy, which is unsurprising considering the 
greater internal and external pressures on the latter. With new technology, anyone can write 
what s/he believes about the campaign and publish it online or offline. While new technology 
has also democratised filmmaking, perhaps due to limited budgets, indie filmmakers prefer to 
create documentaries than to make feature films on the tragedy.  
 
Fig. 19. The Act of Killing (2012), still officially banned in Indonesia. 
The most famous and controversial documentary so far is The Act of Killing (2012), 
which won, among others, the 2013 European Film Award, the Asia Pacific Screen Award, 
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and the 67th BAFTA awards, and was nominated for the Oscar for best documentary feature 
at the 86th Academy Awards. Most of the other documentaries talk about the victims of the 
purge and/or present their point of view, which is quite progressive compared to the total 
silence in the military era. Yet, in The Act of Killing, the unrepentant former members of the 
Indonesian anti-communist militia boast about the murders and even happily re-enact some of 
them in the style of American cowboy movies. Nevertheless, none of the documentaries has 
had a major impact outside of academia and activist circles in Indonesia, not to mention that 
the screenings have regularly been stopped by the militia and the police. 
Major film producers still avoid the issues perhaps because of the perceived economic 
losses and the threats from anti-communist groups. It goes without saying that each member 
of a film-making team may have a different view on the tragedy. Usually, the tragedy 
becomes a mere background for other narratives such as love stories and biopics of national 
figures. This makes The Dancer, the focus of the current chapter, occupy a unique position 
with regard to the massacre. On the one hand, the film conventionally puts the love story 
between Srintil and Rasus first and foremost and sets the anti-communist campaign as the 
background to the romance. It also follows the ruling narrative in several aspects, as will be 
made clear in the analysis later on. On the other hand, the film has certainly achieved more 
than that. Unlike the other films, the tragedy is ‘the’ background of the story, not just one of 
many events in the narrative. Srintil and Rasus also represent the two main historical actors, 
namely the accused Communists and the military, and are not merely passive observers in the 
tragedy. Furthermore, the film is the first commercial feature film to depict the involvement 
of the military in the anti-communist purge, which has been regularly denied by the military 
forces (Heryanto, Identity).   
The unity of Indonesia: The early years of the post-military era were also 
characterised by sectarian conflicts all over the country. The repressed racial and/or religious 
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prejudices during the military era began to surface and many lives were lost. The most 
notable racial conflicts were the xenophobic attack on Chinese Indonesians a few days before 
the succession of General Suharto and the bloody conflict between the Madurese and the 
Dayak in Borneo provinces from 2001-3. Some local fighters and national politicians tried to 
reframe the racial conflicts as religious wars (Bruinessen). This was done, for example, by 
highlighting the fact that the majority of Chinese Indonesians are non-Muslim while the 
majority of non-Chinese are Muslim. There was also a religious conflict within one ethnic 
group that gradually involved fighters from other ethnicities such as in the Moluccas (1998-
2000). It is hard to consider all of the conflicts purely horizontal (between people) 
considering the overwhelming reports of the involvement of the state apparatus in them. 
Meanwhile, the rebellion of East Timor could not help having religious and racial 
dimensions. As with many disgruntled non-Muslim and non-Javanese communities, the East 
Timorese independent fighters perceived the occupation by Indonesia as a racial and religious 
genocide by the Muslim Javanese against the Catholic Timorese.  
In addition to the racial and religious conflicts, the territorial integrity of the nation 
was strongly compromised at the beginning of the new era. The collapse of the military 
regime and the weakening of the country encouraged the repressed separatist movements to 
resurface and fight for their independence. The United Nations forced the Habibie 
government to agree on the referendum in East Timor in 1999, which resulted in the 
independence of Timor Leste and the atrocities committed by the withdrawing of Indonesian 
military forces and militia. The two small islands of Sipadan and Ligitan were lost to 
Malaysia in an international court in Den Haag in 2002. The Free Aceh Movement also 
intensified its international lobbying and guerrilla resistance, which were cut short by the 
devastating tsunami in 2005. The Acehnese rebels and the Yudhoyono government achieved 
a permanent solution in regard to greater autonomy for the province, which included the 
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implementation of sharia laws and the recognition of local parties. There has been a smaller-
scale armed resistance in West Papua that is receiving growing international attention.  
All of those territorial losses and challenges have only increased the public stature of 
the military forces and its ultra-nationalistic militia while decreasing the perceived capability 
of the civilian governments. People have become highly sensitive to the issues of 
nationalism, particularly against Malaysia and China, and this has been politically exploited 
by both the governments and the political parties. However, there are also civil society 
members that advocate a greater decentralisation and welfare approach to pacify the 
separatist tendencies (see Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher). So far the decentralisation has not 
given the expected result but created ‘local strong men’ who are no less corrupt and cruel 
than the central government in Jakarta. There has been progress with the existence of ethnic 
minorities, particularly Chinese Indonesians (see Dieleman, Koning, and Post). Confucianism 
has become one of the officially acknowledged religions in the country. Chinese Indonesians 
are now free to learn Mandarin and practise their traditions. There are a growing number of 
Chinese Indonesians who are actively participating in politics and winning public favour, 
such as the current governor of the capital, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. This progress has been 
openly and secretly opposed by ‘native’ politicians and businessmen.  
Films with nationalist characteristics have flourished in response to the threat of 
national disintegration. Imitating the military-era patriotist films, new films with such 
characteristics still champion military officers as the most nationalistic defenders of the 
nation. This can be seen, for example, in Merah Putih (2009), Darah Garuda (2010), and 
Hati Merdeka (2011). There are also popular motion pictures on Chinese Indonesians 
actively supporting nationalist ideas such as Ca Bau Kan (2001), Gie (2005), and King 
(2009), the first two of which are adaptations of a novel and a diary. None of the Chinese 
Indonesian characters in those films is a military officer, thus portraying the ever limited 
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access of Chinese Indonesians to military positions. For a brief period of time in the early 
2000s, there was also a trend for Chinese-looking actors and actresses and Chinese problems 
in TV serials. 
 
Fig. 20. Ca Bau Kan (2001), a post-military film on Chinese Indonesians, telling the life of a 
pragmatic Chinese businessman who assists the Indonesian freedom fighters and falls in love 
with a native woman.  
There is a new, popular genre called ‘frontier film’, which comprises films about the 
hardship of Indonesians living on the frontiers, far from the more prosperous Java Island 
and/or close to the neighbouring countries. Most of the frontier films deal with West Papuans 
such as Aku Ingin Menciummu Sekali Saja (2002), Denias (2006), and Di Timur Matahari 
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(2012). This is not surprising considering the Papuans’ continued conflicts with the state as 
well as the ‘exoticism’ of the people and the island to non-Papuans. Tanah Surga ... Katanya 
(2012) tells about the tragic life of those who live on the border with the more prosperous 
Malaysia. Atambua 39 Celcius (2012) deals with the pro-Indonesia Timorese militia who run 
away from the newly independent Timor Leste and live on the Indonesian side of the border. 
Aside from addressing nationalist issues, the frontier films also reveal many social injustices 
in the country and will be explored in the discussion of the fifth principle.  
 
Fig. 21. Di Timur Matahari (2012), one of several films on West Papua, narrating the life of 
children in the highly volatile region. 
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Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives: Although 
not without its defects, democracy has been one of the marked achievements of post-military 
Indonesia. It is often believed that democracy can never last outside of the western 
hemisphere, let alone in Islamic societies. Indonesia, however, has peacefully conducted four 
legislative and three presidential elections, which have all been considered free and fair by 
domestic and foreign observers (Nakamura 11). The winning party has consistently changed 
in every election. The parliament has become strong, sometimes to the annoyance of the 
government and the public. In 2004, the parliament adopted a bicameral system with the 
establishment of the Senate House. There have been judicial reforms as well although these 
have not been as marked as the executive and legislative ones. Similar to other democratic 
countries, the progress of the trias politica has been accompanied by the multiplication and 
freedom of the press. The number of print, broadcast, and later digital media grew 
exponentially in 1998-2000 (Garcia).  
Everything must come to an end, and the great politicisation in post-military 
Indonesia has indeed come to an end. People have become disillusioned with the conflicts, 
politics, and corruption. Depoliticisation has returned, but this time not in the traditional, 
repressive mode, as practised by the military regime, but in a more sophisticated form, as in 
advanced democratic countries (Flinders and Wood 135). This new development has been 
signified by the establishment and empowerment of many new ad hoc, professional 
institutions in different sectors. These range from business (Business Competition Monitoring 
Commission), finance (Indonesian Financial Services Authority), and law (Judicial 
Commission) to the press (Board of Press), media (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission), 
and film (Indonesian Film Board). Besides the creation of these new institutions, the 
governments and parliaments have also decreased their control over the existing institutions 
as in the case of the Institute of Film Censorship.  
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The absence of direct control by the governments has brought censorship into the 
hands of whoever dominates the public arena. It is safe to say that for the past ten years the 
public discourses have been greatly steered by the post-Islamists. It is no coincidence 
therefore that the current censorship is quite progressive in terms of politics but remains 
conservative vis a vis sexuality. Government Regulation No. 18 Year 2014, the new 
censorship law, no longer sets down political ideologies that are not to be expressed in films. 
There is no longer a blanket ban on the exposition of Indonesia’s internal or foreign politics 
or the policies of the regime, as in the former regulation. Hence, any political criticisms 
towards governments are no longer seen as a threat to the security of the state and nation. 
Post-military films are free to openly criticise and even make fun of the government and their 
policies. Films can now have corrupt police officers although they usually balance this with 
the existence of honest officers. Officers can be defeated and killed, too, although the law 
enforcement eventually wins against the criminals in the end. Those new developments can 
be seen, for instance, in the critically acclaimed martial arts film The Raid 2 (2014). 
 
Fig. 22. Reza, a corrupt police officer, the moment before he is shot to death by a mob boss in 
The Raid 2 (2014). 
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Mass action, either urban or rural, remains underrepresented in post-military films but 
this time this is due not as much to the governments’ intervention as to public disillusionment 
with politics. Mass action can now be portrayed as positive, especially if it is carried out by 
student demonstrators, as in films on the regime change in 1998. As suggested by Edward 
Aspinall in Opposing Soeharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia 
(2005), political scholars regularly depoliticise student movements as moral activism as 
opposed to political action. This notion has been well received and reiterated by filmmakers. 
Films on the May 1998 chaos in Jakarta, for instance, consistently differentiate the ‘pure’ 
student activists from the ’impure’ rioters. Furthermore, resolutions to social conflicts still 
come overwhelmingly from urban, educated, and/or middle-class professionals or religious 
leaders as represented in many frontier films. This is actually at odds with the facts that most 
social documentaries reveal. In addition, politicians remain underrepresented or negatively 
portrayed in the new films but for a different reason than in the military era. 
 
Fig. 23. An idealised image of student demonstrators in Di Balik 98 (2015). 
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Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia: Officially, the Soeharto regime 
rejected both Capitalism and Socialism as the economic platform of the country and claimed 
to implement a ‘Pancasila Economy’. Essentially, this was capitalism but with the protection 
of selected strategic resources such as energy, food, and information. As portrayed by John 
Bresnan in “The United States, the IMF, and the Indonesian Financial Crisis” (1999), this 
protection eventually eclipsed free competition and extended to the other lucrative sectors 
controlled by the president’s family and cronies. That was why the obstructed foreign capital 
punished the regime’s economy in 1997-8 and foreign capitalist countries generally 
welcomed the collapse of their ex-ally. The early post-military era was characterised by much 
privatisation in every economic sector, including the previously well-protected strategic 
resources. This was partly dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the 
infamous Letter of Intent but at the same time was the new government’s only strategy to 
attract private investments and stop the further collapse of the economy.  
The depoliticised economy has been performing relatively well and to some extent 
has brought Indonesia to a better position than in the military era. Indonesia emerged from 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 relatively unscathed and now has become a member of 
the prestigious G20 countries. The depoliticisation has not gone completely unchecked. As 
early as 2005, politicians and civil societies voiced their concerns over what they called ‘neo-
liberalism’ and it remains a popular catchphrase in the media. Yet, in general, the economy 
has been continuously deregulated and depoliticised. The Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle, which in the past criticised the ruling Democratic Party for becoming the local 
agent of neo-liberalism, launched heavier economic deregulation after winning the last 
election in 2014 to combat the declining value of the currency and the threat of capital flight.  
There has been a change in the general representation of social justice in the literature 
and films. A great number of literary works have revealed the unjust social structures and 
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systematic exploitation of the poor in the past and the present. The frontier films practically 
do the same job as those literary works. On the other hand, there are a few books and films 
that still portray prosperity as being due to talent and hard work and, by implication, poverty 
as due to unluckiness and laziness. Biopic films about successful businessmen and politicians 
generally follow this representation, such as Jokowi (2013) and Sepatu Dahlan (2014). There 
are also motion pictures that stand in the middle of the two extremes; they scrutinise the 
social injustices but at the same time suggest that a combination of luck and hard work can 
conquer all. This middle approach is embodied by Laskar Pelangi (2008), a film adaptation 
of the best-selling novel with the same title, one of the highest grossing films in Indonesian 
box office history, and the recipient of local and international awards.  
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Fig. 24. Laskar Pelangi (2008), setting a new outlook on poverty as well as social mobility in 
Indonesian cinema.  
In general, however, popular literature and films tend to focus on the haves and their 
problems. There is still a die-hard belief among producers and publishers that common 
people do not want to read about and watch their own hardship. As in the early military-era 
films, the early post-military films are preoccupied with the luxurious lifestyles and sexual 
adventures of the super-rich Indonesians in the capital. This can be seen in films, to name a 
few, like Arisan! (2003), Virgin (2004), and Jakarta Undercover (2007). The lifestyles and 
adventures are by and large portrayed as negative, decadent, and immoral. There are also 
films that explore high class cosmopolitanism such as Eiffel … I’m in Love (2003), 99 
Cahaya di Langit Eropa (2013), and 9 Summers 10 Autumns (2015), all of which are film 
adaptations of popular novels. Unlike opulent lifestyles and controversial sexualities, 
cosmopolitanism is generally pictured as positive and progressive in these films.  
Interestingly, cosmopolitanism is no longer associated with lives and settings in 
Europe and Northern America, as in the military-era films, but now extends to fellow Asian 
countries like Egypt, as in Ayat-ayat Cinta (2008), and South Korea, as in Hello Goodbye 
(2012). Egypt might not signify the idea of prosperity per se but it does represent Islamic 
intellectualism due to the existence of its Al-Azhar University and its world-famous Islamic 
intellectuals. Many prominent Indonesian Islamic scholars and politicians are graduates of the 
Egyptian university and they are the new elite group in the post-Islamic country. On the other 
hand, South Korea symbolises wealth, technology and lifestyle, in short, the new awakening 
of Asian countries. Heryanto’s 2014 book reveals that the Indonesian fans of South Korean 
popular culture transcend the presupposed racial and religious boundaries. Islamic girls adore 
Korean love stories as much as they are crazy about Islamic love films.  
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Fig. 25. Hello Goodbye (2012), one of the many Indonesian films set in foreign countries. 
 
3.2 The Dancer the Film: Hyper-politicisation and Depoliticisation 
In the last sub-chapter, I have reviewed the repoliticisation and depoliticisation in post-Cold 
War, post-Suharto, and post-Islamic Indonesia and its cinematic representations. The 
following sub-chapter will present an analysis of The Dancer, the second film adaptation of 
Ahmad Tohari’s novel with the same title. The main aim of this sub-chapter is to explore how 
the repoliticisation and depoliticisation in Indonesia and its films, as previously discussed, 
interact with the adaptation. There are two important subject matters in the film, namely, 
‘secularism’ and ‘conciliatory politics’, both of which traverse the structure and semiotics of 
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the film as well as embodying the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in the text. Then, I will 
reveal the internal (the filmmaker, cast, and crew) and external (the government, society, and 
market) factors that may have influenced the political discourses in the adaptation.  
 
3.2.1 The Structure 
The structure here mainly refers to the series of events, sequentially and/or consequentially 
connected by the actions of the characters in the film. While Tohari divides his trilogy based 
on Srintil’s power relations with the three groups of power (the villagers, the Communists, 
and the civilian/military professionals), the second adaptation completely excludes the 
civilian professionals from the narrative. The post-1965 era is narrated very briefly in the film 
and it focuses exclusively on the ex-Communists and the military. One of the reasons for this 
is perhaps because the exploits of the civilian professional class have been exhaustively 
exposed and criticised elsewhere. In contrast, despite the major changes in the post-military 
era, the military and ex-Communists remain politically and academically enigmatic.  
The narrative of the film can be divided roughly into 1) the making of the ronggeng, 
2) the politicisation of Paruk, and 3) the anti-communist campaign. The structure loosely 
follows the model formulated by the narrative theorist Tzvetan Todorov and adapted by 
Warren Buckland in 2003. The first stage is the state of equilibrium, the second stage the 
disruption of the equilibrium, and the third the creation of a new order. Although mostly 
chronological, the film begins with the detention of the Paruk villagers in the suffocating, 
dark, tight compartments of a sugar factory, which actually belongs to the third stage of the 
narrative. This choice of opening makes clear from the very beginning the importance of the 
anti-communist campaign and, to some extent, the political tone of the film. From this 
opening scene, the film jumps to a flashback of the early situation in Paruk village before 
Srintil becomes a dancer and moves in a linear fashion to the end.   
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The narration of the film is predominantly omniscient with few narrations from the 
point of view of Rasus. The use of Rasus’ point of view in the first stage helps the spectators 
to empathise with him, and, with him, witness how his girlfriend gains cultural, social, and 
economic capital while he himself remains a nobody and can only see her from a distance. 
Being disappointed, Rasus runs away from the village, works as an office boy in the military 
depot in Dawuan, and trains as a military officer. Later, this helps the positive representation 
of the military in the film, which, very much like Rasus, starts as an underdog in contrast to 
the strong Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI) but ends up a winner. In other words, the 
restricted narrations set the narrative of the film as a classic story of losers to winners and, in 
the case of Srintil and the PKI, winners to losers.   
The first stage: The first stage introduces an important narrative device: the 
obstacles, that is, those standing in the way of the main characters reaching their goal. In 
regard to these matters, there is not much difference between the film and the novel. Srintil’s 
main goal is to restore the reputation of her parents and her village by becoming the next 
ronggeng dancer. Her obstacles are the blessing of Kartareja as the guardian of the ronggeng 
tradition, her relationship with Rasus, and her own individuality. On the other hand, Rasus’ 
objective is simply to marry his sweetheart. His obstacle is equally clear, that is, it is 
impossible to marry her if Srintil becomes a ronggeng.  
The first narrative difference between the novel and the film begins with Srintil’s 
relation with her mentor Kartareja and her grandfather Sakarya. There are power relations 
between the villagers in the film, but they are of a different kind than those of the novel. For 
one thing, the Srintil of the film is less politically conscious than the same character in the 
novel. While the Srintil of the novel grows to realise her exploited fate and eventually refuses 
to dance as a protest against the elders of the village, the Srintil of the film never achieves the 
same level of consciousnesss and quits dancing simply because she is broken-hearted. She is 
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merely a passive main character throughout the film, like a precious trophy being fought for 
by others. This is perhaps the first depoliticisation in the film, that is, the disempowerment of 
the relatively politicised female protagonist of the novel. The director admits this 
transformation while arguing: “the representation of Srintil in The Dancer is based on a fact 
that we found during the research, that women in 1965 were an object” (Isfansyah, “Aku” 
par. 19, my trans.). 
The first stage of the film also reduces the social and cultural standing of Sakarya, 
who is now portrayed as powerless and apolitical, in contrast to the powerful and political 
Kartarejas. More significantly, and still related to Sakarya’s reduced role, the film barely 
expresses anything about Kejawenism, Sufism, and their intersections in Cultural Islam, 
although the novel does so extensively. While Paruk in the novel partly embodies apolitical 
but moral Islam, the village in the film fully represents the Kejawen community, but one with 
a rather understated spiritualism. There are indeed the Javanese rituals of finding the kris, the 
bathing ritual, and the Buka Klambu ceremony but their collective significance relies on their 
cultural politics rather than philosophical spiritualism. This tendency can be sensed from the 
very beginning when, unlike in the novel, Kartareja expresses his doubt about Srintil’s 
qualities as ‘the chosen one’.  
 Kartareja : So this Srintil has been a ronggeng since birth, you say? 
 Sakarya  : What I mean is that she has received the indang (the spirit of a 
                                       dancer). 
 Kartareja : Sakarya, Sakarya. So you’re telling me you know when a 
  person has the proper spirit. 
 Sakarya : Don’t get me wrong. When it comes to all the requirements, 
  you are the only one who knows. (Isfansyah, Dancer) 
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It is revealed soon that Kartareja does so partly to increase his bargaining position against 
Srintil, Sakarya, and the other villagers. Likewise, while the novel describes in detail 
Kartareja’s spiritual possession in the bathing ceremony, the film shows that he is completely 
conscious throughout the event. The Buka Klambu itself becomes merely an event for the 
Kartarejas to officially declare their ownership of Srintil and sell her virginity to the highest 
bidder. This elaborate de-spiritualisation is the first step of the discursive repoliticisation in 
the adaptation because it frees the issues surrounding the villagers from the realm of fate and 
promotes them to the area of deliberation and debate. 
Due to its detachment from Islam, the film bears a different kind of Foucauldian true 
and false discourse from the novel. Unlike the novel, the film does not discredit Paruk’s 
sexuality and way of life. What is wrong is the manipulation of the tradition such as in the 
commercialisation of the Buka Klambu. While the novel grounds its moral judgement on the 
belief of the Islamic majority, the film overlooks Islam and Kejawenism altogether and 
focuses instead on a more secular value of integrity. Thus, the ronggeng commercialisation is 
immoral not because it is against Islam or the ronggeng tradition itself but because it is 
against Kartareja’s duty to protect it. Furthermore, unlike the novel, the film does not draw 
any causal relations between the religious practices and the tragedy that befalls the village. 
Although the fall of the community might incite the spectators’ sympathy, it is of a different 
kind from that in the novel because now the tragedy is less divinely sanctioned and more 
politically driven.  
Similar to the novel, the film also extends the politicisation of the community to the 
ever-sensitive area of sexuality. Aside from the lovemaking between Srintil and Rasus, the 
film’s sexual content centres on the bidding for Srintil’s virginity in the Buka Klambu and the 
story of ‘happily cheated wives’. These two events indicate a wide moral division among the 
villagers; there are those who exploit Paruk’s unique sexuality and those who sincerely 
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believe in it. On the one hand, there are Kartareja and Sakarya who are pictured as enjoying 
their new wealth after ‘selling’ Srintil in the controversial ceremony. On the other hand, there 
are wives who compete for their husbands to sleep with the famous ronggeng because they 
sincerely believe that sleeping with a ronggeng will help to restore their husbands’ virility 
and fertility. Meanwhile, the novel’s more controversial stories of Rasus’ prostitute mother, 
open marriage, and gowok tradition are completely excluded in the film.   
The film shows a very different attitude to Paruk’s sexuality from that of the novel. 
Unlike the novel, the film does not exercise what Heryanto calls the post-modern narrative 
technique of under erasure, that is, “to manufacture and nurture a stigma so it could be 
rejected” (Identity 142; see 1.2.1). While the novel frames the free sexuality of Paruk village 
as madness as opposed to the normal, respectable sexuality of Dawuan city, the film does not 
present anything about Dawuan’s sexuality and, therefore, there is neither a contrast nor 
counter-sexuality. The lovemaking between Srintil and Rasus itself breaks a number of sex-
related taboos in Indonesian cinema. It is rare to see extra-marital sexual intercourse between 
two consenting, loving adults on screen, let alone between a highly respected military officer 
and a heavily condemned communist prostitute.  
Furthermore, unlike the novel, the film does not impose Paruk’s politics exclusively 
upon Srintil’s sexuality. While the novel suppresses any notion of class and class conflict, the 
first stage of the film introduces the existence of both in the village. There are landowners 
and their enforcers who exploit the labour of the working-class villagers, who initially 
include the pre-military Rasus. Thus, if the novel tends to reduce economic capital to a mere 
by-product of the cultural and social relations (as in the wealth of Kartareja due to his 
position), the film tries to reinvigorate what Bourdieu calls “the brutal fact of universal 
reducibility to economics” (Forms 253). Above all, this shows that the villagers are already 
divided even before the external politicisation by the PKI in the second stage.  
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Overall, the first stage of the film narrative appears to promote the idea of secularism, 
which, according to Jonathan Fox in Political Secularism, Religion, and the State (2015), is 
“the idea that one can understand the world without reference to religion” (23). While few 
supporters of secularisation theory would today argue that religion will disappear, Fox 
contends that secularism as an ideology continues to challenge religion in government and 
society (17). This challenge is no less existent in the discursive realm as the analysis above 
has just indicated. Politically, The Dancer’s secularism constitutes concurrently an act of 
discursive repoliticisation and one of depoliticisation. On the one hand, the film reasserts the 
forgotten, non-religious dynamics of a religious minority, while on the other, it suppresses 
both the Cultural Islamism of the original text and the post-Islamism of the post-military era 
in its narrative. This is in line with Noah Feldman’s (2005) proposition that secularism does 
not necessarily mean anti-religion but also includes attempts to protect religious minorities 
from interferences by governments and/or religious majorities.  
The second stage: The first turning point in the narrative takes place when Bakar, the 
communist leader, visits the village and engages the ronggeng troupe. The second stage of the 
narrative is the liminal period, which means that it occurs outside of established (or normal) 
social events (Buckland). Although the first stage exposes several events that the rest of the 
country easily considers peculiar (particularly, the sexual practices in Paruk), those are part of 
normal life in the village. The liminality of the second stage relies more on the overt 
collaboration between the ronggeng troupe and the political party, which is considered 
abnormal by both the villagers and wider Indonesian society. While the arts in Indonesia have 
never been completely free from politics, their relations are persistently concealed, 
unacknowledged, and/or made subtle. It was the PKI that for the first time in the history of 
modern Indonesia dispelled these secret relations and openly used literature and the arts for 
its political goals (Foulcher; Moeljanto and Ismail).      
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Ever culturally and socially strong, the Bakar of the film is pictured as highly 
political, perhaps even more so than the Bakar in the novel, yet always true to his political 
ideals. When he ‘uses’ the ronggeng troupe for the cause of Communism, he does so in good 
faith so that the victory of Communism will save the villagers from their wretched existence. 
Being faithful to his communist ideals, Bakar rejects the exploitation of female sexuality for 
political ends. He is far more interested in the welfare of the villagers and the conservation of 
the ronggeng dance as a performing art of the people. As he expresses in his first meeting 
with the villagers:  
Landowner : I bet you keep coming here because of the deflowering     
  ceremony. Right? 
Bakar  : If it were only about sex, for me that would be a minor issue.  
  What’s important is to maintain ronggeng dancing as a  
  traditional art form. So that its dignity and prestige are not co- 
  opted by the bourgeois. (Isfansyah, Dancer) 
Bakar’s personal relationship with Srintil is not seen in the film, nor is her indebtedness to 
him. There is not a single scene in which he talks directly with her despite his frequent visits 
to the village. This physical proximity signifies a discursive dissociation between Bakar and 
the sexual exploitation of the dancer. The film also tempers the anti-religion stigma of the 
Communists that the military and the novel jointly propagate. While the Bakar of the novel 
prohibits Sakarya and Kartareja from setting out offerings, the Bakar of the film comes and 
discusses this sensitive matter with the villagers. It is revealed that he does not forbid the 
superstitious ritual; he just needs more time for political speeches at the rallies. Here, for the 
first time, being political or politicisation does not necessarily carry a negative connotation, 
which is radically different from the central belief of the novel and the military regime.  
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The vandalism of Ki Secamanggala’s tomb, allegedly by the enemy of the PKI, draws 
Srintil and the other villagers closer to the political party. Bakar is present at the scene of the 
vandalism and starts agitating the angry villagers. The ensuing riot, however, is not directly 
provoked by the PKI leader but by Darsun, a non-influential male villager in the novel. 
Darsun unexpectedly hijacks Bakar’s speech and provokes the villagers to destroy a nearby 
forest. Despite the many conflicts in the narrative, the film does not really have a clear 
political villain except in Darsun. Later this character also betrays the PKI and his fellow 
villagers to the military and rural militia when the political tide turns. More than the moral 
and political contradictions between the villagers in the first stage, the character of Darsun 
directly challenges the traditional, depoliticised image of the villagers, as established by the 
military regime and sustained by the novel.  
The positive representation of Bakar (and the negative portrayal of Darsun) can also 
be seen from the repression of several scenes from the screenplay. For example, it is written 
in one of the montages in the script: “Orang-orang sedang dihasut oleh Bakar. Darsun ada 
disana. Bakar memberikan beberapa acecoris berwarna merah” (62). This roughly 
translates: ‘The people are being provoked by Bakar. Darsun is in the scene. Bakar distribute 
some red accessories’. While ‘being provoked’ might still have a neutral or positive meaning 
in English, ‘dihasut’ has a more consistently negative referent in Indonesian. This montage 
does not cut into the film, hence signalling the filmmaker’s changing characterisation of 
Bakar from a negative to a positive or, at least, an ambivalent character.  
Replicating the novel’s attitude, the film also shows sympathy to the villagers as 
innocently accused communists. On several accounts, the film echoes the effect of the 
dominant discourse of the novel and the military on the communised villagers. The villagers 
in the film have not been completely freed from the depoliticising construct that those living 
in the rural areas are unsophisticated and innocent. Some of them are pictured as illiterate and 
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thus ignorant of the meaning of the PKI’s slogans and speeches. They are also unaware when 
their names are written on paper for, in Bakar’s words, “refreshment after dancing” whereas 
they are actually registered as members of the party (Isfansyah, Dancer). These are probably 
the reasons why Heryanto concludes that:  
Sang Penari does not take the next step of challenging or transcending the 
New Order’s overall ideological construct, which has already been built by the 
master narrative of Pengkhianatan G 30 September. With a few exceptions 
(mainly authored by survivors of the anti-communist campaign from 1965), 
left-leaning characters in all Indonesian fiction set against the background of 
the 1965-66 massacre appear either as wicked villains, smart but malicious 
persons who mislead other people, innocent but hopelessly foolish individuals 
who are susceptible to communist propaganda, or unlucky for being related to 
Communists by descent or marriage. Invariably, these fictions convey a 
familiar message to their implied audience: it is the characters’ own fault if 
they are killed off. Sang Penari makes no exception to this general practice. 
(Identity 150-1) 
Nevertheless, the Bakar of the film does not easily sit into any of Heryanto’s stipulated 
categories. He is a peculiar combination of smart and influential as well as innocent and 
unlucky. If he is guilty, he is guilty of idealism but certainly not of selfish manipulation as the 
novel suggests. Evidently, Bakar is also easily deceived by his ‘victims’, as in his encounter 
with Darsun. Thus, the film’s attitude to ideological communists like Bakar is actually more 
complex than what Heryanto describes. 
Similar to its nemesis, the military in the film displays a number of ambivalent 
qualities. Rasus is pictured as a diligent and smart pupil of the military in Dawuan city, but 
not to the point where he begins to reflect or talk philosophically, as in the novel. Nor does he 
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speak with low-frequency words and/or English loanwords. Rasus keeps his strong 
Banyumasan accent even after he becomes a military officer, thus maintaining his identity as 
a villager despite his close contact with the ‘enlightening’ military from the city. He is not 
shown as being enlightened by the sexual morality of the city either, as he still has sexual 
intercourse with Srintil after his military appointment. The fact that Rasus asks Srintil to quit 
being a ronggeng, marry him, and live in the city indicates that he does not have any problem 
with the moral stigma of a ronggeng dancer. To this extent, the representation of the military 
Rasus is different from the novel and rather subversive to the culturally and morally perfect 
image of military officers.  
In general, the other military officers in the film are portrayed as ambivalent, like 
Rasus. Sergeant Slamet, in the novel a Javanese, is replaced in the film by Sergeant Binsar, a 
Bataknese. The sergeant is pictured as a benevolent dictator, coercive but caring, which has 
been the dominant discourse on the military regime. There are times when he physically hits 
Rasus but there are moments in which he takes care of his subordinate and even yields to his 
stubbornness. Yet, at the same time the film challenges the prevalent discourse of apolitical 
military officers in the characterisation of the sergeant. Even before the killing of the six 
generals in Jakarta, Binsar has actively spied on the Communists. He, for instance, instructs 
Rasus: “to monitor the movements of the Communists around here . . . to watch the Dawuan 
Market area” (Isfansyah, Dancer). This shows that the subsequent anti-communist campaign 
is not a knee-jerk retaliation from the military but a culmination of a long power struggle.  
The characterisations of Rasus and his military colleagues in the film repudiate the 
novel’s Foucauldian opposition between true (as represented by the military) and false (as 
epitomised by the PKI). Speaking with largely marginalised/ridiculed language, Rasus thus 
discursively relinquishes the military’s claim to objective truth, which, as Edward Said 
observes, often grounds itself on the “language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian 
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value, and knowledge” (World 216). Furthermore, this rejection also represents a challenge to 
what Wood and Flinders call ‘scientism’, that is, “the use of scientific discourse, expertise, 
and scientifically determined solutions to depoliticise an issue” (163). As with the de-
spiritualisation in the first stage, this de-scientisation constitutes a discursive repoliticisation 
because it brings the infallibility of the military back into question and treats it as a biased, 
political issue. The fact that Rasus is morally imperfect and that Binsar pre-emptively spies 
on the PKI only underlines this politicisation of the military. All in all, the second stage 
effectively puts the military on an equal footing to the Communists and the villagers.  
The third stage: The politicisation of the military is further reinforced in its 
portrayed involvement in the anti-communist purge. The third turning point, at which the 
communisation of Paruk ends and the anti-communist campaign begins, is the assassination 
of six military generals in Jakarta by a group of allegedly communist-inspired young military 
officers. The assassination itself is not portrayed in the film but news of it reaches the village 
of Paruk from a radio Bakar gave in one of his early visits. The radio thus becomes an ironic 
symbol; it is given by Bakar to mark the beginning of his communist campaign but in the end 
is used by the military to signal the start of the anti-communist campaign.  
Sergeant Binsar quickly responds to the development in Jakarta by producing a list of 
names and instructing his subordinates “to secure” the people on the list (Isfansyah, Dancer). 
Here a political conflict is discursively depoliticised into a mere security issue, hence blurring 
the individual, social, and governmental dimensions of the problem (Balzacq; Salter). Yet, to 
post-military Indonesian audiences, the phrase ‘to secure’ has too familiar a connotative 
meaning of ‘to kill’ or, at least, ‘to imprison’, reminding them of the frequent, extrajudicial, 
political measures by the military in its era. What comes later to the accused and ideological 
communists is of course far from being secured. Working with the rural militia, the military 
destroys Paruk and takes away the accused communists, including Srintil, Sakarya, and the 
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Kartarejas. Srintil is later taken out of detention only to be raped by Darsun, who now turns 
from a communist sympathiser into a militia man. In a separate operation, Rasus and his 
colleagues execute Bakar and other communist hard liners. Thus, far from being 
depoliticising, the narrative actually repoliticises the military’s campaign on the 
governmental, societal, and individual levels altogether. The purge is not isolated from the 
governmental coup in Jakarta, the social tensions between the landowners and peasants in the 
district, and the individual conflicts between Srintil and Darsun.  
Similarly, on the surface, the film portrays the exemplary morality of the military 
officers. For one thing, the officers are pictured as not taking advantage of the female 
prisoners during the detainment of the accused communists, which is actually at odds with 
the real situation at the time (see Martyn). Nevertheless, although the only abuser of Srintil 
during her detainment is Darsun, a civilian or her own kind, the film shows that his action is 
clearly known about and permitted by a military officer. In addition to subtly questioning the 
military’s morality, this negligence and hypocrisy subvert the novel’s dichotomy of madness 
(as associated with the Communists) and reason (as attributed to the military officers). While 
the second stage puts the military and the PKI on a relatively equal footing, the third stage 
frames the military as the worse of the two. 
Nevertheless, all of this does not necessarily mean that the film is completely devoid 
of the military’s depoliticising representations, particularly in the character of Rasus. They 
come partly through a dramatic irony in which Rasus is sent on a separate anti-communist 
operation and is thus unaware of the fate of Srintil and the other villagers. Second, he is sent 
to hunt ideological communists like Bakar, not accused communists like the villagers. It 
should be noted that Rasus shoots Bakar only when the latter is about to escape and that he 
shows a lot of remorse afterwards, both of which make his action less cruel and more 
understandable. Third, he spends his time afterwards tracking Srintil’s whereabouts, despite 
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verbal and physical abuse from his superiors and at the risk of being fired from the military 
forces. Rasus eventually locates her place of detention immediately before she is transferred 
to another place but he is beaten to unconsciousness when he is about to save her. These 
representations put him in the position of victim, just like his fellow villagers, and therefore 
blur his political involvement.  
The disruption of the norm thus ends in the third stage of the narrative, but the 
equilibrium achieved at the end is different from the initial equilibrium. The rural community 
and its folk dance are depoliticised again but this time as the permanent enemy of the state 
and society. Despite her great ordeal, Srintil does not become insane and is saved by Rasus, 
as she is in the novel. Looking tired and tawdry, she still dances before some old womanisers 
in Dawuan Market, accompanied only by one percussion instrument played by the blind 
Sakum. When Rasus sees her in that market, she nervously leaves but is stopped by him. He 
returns the kris that he gave for her dancing charm in the first stage and that she lost during 
the attack of the village. The film ends with Srintil and Sakum dancing away to the horizon.  
There are at least two possible interpretations of this open ending. First of all, Srintil 
leaves because she feels embarrassed about her ‘political error’ and thinks that there is no 
way Rasus and she can be together again. The kris giving and the dancing away show that, 
respectively, she is forgiven and there is actually hope for their future. The conflict between 
the ex-communists and the military has thus been resolved or, in other words, depoliticised. 
The other possible interpretation is that Srintil leaves because she does not want to involve 
the military man in either her future or that of the village. Here the conflict and the politics 
are left intact. By returning the kris, the military man himself feels that he no longer belongs 
to them. The last dance may represent the villagers’ confidence in their own future.  
All in all, the narrative of the film, as a whole, ambivalently politicises and 
depoliticises the villagers, the Communists, and the military. This should not be surprising 
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because, as Flinders and Buller state, “the issue of boundaries or conceptual evisceration is . . 
. clouded by the fact that depoliticisation and politicisation may actually take place 
concurrently” (313). Indeed, insisting on a sharp distinction between the two forms of 
discourse “may risk suggesting a binary opposition that is a crude characterisation of their 
complex relationship” (297). Repoliticisation and depoliticisation should actually be seen 
more as “a rebalancing or a shift in the nature of discursive relationships that is a matter of 
degree — not a move from land to sea, but from cave to mountain or valley to plateau” (297).  
In general, ambivalence normally signifies politicisation because it destabilises a 
unity and reveals conflicts, hitherto obscured, within. However, as in this film adaptation, it 
can also offer a conciliatory political tone, if not full-scale depoliticisation (see Fig. 27). 
Arguably, the constant, encompassing ambivalences in the film constitute what Wood and 
Flinders call “hyper-politicisation”, that is, “the creation of an intense political controversy . . 
. to then impose a definitive position that closes down political debate (thereby depoliticising 
the issue)” (164). The villagers, the communists, and the military are being equally and 
extensively divided/politicised so as to convey them and their actions both as wrong and 
right. The expected result is thus a conflict resolution or a depoliticisation. The next section 
will show how this strategy is manifest in the semiotics of the film.  
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Fig. 26. The depoliticisation and repoliticisation of the narrative and semiotics of The 
Dancer. 
 
3.2.2 The Semiotics 
This section will present a critical and analytical discussion of the technical choices made by 
the filmmaker, cast, and crew of The Dancer. The discussion covers four technical areas, 
namely, the mise en scène, cinematography, editing, and sound. I will discuss these technical 
aspects mostly together in what I consider important scenes. It is my contention that the 
semiotics of the film firmly supports the two underlying subject matters of the narrative, 
namely the secularistic politicisation of the villagers and the conciliatory depoliticisation of 
the Communists and the military. 
The divided villagers: The dormant class divisions in Paruk village are pictured for 
the first time in a scene at a rich, green field surrounding the village (Fig. 28, above). The rich 
natural resources of the village are captured through naturally lit, scenic, deep space, extreme 
longshots. The landowners and enforcers are portrayed as well-dressed while the peasants are 
half-naked (Fig. 28, below). This mise en scène is rather in conflict with the description of 
the village in the novel:  
Thousands of hectares of wet rice fields surrounding the village of Paruk had 
been bone dry for seven months. The herons would not find any water, not 
even a pool a foot wide. Entire paddy fields had been transformed into dry, 
gray-colored plains. Grassy plants had all withered and died. The only spots of 
green here and there were the cactus-like kerokot that appeared in the fields 
only during a drought, nature’s sacrifice to the sundry forms of locusts and 
crickets. (Tohari, Dancer 1) 
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This discrepancy was singled out by the novelist in his interview with Kompas and admitted 
by the director in his interview with Pasaribu. Isfansyah defended this choice of setting by 
arguing that hardship does not necessarily correlate with drought. In fact, the setting 
underlines the old irony that poverty often occurs in the midst of wealth, as well as 
underlining the existence of exploitation and class conflict in Paruk.  
 
Fig. 27. The visualisations of the village’s rich natural resources and the inherent class 
conflicts. 
The highly political nature of the villagers is mainly portrayed through Darsun’s 
betrayals of Bakar and his fellow villagers. Using an eyeline match, the film shows that 
Bakar is left dumbfounded by the unexpected interruption of his speech by Darsun (Fig. 29, 
above). The same eyeline technique is used to highlight Darsun’s betrayal of the Paruk 
villagers at the start of the anti-communist campaign (Fig. 29, below left). The subsequent 
shots reveal that Darsun is waiting and giving a signal to the incoming militiamen to surround 
and arrest the villagers. This visual language of betrayal is reinforced by his inter-crossing 
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with the incoming militiamen (Fig. 29, below right). The eyeline match is also used once 
again to indicate his betrayal of Srintil during her detainment.  
 
Fig. 28. The betrayals of Darsun, the highly political villager. 
The film portrays Paruk’s sexuality less extensively than the novel and less erotically 
than in the first adaptation. What is being presented on the screen is mostly pre- and/or post-
sexual intercourse such as when men enter or leave Srintil’s bedroom and/or when they lie 
down next to/below her (Fig. 30, above). The pre- and post-sex are (dis-)connected through 
jump-cuts. At times, these very limited exposures are further blocked by a closed or half-
closed door. Another visual language for sex is Srintil’s hair. The pre- and post-sex are 
signified by, respectively, her loosened hair and/or her doing her hair (Fig. 30, above right 
and below left). This index can be seen, for instance, after she gives up her virginity to Rasus 
and after she has sex with him on one of his homecomings. The lovemaking scenes between 
Srintil and Rasus are slightly longer and more explicit than the sexual scenes involving Srintil 
and other men (Fig. 30, below). This is fairly unique considering the prevalent norm of 
presenting sex as rape or prostitution rather than an expression of love.  
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Fig. 29. The diverse visualisations of sex in The Dancer. 
One of the distinctive features of the lovemaking scenes between Rasus and Srintil is 
the soundtrack. They always involve the non-diegetic sound of a cello and/or a violin, at 
times, together with the non-diegetic sound of ronggeng percussion. By contrast, the sexual 
scenes between Srintil and other men never incorporate the cello/violin sound and always 
start with the ronggeng percussion. Thus, the cello/violin and ronggeng percussion appear to 
represent, respectively, love and tradition. While the sexual scenes between Srintil and other 
men only signify her duty to the ronggeng tradition, her lovemaking with Rasus epitomises 
both love and the village’s free sex tradition. It is not readily clear why the music directors 
used the cello/violin for the signification of love. In fact, Sembiring considers it rather out of 
place for a film about a Javanese community as there are many Javanese melodic, wind or 
stringed instruments used for the same purpose (“Gripping”).   
Not only does the film syntagmatically differentiate love-based from tradition-based 
sex, it also divides the latter further into exploitative and non-exploitative sex. Kathleen 
Azali, in 2012, states that the distinction between exploitative and cultural/religious 
prostitution was well-known and well-accepted by the pre-Islamic Indonesian society but has 
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been suppressed by the Islamic and post-Islamic populace. This deeper division/politicisation 
is mainly portrayed using symbols and indexes. For instance, Sakarya’s new roof and 
Kartareja’s water buffalo symbolise their newly acquired wealth derived from exploiting 
Srintil’s sexuality (Fig. 31, above left). In another scene, there is a wife who is gratefully 
giving Srintil a gift of new sandals for sleeping with her husband (Fig. 31, above right). This 
moral division is further visually reinforced by the use of indexes, particularly Srintil’s 
metonymic gestures. In the case of the exploitative Buka Klambu, Srintil projects her disdain 
by looking at herself in the mirror in utter contempt and disgust. This seeing herself in the 
mirror is repeated again after she is raped by Darsun (Fig. 31, left-below). In contrast, 
although she does not love the husbands and practically serves them as a prostitute in the 
scenes of happily cheated wives, she expresses calmness and even kindness to them (Fig. 30, 
right-above and 31, right-below).  
 
Fig. 30. The moral divisions as represented by the contrastive symbolic representations 
(above) and metonymic gestures (below). 
The film uses plenty of montages to compress the progress of the narrative and thus 
bypasses details of the novel, which the critic Soebagyo singles out as one of the weaknesses 
243 
 
of the film. In addition to compressing the narrative’s development, they actually serve to 
highlight contrasts in the film, including those between the villagers. For example, the 
montage in the first narrative stage exposes the contrast between Rasus, who starts training as 
a military cadet in a serious, stressful environment, and Srintil, who begins gaining fame and 
wealth in the relaxed, sexual rural area. This editing technique is employed more powerfully 
to reinforce the clashes between the Communists and the military.  
The ambivalent communists and the military: The positive representations of the 
political Bakar can be visually seen in his scenes with the Paruk villagers at the warung. 
Normally, a warung is a place where poor villagers go not only for food and drink but also 
for social interaction. The choice of the setting and the fact that he, a highly respected, 
educated man, is willing to come there easily shows that the character is ‘pro-poor’. This 
further reflects the official instruction of the PKI to its cadres to ‘turun ke bawah’ (go down 
to the masses), which was, in the 1950-60s, quite unusual considering the feudal culture. The 
atmosphere of the meetings is also set as warm and friendly, and this is partly created by the 
intimate distance between the participants (Fig. 32). Most of the time Bakar sits with the 
villagers and very rarely stands up or, for that matter, stands out. This blocking re-emphasises 
the old Indonesian socialist adagium ‘duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi’ (literally, sit 
as low, stand as high). Despite this ‘egalitarian’ mise en scène, Bakar always impresses the 
villagers, particularly when he turns on a radio, the ironic symbol as previously discussed in 
the narrative, and lets the villagers listen to it for the first time in their lives (Fig. 32, below). 
The set is also naturally lit, which paradigmatically sets it apart from the Communists’ dark, 
secret meetings, as portrayed in the military regime’s official film about the PKI, 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (1984).  This visualisation further subverts the common 
representation of the Communists in the novel and other works. The Communists have 
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consistently been associated with provocative, unintelligible, and loud speeches at large 
political rallies.  
 
Fig. 31. Bakar’s scene with Paruk villagers in the warung. 
The film also pictures the communist rallies very differently from the ones in the 
novel and other corresponding texts. They are all portrayed as small and friendly gatherings, 
and certainly not as “packed with people, always turned into noisy, unruly affairs”, as 
described in the novel (Tohari, Dancer 251). In addition to the small number of attendees, 
this is visually achieved through the use of deep focus, medium close up, tight framing, 
intimate distance, and natural light (Fig. 33). The red colour dominates the scene along with 
the happy faces of the dancing participants. This mise en scène is in stark contrast with the 
‘possessed’ or angry faces of the dancing communists in the forest of Kemayoran in the 
middle of the night in the military’s film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. Ironically, the only 
unfriendly, intrusive faces at the rallies belong to the soldiers guarding the events (Fig. 33, 
below). This military intrusion is set immediately before the start of the anti-communist 
campaign. 
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Fig. 32. The intimate, friendly atmosphere of the communist rallies (above) in contrast to the 
distant, unfriendly faces of the military officers (below). 
Nevertheless, the film still indicates Bakar’s and the PKI’s involvement in the rural 
unrest. After the Paruk riot, for instance, the villagers sing and dance, in the same way that 
the PKI members do in the military’s Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (Fig. 34, above). The riot 
itself replicates the visual convention of rural anarchy in Indonesian cinema: “the action 
always takes place in the darkness of the night, with a mob of men in dark clothes carrying lit 
torches. Minimal lighting is used in these scenes—at times only diegetic lighting” (Sen, 
Indonesian 121). Similarly, there is a shot, with a similar mise en scène, in which 
unidentified people smash the windows of the house of a landowner’s enforcer (Fig. 34, 
below). No direct clue is given that the attack has been orchestrated by Bakar and the PKI, 
but the fact that the shot is placed (in a montage) between that of a PKI rally and Bakar 
smiling in the warung cannot help but imply their involvement in the incident.  
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Fig. 33. The riot in Paruk, replicating the visual convention of rural anarchy and the infamous 
Lubang Buaya dance (above). The smashing of a rural enforcer’s window followed by Bakar 
smiling in the warung, implying the involvement of the party in the rural unrest (below). 
Similar to the novel, the adaptation completely represses symbols of the party 
throughout the film. Bakar just calls the banned party “my party” in his dialogues with the 
villagers. The red colour dominates the party’s rallies, banners, and attire although, curiously, 
Bakar himself never wears red. The Hammer and Sickle, the symbol of the PKI, is 
completely missing from the visual representations of the party. There are political slogans 
such as “TANAH UNTUK RAKJAT” (land for the people), “WARUNG RAKJAT” (people’s 
food stall), and “MANIPOL USDEK” (the Indonesian acronym for Political Manifesto, the 
1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and 
Indonesian Identity). Those slogans are being painted on the roofs of almost every house in 
Paruk village (Fig. 35). Nevertheless, historically, they can hardly all be called the PKI’s own 
slogans because they were common mottos during the left-wing Sukarno era. The Manipol 
Usdek, for instance, is actually the conception of President Sukarno, not of the PKI. 
Communist-specific slogans like ‘Ganyang Kapitalis-Birokrat’ (destroy bureaucrat-
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capitalists), ‘Ganyang Setan Desa’ (destroy rural devils’), ‘Buruh-Tani Dipersenjatai’ (arm 
workers and peasants) are completely absent from the mise en scène of the communised 
Paruk.  
 
Fig. 34. The visual ‘communisation’ of Paruk village (above).  
The ambivalent nature of the military can be seen from the visual portrayals of Rasus 
and his mentor Sergeant Binsar. Soldier Rasus looks dashing and disciplined in his military 
uniform and on his military jeep (Fig. 36, above), syntagmatically opposed to his half-naked, 
unruly existence as a villager (Fig. 28, below right). Yet, when he visits his old village, he 
becomes a villager again in both action and gesture. In addition to making love to Srintil, 
which is against the image of morally perfect military officers, he is also pictured as cleaning 
and praying at her late grandmother’s grave (Fig. 36, below). This action is considered a 
remnant of the superstitious pre-Islamic culture and is condemned by some Islamic hardliners 
as ‘bidah’ (heretical) and ‘haram’ (forbidden). Rasus also looks awkward and weak in his 
costume, some civilian shirt and military trousers. His walk is care-free and his posture is 
bent, highly typical of Indonesian villagers.  
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Fig. 35. The dashing and disciplined Rasus (above) and the ever immoral and superstitious 
Rasus (below). 
The image of Sergeant Binsar as the benevolent dictator, which was the military 
regime’s self-image, is mainly portrayed through his ambivalent attitude to Rasus. In their 
first encounter, the sergeant slaps the civilian Rasus, as his civilian shirt signifies, because the 
latter is fighting with another civilian (Fig. 37, above left). This easily reminds the audiences 
of the all-powerful military officers during the military era, when they could interfere with 
any civilian matters without any consequences. Later, the sergeant punches and kicks the 
non-commissioned officer Rasus for disobeying his order (Fig. 37, above right). In another 
scene, however, he treats him as an equal and even asks Rasus to eat his food with him (Fig. 
37, below left). In addition to the intimate distance, eating with hands signifies his caring 
manner because Indonesians normally do this only with close friends and relatives. Rasus 
also catches the sergeant doing a sholat, which is a common visual index of religious piety 
and the only Islamic signifier throughout the film (Fig. 37, below right).  
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Fig. 36. Sergeant Binsar as a benevolent dictator, explosive but also caring/religious.  
The restrained anti-communist campaign: Critics may differ on many points about 
The Dancer, but all of them unequivocally agree that one of the greatest achievements of the 
adaptation is its portrayal of the anti-communist purge and the military’s direct involvement 
in it (see 0.2). While the military regime insisted that the killings of the Communists were led 
spontaneously by anti-communist militia without any involvement or order from the military, 
and were thus a spontaneous horizontal conflict, the film clearly pictures the involvement of 
the army and their alliance with the militia. The shots of the rural militiamen rounding up the 
villagers crosscut with those of the military officers approaching the village. Although 
without identifiable badges, some of the militiamen are clearly wearing the grey uniform of 
Barisan Ansor Serbaguna, the youth militia group of Nadhlatul Ulama, the political 
competitor of the PKI in Central and East Java (Fig. 38, above). The leader of the militia is 
reading a list of names that looks identical to that of Sergeant Binsar. The montage ends with 
the physical meeting between the two forces, one leaving the village to go to the waiting 
military trucks and another entering the village to follow up the initial search and destruction 
(Fig. 38, below).  
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Fig. 37. The alliance of the rural militia and military in a montage. 
The military is also shown detaining and torturing the villagers in a sugar factory. It 
should be noted here that, based on the script, the detention was to be shot in a coconut oil 
factory. The final choice of the setting is historically more accurate as most communist 
prisoners in 1965 were detained and interrogated in sugar factories throughout Java due to the 
shortage of military prisons (Tempo). There are two kinds of framing being used, namely 
tight and loose framing and they are employed for, respectively, the detention and torture 
scenes. In the tight framing the mise en scène is arranged so that the object photographed has 
limited or no freedom of movement while the loose framing requires the scene to be 
spaciously distributed such that the object has great latitude of movement. The former helps 
create the suffocating atmosphere of the detention in which many prisoners are squeezed into 
a small room (Fig. 39, above right). The latter signifies the emotional proximity between the 
suspects and the interrogators (Fig. 39, above left).  
As the novel represses the torture and killing of the accused communists through 
certain writing techniques, the film does the same by means of specific mise en scène and 
cinematography. The detention and interrogation of the accused communists are shot using 
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low-key lighting and in high contrast, exposing the inmates but covering the interrogators 
(Fig. 39). The identity of the interrogators is narrowly revealed through their military boots or 
sleeves (Fig. 39, above right and below left). The interrogation sometimes takes place off-
screen such as behind a closed door (Fig. 39, below right). The same limited visualisation 
also happens with the taking out of Srintil during her detention time.  
 
Fig. 38. The detention and torture of the villagers as the accused communists. 
Furthermore, the military only executes Bakar and other ideological communists, not 
accused communists like the Paruk villagers. Thus, it is more a political killing of political 
enemies, and less a slaughter of innocents. This shows that the politicisation of a killing can 
actually be used to make the action less cold-blooded, less cruel, and more understandable. 
The execution itself takes place in another historically accurate setting: a riverbank. Using 
low-key lighting, the film deploys several different techniques of cinematography for the 
execution. The victim, Bakar, is shot in a high-contrast, shallow focus, medium close-up (Fig. 
40, above left). This means that the spectators can easily recognise him and the fear on his 
face. The killer, Rasus, however, is shot in a low-contrast, shallow focus, close-up (Fig. 40, 
252 
 
above right). The result is that it is less easy to identify him but the spectators can still 
recognise him and the regret on his face. The execution itself is visualised using deep space, 
medium longshots and longshots, which effectively hide the sheer brutality of the event (Fig. 
40, below).  
 
Fig. 39. The execution of Bakar and other ideologically-driven communists. 
It is noteworthy that, while the round-up of the village is shot in broad daylight, which 
is actually against historical common practice, both the torture and the killing are filmed in 
low-key lighting/at night. As the arrest also involves violence, the use of low-key lighting 
does not just cover the brutality of the torture and killing but also more specifically conceals 
the brutality of the military. The violence during the daylight round-up is entirely committed 
by the rural militia while the military, which arrives later, only combs out the villagers’ 
houses. By contrast, the violence during the dark detention and execution is all committed by 
the military officers. 
The discussion of the semiotics has just clarified the concurrent hyper-politicisation 
and depoliticisation in the film as brought forward by the narrative analysis. As is already 
implicit in the previous sections, The Dancer does not exist, and is not brought into existence, 
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within a cultural vacuum. There are subjects and contexts that have directly and indirectly 
shaped the film to be what it is. The subjects refer to the people involved in the film 
adaptation of the novel while the contexts refer to the external factors that may have 
influenced the subjects and their work. In the next two sections, I am going to explore the 
subjects and the contexts of The Dancer so as to create more, I hope, penetrating meanings 
behind the text. As I have reviewed the general contexts in the first sub-chapter, the contexts 
that I am going to discuss here are only those directly related to the issues of secularism and 
conciliatory politics.  
 
3.2.3 The Filmmaker, Cast, and Crew 
In this section, I will introduce and discuss the people involved in the making of The Dancer. 
The filmmaker refers to the producer, the director, and, due to the nature of the film as an 
adaptation, the screenwriters of the film. Shanty Harmayn acted as the producer and one of 
the screenwriters while Ifa Isfansyah directed and co-wrote the screenplay. The first and 
‘professional’ screenwriter of the film was Salman Aristo, an established figure in the 
Indonesian film industry. The cast includes the actors who play the major characters in the 
narrative such as Prisia Nasution (Srintil), Oka Antara (Rasus), Slamet Raharjo (Kartareja), 
Landung Simatupang (Sakarya), and Lukman Sardi (Bakar). The crew comprises those with 
leading roles in the production such as Eros Eflin (the art director), Yadi Sugandi (the 
director of photography), Cesa David Lukmansyah (the editor), as well as Amelya Octavia 
and Riri Pohan (the casting directors).  
Although film is a collective work as opposed to the more solitary endeavour of a 
novelist, the film’s emphasis on secularism might be related to the shared background of the 
filmmaker and crew. Hitherto none of the director’s films has touched on the subject of 
religion, which is fairly unique considering that the religious genre is trending in the country 
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and many Indonesian directors have been trying their hand at this genre (Heeren 107-29; 
Heryanto 49-73). Ifa Isfansyah’s early film Garuda di Dadaku (2009) is overtly patriotic or 
nationalistic, which in Indonesia is very much synonymous with being secular, that is, 
transcending/ depoliticising religious conflicts for the salvation of the nation. This is 
consistent with Elie Kedourie’s proposition that “[n]ationalism is a form of secular 
millenarianism . . . replacing religion as the key to salvation” (Hutchinson and Smith 47). 
Shanty Harmayn, the producer and co-screenwriter, is not known for producing and writing 
for religious films either. Salman Aristo, the first screenwriter, was involved in the making of 
the highly successful Islamic film Ayat-ayat Cinta but that is just one of eighteen films that 
he has so far (co-) written. Yadi Sugandi, the director of photography, is perhaps one of the 
most nationalistic figures behind the film as he himself has directed a number of nationalistic 
films such as Merah Putih (2009), Darah Garuda (2010), and Hati Merdeka (2011).  
The sexual suppression in the film may have been partly determined by the same 
internal factor. There are indeed problems with the Institute of Film Censorship and Islamic 
radicalisation but it would be too simplistic to attribute the visual repression of sex 
exclusively to the external factors. As a matter of fact, there are many films that expose 
sensuality and sexuality more explicitly than The Dancer that received no protest from 
Islamic radicals. As Heider, Sen, and, later, Murtagh identify in their respective books, there 
are ways to expose sexual content in Indonesian cinema without provoking the Institute’s 
censorship and the religious communities’ protest, such as framing them as rape and/or the 
characters as prostitutes. These strategies could easily have been adopted by the filmmaker 
and crew considering the rape-like nature of the Buka Klambu ceremony and the prostitute-
like image of Srintil. As far as this research is concerned, none of the figures mentioned 
above has ever been involved in films with erotic content. The nationalistic director of 
photography has even explicitly expressed his disapproval of sexual films:  
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As I said before, film is a document of a country’s civilisation. Thirty to forty 
years from now, imagine people watching that kind of film. Those who don’t 
know the history of Indonesia will think, Indonesia in 2010 achieved only thus 
far. If they carefully observe, there were many good films already. So, if we 
make that kind of film, it means a civilisation regression. (Sugandi, 
“Kecelakaan” par. 7, my trans.) 
Naturally, the background and attitude of the filmmaker and crew go together with the 
traditional demand of the time. It is impossible to cover all of the unique sexual beliefs and 
practices of Paruk in the 111-minute film. Judging from his more than a hundred diverse 
films and the fact that he was once married to a controversial Indonesian Playmate, Cesa 
David Lukmansyah (the editor) might not have a similar artistic/ideological reservation but 
rather, he might have been focusing on the technical aspect of time constraints and, as will be 
explained in the next section, the demands of censors. Although visually supressed, sexuality 
is deeply politicised in this film. It seems that the filmmaker did this to rebalance the 
depoliticisation of the 1965 conflict. Judging from the fresh anti-communist actions in 
Indonesia (April-May 2016), no matter how controversial a sexual issue is, it is still much 
safer than a discussion of the 1965 tragedy. 
The ambivalent representations of the PKI and the military can also be partly 
explained by the lack of interest of the filmmaker. As Heryanto observes, young Indonesian 
filmmakers appear to have little interest in the past political violence (Identity). They have 
“no reason for being particularly interested in such a heavy and depressing theme” (76). In 
addition, apart from political sensitivity and censure, any filmmakers revisiting the 1965 
content-wise must confront a set of challenges that arise from the obscurity of the subject 
matter. The military’s official narrative of the PKI has been seriously challenged by 
historians and academia (see, for instance, Anderson and McVey; Roosa; Scott) but the lack 
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of data (due to it being largely destroyed or kept by the military) and freedom makes it 
difficult to investigate and mount a more definite account of the party’s history.  As a result, 
what is circulating in the public space is not far from speculation, accusations, and conspiracy 
theories. Both problems are revealed by the director and co-screenwriter Ifa Isfansyah: 
I took the courage to make this film after I had convinced myself that this 
novel was about love. So I tried to look at it from a love perspective first. I 
don’t like politics. I don’t understand it and don’t like it. Doing research, it 
was the hardest because . . . oh, no . . . reading politics. This film was not 
about politics, really. I was seeing the politics from contemporary 
perspectives, from the perspectives of the young generation now. I don’t 
understand the incidence of 65. I don’t know and don’t want to pretend to 
know. (“Aku” par. 21, my trans.) 
The confession above also indirectly reveals the attitude of the director towards the political 
content of the novel. Isfansyah actually intended to depoliticise the political novel into a love 
story, as the first adaptation did. What he means by “the politics from contemporary 
perspectives” is none other than a form of discursive depoliticisation. All of the involved 
parties would be stripped of their conflicting political natures and desires. In his directorial 
vision:  
The Dancer is non-partisan; neither pro the PKI, nor pro the military. It is a 
story about human beings. We don’t side with any parties, we side with human 
beings. The Paruk villagers are human beings, only playing roles based on the 
costumes they are wearing. You are wearing the green uniform, you are the 
military. You can be red, too. Or peasants. They are people, illiterate, 
accidentally becoming involved in many political intrigues. (Isfansyah, “Aku” 
par. 51, my trans.) 
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The other two scriptwriters have more or less apolitical attitudes to the story. Salman Aristo, 
according to Isfansyah, was mainly tasked with transforming the story of the novel to the film 
structure, or in his words “to change the complicated thing to something simple and visual” 
(par. 12, my trans.). Shanty Harmain, a business-minded producer from an older generation, 
made sure that “these two young people do not go off limits” (par. 16, my trans.). The 
nationalistic cinematographer advocates political unity over conflict and claims that he 
“became one” with the director (Sugandi, “Mengapa” par. 13, my trans.).  
The depoliticisation and politicisation in the film are reinforced by the selection of the 
cast. The political Kartareja and apolitical Sakarya are played by, respectively, a senior film 
actor Slamet Raharjo and a senior monologuist Landung Simatupang. In addition to his 
succesful acting career, Slamet Raharjo is widely known for his political activism. He 
regularly plays in a TV show a witty, retired Javanese lord who satirically comments on 
social and political issues in the country.  Landung Simatupang has long been famous for his 
distinctive skills in theatrical monologue but is not as well-known for political activism. 
Srintil’s innocence and depoliticisation are to some extent supported by the casting of Prisia 
Nasution. In contrast to Raharjo and Simatupang, Nasution had never acted in any feature 
film and had nothing to do with political activism. The highly political character of Darsun is 
played by Teuku Rifnu Wikana, a young actor consistently cast in bad guy roles. The 
character of Bakar is played by a famous Indonesian actor, Lukman Sardi. He is well-known 
for his various good guy roles and has never played a bad guy role in his fairly long career. 
This supports the positive, or at least ambivalent, characterisation of the communist Bakar. 
Rasus is just Oka Antara’s second leading role after Hari untuk Amanda (2010), in which he 
also plays the good guy. Antara’s background helps shape the character of Rasus as an 
innocent, amiable military officer.  
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Sergeant Binsar is played by Tio Pakusadewo, a senior actor with a strong Javanese 
background. This choice is rather ironic because, as mentioned in the narrative analysis, the 
Bataknese Sergeant actually replaces the Javanese sergeant of the novel. This transcultural 
casting is hardly unique as it also happens with the main characters of Srintil and Rasus. 
Prisia Nasution is not Javanese and does not speak the Javanese language, let alone the 
Banyumasan dialect. The critic Sembiring singles out the inevitable language problem: 
“several scenes feature Srintil, played by Prisia Nasution, speaking Javanese, but with the 
wishy-washy air of a Jakarta teenager in a bad mood” (“Gripping” par. 10). Similarly, Oka 
Antara is a non-Javanese actor and non-native speaker of the language. All of these factors 
underline the previously discussed secularist spirit of the film, yet this time this does not 
concern religion but another equally sensitive subject: ethnicity. The Dancer, or at least 
Amelya Octavia and Riri Pohan (the casting directors), seems to discount the convenience of 
ethnic/linguistic backgrounds and highlight the diversity and unity of the cast. 
It is less straightforward to qualify the art director Eros Eflin’s attitude towards 
politics due to the minimum information available regarding his other works. His drive for 
realism in this film, as shown from his location selection and set development, seems to have 
been eclipsed by his colleagues’ depoliticising vision and techniques. It is equally difficult to 
predict the general tendency of the editor with his many diverse films. In any case, despite the 
dominant depoliticising attitude, the film evidently also repoliticises the villagers, the 
Communists and the military. A possible reason for this is the interplay between the internal 
factors above and several external considerations, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2.4 The Government, Society, and Hollywood  
This section will address several external factors that may directly or indirectly have 
influenced the people involved in the film adaptation with regard to its depoliticisation and 
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repoliticisation. The external factors refer to the government, the society, and the market of 
post-military Indonesia. The government is not wholly represented by the Institute of Film 
Censorship for the latter has had a degree of independence since the military era. It is also 
represented by the law enforcement, who supposedly guarantees the freedom of information 
and expression vital to the creative process of the people behind a film. The society refers to 
the prominent literary/film communities as well as the influential social, political, and 
religious groups. Hollywood represents the strongest external influence on Indonesian 
cinema, past and present. 
Aside from the secularist tendency of the filmmaker, there are also a number of 
external reasons why The Dancer highlights the socio-political condition of the Kejawen 
community. There has not been much progress since the 1980s, and, to some extent, the 
community is now more repressed than ever. Although it was not officially acknowledged as 
a religion by the military regime, the freedom to practise this belief was at least guaranteed 
by the constitution and enforced by the Suharto government. Even Suharto himself used to be 
an open follower of Javanese mysticism. Following the collapse of the secular military 
regime in 1998, there have been continued efforts from the Indonesian Islamic radicals to 
erase the non-religions completely from the constitution (Salim). There have been numerous 
physical and verbal terrors on the followers of non-religions as well (Bruinessen).  
The film’s secularism enabled the filmmaker to transcend/depoliticise all of the 
religious divisions plaguing the country. Although the moderate Cultural Muslims remain the 
religious majority in Indonesia, they are also more or less influenced by the current Islamic 
radicalisation, at the very least in terms of their identity (Heryanto, Identity). Most of the 
time, they act as a silent majority who neither openly agrees with nor oppose the Islamic 
radicals. The radicals remain in the minority but what they lack in number they compensate 
for in their outspokenness, boldness, and, not infrequently, terror. The filmmaker simply 
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could not rely on the protection of the government on this sensitive matter. The government 
is pragmatic, sometimes adopting an Islamic identity, and at other times a secularistic 
approach, depending on its political needs. In addition, the literary and film communities 
have become diverse, ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right, from the traditional 
to the cosmopolitan (see Herlambang, Kekerasan; Heryanto, Identity). Finally, as a 
commercial film aimed mainly at the urban youth market, it seemed best to avoid the 
commercially unrewarding issues of religion.  
The repression of the religious issues to some extent serves its purpose quite well. 
Unlike the novel, there is neither reported protest from the Islamic communities nor religious 
censorship from the Institute. The unique secularism of the film pleased both the traditional 
and cosmopolitan critics. Wening Trisna Asih, in 2013, compliments the film’s use of 
Banyumasan expressions. It is quite rare to find Indonesian films in a local language, let 
alone a dialect, despite the fact that most Indonesians speak local languages as their first 
language. Writing for an English-language newspaper, the cosmopolitan Sembiring states: 
“under the direction of Ifa Isfansyah, the rest of the actors relate admirably to the socio-
cultural elements that wrap each of an ensemble of characters befitting a Shakespearean 
tragedy” (“Gripping” par. 11).  
As mentioned previously, the visual suppression of sex seems to have been motivated 
by the current Islamic radicalisation as well as the official censorship. The protests of the 
Islamic radical groups towards other films might have deterred The Dancer’s creators from 
presenting more sexual content on screen because that can result in the banning of films by 
the Institute of Film Censorship (see Kusumaryati). When it comes to sexuality, there has not 
been a significant change from the censorship of the Suharto era. Murtagh observes that 
“displays of sex and intimacy continue to attract the concerns of censors, albeit erratically” 
(3). As described by the director: 
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Before we gave the print of the film to the Institute of Film Censorship, we 
had a chance to meet them. We gave them the DVD of The Dancer, still 
in rough cut. Some of them watched it, and we got some feedback. Reduce the 
sexual acts . . . We followed them . . . But, censorship really depends on who 
is in charge. The team who watched The Dancer in the second meeting were 
different from the first. That team seemed to have a different understanding 
from the first team. They envisioned that in a sexual act, the man was on top 
of the woman, the woman’s hands were on the back of the man, the clothes 
were opening, and cut. If you wanted to show the after-sex moment, you only 
had a few seconds. (Isfansyah, “Aku” par. 54, my trans.) 
The report above shows that the censorship process in the post-military era is still done in 
multiple stages just as in the military era. It also shows that the Institute of Film Censorship 
maintains more or less similar concepts regarding permissible sex acts on screen such as men 
must be on top, no explicit contact, and diversion to another object. More importantly, this 
also indicates that the censorship guideline is still quite generic and therefore open to 
different interpretations. This ultimately gives freedom and power to who controls - or 
whatever preoccupies - the Institute of Film Censorship. Reflecting the state and spirit of the 
era, the Institute is now heavily influenced by the post-Islamists, who are politically liberal 
but rather conservative vis a vis sexual representations. As reported by the director:  
The lovemaking there was not porn. But it was eventually cut. The politics 
was said to be okay. The censor team consisted of many: from the military, 
religions, and others. Even it was mentioned that the one who said it was okay 
was from the military. The reason: people’s concerns now were no longer 
about the military, but about religions. (par. 55, my trans.)  
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The representations and repressions of the Communists and the military reflect the 
complex relations between the filmmaker and the Institute of Film Censorship. The permitted 
visualisations of the communist and anti-communist campaigns can be interpreted as a 
change in the military’s attitude, which was also admitted by the military representative at the 
Institute. Nonetheless, the repressed visualisations of the original signifiers, the torture and 
killing of the Communists, were also influenced by the demands from the same Institute. The 
director also recalls in his first meeting with the Institute that it specifically asked the 
filmmaker to “delete the head drowning act” (Isfansyah, “Aku” par. 53, my trans.). Similar to 
cases with other films, this might have encouraged the filmmaker of The Dancer to self-
censor. 
 Furthermore, the representations and repressions of the Communists and the military 
may also have been driven by another external factor, as can be deduced from the ambiguous 
ending of the film. The two possible meanings are actually a reflection of the two equally 
strong groups and discourses about the military in contemporary Indonesia. Civil society, 
particularly the left-wing organisations, has demanded that the military must take 
responsibility for the anti-communist campaign, and also stop interfering in civilian affairs. 
The dual function of the military, that is, as the security and the socio-political force, has 
been officially revoked. However, as discussed in the first sub-chapter, there are a 
considerable number of civilian groups who would support the return of the military to the 
leadership of the country. In fact, when the film was produced, the president of the country 
was Soesilo Bambang Yoedoyono, a retired army general who won the first two direct 
elections in Indonesia and succeeded the three civilian presidents after Suharto.  
The complexity and ambivalence of the film generally received appreciation from the 
widely-divided public. The left-wing groups welcomed the marked expressions of political 
divisions in the film. Writing for the left-wing Indoprogress in 2011, Suluh Pamuji begins his 
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critique by saying: “The Dancer by a young director Ifa Isfansyah should be considered a 
phenomenon in the Indonesian film industry, which dares to take on the love theme with a 
more serious frame: poverty and the Indonesian political tragedy of 1965” (par. 1, my trans.). 
The pro-military groups are content with the positive representations of Rasus. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to determine whether the government welcomes the ambiguous representation of 
the military and the PKI. On the one hand, the government has repeatedly stated that it 
supports the investigation into the anti-communist campaign and the rehabilitation of the 
accused communists as demanded by non-governmental organisations. Yet, on the other 
hand, it never does anything significant so as not to provoke the military and the religious 
communities. At best, the film represents the undecided position of the post-military 
government.  
Unfortunately, the film failed in the market, attracting fewer than 300,000 viewers by 
December 2011 and puzzling the critics. Yan Wijaya, a senior film observer, says the film 
should have easily garnered one million viewers and concludes: “there must be something 
wrong, but I don’t know where the problem is” (Fahrul par. 7, my trans.). Despite the 
director’s effort to highlight the love story and tone down the politics, the film is still strongly 
associated with politics and considered a political film, a category that politically weary 
Indonesians despise. The fact that The Dancer contains much political ambivalence does not 
help. For too long, Indonesian audiences have been denied the complexity of political history, 
and any representations of it in film. The audience, as a result, finds The Dancer with its 
ambivalences quite puzzling, if not confusing. As Sembiring reports: “some teenagers who 
were laughing and giggling at the beginning of the film left the theatre with a puzzled look” 
(“Gripping” par. 15). This “puzzled look” apparently precipitated the market failure of The 
Dancer.  
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As with the first adaptation, it is necessary to contextualise the second adaptation not 
just in relation to the national politics and cinema, but in relation to world affairs and the 
films produced within this period. While Blood and Crown is homologous to the Vietnam 
War films, there are similarities between the 1965 tragedy films and American Civil War 
films despite the obvious differences in setting. This should not be surprising considering the 
long and heavy influences of Hollywood on Indonesian cinema, as traced by Biran in Sejarah 
Film 1900-1950: Bikin Film di Jawa (2009). Hollywood’s influences still eclipse those of 
Hong Kong and Korean cinema, despite the latter’s growing popularity in Indonesia. The 
influences of films from other post-colonial countries with similar political issues remain 
unseen due the lack of availability of the films and studies as well as the language barriers. 
Gary Gallagher, in Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten (2008), explores how 
Hollywood and popular arts portray the American Civil War. He outlines the four major 
traditions in Civil War films, namely, the Lost, Union, Emancipation, and Reconciliation 
Causes. The Lost Cause comprises a series of representations that casts the South’s rebellion 
as a noble struggle against impossible challenges, represses the significance of slavery in 
creating separation and war, and celebrates Confederates gallantry on the battlefield, such as 
in Gone with the Wind (1939). The Union Cause portrays the war as an effort to defend a 
united nation in the face of the separatist actions that endangered “both the work of the 
Founders and, by extension, the future of democracy” (2). The Emancipation Cause sees the 
conflict as a struggle to liberate slaves and eliminate a harmful influence on American 
society, as can be seen in Glory (1989). Finally, the Reconciliation Cause signifies “an 
attempt by white people North and South to extol the American virtues both sides manifested 
during the war, to exalt the restored nation that emerged from the conflict, and to mute the 
role of African Americans”, such as in Gettysburg (1993) and Gods and Generals (2003) (2).  
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What is immediately useful here is that this cinematic model vividly pictures the 
complexity of politicisation and depoliticisation, as pointed out by Flinders and Buller (see 
3.2.1). It shows once again that depoliticisation and politicisation may occur concurrently in 
the same text, which is the principal argument of the current analysis of The Dancer. For 
instance, while the Lost Cause promotes the new debate on the justifiability of the Southern 
cause, it simultaneously represses the debate on slavery. Similarly, the Reconciliation Cause 
can only work by discursively politicising the virtues of the South and depoliticising the issue 
of slavery. This comprehensive model may also have influenced other Indonesian films 
concerned with civil conflict. 
Naturally, there are undeniable differences between the American Civil War and the 
Indonesian anti-communist campaign. First of all, it is rather premature to call those four 
representations ‘traditions’ in Indonesia due to the relatively short distance between the real 
event in 1965 and the present day as well as the unique political situation. Perhaps, only the 
Union-like Cause can be legitimately considered a tradition in the country because the rest 
have just gained momentum since the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998. Second, it 
might be wrong to call the anti-communist campaign a war. It is a massacre par excellence, 
almost without any resistance from the losing side. Third, the losing side in the Civil War 
could live and express their identity quite freely in the post-war era whereas the Indonesia ex-
communists could not do either, even after the toppling of the military regime. Fourth, the 
1965 conflict did not carry racial issues or, at least, these were not as strong as in the Civil 
War. If any, it was the military’s effort to tie the PKI with Communist China and, in turn, 
Chinese Indonesians.  
Despite those differences, there are revealing similarities between the two conflicts 
and their cinematic representations. Just like Lost Cause, the sympathisers of the PKI and 
accused communists often portray the PKI’s actions at the time as an admirable struggle 
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against feudalism, capitalism, and the exploitation of people in general. This tendency can be 
seen in the film documentaries on the victims of the anti-communist campaign, as discussed 
in 3.1. On the other hand, the military and anti-communist militia consistently frame the 
PKI’s actions, including the alleged killing of six army generals, as a betrayal of the Republic 
of Indonesia, which is typical of the Union Cause. Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, whose very 
translation is The Treachery of G30S/PKI, quite easily represents this framing game along 
with Operasi Trisula (1986). It is noteworthy that while it is hard to find an example of this 
cause in the American Civil War films, it is the dominant cause in Indonesian films on the 
1965 massacre. The Emancipation Cause, largely represented by the Indonesian liberal 
humanists, porrays the conflict as a struggle to liberate people from the impending 
communist tyranny and remove the hostile influence on Indonesian culture and society. This 
cause is embodied, for instance, by The Year of Living Dangerously (1983) and Gie (2005). 
The Reconciliation Cause, which I believe The Dancer has taken up, represents an attempt by 
Indonesians to show the virtues and vices that both sides manifested during the Indonesian 
Revolution (1945-1965), to justify the New Order that came after the campaign, and to 
silence the victims of the conflict.   
Reconciliationist films represent a relatively current trend of seeing the Civil War and 
the 1965 massacre as a sad example of a society somehow falling into a bloody conflict. They 
focus on the innocence of the people on both sides but avoid talking about the political 
divisions that led to the conflict. The conflicting parties share responsibility for the conflict, 
just as they share their pain. This mode of representation is also commercially sound as it 
does not offend the different factions in the society. John Huston’s 1951 film adaptation of 
Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage presents a couple of typical reconciliationist 
scenes, which greatly embellish Crane’s original story. The long exchange between the two 
pickets originally takes up just thirteen lines in the novel and includes a single sentence of 
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dialogue. The Yankee’s encounter with the rebel across the river only makes him temporarily 
regret war. Crane’s passage concerning the prisoners offers four words of dialogue and far 
less personal revelation than the film’s screenplay. In the same way, Isfansyah’s The Dancer 
greatly expands Tohari’s very short narrative of the anti-communist campaign (see 1.2.2). 
There is no rounding up of the village, let alone the torture and killing of the Communists in 
the novel. There is no mention of Rasus trying to find and save Srintil and other villagers.  
The Civil War section of How the West Was Won (1962), directed by John Ford, gives 
a different slant on reconciliation. Although an unusual variety of reconciliation, the film 
underscores the similarity of two antagonists both disgusted by the war and unconcerned with 
national issues. A similar attitude is markedly shown by Rasus and Srintil in The Dancer. 
Gettysburg (1993) and God and Generals (2003), both by Ron Maxwell, offer a far more 
traditional reconciliationist model in the scenes involving both officers and common fighting 
men. The latter is parallel to the shared fate of Rasus as a low-rank officer and the Paruk 
villagers, as discussed in the third stage of the narrative. 
The Emancipation, Union, and Reconciliation traditions overlap in many respects, as 
do the Lost and Reconciliation models. Nonetheless, each of the models can be seen as a 
discrete attempt to understand and/or portray the American Civil War and the Indonesian 
anti-communist campaign. For example, the Union and the Emancipation symphatisers join 
in expressing joy at the defeat of the Confederacy but at times diverge in seeing the issue of 
slavery. For the Union Cause, the war represents a tool to defeat the Confederacy and remove 
a long-standing threat to the development of the republic. For the Emancipation Cause, the 
slave liberation stands as the most important objective of the northern war effort and a mighty 
blow for the advancement of African Americans. Similarly, the Indonesian military and 
liberal humanists jointly applaud the collapse of the PKI but often diverge in discussing the 
de-communisation. For Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, the military action represents an effective 
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means of punishing the betrayers, undermining Communism, and removing a long-standing 
threat to the development of the republic. For the main character of Gie, however, the 
massacre represents a violation of human rights, which he and his friends are fighting for.  
Furthermore, supporters of the Lost and Reconciliation traditions may agree to 
suppress the slavery-related politics of separation, but many Lost Cause sympathisers, 
whatever their official statements about loyalty to the United States of America, persist in 
“celebrating a struggle for southern independence that had nearly undone the Founders’ 
handiwork” (Gallagher 4). Comparably, the ex-communists in a documentary Tjidurian 19 
(2009) tone down their past confrontational actions against what they called ‘counter-
revolutionaries’ and many of them still believe that those actions were called for. The Union 
and Reconciliation jointly laud the fact that one united nation emerged from the war, and 
anyone who cherishes the Union has to welcome on some level the reintegration of former 
rebels into the national history and citizenry. Yet unlike the reconciliationists, who avoid the 
question of which cause was more just, the Unionists are certain that the Confederates were 
in the wrong. The former accurately represents the ambivalent attitude of The Dancer while 
the latter represents the strong confidence of the military and anti-communist groups in 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI.  
There are several reasons why films on the Civil War and 1965 tragedy have been on 
the rise. Gallagher attributes the returning interest to the American Civil War in the 1980s to 
the increasing distance from the Vietnam War and the use of military strength by the Reagan 
administration as a tool of national policy. Nevertheless, these two events obviously cannot 
explain the ever-strong interest in this theme in the 2010s. Drew Faust, a Civil War historian, 
sees relations between the recent interest and the current War on Terror although she does not 
really explain them in detail. Not only does this war change world politics, but it also changes 
the domestic politics in America. Responding to the real and imagined threats of Islam and 
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terrorism, the country falls again into the old divisions between the ‘liberal’ North and the 
‘conservative’ South.  
The Indonesian situation is slightly more complex. Like many other countries, 
Indonesia is conducting its own War on Terror albeit only domestically. Despite the 
inevitable complexities, this domestic war generally also divides the country into liberal and 
conservative groups. Yet, as the world’s largest Muslim population, and in contrast to their 
American counterparts, the Indonesian conservatives are pro-Islam and their more radical 
elements even justify terrorist acts. The Indonesian War on Terror is not the main factor 
behind the resurging interest in the 1965 tragedy. The real factor is the collapse of the 
military regime and the interest in the regime’s human rights abuses. Although it has not 
directly created the interest in the tragedy, the Indonesian War on Terror strongly influenced 
the structure and semiotics of the film. While the liberals are generally open to the 
investigation and representation of the 1965 tragedy, the conservatives are fully against it. 
This explains the ambivalent representations of the military and communists in the narrative 
and the restrained visual portrayals of the anti-communist campaign. The liberal-conservative 
division is also apparent in the inclusion and exclusion of religion and sexuality in The 
Dancer.    
 
3.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that the film The Dancer is both politically progressive and 
conservative as opposed to the less ambivalent judgements of previous critiques. The 
adaptation displays a revolutionary vigour by hyper-politicising the depoliticised content of 
the novel. Yet, this very hyper-politicisation also leads to the depoliticisation of the conflicts 
it originally exposes. Echoing the powerful words of Leon Trotsky, the analysis shows that 
“the revolution [has been] betrayed”.  
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The Dancer neglects altogether the issue of religion and instead promotes the idea of 
secularism. The film’s secularism constitutes concurrently an act of discursive repoliticisation 
and one of depoliticisation. On the one hand, The Dancer reintroduces the forgotten, non-
religious dynamics of a religious minority while it simultaneously supresses the Cultural 
Islamism of the original text and post-Islamism of the new era. The narrative and the 
semiotics ambivalently politicise and depoliticise the conflicting parties, namely the villagers, 
the Communists, and the military. While ambivalence generally signifies politicisation, it can 
also offer a conciliatory political tone, if not depoliticisation. The constant, extensive 
ambivalences in the film constitute what Wood and Flinders call “hyper-politicisation” (164). 
The conflicting parties are equally and thoroughly politicised so as to make them (and their 
actions) equally wrong as well as equally right, which results in a conflict resolution or a 
depoliticisation.  
The film’s emphasis on secularism might be traced back to the shared nationalistic 
attitude of the filmmaker and crew. Similarly, the fact that none of the figures behind The 
Dancer has ever been involved in sexual films seems to affect the representation of sexuality 
in the film. The ambivalent representations of the PKI and the military can also be partly 
explained by the interest and knowledge of the filmmaker and crew in regard to the 1965 
conflict. The selection of the cast powerfully reinforces the depoliticisation and politicisation 
in the adaptation.  
In addition to the internal reasons, there are several external considerations regarding 
why the film politicises and depoliticises the aforementioned issues and parties. First of all, 
the film seems to take into account the current sociological state of Indonesian society, 
particularly in relation to the growing religious tensions. The secularism helps the film to 
transcend/depoliticise all of the religious divisions. The sexual suppression in the film seems 
to be motivated by both the current Islamic radicalisation and the official censorship. The 
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protests of the Islamic radical groups towards several films might have deterred The Dancer 
from exposing more sexual content on screen, for this frequently results in the banning of 
films by the post-Islamist censors, who are quite receptive to political content, but rather 
sensitive to sexual representations.  
The representations and repressions of the Communists and the military reflect the 
complex relations between the filmmaker and the censors. The permitted portrayals of the 
anti-communist campaign can be seen as a change in the Institute’s attitude. Nonetheless, the 
repressed visualisations of the torture and killing of the Communists were also influenced by 
the demands of the same institution. Further, this ambivalence may also have been driven by 
the two strong groups and discourses in contemporary Indonesia: the anti- and pro-military.   
The complexity and ambivalence of the film generally received appreciation from the 
widely-divided public. Anti-military organisations see The Dancer as brave enough to 
visualise the anti-communist campaign and the military’s involvement while pro-military 
groups are content with the positive portrayals of the military main male character. Despite 
the director’s effort to make the film less political, the film is still strongly associated with 
politics and considered a political film, which generally does not sell well.  
Although films in post-colonial countries might be created in response to their own 
needs, they are not immune from the influences of the empire. The second adaptation appears 
to have been influenced by the reconcilliationist American Civil War films, particularly in 
showing the virtues and vices of both sides, justifying the new era that came after the 
campaign, and silencing the victims of the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his 2009 critique, Eckart Voigts contends that “adaptation studies is often conflated with 
the narrow scope of ‘novel into film studies’” and that “the ‘literature-into-film’ field is 
merely an ancient, neglected alcove in the large public house of intermediality” (139). 
Promoting intermediality, he admits that “ there is one area, however, where the 
terminologies of intermediality do not help much” because “[an adaptation’s] success, impact 
and relevance is crucially determined by the cultural situation in which it emerges” (149). He 
therefore suggests that “future adaptation studies will have to merge the study of social 
constructions of national, regional, local, ethnic, gendered or class- and age-based identities 
and research into transcultural images and stereotypes with hitherto mainly textual questions 
of intertextual and intermedial contact in adaptation studies” (150).  
In this study, I have shown that even in the narrow, ancient world of transferring 
literature into film, much has been left unexplored, including the interaction of intracultural 
and intercultural elements and textual questions. In particular, I have endeavoured to draw 
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attention away, not only from the domination of Anglo-American adaptations but also from 
the Anglocentrism of contemporary postcolonial criticism. Post-colonial criticisms, which are 
supposed to counter the Anglo-American hegemony, have ironically fallen into a new kind of 
Anglocentrism with the domination of texts from former British colonies over those from 
beyond. Moreover, as Arun Mukherjee suggests, post-colonial studies have relied for too 
long on the homogenising construct of the Centre (the West) versus the Periphery (the East), 
implying that “we do not write out of our own needs but rather out of our obsessions with an 
absent other” (6). The fact is that post-colonial countries have “their own internal centres and 
peripheries, their own dominants and marginal”, and their own conflicts (Mukherjee 6).   
The thesis addresses the problems above by, first, introducing and investigating 
literary and cinematic works from Indonesia, a non-British former colony. The Dancer and its 
adaptations were focused on domestic conflicts in the country and created mainly for local 
readers/spectators. Second, the study deals with the longstanding issue in Indonesian 
literature and cinema: the practices of depoliticisation (typically associated with the 
government’s censorship and imprisonment) and politicisation (the writers and filmmakers’ 
attempts to promote social issues in spite of the government’s repression). Third, in 
investigating the novel and the adaptations, the thesis begins from and focuses more on the 
intra-cultural or national factors (Indonesian history, politics, literature, and cinema) rather 
than the inter-cultural or transnational elements (Hollywood), without denying the existence 
of the latter. Fourth, the fact that the theories brought to this study are neither too universalist 
(like, for instance, Marxism and Structuralism) nor too particularist (like ‘mimicry’ and 
‘indigeneity’) allows the research to maintain the balance between the intra-cultural and 
intercultural elements in the analysis. 
It is my contention that the struggles in the novel and the adaptations represent the 
latent conflict between depoliticising and repoliticising tendencies, by which competing 
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parties have attempted to move issues within and beyond the limits of traditional politics. In 
turn, the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in the texts closely relate to the Foucauldian 
discursive exclusion and inclusion as well as the Bourdieusian conflict of capital. The current 
study set out four key objectives, namely, 1) to identify the discursive depoliticisation and 
repoliticisation in the novel and adaptations; 2) to explore the contexts in which the novel and 
the adaptations were respectively produced, in relation to the governmental, societal, and 
discursive depoliticisation and politicisation within and beyond the country; 3) to investigate 
the subjects and their politics in dealing with those external factors in the writing and 
production of the novel and adaptations; and finally 4) to determine the impacts of the 
depoliticisation and politicisation on the readers and spectators. 
Chapter One examined the depoliticisation and politicisation in the Indonesian 
military era and Ahmad Tohari’s novel. The military era was characterised by a total 
depoliticisation whereby the government enforced “the denial of politics” in all sectors 
(Wood and Flinders 136). Reputedly critical of the military regime, the novel, for the most 
part, supports the governmental, societal, and discursive depoliticisation by the regime. In the 
first part of the novel, Tohari politicises the long depoliticised Kejawen community by 
portraying it as a vibrant community with sophisticated politics and sexuality. Through the 
character of Srintil, the erotic dancer, the author seemingly gives a voice to the triple-
repressed subject in the societal and governmental discourse in Indonesia: a female prostitute 
in a backward community. Nevertheless, the novel exposes this hidden side of the rural and 
religious community only to condemn it as immoral. Simultaneously, it presents a 
depoliticised side of the village, particularly the apolitical principles and practices of Sufism, 
and condones it. This Sufism, to an extent, represented a discursive challenge to the 
economic-oriented government and cosmopolitan literary circles. Nevertheless, Tohari and 
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his Sufism accepted, if not supported, the depoliticisation of Islam by the secular regime and 
the liberalist-humanist literary communities.  
In the second part of the novel, the author continues to depoliticise the Kejawen 
community by portraying them as innocent victims of the Indonesian Communist Party (the 
PKI). By portraying it as highly political, The Dancer actually depoliticises the PKI in that it 
only reinforces what has long been believed about the banned party. The depoliticisation of 
the PKI was an area of convergence of the author’s religiosity and the regime’s anti-
communist ideology. Ironically, the mere appearance of the Communists, be it negative or 
positive, attracted the interest of the public in the anti-communist country. While the PKI 
represents the negative side of the city, the military, through the character of Rasus, stands for 
the positive face of the metropolis. In contrast to the PKI’s political exploitation of sexuality, 
the military is portrayed as asexual or, at least, not sexually exploitative. The novel also 
represses and depoliticises the military’s persecution and killing of the suspected communists 
through the pretexts of self-defence, ignorance, and guilt.  
In the final part, Srintil is pitched against one of the ruling classes in the military era: 
the civilian professional class. The novel politicises the allegedly apolitical class and 
undermines its claimed disinterestedness, thus drawing parallels between the professionals 
and the Communists. While exposing and politicising the civilian professionals, the novel 
represses and depoliticises the exploits of the military professionals as the main pillar of the 
military regime. This strategy saved the author from the retribution of the regime’s 
ideological policing while simultaneously offering his readers the illusion of resistance to the 
regime. He also received critical acceptance from both the liberal-humanist literary circles 
and, later, the left-wing circles. The novel has enjoyed a wide readership and been adapted 
twice, which is very rare in Indonesia.   
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In Chapter Two, I addressed the depoliticisation and politicisation of the cinema of 
the Suharto era and the surviving script of the novel’s first adaptation. In general, military-era 
films were more apolitical than military-era novels mainly because of the multi-layered 
censorship and commercial factors, which often resulted in self-depoliticisation by 
filmmakers. Failing to locate the film, I went further by reviewing the base and superstructure 
of Indonesian film archiving. By doing so, I identified the reasons why Blood and Crown has 
been marginalised and forgotten, and is now missing. These are the poor infrastructure of 
Indonesian film archiving, the mediocre status of film adaptation and adaptation studies, and 
the unfortunate fate of a commercially unsuccessful popular film adapted from a 
commercially successful canonical novel.   
The script of the first adaptation does not contain as much religious content as the 
novel but is less secular than the second adaptation. The Srintil of the first film fulfils the 
typical representations of women in military-era films such as being passive rather than 
active, feminine rather than masculine, and silent rather than outspoken, all of which can be 
traced back to colonialist/orientalist discourses (Sen, Indonesian 131-156). This is a case of 
what I call ‘double depoliticisation’, that is, when a similar issue is depoliticised by the 
empires and continued by post-colonial powers for a similar purpose. Although the script 
does not exploit Srintil’s sexuality as significantly as the critics suggest about the film, it still 
implies the exoticism of the village’s sexuality and helps divert attention from the more 
political content of the novel. The casting of Indo-Eurasian actors in the film reflects the 
ambivalent attitude of the outwardly anti-western country to the old and new western 
empires. The fact that the regime and society silently accepted rather than actively debated 
this ambivalence is a clear case of depoliticisation.  
Blood and Crown transforms the political drama novel into a type of local action film 
called silat. The male protagonists’ actions resemble those of John Rambo in Rambo: First 
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Blood, which gained immense popularity in Indonesia a year before the release of Blood and 
Crown. The appropriation of this depoliticising Hollywood action film by the depoliticising 
local action film represents another instance of double depoliticisation. Finally, the adaptation 
also brings forward the issue of city versus village, particularly through the action of Rasus 
and Srintil leaving the village for the city. This kind of resolution is a standard ending for 
popular films of the military era and is closely related to the issue of depoliticisation, as it 
suppresses the ugly side of the military’s cities. 
Chapter Three examined the depoliticisation and repoliticisation in the post-military 
films and the second adaptation of the novel. The film, The Dancer, represents the spirit of 
repoliticisation of early post-military Indonesia while depicting the tendency to 
depoliticisation of the current post-military era. The film neglects altogether the issue of 
religion and instead promotes the idea of secularism, which constitutes concurrently an act of 
discursive repoliticisation and one of depoliticisation. On the one hand, the film reasserts the 
forgotten, non-religious (sexuality and class antagonism) dynamics of the Kejawen 
community but, on the other hand, it suppresses the religiosity of the original text as well as 
the current era. Furthermore, the second adaptation equally divides/politicises the villagers, 
the Communists, and the military so as to make them equally wrong as well as equally right, 
and this ambiguity ultimately results in a conflict resolution or a depoliticisation. This is 
consistent with what Wood and Flinders name “hyper-politicisation”, that is, “the creation of 
an intense political controversy . . . to then impose a definitive position that closes down 
political debate (thereby depoliticising the issue) (164).  
The politicisation and depoliticisation in the second adaptation are motivated by both 
internal and external factors. The film’s emphasis on secularism might be related to the 
shared ‘nationalistic’ attitude of the filmmaker as well as the demands of the interreligious 
situation. Its secularism enables the film to transcend/depoliticise all of the religious conflicts 
278 
 
currently plaguing the country. The visual suppression (but not the politicisation) of sex in 
the film seems to be motivated by both the current Islamic radicalisation and the post-Islamist 
censorship. The permitted and restrained visualisations of the Communist and anti-
communist campaign can be seen as the censors’ changing political attitude as well as the 
continued battle between the anti- and pro-military groups. Despite the filmmaker’s efforts to 
tone down the politics, the film was still strongly associated with politics and considered a 
political film, which the politically weary Indonesians tended to avoid. Transculturally, the 
second adaptation appeared to be influenced by the reconcilliationist American Civil War 
films, particularly in showing the virtues and vices of both sides, justifying the new era that 
came after the campaign, and silencing the victims of the conflict.   
Taken together, the analysis shows that the depoliticisation and politicisation in the 
novel and the film adaptations generally correspond with the depoliticisation and 
politicisation in the governmental, societal, private arenas in their respective eras, particularly 
on the problems of religion, sexuality, and politics. There are delays in time, complications, 
indirect or relatively distant relationships, and even mediation, but there is a fundamental 
homology or correspondence of structure between them. The novel and the first adaptation 
embody the typical depoliticisation during the Indonesian military era in which different 
discourses and practices were only possible as a pretext/justification for the regime’s violent 
or non-violent suppression. Long applauded as the first novel to tell about the persecuted and 
banned PKI, The Dancer essentially reiterates what the military regime said about the party 
and thus removes the possibility of new debates on the party and the military’s anti-
communist massacre in 1965. The novel also introduces the relatively unknown and unique 
religious discourses and sexual practices in the Javanese community only to point out their 
backwardness and immorality and, therefore, to rationalise the necessity of their relegation in 
the modern, moral military era. In a similar way, the first adaptation politicises the ‘thugs’ as 
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a product of westernisation and an enemy of the state to justify their violent repression. The 
second adaptation, however, signifies the early hyperpoliticisation and the on-going 
depoliticisation in the Indonesian post-military era. It simultaneously reproduces and 
reinterprets the Javanese community, the PKI, and the military in the novel so as to exhaust 
the ongoing debates on these conflicting parties. All of this shows that, despite their 
subversion and resistance in the texts, the novelist and the filmmakers basically play the same 
tune as the rest of the country and, for that matter, the world. In spite of their obvious focus 
on domestic affairs, there are traces of Hollywood’s depoliticising models in both 
adaptations, particularly with regard to the Vietnam War and the American Civil War 
cinema.  
There are several theoretical implications of the current study for the theory of 
depoliticisation, adaptation studies, and post-colonial adaptation. First of all, the study has 
shown that depoliticisation and politicisation extend over numerous areas as well as varying 
significantly from one place to another, possibly far beyond the imagination of Matthew 
Flinders and Matt Wood, who limitedly “focus[ ] . . . on emergent tensions and trends of 
depoliticisation (and re-politicisation) in liberal democratic states” (147), and never identify 
literature and film as key sites of discursive depoliticisation. As depoliticisation is deemed to 
be integral part of neo-liberalism and/or neo-colonialism, this research should be a valuable 
addition to the field of post-colonial studies. The study’s discussion of the governmental, 
societal, and discursive depoliticisation in Indonesia has revealed how the global powers, 
with the active help of the local governments, media, intellectuals, and art workers, have tried 
to overcome political resistance in the post-colonial country. This has been done less with the 
hard power such as direct military interventions and economic restrictions than the soft power 
such as the championing of professionalism (non-elected governmental institutions), 
individualism (individual rights over social deliberations), and liberal humanism (art for art’s 
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sake). This, as the discussion has further shown, does not go unopposed or as exactly 
planned. In Indonesia, professionalism, individualism, and liberal humanism can join in 
unholy matrimony with militarism, capitalism, and religious fundamentalism.  
With regard to post-colonial adaptation studies, this research has demonstrated the 
importance of ‘cultural inwardness’ and ‘cultural insiders’, which have been supressed by the 
obsession over the conflict between the West and the East. Rather than fixating on what an 
Eastern text wants to say to the Western audience, post-colonial studies need to find out first 
and foremost how the text shapes, and is being shaped, by readers/spectators who belong to 
the society to which the novelist or film adapter is affiliated through religion, politics, culture, 
and class. In addition, the nature of the relationship between the East and the West is not 
necessarily antagonistic, corruptive, and/or subversive; it can be mutualistic, productive, 
and/or cooperative, as in the case of double depoliticisation.  
Finally, the integration and application of the theories of depoliticisation, Foucauldian 
discourse analysis, and Bourdieusian capital have provided a new outlook on the political 
dimension of adaptation as they have revealed new principles, actors, arenas, tactics, and 
complexities in ostensibly political or apolitical adaptations. The study has shown that every 
adaptation is inherently political. Apolitical or, to be more precise, depoliticised adaptations 
often serve the political needs of the ruling classes. In addition, a highly politicised 
remediation can at times be a highly depoliticised adaptation in disguise. The study further 
shows that adaptations stand in at least three different political arenas such government, 
society, and individual with their distinctive players, issues, and interests. Although 
adaptations mainly perform discursive acts of depoliticisation or politicisation, they 
frequently shape and reinforce social reforms and governmental decisions.  
Despite the far-reaching implications, a number of important limitations need to be 
considered. First, the research examined one Indonesian novel and two Indonesian film 
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adaptations, one of which is currently missing. It has not taken into account film adaptations 
from other countries with similar backgrounds (non-British former colonies with a strong 
military presence) mainly due to the lack of availability of those films and their studies. As a 
result, this study might run the risk of looking like an ill-reputed ‘case study’, which Robert 
B. Ray famously criticises in his article “The Field of Literature and Film” (2000). In his own 
words: 
Without benefit of a presiding poetics, film and literature scholars could only 
persist in asking about individual movies the same unproductive layman’s 
question (how does the film compare with the book?), getting the same 
unproductive answer (The book is better). Each article seemed isolated from 
all the others; its insights apparently stopped at the borders of the specific film 
or novel selected for analysis. (44) 
It should be noted, however, that Ray does not reject all case studies in adaptation studies but 
those stubbornly leaning towards fidelity and/or New Criticism. After all, he himself 
applauds elsewhere in the same article how Roland Barthes “subject[s] a single Balzac 
novella to what he called a slow motion reading” (41). Agreeing with Ray’s concern but 
criticising his overgeneralisation, Cartmell and Whelehan assert, in 2010, that “adaptation 
critics know only too well how much easier it is to work through a critical position by the use 
of a key example, just as Barthes’s S/Z would be the lesser theoretical text without its focus 
on Sarrasine” (Impure 55). The heavily context-dependent nature of this research should 
adequately free itself from the “inadequacy” of New Criticism (Ray 45). This study could not 
avoid comparing and contrasting the novel and the films, which Ray may call “the 
unproductive layman’s question” (44), but it is certainly more than just that and is acutely 
aware of the issues of fidelity.  
282 
 
In fact, this study of depoliticisation stands as an invitation to review and re-evaluate 
the now infamous concept of fidelity. A similar call has been made by, to name a few, Erica 
Sheen (2013), Nico Dicecco (2015), and Casie Hermansson (2015). In the case of the current 
study, the notion of fidelity can be closely compared to the process of depoliticisation in that 
both attempt to close down new interpretations of and debates on adapted texts. While total 
fidelity and total depoliticisation are a long-discredited utopia, striving for fidelity as well as 
depoliticisation is a psychological default of and survival tool for many adapters in Indonesia 
and, perhaps, other post-colonial countries. This is more true of post-colonial adaptations on 
domestic problems, such as Blood and Crown of the Dancer and The Dancer, than of those 
on East-West issues, such as Do Phool (1958) as studied by Michael Lawrence in 2011 and 
Maya Memsaab (1992) by Mary Donaldson-Evans in 2009. The latter category is allowed 
and, to some extent, encouraged to be subversive and, thus, unfaithful to its Western source 
texts by local governments and/or communities for the sake of voicing Eastern voices, and by 
Western spectators for the sake of novelty.  
Adapting writings on domestic disputes into films, however, brings its own 
challenges; it is arguably riskier than adapting texts on East-West conflicts. The worst that 
can happen to the latter is a rejection or a dismissal by foreign and domestic markets while 
for the former it can entail condemnation, persecution, and imprisonment by offended local 
governments, political parties, and/or mobs. Trying to be as faithful as possible to original 
texts that have been provenly well-received by their own governments, communities, and 
markets is a way out of unwanted controversies and troubles for post-colonial adapters and is 
an act of depoliticisation. This study has therefore answered, partly and indirectly, Thomas 
Leitch’s question in his book Adaptation and Its Discontents (2009): “Instead of constantly 
seeking answers to the question, ‘Why are so many adaptations unfaithful to perfectly good 
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sources?’ adaptation studies would be better advised to ask the question, ‘Why does this 
particular adaptation aim to be faithful?’” (128). 
Finally, while case studies of Anglo-American adaptations might be abundant, 
repetitive, and unproductive, case studies of post-colonial adaptations are still very much 
wanting. The proliferation of the latter case studies could well generate more (post-colonial) 
metacritical perspectives, which Ray and others have longed for. 
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Appendix A  
Timeline of Indonesian History, Cinema, and Adaptation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Date Event 
1900 05 December 
The first film screening in The Netherlands East Indies (the future 
Indonesia) was held in Batavia (the future Jakarta). 
1901 
 
The Dutch colonial government introduced its ‘Ethical Policy’, by 
which natives could receive a Western education.   
1908 
 
Budi Utomo was founded as the first modern indigenous movement. 
1912 
 
Sarekat Islam became the first mass-based nationalist movement.  
18 November 
Ahmad Dahlan founded the modernist Islamic 
organisation Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. 
1920 23 May 
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was established in 
Semarang.  
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1925  
The Dutch Indies Film Commission was established to censor every 
film coming into the country. 
1926 
31 January 
Hasyim Asy'ari founded the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama as a 
response to the creation of Muhammadiyah. 
12 November 
The PKI revolted against the colonial government and was quickly 
suppressed.  
 
The first locally made feature film, Loetoeng Kasaroeng, was 
released. 
1929 
 
Njai Dasima, the first film adaptation, was released. 
1930  
Sukarno's gave his historic nationalist speech “Indonesia Accuses” at 
his political trial.  
1942  
The Japanese defeated the Dutch and installed their own imperial 
structure in the former Netherlands East Indies. 
 Nihon Eigasha, a Japanese-occupation film unit, was established. 
1945 
15 August Japan surrendered to the Allied powers.  
17 August Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia.  
10 November 
The Battle of Surabaya, the heaviest single battle of the Indonesian 
independence, was fought between pro-independence fighters (the 
Republicans) and Dutch and British troops.  
1946 
 
Federal states were set up by the Dutch-occupation government.  
 
Regeering Film Bedrij, a Dutch-occupation film unit, was established 
and joined by Usmar Ismail, the father of Indonesian cinema.  
1947 20 July 
The Dutch military launched its first major military offensive against 
the Indonesian Republicans.  
1948 
 
The Darul Islam rebellion began in West Java, spreading to other 
parts of the new nation.  
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18 September 
The PKI began a revolt in East Java to take over the Republic but 
were defeated by Nationalist troops.  
19 December 
The Dutch launched their second assault, capturing the Republican 
capital of Yogyakarta.  
1949 December 
International pressure forced the Netherlands to recognise the 
independence of ‘the United States of Indonesia’ (RUSI) at 
the Round Table Conference, Den Haag.  
1950 
 
The Indonesian military formulated its doctrines of dwifungsi: a 
military role in security and socio-politics.  
17 August 
Sukarno dissolved the RUSI and proclaimed a unitary 'Republic of 
Indonesia'.  
06 September 
The first parliamentary cabinet was established, followed by six 
others by 1959. Sukarno held a symbolic position as head of state.  
 
Perfini, the first indigenous Indonesian-owned film company, was 
established. Its first production was Darah dan Doa. 
1952 17 October 
An army-organised strike took place in Jakarta to demand the 
parliament’s dissolution and a general election.  
1955 
30 March The first Indonesian Film Festival was held in Jakarta. 
18 April 
Indonesia hosted the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, the first 
convention of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
29 September 
Indonesia held the first general parliamentary election, the last free 
election until 1999.  
1957 March Regional rebellions took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
1959 05 July 
Sukarno issued a decree dissolving the parliament, reintroduced 
the Constitution of 1945, and assumed the additional role of Prime 
Minister, which led to ‘Guided Democracy’.  
1960 24 June 
Sukarno established the People’s Consultative Assembly to replace 
the dissolved parliament.  
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17 August 
Indonesia severed its diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in 
protest over the latter’s rejection to give up Western New Guinea 
(West Papua).  
1961 04 March 
Indonesia signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to purchase 
armaments for the West Papua liberation.  
1962 02 January 
The Mandala Command to liberate West Papua was established 
under the control of Major General Suharto. 
1963 
01 May 
Following pressure from the Kennedy government, 
the Netherlands yielded West Papua to temporary UN supervision.  
18 May 
Sukarno was elected president for life by the People’s Consultative 
Assembly. 
27 July 
Sukarno announced his opposition to the creation of Malaysia, 
marking the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation. 
1964 
16 August American films were banned in Indonesia. 
17 August 
Sukarno publicly denounced the United States, and over the ensuing 
months the PKI attacked American and British interests in the 
country. 
1965 
14 January The PKI called for workers and peasants to be armed.  
30 September 
An abortive coup in Jakarta resulted in the assassination of six army 
generals. 
01 October 
Major General Suharto, now the commander of the Army Strategic 
Reserve Command, blamed the PKI for the coup and launched a 
counter coup, resulting in the massacre of about one million 
suspected communists.  
14 October 
Lieutenant General Suharto was appointed minister/commander of 
the army by Sukarno.   
1966 
10 January Anti-communist organisations demanded the dissolution of the PKI. 
11 March 
Sukarno delegated key executive functions to Lieutenant General 
Suharto by signing the Order of March the Eleventh (Supersemar). 
The following day Suharto dissolved the PKI. 
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20 June 
The military-controlled People's Consultative Assembly raised the 
status of the Supersemar to a decree.  
1967 
10 January 
New laws were passed to attract foreign investment; restrictions were 
imposed on Chinese schools, names, and religion.  
07 March 
The Assembly stripped Sukarno of his remaining power and 
appointed General Suharto acting president. 
1968 March The Assembly conferred the full presidential power on Suharto. 
1969 
 
Papuan ‘representatives’ voted in favour of Indonesian rule in 
‘the Act of Free Choice’. 
1970 
 
Nurcholish Madjid, a Muslim intellectual, introduced a religious 
developmental principle: 'Islam, yes; Islamic party, no'. 
1971 03 July The first parliamentary election under the New Order was held.  
1973 
 
The military regime forced the fusion of the political parties.  
1974 
January 
The student uprising broke out in Jakarta as a protest against the 
Japanese penetration, Chinese Indonesian domination, and 
government corruption of the economy.  
 
Atheis, a film adaptation by Sjuman Djaya, created controversy 
because the content was deemed unsuitable for the religious society 
although both the novel and the film denounced atheism.  
1975 
April A civil war broke out in East Timor, a former Portuguese colony.  
06 December 
U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
made a one-day visit to Jakarta to discuss the East Timor crisis.  
07 December Indonesia invaded East Timor.  
1976 19 November 
The UN General Assembly rejected the Indonesian annexation of 
East Timor.  
1978 
 
The People's Consultative Assembly elevated the Five Fundamental 
Principles to the status of mandatory moral education of every 
citizen.  
1982 
 
The first book of The Dancer trilogy, The Dancer of Paruk Village, 
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was published. 
1983 
 
Blood and Crown of the Dancer, the film adaptation of The Dancer 
of Paruk Village, was released. 
 
Thousands of alleged criminals were murdered by government 
security forces. 
1984 
12 September 
Muslims protested over alleged insults to Islam in North Jakarta; a 
riot ensued resulting in many deaths. The regime suppressed Islamist 
movements.  
 
Roro Mendut, a film adaptation, triggered debates in the media as the 
author of the novel protested over the ending of the adaptation. 
1985 
 
The government required every organisation to adopt the Pancasila 
as their sole ideology. 
 
The second book of The Dancer trilogy, A Shooting Star at Dawn, 
was published. 
1986  
The third book of The Dancer trilogy, The Rainbow’s Arc, was 
published. 
1987 
 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno's daughter, became a parliament 
member; Suharto prohibited the displaying of Sukarno’s images 
although they appeared frequently nonetheless.  
1989 
 
The Free Aceh Movement re-emerged after being nearly wiped out in 
1979; repression of its guerrilla activities led to thousands of deaths 
by 1991.  
 
Pacar Ketinggalan Kereta, a film adaptation, won best film at the 
1989 Indonesian Film Festival. 
1990  
Taksi, a film adaptation, won best film at the 1990 Indonesian Film 
Festival. 
1991 
 
Indonesia assumed the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement.  
12 November 
Soldiers fired on a demonstrative funeral procession in the provincial 
capital of East Timor.  
1992  The government announced Act No. 8 Year 1992 on film. Badan 
Sensor Film (the Board of Film Censorship) changed its name to 
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Lembaga Sensor Film (the Institute of Film Censorship). 
1994  
The government announced Government Regulation No. 04 Year 
1994, which integrated, updated, and upgraded the existing 
censorship guidelines.  
1996 
 
The Free Papua Movement kidnapped foreign scientists and local 
foresters. The hostages were freed in a rescue operation led by Major 
General Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of Suharto.  
27 July 
Army-backed thugs attacked the headquarters of Sukarnoputri's party 
and killed many of her supporters.  
1997 July 
The Thai baht collapse triggered the Asian monetary crisis, and over 
the following months it crippled Indonesia’s economy. 
1998 
March 
Peaceful student strikes against Suharto rose to international 
prominence. 
12 May Four Trisakti University students were shot dead by security forces.  
13 May 
Memorial services for the slain students led to a riot; looting, arson, 
and rape by unidentified mobs continued for several days, leaving 
over a thousand dead. 
21 May 
Being deserted by his closest supporters, Suharto stepped down and 
was replaced by Vice President B. J. Habibie. 
August 
The military announced the discharge of Lieutenant General 
Subianto from active duty after allegations regarding the abduction 
and torture of student activists. 
1999 
19 January 
A small argument in Ambon city triggered Christian-Muslim 
conflicts that lasted for years across the Maluku Islands. Over ten 
thousand were killed.  
07 June Indonesia held the first free general election since 195.  
30 August 
East Timor voted to break away from Indonesia in a UN-supervised 
referendum. Pro-Indonesian militias resorted to a scorched earth 
policy that left as many as a thousand dead. 
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October 
The People's Consultative Assembly rejected President Habibie's 
accountability report. Abdurahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri were elected president and vice president. 
2000 24 December 
Churches were bombed by Jamaah Islamiyah in retaliation for the 
killings of Muslims in Maluku and Poso. 
2001 
 
Ethnic cleansing erupted in Borneo as native Dayaks hunted and 
killed Madurese settlers.  
July 
The parliament impeached President Wahid on the grounds of 
corruption and appointed Vice President Sukarnoputri president.   
2002 
February 
The Malino Conference ended religious violence in Maluku 
and Poso. 
12 October 
Jamaah Islamiyah bombed nightclubs in the Kuta district of 
Bali, killing over two hundred people.  
2003  
The Dancer trilogy was republished in a single volume and translated 
into English. 
2004 
October 
Indonesia's first direct presidential election elected General (ret.) 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
26 December 
An earthquake-triggered tsunami killed hundreds of thousands 
in Aceh and caused widespread destruction. 
2005 
15 August 
The Yudhoyono government and the Free Aceh Movement signed a 
peace agreement in Helsinki.  
 
Gie, a film adaptation, won best film at the 2005 Indonesian Film 
Festival.  
2006  
Fiksi, a film adaptation of Alice in Wonderland, won best film at the 
2006 Indonesian Film Festival. 
2009 
08 July 
The incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 
second direct presidential election. 
 The government released Act No. 33 Year 2009 to replace Act No. 8 
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Year 1992 on film. 
2010  
3 Hati Dua Dunia, Satu Cinta, a film adaptation, won best film at the 
2010 Indonesian Film Festival. 
2011  
The Dancer, the film adaptation of The Dancer trilogy, was released 
and won best film at the 2011 Indonesian Film Festival. 
2012  The revised English translation of The Dancer trilogy was published. 
2013  
Tenggelamnya Kapal Van der Wijck, a film adaptation, was 
denounced by the Minang community for its depiction of the Minang 
female character. 
2014 
July 
Indonesia held its third direct presidential election. Jakarta’s 
governor Joko Widodo defeated Lieutenant General (ret.) Prabowo 
Subianto. 
 
The government released Government Regulation No. 18 Year 2014 
to replace Government Regulation No. 04 Year 1994 on film 
censorship. 
2016 
December 
Jakarta’s governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian of Chinese 
descent, faced a trial on charges of blasphemy after he referenced a 
verse from the Holy Qur’an. 
 
Athirah, a film adaptation, won best film at the 2016 Indonesian Film 
Festival. 
 
 
  
332 
 
Appendix B  
Written Communications on Blood and Crown of the Dancer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I remember watching Blood and Crown on a TV station in the mid-1990s. It was screened 
late at night when Indonesian TV would broadcast anything they had left in their store rooms. 
Not only did the late-night screening signify a low-quality show, but it often suggested sexual 
and violent content. I began searching for the film after I had conducted a preliminary study 
of The Dancer, the second adaptation, and became interested in doing a comparison. Due to it 
being a relatively recent production, I was under the impression that I would be able to find it 
easily somewhere. Even when I failed to find it on Indonesian streaming sites and YouTube, 
where Indonesian films are freely uploaded without any copyright enforcement, I was still 
confident that I would be able to find it offline. 
Hitherto, I am still unable to locate and get a copy of the film despite my persistent 
search and numerous contacts with relevant parties. Many of them have said they do not have 
it, while others have not replied to me at all. I have also asked for help from several 
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prominent figures who have direct or indirect relations with my target institutions, which is 
the most culturally effective approach in the country to get what one needs. From all of the 
parties that I have contacted, there are a few that I would like to report and showcase below 
to illustrate the situation, support my analysis of film archiving in Chapter Two, and provide 
a springboard to future research.   
 My first contact with the target parties was with a film archivist responsible for the 
most complete online documentation of Indonesian films, http://filmindonesia. or.id. She 
helped me check this film in the latest catalogue of Sinematek Indonesia, the largest film 
library in Indonesia, but could not find it. The archivist said there was a possibility that the 
film was in the storage room but had not yet been catalogued. Thus, she asked me to visit 
Sinematek in person because the institution was slow to respond to a phone or email query. 
She also asked J. B. Kristanto, a renowned Indonesian researcher, who donated his video 
collections to Sinematek after the publication of his research, Indonesian Film Catalogue: 
1926-1995. Unfortunately, Kristanto could not remember whether Blood and Crown was one 
of his donated films. Lastly, the archivist also asked a producer of pre-1995 digitalised films 
but the latter said he could not find this title.  
Before receiving the information above, I had actually sent an email regarding the 
existence of this film to the Haji Umar Ismail Film Centre, the parent institution of 
Sinematek, but it did not respond. When I eventually wrote to Sinematek, the officer in 
charge replied quickly, stating that the centre did not have the film. As I was already in the 
UK for my study at this point, I asked my partner as well as Jakarta-based former students to 
visit Sinematek and ask directly about the film but the result was also negative. Around the 
same time, I found an entry for this film in the online catalogue of the National Library of 
Indonesia. As the library had not responded to my email, I gave it a call. The receiver said 
that the library only kept a filmography but not a copy of the film. After reading about the 
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existence of Jakarta Prima Digital, the new film restoration company, I sent an email and a 
Facebook message to one of its managers but did not receive any response. 
Gramedia Film, the production company, has been closed for many years, but I wrote 
an online query on the website of its parent company, Kompas Gramedia Group. A public 
relations officer answered, stating that it would take some time to find the film, but she did 
not reply to my subsequent email. A colleague of mine who worked at Kompas Newspaper 
suggested to me that I should contact Kompas TV, a new Kompas Gramedia company that 
might inherit the archives of the defunct Gramedia Film. The TV company did not reply to 
my query. Later, I sent a message to Kompas Information Centre, which in response advised 
me to contact Sinematek instead. Finally, my former lecturer introduced me via email to the 
Vice President of Kompas Gramedia, but he did not respond to our emails.  
My next institutional target was ANTV, which, as far as I remember, has screened the 
film. A public relations officer gave a brief reply, stating that the station could not release the 
screening copy. She did not respond to my follow-up email in which I explained that I would 
use it strictly for research purposes and was more than willing to undertake any necessary 
procedures. None of the film critics who described this film in contrast to the second 
adaptation gave answers to my questions. 
  Last but not least, I made contact with the family of the late director, Yazman Yazid. 
I found out that he passed away in December 2014, two months after my departure to the UK. 
Several entertainment media reported his death mainly because of the popularity of his TV 
sitcoms. In an interview after his funeral, his wife said that the late director kept 
documentation of his works at his home office, and the family planned to make this office a 
private museum. I contacted the interviewers in the hope of getting his wife’s contact details 
but none of them answered. I also tried without success to search for their names in the phone 
book of Tangerang District, Jakarta, where, according to the news reports, they lived.  
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Not long afterwards, I stumbled upon an invitation to attend a tahlilan (a public 
prayer and gathering held after a death) for the late director from a certain person on Twitter. 
I searched for his account on Facebook and sent him a message, to which he responded quite 
promptly. He confirmed that he was the son of the late director but, unfortunately, the family 
did not have the film. Nevertheless, the family would help me to contact those who might 
have it, including Kompas Gramedia, where his mother used to work and met his father for 
the first time. A week after that, I asked him if there had been any progress but he stopped 
responding. Almost a year later, I saw that he had posted on Facebook a picture of his father 
when he was studying at the Arts Institute of Jakarta. I commented on the picture and 
indirectly reminded him of my research, to which he replied that the family could not find the 
film.  
I have by no means mentioned here all of the parties that I have contacted to find this 
film. I also established communication with, to name just a few, the author of the novel, the 
filmmakers of the second adaptation as well as Indonesian film communities and online video 
sellers, but none of them own a copy of Blood and Crown. Below is a sample of the written 
communications between the aforementioned people and institutions and myself. The words 
have been printed verbatim while the formats have been slightly altered for the convenience 
of the reader as well as for identity protection. All of the individuals’ names and contacts, 
except my own, have been kept confidential for reasons of privacy. 
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Film Archivist 
 
Subject: Adaptasi Pertama Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@peter.petra.ac.id> 
Date: 18-Jan-14 8:06 AM 
To: lisabonarahman@gmail.com 
CC: jerini@petra.ac.id 
 
Ibu Lisa Bona Rahman Yth.,  
 
Saya Dwi Setiawan, dari UK Petra, Surabaya. Saya mendapatkan email Anda dari Ibu Julia 
Eka Rini yang merupakan kawan S3 dari Ibu Jusnidar Rahman.  
 
Saya ingin meneliti dua adaptasi film dari novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk untuk rencana S3 
saya. Saya kesulitan menemukan adaptasi yang pertama yang berjudul 'Darah dan Mahkota 
Ronggeng' (http://filmindonesia.or.id/movie/title/lf-d023-83-501199_darah-dan-mahkota-
ronggeng#.Us2OuPQW1lo).  
 
Apakah Ibu memiliki info bagaimana saya dapat mendapatkan film ini? Terima kasih banyak 
sebelumnya untuk kerepotannya.  
 
Salam,  
Dwi Setiawan  
Lecturer  
English Department, Petra Christian University  
http://inggris.petra.ac.id  
 
 
Subject: Re: Cara memperoleh copy film Indonesia jaman dulu 
From: Lisabona Rahman <lisabonarahman@gmail.com> 
Date: 14-Jan-15 9:09 AM 
To: jusnidar rahman <jusnidar@yahoo.com> 
CC: "jerini@peter.petra.ac.id" <jerini@peter.petra.ac.id>, dewey@peter.petra.ac.id 
 
Mama, Ibu Julia dan Pak Dwi, 
Mohon maaf pertanyaan Anda sekalian terlewatkan oleh saya setahun yang lalu.  
Saya sudah cek di katalog Sinematek Indonesia yang saya punya (diperbarui tahun 2010) dan 
film ini tidak ada dalam koleksi mereka, baik dalam bentuk rol film maupun media digital. 
Beberapa kawan di Jakarta memeriksa ulang dalam 2 hari terakhir dan tetap tidak 
menemukannya di katalog. 
Tentu saja ada kemungkinan bahwa film ini ada di ruang penyimpanan Sinematek akan tetapi 
belum didaftarkan di katalog. Saya kira selalu saja ada jeda waktu antara film masuk koleksi 
dan pendaftaran/katalogisasinya.  
337 
 
Saya sarankan Pak Dwi mendatangi Sinematek Indonesia langsung dan menanyakan. Saya 
tidak menyarankan bertanya lewat telepon karena tanggapannya sering lamban atau kadang 
tidak ada sama sekali, lebih baik berkunjung. Alamatnya: 
Gd. PPHUI Lt.4 
Jl. HR Rasuna Said Kavling C-22 Kuningan  
Jakarta Selatan 12950  
Telp. +62 21 5265268 
Ada baiknya Pak Dwi minta staf Sinematek Indonesia memeriksa judul ini di semua bagian 
koleksi: rol film, VHS, Betamax, dan VCD. Ada kemungkinan Sinematek pernah menerima 
sumbangan video saat Bapak JB Kristanto menyerahkan koleksi filmnya dari bahan riset 
Katalog Film Indonesia 1926-1995. Saya sudah coba bertanya juga kepada Pak JB Kristanto, 
tapi beliau tidak ingat persis apakah film ini termasuk dalam koleksi yang ia serahkah saat 
itu.  
Saya juga sudah bertanya kepada salah satu produsen video yang mengalih-mediakan film-
film Indonesia sebelum tahun 1995 ke format digital. Beliau menyatakan belum menemukan 
judul ini.  
Mohon maaf hanya sekian bantuan yang bisa saya berikan. Jika ada kabar lanjutan akan saya 
teruskan.  
Salam hangat, 
Lisabona Rahman 
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Usmar Ismail Film Centre 
 
Subject: Koleksi Film 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 10-Aug-14 9:24 AM 
To: stefanini.s@usmarismailhall.com 
 
Bapak/Ibu Pengurus Pusat Perfilman Usmar Ismail Yth., 
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya akan melanjutkan 
studi doktoral saya di De Montfort University, UK. Topik penelitian saya adalah adaptasi 
novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film, yang salah satunya berjudul Darah dan 
Mahkota Ronggeng, produksi PT Gramedia Film. 
 
Saya sudah berusaha mencari film tersebut secara online dan offline namun belum 
membuahkan hasil. Apakah Pusat Perfilman Usmar Ismail menyimpan kopi film tersebut? 
Bagaimana saya dapat mendapatkan kopinya? 
 
Atas perhatian dan bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Hormat Saya, 
   
Dwi Setiawan 
Lecturer 
English Department, Petra Christian University 
http://inggris.petra.ac.id 
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National Library of Indonesia and Sinematek 
 
Subject: Film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) untuk Disertasi 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 07-Jul-15 5:22 AM 
To: Info@pnri.go.id, sinematekindonesia@yahoo.co.id 
 
Yth. Bapak-Ibu PNRI dan Sinematek,  
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya 
tengah menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, Inggris. Topik penelitian saya 
adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film yang salah satunya 
berjudul Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983), produksi PT Gramedia Film.  
 
Saya ingin bertanya apakah PNRI dan/atau Sinematek menyimpan film tersebut dan 
bagaimana prosedur untuk dapat menggandakannya. Jika tidak ada, apakah dapat 
merekomendasikan pihak yang dapat saya hubungi untuk penelusuran selanjutnya?  
 
Atas balasan dan bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih.  
 
Salam,  
--  
Dwi Setiawan  
DMU P14164582  
 
 
 
Subject: Bls: Film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) untuk Disertasi 
From: sinematekindonesia sinematekindonesia <sinematekindonesia@yahoo.co.id> 
Date: 08-Jul-15 5:58 AM 
To: Dwi Setiawan <p14164582@myemail.dmu.ac.uk> 
 
Sayang sekali kami tidak memiliki koleksi film tersebut. 
 
 
 
terima kasih 
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Jakarta Prima Digital 
 
Subject: Film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 09-Apr-16 12:45 AM 
To: info@jktdigital.com 
 
Yth. Bapak-Ibu JKT Digital, 
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya, dan sekarang tengah 
menempuh studi doktoral bidang adaptasi di De Montfort University, Inggris. Untuk 
penyelesaian disertasi, saya sangat membutuhkan salah satu film adaptasi novel Ronggeng 
Dukuh Paruk yang berjudul Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983), produksi PT Gramedia 
Film. 
 
Saya ingin bertanya apakah JKT Digital memiliki film tersebut dan bagaimana prosedur 
untuk dapat membeli/mendapatkannya. 
 
Atas balasan dan kerepotannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Salam, 
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU 14164582 
 
 
Messages 
Edwin Theisalia 
You're friends on Facebook 
Technical Manager at PT. Jakarta Prima Digital 
Lives in Jakarta, Indonesia 
10/05/2016 00:01 
Dwi 
Mas Edwin Theisalia Yth., Terima kasih banyak sudah menerima undangan pertemanan dari saya. 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, UK Petra, Surabaya. Sekarang saya tengah 
menempuh studi doktoral bidang adaptasi sastra ke film di De Montfort University, UK. Subyek 
penelitian saya adalah adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk karya Ahmad Tohari ke dalam film 
Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) dan Sang Penari (2011). Sampai sekarang saya belum 
menemukan film yang pertama meskipun sudah berhasil mendapatkan screenplay-nya. Karena 
kesulitan tersebut, akhirnya saya membahas pengarsipan dan restorasi film (adaptasi) lama dan 
menemukan artikel-artikel tentang Jakarta Prima Digital (JPD) dan nama Anda. Mohon 
bantuannya jika nanti saya bertanya lebih lanjut tentang JPD demi keperluan penelitian saya. 
Mohon info juga bila JPD memiliki film yang saya cari tersebut. Terima kasih banyak sebelumnya. 
PS: Saya sertakan surat dari pembimbing mengenai saya dan penelitian saya. Salam, Dwi 
Setiawan 
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Kompas Gramedia Group 
 
Subject: Permintaan Film Darah & Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) 
From: "pr" <pr@kompasgramedia.com> 
Date: 22-Jun-15 4:25 AM 
To: <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
 
Dear Dwi Setiawan, 
 
Untuk permintaan Film Darah & Mahkota Ronggeng akan kami tanyakan terlebih 
dahulu ke KG Production. Dikarenakan film tersebut merupakan tahun lama 
sehingga harus kami pastikan apakah arsipnya masih ada atau tidak 
 
Semoga berkenan dan terima kasih :)  
 
  
 
Subject: Re: Permintaan Film Darah & Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 22-Jun-15 2:27 PM 
To: pr <pr@kompasgramedia.com> 
 
Bapak/Ibu Kehumasan Kompas Gramedia Yth., 
 
Terima kasih banyak atas balasan dan bantuannya. Semoga ada kabar baik :) 
 
Sekali lagi, terima kasih. 
 
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU P14164582 
 
 
 
Subject: Re: Permintaan Film Darah & Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 01-Jul-15 1:48 AM 
To: pr <pr@kompasgramedia.com> 
 
Bapak/Ibu Kehumasan Kompas Gramedia Yth., 
 
Saya hanya ingin bertanya apakah sudah ada informasi tentang permohonan film Darah dan 
Mahkota Ronggeng yang saya sampaikan dalam email sebelumnya.  
 
Atas bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Hormat, 
 
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU P14164582 
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Kompas Information Centre 
 
Subject: PT Gramedia Film 
From: Laurensia Fransiska <laurensia.fransiska@kompas.com> 
Date: 07-Jul-15 4:13 AM 
To: "dewey@petra.ac.id" <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
 
Selamat pagi, 
  
Terima kasih atas kiriman Anda, tertanggal 06 Juli 2015: 
  
“Dwi Setiawan 
Bapak-Ibu PI Kompas Yth., Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas 
Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya tengah menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, 
Inggris. Topik penelitian saya adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam 
film yang salah satunya berjudul Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983), produksi PT 
Gramedia Film. Saya belum dapat menemukan film tersebut meskipun sudah mencari di 
Sinematek, kolektor dan penjual film lama, stasiun TV, perpustakaan, keluarga sutradara, 
dll. Apakah PIK memiliki koleksi ini atau tahu di mana saya dapat mengakses film ini? Atas 
bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. Salam, Dwi Setiawan” 
  
Kami tidak memiliki film yang dimaksud. Anda dapat mencoba menghubungi Bentara 
Budaya Jakarta di nomor +62215483008, atau di Dokumentasi Perfilman Indonesia, dikelola 
oleh Sinematek dan Perpusnas, di nomor (021) 3101411, 3154863, 3154870 Pesawat 247. 
Demikian informasinya dan semoga cukup membantu. 
  
Salam, 
Laurensia Fransiska 
PUSAT INFORMASI  
Gedung Kompas Gramedia Unit II Lt.4 
Jl. Palmerah Selatan No.26-28 
Jakarta 10270, Indonesia 
Ph  : (+62-21) 534.7710 ext. 5316 
Web: pik.kompas.co.id 
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Vice President of Kompas Gramedia Group 
 
Subject: Film PT Gramedia Film 
From: Anita Lie <anitalie2003@gmail.com> 
Date: 13-Jul-15 1:42 AM 
To: sularto@kompas.com 
CC: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@peter.petra.ac.id> 
 
Yth. Bpk Sularto 
Semoga Bapak dalam kondisi dan baik dan sehat. Kiranya Tuhan selalu menyertai Bapak 
sekeluarga. 
Seorang rekan-bpk Dwi Setiawan-- sedang mengambil studi S3 di Inggris dan memikirkan 
untuk menganalisis "Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng" karya PT Gramedia Film yang 
merupakan adaptasi dari novel karya Ahmad Tohari "Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk." 
Pak Dwi sudah menghubungi beberapa rekan yg dulu terkait dg PT Gramedia Film namun 
tidak berhasil mendapatkan copy film tsb.  Apakah mungkin Perpustakaan Kompas 
mempunyai film tsb dalam koleksinya? Bolehkah pak Dwi meminta kontak orang yang 
mengurusi perpustakaan? 
Terima kasih dan mohon maaf telah mengganggu kesibukan Bpk Sularto. 
Salam 
Anita Lie 
 
Subject: Re: Film PT Gramedia Film 
From: Dwi Setiawan <dewey@petra.ac.id> 
Date: 30-Sep-15 10:32 PM 
To: sularto@kompas.com 
 
Bapak Sularto Yth., 
 
Mohon maaf sebelumnya jika saya mengganggu kesibukan Bapak. Saya Dwi Setiawan, rekan 
dari Ibu Anita Lie seperti yang sudah diperkenalkan di bawah. Saya membutuhkan 
film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng, produksi PT Gramedia Film tahun 1983, untuk 
keperluan penelitian saya. Sebelumnya saya sudah mencari dan menghubungi banyak pihak 
namun belum mendapatkan sampai saat ini. 
 
Apakah Pak Sularto memiliki informasi tentang penyimpanan film-film produksi PT 
Gramedia Film zaman dahulu? Apakah ada pihak/petugas yang dapat saya hubungi? 
 
Atas perhatian dan bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Salam Hormat, 
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU P14164582 
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Kompas TV 
 
Subject: Film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng 
From: Dwi Setiawan <p14164582@myemail.dmu.ac.uk> 
Date: 26-Nov-15 1:42 AM 
To: <public.relations@kompas.tv> 
 
Yth. Bapak-Ibu Public Relations Kompas TV, 
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya, dan sekarang tengah 
menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, Inggris. Untuk penyelesaian disertasi, 
saya sangat membutuhkan film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983), produksi PT Gramedia 
Film, dan belum mendapatkannya sampai saat ini. 
 
Saya sudah menghubungi Public Relations Kompas Gramedia namun belum mendapatkan 
jawaban kembali. Saya ingin bertanya apakah PT Gramedia Media Nusantara/Kompas TV 
menyimpan film tersebut dan bagaimana prosedur untuk dapat 
membeli/meminjam/menggandakan/melihatnya. 
 
Atas balasan dan kerepotannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima 
kasih. 
 
 
Salam, 
 
--  
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU 14164582 
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ANTV  
 
Subject: Mohon Info untuk Penelitian 
From: Dwi Setiawan <p14164582@myemail.dmu.ac.uk> 
Date: 20-Jun-15 2:06 AM 
To: <humas@an.tv> 
 
Bapak/Ibu Yth., 
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya 
tengah menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, Inggris. Topik penelitian saya 
adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film yang salah satunya 
berjudul Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983), produksi PT Gramedia Film. 
  
Saya belum dapat menemukan film tersebut meskipun sudah mencari di Sinematek, kolektor 
dan penjual film lama, perpustakaan, keluarga sutradara, dll. Berdasarkan info dari beberapa 
kolega, film tersebut pernah diputar di ANTV. Apakah ANTV masih menyimpan film 
tersebut? Dapatkah saya mendapatkan salinan-nya dan bagaimana prosedur yang perlu saya 
kerjakan? 
 
Atas perhatian dan bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Hormat, 
 
 
--  
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU P14164582 
 
 
 
Subject: RE: Mohon Info untuk Penelitian 
From: Humas antv <humas@an.tv> 
Date: 22-Jun-15 5:56 AM 
To: Dwi Setiawan <p14164582@myemail.dmu.ac.uk> 
 
Selamat siang, 
 
Terkait kebutuhan tersebut, mohon maaf ANTV tidak bisa mengeluarkan copy tayang yang 
diminta.  
 
Terima kasih.   
 
Salam,  
Humas ANTV 
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Subject: Re: Mohon Info untuk Penelitian 
From: Dwi Setiawan <p14164582@myemail.dmu.ac.uk> 
Date: 02-Jul-15 3:23 PM 
To: Humas antv <humas@an.tv> 
 
Yth. Bapak-Ibu Humas ANTV, 
 
Terima kasih banyak atas balasan yang diberikan. Apakah mungkin untuk 
mempertimbangkan ini sebagai kasus khusus mengingat apa yang saya kerjakan adalah untuk 
penelitian dan bukan untuk tujuan komersial? Saya siap untuk memenuhi prosedur/perjanjian 
yang dibutuhkan.  
 
Atau, saya sangat berterima kasih jika ANTV dapat berbagi info tentang pihak luar 
(produser/contact person di Kompas Gramedia) yang dapat saya hubungi untuk mendapatkan 
film tersebut. 
 
Mohon maaf sebelumnya jika permintaan-permintaan di atas merepotkan. Sekali lagi terima 
kasih. 
 
Hormat, 
 
 
Dwi Setiawan 
DMU P14164582 
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Film Critic 
 
 
Messages 
Ika Krismantari 
2 mutual friends: Gunawan Maryanto and Soe Tjen Marching 
Works at The Jakarta Post 
Lives in Jakarta, Indonesia 
06/07/2015 03:01 
Dwi 
Ibu Ika Krismantari Yth., 
 
Nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya tengah 
menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, UK. Topik penelitian saya sementara ini 
adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng 
(1983) dan Sang Penari (2011). Saya menikmati dan mendapatkan banyak insights dari ulasan 
Anda di http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/03/ahmad-tohari-the-return-people-s-
writer.html. 
 
Sampai saat ini saya belum menemukan film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng meskipun sudah 
mencari di Sinematek, perpustakaan, kolektor dan penjual film lama, stasiun TV, perusahaan film, 
keluarga almarhum sutradara, dll. Saya ingin bertanya apakah Ibu memiliki film tersebut atau 
mengetahui di mana saya dapat mendapatkannya.  
 
Atas perhatian dan bantuannya, sebelumnya saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. 
 
Salam, 
 
Dwi Setiawan 
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Yazman Yazid’s Son 
 
 
Messages 
Ario Paramadita 
You're friends on Facebook 
Assistant Manager - IT Operations at Multivision Plus 
Lives in Jakarta, Indonesia 
13/05/2015 04:47 
Dwi 
Mas Ario Yazid Yth., Perkenalkan nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas 
Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya tengah menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, Inggris. 
Topik penelitian saya adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film karya 
Bapak Yazman Yazid yang berjudul Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng (1983) Saya kesulitan mencari 
film tersebut meskipun sudah sekian lama menghubungi Sinematek, kolektor dan penjual film 
lama, stasiun TV, perpustakaan, dll. Saya melakukan penelusuran di internet dan menemukan 
berita bahwa Bapak Yazman Yazid rutin mendokumentasikan karya beliau. Setelah saya telusuri 
lebih lanjut saya akhirnya menemukan twitter dan FB Mas Ario. Saya ingin bertanya apakah 
keluarga masih menyimpan film ini dan bersedia membiarkan saya menggandakannya demi 
penelitian saya. Sebelumnya saya sampaikan terima kasih untuk segala kerepotannya. 
Keberhasilan studi doktor saya ini sangat bergantung kepada film tersebut. Atas perhatian dan 
balasannya, saya sampaikan banyak terima kasih. Salam, Dwi Setiawan 
14/05/2015 03:24 
Ario 
Bpk. Dwi Yth. 
Dwi 
Halo, Mas Ario. Senang sekali menerima balasan dari Anda. 
Salam kenal ya. 
 
Ario 
Dear Bapak Dwi Setiawan Yth, 
 
Salam kenal juga. Sebelumnya saya mengucapkan terima kasih yang sebesar-besarnya atas 
ketertarikan Bapak dalam menggunakan Karya-karya Almarhum ayah saya Bapak Yazman untuk 
menyelesaikan studi anda, saya merasa sangat terhormat 
 
Mengenai judul film yang bapak sebutkan diatas, yakni "Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng", bisa 
dilihat tahun pembuatannya yaitu tahun 1983. Kalau tidak salah film ini diproduksi antara Parkit 
Film atau Gramedia Film (Saya lupa yang mana karena Parkit Film sekarang sudah berubah 
menjadi PT. Tripar Multivision Plus dan Gramedia Film pun sudah bangkrut). Saya bisa bantu 
carikan film yang bapak maksudkan diatas, namun saya khawatir film tersebut ada hak cipta yang 
dimiliki oleh perusahaan yang saya sebutkan diatas, mungkin saya akan coba koordinasikan ke 
PT. Tripar Multivision Plus apakah mereka masih memiliki arsip untuk film-film lamanya. Karena 
kebetulan saya mengenal sangat baik Chief Librarian nya. 
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Untuk mekanisme penggandaan film yang bapak maksudkan, saya juga akan coba tanyakan 
seperti apa prosesnya. Berhubung saya baru masuk kantor lagi Hari Senin, jd Insya Allah hari 
senin saya akan kabari bapak Dwi secepatnya ya 
 
Terima Kasih dan saya tunggu info selanjutnya dari Bapak  
Dwi 
Terima kasih banyak untuk kerepotannya, Mas Ario. Kalau berdasarkan data, film tersebut 
diproduksi oleh Gramedia Film. Saya sudah pernah mencoba menghubungi Kompas Gramedia 
sebagai induk namun tidak mendapatkan balasan. Ada kenalan yang memberi info bahwa koleksi 
Gramedia Film dihibahkan ke Sinematek tetapi, seperti yang saya sampaikan, Sinematek 
menyatakan tidak memiliki film tersebut. Tapi mudah-mudahan PT Tripar Multivision Plus juga 
menyimpannya. Iya, Mas, saya akan memenuhi segala persyaratan administrasinya. Nanti istri 
saya yang akan membantu melengkapinya karena saya sekarang di UK. Istri saya bernama 
Marsella Hatane dengan nomor telpon 081 217021831/ 081 703515536. Mohon dibantu jika istri 
saya menghubungi. 
Dwi 
Sekali lagi terima kasih, Mas. Semoga ada titik terang. 
Dwi 
Iya, saya sangat ingin mengangkat karya almarhum di dunia internasional dan mengkajinya 
dengan serius. Selama ini dianggap hanya hiburan semata padahal sangat kompleks. 
15/05/2015 03:46 
Ario 
Dear Mas Dwi, 
 
Mohon maaf baru bisa membalas, hehehe. Iya Mas Dwi, kebetulan Ibu saya (Istri Almarhum) 
adalah karyawan di Kompas Gramedia selama 35 tahun dan beliau tau semua mengenai Kompas 
Gramedia dan Sinematek. Saya sudah coba tanyakan ke beliau mengenai judul film yang 
dimaksud dan beliau akan membantu sebisanya untuk bisa mendapatkan film tersebut. Saya juga 
sudah meminta bantuan kepada Ibu Jenny Rachman, karena pengalaman beliau sebagai artis 
senior, mungkin bisa membantu untuk menemukan koleksi film-film lama 
 
PT. Tripar Multivision Plus seharusnya mereka memiliki koneksi banyak mengenai arsip 
penyimpanan film nasional, hari ini akan saya coba tanyakan. Justru saya dan keluarga yang 
seharusnya berterima kasih kepada Mas Dwi karena sudah menyempatkan untuk menyelesaikan 
pendidikan dengan menggunakan karya-karya almarhum hehehe. 
 
OK siap nanti saya akan menghubungi istri Mas Dwi apabila ada info terbaru yaa. Terima kasih 
dan salam hangat  
15/05/2015 05:00 
Dwi 
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Terima kasih sekali lagi untuk Mas Ario dan Ibu untuk segala bantuannya. Betul-betul kebetulan 
yang luar biasa Ibu bekerja di Kompas Gramedia. Saya sangat menghargai sambutan baik ini. 
15/05/2015 08:30 
Ario 
Iya Mas Dwi sama sama hehehe. Justru Almarhum Pak Yazman dan Ibu Ace bertemunya kan 
karena mereka kerja di Gramedia, namun waktu Gramedia Film dinyatakan pailit, Pak Yazman 
langsung di rekrut sama Parkit Film dibawah perintah Pak Raam Punjabi langsung. 
 
Sama-sama Mas Dwi, saya juga sangat senang karya-karya almarhum bapak masih mendapat 
perhatian, kami dari pihak keluarga merasa sangat terhormat dan senang tentunya  
 
21/05/2015 02:36 
Dwi 
Selamat pagi, Mas Ario. Apa kabar? Semoga baik2 saja ya Mohon maaf mengganggu 
kesibukannya lagi. Apakah ada kabar/perkembangan soal film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng? 
Terima kasih byk sebelumnya  
31/05/2015 02:29 
Dwi 
Selamat pagi, Mas Ario. Apa kabar? Semoga baik2 saja ya Mohon maaf mengganggu 
kesibukannya lagi. Apakah ada kabar/perkembangan soal film Darah dan Mahkota Ronggeng? 
Terima kasih byk sebelumnya  
16/06/2015 14:59 
Dwi 
Halo, Mas Ario. Sebelumnya saya mohon maaf jika terus menghubungi tentang film Bapak 
Saya ingin memberitahu bahwa istri saya sudah menyusul ke UK tanggal 09 Juni yang lalu setelah 
berpisah hampir satu tahun. Jika nanti diperlukan, saya akan minta saudara/kolega saya di Jakarta 
untuk mengurus segala sesuatu terkait film tersebut. Jika ada persyaratan yang perlu saya 
kerjakan dari sini, mohon memberitahu saya juga di kala Mas Ario senggang. Sekali lagi terima 
kasih untuk waktu dan bantuannya. 
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Messages 
Suyoto Achmadi 
You're friends on Facebook 
Self-employed 
Lives in Jakarta, Indonesia 
06/04/2015 03:00 
Dwi 
Salam kenal, Mas Suyoto Achmadi, Saya Dwi Setiawan, dari UK Petra, Surabaya, tengah studi 
lanjut di De Montfort, UK. Saya ingin meneliti film adaptasi jadul "Darah dan Mahkota 
Ronggeng". Sudah saya cari ke mana-mana masih belum menemukan. Apakah Mas Suyoto 
punya atau memiliki info soal keberadaan film ini? Terima kasih banyak sebelumnya. Dwi 
 
Suyoto 
Wah sayang sekali sy blm punya mbak 
Dwi 
Hahaha. Saya laki-laki kok, Mas. 
 
Suyoto 
Itu film sih 
Dwi 
Apakah ada referensi kawan lain yang bisa saya coba hubungi? 
Terima kasih sebelumnya. 
 
Suyoto 
Haha oh iya salah 
Klo temen2 blm ada yg punya jg 
Sudah coba hubungi sinematek? 
Tp seingat sy sinematek jg gak punya 
Tp kli saja skg punya 
Dwi 
Kata Sinematek tidak ada di katalog, Mas. Tapi bisa jadi belum dikatalog  
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Nah sambil menunggu saya tanya2 ke yang lain. 
Suyoto 
Nah itu kyknya emang gak ada d mereka 
Sm siapa di sinematek? 
Dwi 
Saya minta tolong istri saya ke sana jadi saya tidak tahu namanya. Tapi saya dapat info yang 
sama dari Lisa Bonarahman. 
Apakah Mas Suyoto tahu orang Sinematek yang bisa saya hubungi? 
 
Suyoto 
Sy biasa kesana sm mbak nia. Tp skg sdh keluar 
Trus ada mas sandas jg skg msh disana 
Dua mingguan yg lalu sy kesana lgs hubungan dgn kepalanya 
Pak adisurya abdi 
Dwi 
Mas, berdasarkan pengalaman, apakah mereka bersedia mencarikan di koleksi yang belum di 
katalog? 
Suyoto 
Setau sy sih mereka akan ksh tau klo memang ada 
Judul2 yg blm masuk mereka biasanya diusahakan dicari 
Tp gak lgs nyari jg sih 
Dwi 
Gitu ya. Saya khawatirnya film ini benar2 tidak ada dokumentasinya meskipun ada yang bilang 
pernah diputar di ANTV. 
 
Suyoto 
Klo gt coba ke antv mas 
Cr bagian library 
Dwi 
Iya, Mas. Saya sedang mencari keluarga sutradaranya juga. Siapa tahu masih menyimpan. Mohon 
dikabari kalau Mas Suyoto mendapat info juga. 
Terima kasih banyak sebelumnya. 
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Suyoto 
Hehe sulit mas klo sm keluarga atau sutradara gw yakin mlh gak punya mereka 
Dwi 
Iya. Saya baca kalau alm. Yazman Yazid, sutradaranya, selalu mendokumentasikan karyanya dan 
keluarga berencana menjadikan ruang kerjanya museum pribadi. Tapi masalahnya nyari 
keluarganya ini  
19/06/2015 15:06 
Dwi 
Halo, Mas. Apa kabar? Cuma mau tanya apakah ada kabar baik dari kawan2 soal film Darah dan 
Mahkota Ronggeng Terima kasih sebelumnya. 
 
Suyoto 
Kabar baik mas 
Oh iya blm dpt mas 
Dwi 
Okay. Terima kasih banyak, Mas. Mohon mengingat saya kalau nanti dengar2 kabar  
 
Suyoto 
Ok ms 
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Messages 
Daniel Irawan 
You're friends on Facebook 
Writer at Jazzuality.com, Founder at CD Project Band and Founder at Cinema Etranger, a.b.g. 
Lives in Medan, Indonesia 
27/04/2015 11:21 
Dwi 
Pak Daniel Irawan Yth., Perkenalkan nama saya Dwi Setiawan, dosen Sastra Inggris, Universitas 
Kristen Petra, Surabaya. Saya tengah menempuh studi doktoral di De Montfort University, UK. 
Topik penelitian saya adalah studi adaptasi novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk ke dalam film Darah 
dan Mahkota Ronggeng dan Sang Penari. Saya menikmati membaca ulasan Anda tentang film 
Sang Penari di blog Anda. Saya ingin bertanya apakah Anda memiliki film Darah dan Mahkota 
Ronggeng. Saya masih belum menemukannya meski sudah mencari dan bertanya ke mana-
mana. Atau paling tidak informasi di mana saya kira-kira bisa mendapatkannya? Terima kasih 
banyak sebelumnya. Salam, Dwi 
28/04/2015 16:50 
Daniel 
Wah saya jg blm punya mas, cuma dulu nonton versi lamanya. Mungkin bisa ditanya ke 
sinematek Indonesia kalo mereka punya copy VHS-nya. 
Dwi 
Belum ada dalam katalog mereka, Mas Daniel. Apakah Anda ingat pernah nonton di tivi apa 
untuk saya lacak ke stasiun tivinya? 
 
Daniel 
Saya nontonnya di bioskop dan di vhs mas 
 
Daniel 
 
Daniel 
 
Daniel 
Eh sori kepencet 
Dwi 
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I see. Saya masih melacak rumah sutradaranya juga. Beliau sudah meninggal Desember lalu. 
Masih buntu Anyway, thank you. 
 
Daniel 
Sama2. Sulit jg sih, even sutradara kita sering gak nyimpen film2 mereka sendiri. 
Dwi 
Iya, Mas. Saya baca dalam artikel tentang penguburan beliau bahwa keluarganya akan 
menjadikan ruang kerja beliau sebagai museum karena beliau selalu mendokumentasikan 
karyanya. Semoga betulan Tapi saya belum dapat alamatnya. 
 
Daniel 
Coba ntar saya tanya2 kalau ada temen2 di film yang tau 
Dwi 
Terima kasih banyak, Mas Daniel. Senang dapat berkenalan. 
 
Daniel 
sama sama mas 
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Post-Colonialism from Within: Repoliticisation and Depoliticisation in Ifa 
Isfansyah’s Adaptation of Ahmad Tohari’s The Dancer 
 
 
Abstract Indonesia is largely invisible in adaptation studies and post-colonial film 
adaptation. As with many post-colonial countries, Indonesia has suffered from a 
long conflict between the military forces and civil society since its independence in 
1945. This struggle is reflected in a novel entitled The Dancer written by Ahmad 
Tohari during the Suharto era and its film adaptation with the same title by Ifa 
Isfansyah in the post-Suharto era. Using the political theory of depoliticisation, I 
argue that the adaptation represents the spirit of repoliticisation of the early post-
Suharto Indonesia while concurrently offering a distinctive type of depoliticisation 
typical of the current era. Not only does the study try to shift attention from Anglo-
American and Commonwealth film adaptations, but it also offers an alternative to 
the homogenising discourse of the Centre (the West) and Periphery (the East) and 
its derivative post-colonial adaptation theories. 
 
Keywords: Indonesia, Suharto era, post-Suharto era, PKI, army 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article investigates The Dancer (2011), an Indonesian film adaptation by Ifa 
Isfansyah of an Indonesian novel with the same title by Ahmad Tohari (1982). In so 
doing, not only does it depart from most work on adaptation that ‘is still dominated by 
Anglo-American texts’ (Cartmell 7), but it also attempts to offer insights from a largely 
unknown former Dutch colony into post-colonial film adaptation, which is still 
dominated by former British colonies. The problems with post-colonial adaptations are 
not only historical but also theoretical. Post-colonial adaptation studies have relied too 
long on the homogenising construct of the Centre (the West) versus Periphery (the East), 
as evident in the proliferation of approaches: just to name a few, mimicry, hybridity, 
and writing back. The fact is that post-colonial countries and adaptations have their 
own conflicts, ‘their own internal centres and peripheries, their own dominants and 
marginals’ (Mukherjee 6). 
One of the most prominent conflicts in the history of Indonesia is between the 
army and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, henceforth PKI). 
The struggle began from the dawn of the independence era in the mid-1940s and 
culminated in the mid-1960s. The early independence era has been known as the 
Sukarno era, named after the first president, a civilian freedom fighter. Although he 
was not a member of the PKI, Sukarno drew great support from the then largest 
political party in Indonesia. Sukarno was removed from the presidency after two 
bloody events of central importance to the country’s history. The first was the 
kidnapping, torture, and murder of six army generals by a group of low- and middle-
ranking officers in Jakarta on 1 October 1965. The army, under General Suharto, led a 
successful counterattack against the kidnappers and accused the PKI of masterminding 
the First of October movement. The second event refers to ‘the widespread pogrom 
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from October 1965 to mid-1966 of members of the PKI, its affiliated organisations, and 
anyone perceived to have done or said anything deemed sympathetic to any of these 
then legal organisations’ (Heryanto 77–8). Estimates vary, but the victims of the 
massacre are between 300,000 to one million dead (Cribb and Kahin lxxiv). Thus, the 
Sukarno era ended and the Suharto era began. 
The Suharto regime tried to control public consciousness and discourse about 
the 1965–1966 conflict by constructing and enforcing an official version of that his- 
tory, including through literature and film. The regime instructed the production of 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (The Treachery of G30S/PKI) by the State Film Corporation in 
1984 and its novelisation by Arswendo Atmowiloto in 1986 (Herlambang 171-2). The 
story in the nearly five-hour film focuses on the dramatized kidnapping of the generals, 
their gruesome torture by female members of the PKI, and the glorious counterattack 
by the army. Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI is completely silent about the subsequent anti-
communist purge whereas the film has effectively become the central narrative to 
justify the massacre as well as to warn people of the latent danger of Communism. The 
Suharto regime required students to watch the film in school or in a theatre. It was also 
screened on all TV channels every 30 September until the collapse of the regime in 
1998. 
The novel and the film in this study are set right before, during, and shortly after 
the anti-communist pogrom. The novel was first published as a trilogy, namely, Ronggeng 
Dukuh Paruk (1982), Lintang Kemukus Dini Hari (1985), and Jantera Bianglala (1986) and 
republished as one book in 2003, 2011, and 2012. The story revolves around the life of a 
ronggeng, a traditional erotic dancer, named Srintil from Paruk village who unknowingly 
performs in political rallies of the PKI. Following the widespread anti-communist 
campaign, Srintil is implicated, captured, and imprisoned without trial.  She survives the 
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ordeal only to be betrayed by those who exploit her status as an ex-communist in the anti-
communist Suharto era. Due to this novel, Ahmad Tohari reportedly had to face a long 
interrogation by the military, and the novel underwent a thorough censorship. 
In 1983, the novel was adapted by Yazman Yazid into a film entitled Darah dan 
Mahkota Ronggeng (Blood and Crown of the Dancer), focusing solely on Srintil becoming a 
ronggeng. There is no available data on the reception of the first adaptation by its 
contemporary audience, and the film is actually missing. In 2011, thirteen years after the 
collapse of the Suharto regime, the novel was adapted again into a film entitled Sang Penari 
or The Dancer by a young director, Ifa Isfansyah. This makes the book arguably the only 
political novel that has been cinematically adapted twice in Indonesia and, more 
importantly, the two adaptations were produced, respectively, during the Suharto and the 
post-Suharto era. The second adaptation was nominated for nine awards at the 2011 
Indonesian Film Festival, winning Best Film, Best Director, Best Leading Actress, and 
Best Supporting Actress. Critics claim that the film successfully represents the spirit and 
idea of the novel (Krismantari; Kurniasari; Soebagyo). Some even state that it goes 
further than the novel, revealing the horror that the author witnessed but could not 
write about due to the oppressive situation in the Suharto era (Sembiring par. 3; Siregar 
par. 3). Yet there are also some dissenting opinions, such as that of Ariel Heryanto, who 
argues that The Dancer ‘does not take the next step of challenging or transcending the 
[Suharto regime]’s overall ideological framework’ (102). 
In this study, I approach Ifa Isfansyah’s The Dancer from a political theory of 
depoliticisation and politicisation. Matthew Flinders and Matt Wood define 
depoliticisation and politicisation as, respectively, ‘attempts to stifle or diffuse conflict’ 
and ‘the emergence and intensification of friend-enemy conflict (139). There are three 
primary forms of depoliticisation and politicisation: governmental, societal, and discursive 
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(Wood and Flinders). Governmental depoliticisation includes the transfer of governmental 
power from elected politicians to professionals, experts, or specialists. In the case of 
Indonesian cinema, this can be seen from the recent purification of the censorship bodies 
from political parties and the reduced control of the government. Societal depoliticisation 
involves roles performed by the media (including films like The Dancer), corporations (like 
film companies), and social organisations in demoting social issues to individual affairs. 
Finally, when certain issues are thoroughly repressed and/or considered normal, natural, or 
permanent by means of language and discourse, this process is identified as discursive 
depoliticisation. Governmental, societal, and discursive repoliticisation are the opposites 
or counter-processes, so to speak, of those types of depoliticisation. Depoliticisation, 
politicisation, and their primary forms are highly interdependent and at times overlapping. 
It is my contention that Isfansyah’s adaptation of Tohari’s novel represents the 
spirit of repoliticisation of the early post-Suharto era while concurrently projecting the 
depoliticisation tendency of the current post-Suharto era. As the first half of the article 
will show, the discursive repoliticisation of the parties/issues in The Dancer is intensely 
carried out so as to justify the eventual depoliticisation of those parties/ issues. 
Furthermore, the discursive repoliticisation/depoliticisation in the text signifies the 
complex interplays between the subjects (the filmmaker, cast, and crew) and the 
contexts (the government, society, and market) of the adaptation, or, in other words, the 
societal and governmental repoliticisation/depoliticisation in the post-Suharto era. The 
second half of the article will be devoted to exploring these relations. 
 
THE TEXT 
The narrative of the adaptation can be divided roughly into three stages: (1) the making 
of the ronggeng, (2) the politicisation of the dancer and her community, and (3) the 
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anti-communist persecution. The discursive repoliticisation/depoliticisation in the film 
can be seen from the conflicting representations of the villagers, the Communists and 
the army, and the anti-communist campaign in those corresponding stages. The 
semiotics (particularly mise-en-scène, cinematography, editing, and sound) of the film 
similarly challenge, and reinforce, the longstanding images of the three parties in both 
the novel as well as the Suharto regime’s Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. 
 
The divided villagers 
The villagers in the novel and the film represent a community of belief. The belief in 
question is a local religion called Kejawen or Kejawenism, which ‘encompasses many  
non-Islamic elements, especially mysticism and respect for local spirits’ (Cribb and 
Kahin 1). As in the novel, there are power relations between the villagers in the film, 
but of a different kind and with a tendency to undermine Srintil’s character. The Srintil 
of the film is less politically conscious than her counterpart in the novel. While the 
Srintil of the novel grows to realise her exploited fate and eventually refuses to dance as a 
protest against the elders of the village, the Srintil of the film stops dancing because she 
is broken-hearted. This is perhaps the first depoliticisation in the film, that is, the 
disempowerment of the fairly politicised female protagonist of the novel. The director 
admits this transformation while arguing: ‘the representation of Srintil in The Dancer is 
based on a fact that we found during the research, that women in 1965 were an object’ 
(Isfansyah, ‘Aku’ par. 19, my trans.). 
The adaptation also reduces the social and spiritual standing of Sakarya, the leader 
of the village and Srintil’s own grandfather. He is now portrayed as powerless and apolitical, 
in contrast to the power and political astuteness of Kartareja, the leader of the ronggeng 
troupe and Srintil’s mentor. Related to Sakarya’s diminished role, the film scarcely 
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expresses anything about religion, either Kejawenism or Islam, in the way the novel 
intensely does (see, for example, Lysloff; Al-Ma'ruf). While the novel implicitly 
promotes an apolitical cultural Islam, the kind of Islam that the Suharto regime could 
tolerate (see Mietzner 70), at the expense of the primitive Kejawenism, the film appears to 
support secularism. There are indeed the Javanese rituals of finding the dagger, the 
bathing ceremony, and the Buka Klambu (deflowering) ceremony in the film, but their 
collective significance relies on cultural politics instead of philosophical spiritualism. The 
film’s secularism constitutes concurrently an act of discursive repoliticisation and 
depoliticisation. On the one hand, the film reasserts the forgotten, non-spiritual dynamics of 
the religious minority. At the same time, it suppresses the apolitical Islam of the original 
text and the emerging political Islam of the  post-Suharto era. 
The division/politicisation of the rural community in the film extends to the 
ever-controversial area of sexuality. In general, the film’s description of the village’s 
free sexuality is less extensive and explicit than the novel. The lovemaking scenes 
between Srintil and Rasus, her lover in the army, are slightly more explicit than those 
involving Srintil and other men. Another distinctive feature of the former is the 
soundtrack, which involves a non-diegetic sound of cello, at times, together with a 
non-diegetic sound of ronggeng percussion. By contrast, the sexual scenes between 
Srintil and other men never incorporate the cello sound and always begin with the 
ronggeng percussion. The cello and ronggeng percussion thus appear to signify, 
respectively, love and tradition. 
Not only does the film syntagmatically differentiate love-based from tradition-
based sex, it also divides the latter further into exploitative and non-exploitative. The 
tradition-based sex in the adaptation centres on the bidding for Srintil’s virginity in the 
deflowering ceremony and the scenes of happily cheated wives. Her mentor Kartareja 
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acquires a great wealth from selling Srintil’s virginity to the highest bidders, as 
symbolised by his newly purchased water buffalo. On the other hand, there are wives 
who sincerely compete to have their husbands sleep with the famous ronggeng because 
they believe it helps restore their husbands’ virility and fertility. A gift of new sandals 
from a happily cheated wife symbolises this non-exploitative, tradition-based sex. On top 
of that, these two events indicate a wide moral division among Paruk villagers; there are 
those who exploit the Paruk’s free sexual practices and those who sincerely believe in 
them. This moral division is further visually reinforced by Srintil’s metonymic gestures. 
In the case of the exploitative deflowering ceremony, Srintil projects her disdain by 
looking at herself in the mirror in utter contempt and disgust. By contrast, although she 
does not love the husbands and practically serves them as a prostitute in the scenes of the 
happily cheated wives, she always looks calm and even kind to the husbands. 
Furthermore, the film does not exercise what Heryanto calls a narrative technique 
of ‘under erasure’, which is ‘to manufacture and nurture a stigma so it could be 
rejected’ (142). While the novel frames the free sexuality of Paruk village as madness as 
opposed to the normal, respectable sexuality of Dawuan town (the district seat) the 
film does not show anything about the Dawuan’s sexuality and, therefore, there is 
neither a comparison nor a counter-sexuality. Moreover, the love making of Srintil and 
Rasus breaks a number of sexual taboos in Indonesian films. Most of the time, sex 
would be filmed only when it is a rape or prostitution (Heider 66–9; Sen 144–7). It is 
rare to see extra-marital sexual intercourse between two consenting adults on screen, let 
alone between the highly-feared army officer and the heavily condemned communist 
prostitute. Finally, unlike the novel, the film does not draw any causal relations between 
the free sexual practices and the tragedy that befalls the village. The tragedy is presented 
as less divinely sanctioned than politically driven. 
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The film does not align the politics in the village exclusively with Srintil’s 
sexuality. While the novel suppresses any notion of class and class conflict, the first 
stage of the film introduces the existence of both in the village. The dormant class 
divisions in the village are pictured for the first time in a scene at a rich, green field 
surrounding the village. The rich natural resources of the village are visualised through 
natural-lighted, scenic, deep space, and extreme longshots. There are well-dressed 
landowners and their enforcers exploiting the labour of the half-naked working-class 
villagers, who include Rasus before his military service. This mise-en-scène is in 
conflict with the description of the village in the novel: 
Thousands of hectares of wet rice fields surrounding the village of Paruk 
had been bone dry for seven months. The herons would not find any water, 
not even a pool a foot wide. Entire paddy fields had been transformed into 
dry, gray-colored plains. Grassy plants had all withered and died. The only 
spots of green here and there were the cactus-like kerokot that appeared in 
the fields only during a drought, nature’s sacrifice to the sundry forms of 
locusts and crickets. (Tohari, Dancer 1) 
The director defends his choice of setting by arguing that hardship does not necessarily 
correlate with drought (Isfansyah, ‘Aku’ par. 47). In fact, the selection underlines the 
old irony that poverty often occurs in the midst of wealth, as well as reinforcing the 
existence of exploitation and class conflict in Paruk. Thus, if the novel tends to view 
economic capital as the by-product of cultural and social power relations (as in the 
wealth of Kartareja due to his position), the adaptation tries to reinvigorate what 
Bourdieu calls ‘the brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics’ (253). Above all, 
this shows that the villagers are already divided even before the external politicisation 
by the PKI. 
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The ambivalent communist and army 
Although the previous part exposes events which the rest of the country may consider 
abnormal (particularly the free sexual practices in Paruk), those are part of normal life 
in the village. The liminality of the film relies more on the collaboration between the 
ronggeng troupe and the PKI as represented by its local leader Bakar. Always culturally 
and socially strong, the Bakar of the film is pictured as highly political, perhaps even 
more so than the Bakar of the novel, yet is always true to his political ideals. When he 
uses the ronggeng troupe for the cause of Communism, Bakar does it in good faith so 
that the victory of Communism will save the villagers from their wretched existence. 
Being faithful to his communist ideals, Bakar explicitly rejects the exploitation of female 
sexuality for political ends as in his dialogue with a landowner. His personal relation- 
ship with Srintil is also not seen in the film, as is her indebtedness to him. There is not a 
single scene in which he talks directly with her, despite his frequent visits to the village. 
Here, being political and/or politicisation does not necessarily carry a negative con- 
notation, which is radically different from the central discourse of the novel and the 
Suharto regime’s official film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. 
The positive representations of the political Bakar can be seen in his scenes 
with Paruk villagers at a warung, a place where poor villagers go not only for food and 
drinks but also social interactions. The choice of the setting and the fact that he, a 
highly respected, educated man, is willing to come there easily show that the character is 
pro- poor. The atmosphere of the meetings is also set as warm and friendly, as partly 
created by the intimate distance between the participants. The set is also naturally lit, 
which paradigmatically sets it apart from the Communists’ dark, secret meetings as 
portrayed in Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI and other official texts. The Communists have 
largely been associated with provocative, unintelligible, and loud speeches at large 
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political rallies. 
The adaptation portrays the communist rallies very differently from the ones in 
the novel and other relevant texts. They are all portrayed in the film as small and 
friendly gatherings, and certainly not as ‘packed with people, always turned into noisy, 
unruly affairs’ as the novel describes (Tohari, Dancer 251). Besides the small number of 
attendees, this is visually achieved through the use of deep focus, medium close up, tight 
framing, intimate distance, and natural light. The red colour dominates the scene along 
with the happy faces of the dancing participants. This mise-en-scène is in stark contrast 
with the possessed faces of the dancing communists in the forest of Kemayoran in the 
middle of the night in Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. Ironically, the only unfriendly, intrusive 
faces in the rallies belong to the soldiers guarding the events. 
Nevertheless, the adaptation represses the symbols of the party throughout the 
film. Bakar consistently refers to the PKI as ‘my party’ in all his dialogues with the 
villagers. The red colour dominates the party’s rallies, banners, and attires although, 
curiously, the hammer and sickle, the infamous logo of the PKI, is completely missing. 
There are political slogans such as ‘TANAH UNTUK RAKJAT’ (land for the people), 
‘WARUNG RAKJAT’ (people’s food stall), and ‘MANIPOL USDEK’ (the Indonesian 
acronym for Political Manifesto, the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided 
Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity). Those slogans are being 
painted on the roofs of almost every house in Paruk village. Nonetheless, they can hardly 
be called the PKI’s slogans because they were common mottos during the left-wing 
Sukarno era. 
The vandalism of the tomb of the village’s patriarch, allegedly by the enemy of 
the PKI, draws Srintil and other villagers closer to the political party. Bakar is present 
at the scene of vandalism and begins agitating the angry villagers. However, the ensuing 
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riot is not directly provoked by him but by Darsun, a non-influential male villager in 
the novel. Using an eyeline match, the film shows Bakar is left dumbfounded by the 
unexpected interruption of his speech by Darsun. A similar eyeline technique is used to 
indicate Darsun’s betrayal of Paruk villagers at the start of the anti-communist campaign. 
The subsequent shots reveal that Darsun is giving a signal to the incoming militiamen to 
surround and arrest the villagers. More than the previously discussed moral and political 
contradictions in the village, the character of Darsun directly challenges the traditional, 
depoliticised image of villagers as jointly propagated by the Suharto regime and the 
novel. 
Nonetheless, the film still implicitly indicates Bakar and the PKI’s involvement 
in the rural unrest. After the Paruk riot, for instance, the villagers sing and dance 
hysterically as the PKI members do in Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. The riot itself replicates 
the visual convention of rural anarchy in Indonesian cinema as identified by Krishna 
Sen: ‘the action always takes place in the darkness of the night, with a mob of men in 
dark clothes carrying lit torches. Minimal lighting is used in these scenes—at times 
only diegetic lighting’ (121). Similarly, there is a shot, with a similar mise-en-scène, in 
which unidentified people smash the windows of a house of a landowner’s enforcer. No 
direct clue has been given that the attack is orchestrated by Bakar and the PKI, but the 
fact that the shot is placed (in a montage) between that of a PKI rally and Bakar smiling 
in the warung cannot help imply their involvement in the assault. 
On several accounts, the film still echoes the effect of the dominant discourse of 
the novel and the regime on villagers. The villagers in the film have not been 
completely freed from the depoliticising construct that those living in rural areas are 
unsophisticated and innocent. Some of them are pictured as illiterate and thus ignorant 
of the meaning of the PKI’s slogans and speeches. As Heryanto observes: 
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With a few exceptions (mainly authored by survivors of the anti-communist 
campaign from 1965), left-leaning characters in all Indonesian fiction set 
against the background of the 1965–66 massacre appear either as wicked 
villains, smart but malicious persons who mislead other people, innocent 
but hopelessly foolish individuals who are susceptible to communist 
propaganda, or unlucky for being related to Communists by descent or 
marriage. Invariably, these fictions convey a familiar message to their 
implied audience: it is the characters’ own fault if they are killed off. [The 
Dancer] makes no exception to this general practice. (150–1) 
However, the Bakar of the film does not easily fit into any of Heryanto’s stipulated 
categories. He is a peculiar combination of smart and influential as well as weak and 
unlucky. If he is guilty, he is guilty of political idealism rather than manipulation, as the 
novel explicitly suggests (Tohari, Dancer 251). Bakar is also easily deceived by his victims, 
as in his encounter with Darsun. Thus, the film’s attitude towards ideological 
communists like Bakar is less straightforward. 
Just as the PKI, the army in the film also displays a number of ambivalent 
qualities, as can be seen from the characters of Rasus and his superior, Sergeant Binsar. 
The narration of the film is predominantly omniscient, with a few restricted narrations 
from the point of view of the pre-military Rasus in the early part of the narrative. Rasus’ 
point of view encourages the viewers to empathise with him as they witness how his 
childhood girlfriend (Srintil), by becoming a dancer, gains cultural, social, and 
economic capital while he himself remains capital-less. Being broken-hearted, he runs 
away from the village, works as an office boy in the army depot in Dawuan, and 
eventually trains as an army officer. This helps the positive representation of the army 
later on, which, very much like Rasus, starts as an underdog as opposed to the strong 
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PKI and ends up a winner. In other words, this focalisation establishes the narrative of 
the film as a classic story of losers to winners or, in the case of Srintil and the PKI, 
winners to losers. 
Rasus is pictured as a diligent and smart pupil of the army in Dawuan, but not to 
the point that he begins to reflect or talk philosophically as in the novel. Nor does the 
film character speak with low-frequency words and/or English loanwords, which are 
com- mon practices of the Indonesian middle and upper classes. The Rasus of the film 
also keeps his strong Banyumasan accent even after he becomes an army officer. 
Speaking with the largely marginalised/ridiculed accent, Rasus discursively 
relinquishes the army’s claim to objective truth, which, as Edward Said observes, 
often grounds itself on the ‘language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, 
and knowledge’ (216). Further, this rejection also represents a challenge to what Wood 
and Flinders call ‘scientism’, that is, ‘the use of scientific discourse, expertise, and 
scientifically determined solutions to depoliticise an issue’ (163). This de-scientisation 
constitutes discursive repoliticisation as it brings the infallibility of the army back into 
debate and treats it as a biased, political subject. 
The ambivalent nature of the army man can also be seen from his visual portrayals. 
Rasus looks dashing and disciplined in his army uniform and on his army jeep, 
syntagmatically opposed to his half-naked, unruly existence as a villager. Yet, when he 
visits his old village, he becomes a villager once again. The fact that Rasus has sex with 
Srintil during his homecoming shows that he is never morally reformed by the enlightening 
army either. He is also pictured as cleaning and praying at her late grandmother’s grave. 
This action is sometimes considered a remnant of the superstitious pre-Islamic culture 
and condemned by some Islamic radicals as blasphemy. To this extent, the 
representation of the military Rasus is different from that of the novel and rather 
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subversive of the culturally and morally perfect image of a rmy  officers. 
His mentor Sergeant Binsar is presented as a benevolent dictator, which is a no 
less ambivalent characterisation. In their first encounter, the sergeant slaps the 
civilian Rasus because the latter is fighting with another civilian. Later, the sergeant is 
punching and kicking Officer Rasus for disobeying his order. In another scene, 
however, he treats him as an equal and even asks Rasus to eat his food together with 
him. Aside from the intimate distance, eating with hands signifies his caring attitude 
because Indonesians would do this only with close friends and relatives. Rasus also 
catches the sergeant doing a sholat, which is a common marker of religious piety and 
probably the only Islamic signifier throughout the film. 
 
The restrained anti-communist campaign 
The anti-communist campaign in the Paruk village and the Dawuan district greatly 
embellishes that of the novel, which vaguely narrates the event in the space of a few 
pages. While the army has insisted that the anti-communist purge was led 
spontaneously by anti-communist militia without any involvement from the army, the film 
clearly pictures the involvement of the army and their alliance with the militias. 
Sergeant Binsar quickly responds to the order from his superior by producing a list of 
names and instructing his subordinates ‘to secure’ the people in the list (Isfansyah, 
Dancer). Here a political conflict is being depoliticised into a security issue, hence 
erasing individual, social, and governmental dimensions of the problem. 
Yet, to post-Suharto viewers, the phrase ‘to secure’ has too familiar a 
connotative meaning of ‘to kill’ or, at least, ‘to imprison’, reminding them of the 
frequent, extra- judicial, political measures taken by the Suharto regime. Working with 
the rural militia, the army destroys Paruk and detains the accused communists, including 
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Srintil, Sakarya, and Kartareja. The shots of rural militiamen rounding up the villagers 
cross-cut with those of army officers approaching the village. Although without 
identifiable badges, some of the militiamen are wearing the grey uniform of Barisan Ansor 
Serbaguna, a youth militia of Nadhlatul Ulama, an Islamic political competitor of the PKI 
in Central and East Java. The leader of the militia is also bringing and reading a list of 
names, which Sergeant Binsar apparently shares. The montage ends with the physical 
meeting between the two forces, one leaving the village to the waiting army trucks and 
another entering the village to follow up the initial search. 
While the novel completely represses the tortures and killings of the 
Communists due to ‘specific conditions’ (Tohari, Dancer 267), the film dares to visualise 
them, albeit still restrictively. The detentions and interrogations of the accused 
communists are shot using low-key lighting and in high contrast, thus exposing the 
inmates but covering the interrogators. The identity of the interrogators is narrowly 
revealed through their military boots or sleeves. The interrogation sometimes takes place 
off-screen such as behind a closed door. Srintil is taken out of the detention only to be 
raped by Darsun, who now turns from a communist sympathiser to a militia man. 
Although, like her, the rapist is a civilian, his action is clearly known and permitted by 
an army officer. 
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the film is completely devoid 
of the army’s depoliticising representations, particularly in the character of Rasus. They 
appear partly through a dramatic irony in which Rasus is sent on a separate anti-
communist operation and is thus unaware and innocent of the fate of Srintil and other 
villagers. Secondly, Rasus only executes the ideological communists like Bakar, and only 
does so when they are about to run away. In addition, he spends his time afterwards 
tracking Srintil’s whereabouts, despite verbal and physical abuse from his superiors and 
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at the risk of being fired from the army. These representations put him in the position of 
victim, just like his fellow villagers, and therefore blur his political responsibility. 
The execution of the true communists takes place in a historically accurate 
setting: a riverbank. Using low-key lighting, the film deploys different techniques of 
cinematography for the occasion. The victim, Bakar, is shot in a high-contrast, shallow 
focus, medium close-up. This means that the spectators can easily recognise him and the 
fear on his face. The killer, Rasus, is shot in a low-contrast, shallow focus, close-up. 
The result is that it is less easy to identify him but still possible to see the regret on his 
face. The execution itself is visualised using deep space, medium longshots and 
longshots, which effectively hides the sheer brutality of the event. It should be 
highlighted that, while the round-up of the village is shot in broad daylight, the tortures 
and the killings are filmed in low-key lighting/at night. While the violence during the 
daylight round- up is entirely committed by the rural militia, the brutality during the 
dark detention and execution is all committed by the army officers. 
As a whole, the narrative and semiotics of the film ambivalently politicise and 
depoliticise the villagers, Communists, and army. This should not be surprising, as 
Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller note: ‘the issue of boundaries or conceptual 
evisceration is . . . clouded by the fact that depoliticisation and politicisation may 
actually take place concurrently’ (313). Insisting on a sharp distinction between the 
two forms of discourse ‘may risk suggesting a binary opposition that is a crude 
characterisation of their complex relationship’ (297). Repoliticisation and 
depoliticisation should be seen more as ‘a rebalancing or a shift in the nature of 
discursive relationships that is a matter of degree—not a move from land to sea, but 
from cave to mountain or valley to plateau’ (297). 
In general, ambivalence leans towards politicisation because it destabilises a 
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unity and reveals conflicts within. However, as in this film adaptation, this can also 
offer a conciliatory political tone, if not full-scale depoliticisation. The constant, 
encompassing ambivalences in the film constitute what Wood and Flinders call ‘hyper-
politicisation’, that is, ‘the creation of an intense political controversy . . . to then 
impose a definitive position that closes down political debate (thereby depoliticising the 
issue)’ (164). The villagers, Communists, and army are being equally and extensively 
divided/politicised so as to make them and their actions equally wrong as well as 
equally right. The expected result is thus a conflict resolution or depoliticisation. 
 
THE SUBJECTS AND CONTEXTS 
The hyperpoliticisation and the depoliticisation in the adaptation generally 
correspond with developments in the government, society, and discourse of the post- 
Suharto era, particularly on the issues of religion, sexuality, and the 1965 conflict. 
There are delays in time, complications, indirect relationships, and mediation, but 
there is an essential homology or correspondence of structures between the text, the 
subjects (the filmmaker, cast, and crew), and the contexts (the government, society, 
and market). 
 
The filmmaker, cast, and crew 
The adaptation’s emphasis on secularism might be related to a shared background of the 
filmmaker and crew. Hitherto none of the director’s films has touched the subject of 
religion, which is fairly unique considering that the religious genre is trending in the 
country and many Indonesian directors have been trying their hands at this genre 
(Heeren 107–29; Heryanto 49–73). Ifa Isfansyah’s early film Garuda di Dadaku (2009) is 
overtly patriotic or nationalistic, which in Indonesia and many countries is synonymous 
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with being secular (see Hutchinson and Smith 47), transcending/depoliticising 
religious, and racial differences for the unity of the nation. Shanty Harmayn, the producer 
and co-screenwriter, is not known for producing and writing for religious films either. 
Salman Aristo, the first screenwriter, was involved in the making of the highly successful 
Islamic film Ayat-ayat Cinta (2008) but that is just one of eighteen films that he has so far 
(co-)written. Yadi Sugandi, the director of photography, has himself directed a number of 
nationalistic films such as Merah Putih (2009), Darah Garuda (2010), and Hati Merdeka 
(2011). 
The restricted representations of the PKI, army, and 1965 persecution can be 
partially explained by the lack of interest of the filmmaker. As Heryanto states, young 
Indonesian filmmakers have ‘no reason for being particularly interested in such a heavy 
and depressing theme’ (76). In addition, any filmmakers revisiting the 1965 tragedy must 
face a set of challenges that arise from the obscurity of the subject matter. The 
military’s official narrative of the tragedy has been seriously challenged (see, for 
instance, Anderson; Roosa; Scott) but the lack of data (largely destroyed or kept by the 
military) makes it difficult for filmmakers to present a more definite account of the 
event. These problems are revealed by the director and co-screenwriter Ifa Isfansyah in 
his interview: 
I took the courage to make this film after I had convinced myself that this 
novel was about love. So I tried to look at it from a love perspective first. I 
don’t like politics. I don’t understand it and don’t like it. Doing research, it 
was the hardest because . . . oh, no . . . reading politics. This film was not 
about politics, really. I was seeing the politics from contemporary 
perspectives, from the perspectives of the young generation now. I don’t 
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understand the incidence of 65. I don’t know and don’t want to pretend to 
know. (‘Aku’ par. 21, my trans.) 
The confession above reveals the attitude of the director towards the political contents of 
the novel. Isfansyah apparently aims to depoliticise the political novel into a roman- tic 
film. What he means by ‘the politics from contemporary perspectives’ is none other than 
discursive depoliticisation as all the involved parties would be stripped of their 
conflicting political natures and desires: 
The Dancer is non-partisan. Neither pro the PKI, nor pro the military. It is 
a story about human beings. We don’t side with any parties, we side with 
human beings. The Paruk villagers are human beings, only playing roles 
based on the costumes they are wearing. You are wearing the green 
uniform, you are the military. You can be red, too. Or peasants. They are 
people, illiterate, accidentally becoming involved in many political 
intrigues. (Isfansyah, ‘Aku’ par. 51, my trans.) 
The other scriptwriters have more or less apolitical attitudes towards the story. Salman 
Aristo, according to Isfansyah, was primarily tasked with transforming the story of 
the novel to the film structure, or in his words ‘to change the complicated thing to 
something simple and visual’ (par. 12, my trans.). Shanty Harmayn, a business-minded 
producer and from an older generation, made sure that ‘these two young people do not go 
off limits’ (par. 16, my trans.). The nationalistic cinematographer claims that he ‘has 
become one’ with the director (Sugandi par. 13, my trans.). 
While depoliticising the overtly political content of the 1965 conflict, the 
filmmaker rebalances the discourse by politicising the less harmful subject of 
sexuality. Judging from the fresh anti-communist actions in Indonesia (April-May 
2016), no matter how controversial a sexual issue could be, it would be still much safer 
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than a discussion of the 1965 tragedy. 
The depoliticisation and politicisation in the film are to some extent supported 
by the selection of cast. The political Kartareja and apolitical Sakarya are played by, 
respectively, a senior actor, Slamet Raharjo, and a monologuist, Landung Simatupang. 
Beside his successful acting career, Slamet Raharjo is widely known for his political 
activism. He regularly plays in a TV show Sentilan-Sentilun (2010-now) as a witty, 
retired Javanese lord who satirically comments on social and political issues in the 
country. Landung Simatupang has been long famous for his distinctive skills in theatrical 
monologue but not as well-known for political activism. Srintil’s innocence and 
depoliticisation are supported by the casting of Prisia Nasution, who had never acted in 
any feature fi and had nothing to do with political activism. The highly political villager 
Darsun is played by Teuku Rifnu Wikana, a young actor mostly cast in bad guy roles. 
The character of Bakar is played by Lukman Sardi, who is famous for his various good 
guy roles in his fairly long career. This supports the positive, or at least ambivalent, 
characterisation of the communist figure. Rasus is just Oka Antara’s second leading role 
after Hari untuk Amanda (2010), in which he also plays the good guy. Antara’s 
background helps shape the character of Rasus as an innocent, amiable military officer. 
The Batak Sergeant Binsar is played by Tio Pakusadewo, a senior actor with 
a strong Javanese background. This choice is rather ironic because the Batak sergeant 
of the film actually replaces the Javanese sergeant of the novel, Sergeant Slamet. This 
transcultural casting is hardly unique, as it also happens with the characters of Srintil 
and Rasus. Prisia Nasution is not Javanese and does not speak the Javanese language, 
let alone the Banyumasan dialect. Labodalih Sembiring, a film critic, singles out the 
inevitable language problem: ‘several scenes feature Srintil, played by Prisia Nasution, 
speaking Javanese, but with the wishy-washy air of a Jakarta teenager in a bad mood’ 
378 
 
(par. 10). Similarly, Oka Antara is a non-Javanese actor and non-native speaker of the 
language. All of these factors underline the secularist spirit of the film, yet this time they 
do not concern religion but another equally sensitive subject: ethnicity. The Dancer, or at 
least Amelya Octavia and Riri Pohan (the casting directors), seems to highlight the 
diversity and unity of the casts. 
 
The government, society, and market 
The early post-Suharto era was characterised by many sectarian conflicts, separatist 
rebellions, and other forms of governmental and societal politicisation, which had been 
successfully repressed by the Suharto regime for 32 years. As with the later Arab Spring, 
Indonesian Islamist activists welcomed the chaotic yet democratic situation by competing 
in elections and winning a considerable share of power. More radical activists chose the 
extra-governmental path by founding the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jamaah Islamiyah and its 
cells or Islamist militia groups (Bruinessen). Ironically, the introduction of Islamist 
policies was in many places supported by politicians from the Suharto-era secular par- 
ties, thus ‘outmanoeuvring, co-opting, and marginalising the more consistently Islamist 
parties as well as the more progressive elements of the civil society’ (Heryanto 43; see 
also Salim). 
As a result, people have become disillusioned with politics in general and 
political Islam in particular. The Islamists’ power has been much reduced these days, 
and Indonesian Muslims are now leaning towards post-Islamism, which is ‘neither 
anti- Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular’ (Bayat 19; see also Heryanto 24–48). On the 
surface, it looks similar to the cultural Islam of the Suharto era in that it focuses on 
religious piety rather than political power. Yet, while the cultural Islamists tend to 
repress their Islamic identity, the post-Islamists consider identity to be central to their 
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life. In other words, post-Islamism is a new kind of governmental and, to some extent, 
societal depoliticisation of religion. 
The film’s secularism enables the filmmaker to transcend/depoliticise further all 
the religious divisions plaguing the country. Although the moderate cultural Muslims 
remain the majority in Indonesia, they are also more or less influenced by both the 
current Islamism and post-Islamism. The Islamist radicals remain in the minority but 
what they lack in number they compensate for in outspokenness, boldness, and, not 
infrequently, terrorism. The filmmaker simply could not rely on the protection of the 
government on this sensitive matter. The government is pragmatic, sometimes adopting 
an Islamic identity, at other times a secularistic approach, depending on the needs. 
The visual suppression (but not the politicisation) of sex in the film seems to be 
motivated by similar factors. The protests of Islamic groups towards sexual films might 
directly or indirectly deter the filmmaker from exposing more sexual content on screen. 
Often, the protests result in the banning of films by the Board of Film Censorship. 
When it comes to sexuality, there has not been much change from the censorship of the 
Suharto era. As reported by the director, the Board of Film Censorship maintains more or 
less similar concepts of permissible sex acts on screen (Isfansyah, ‘Aku’, my trans.). 
More importantly, the same report also indicates that censorship depends more on the 
censors than the guidelines (par. 54). This gives power to whoever controls the Board of 
Film Censorship. Reflecting the state and spirit of the era, the Board is now heavily 
influenced by the post-Islamists, who are more enthusiastic about religious piety but less 
sensitive towards political content. 
 The permitted visualisations of the Communist and the anti-communist 
campaigns can be interpreted as a change in the Board’s attitude towards political con- 
tent, which is also confirmed by a military representative on the Board (Isfansyah, 
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‘Aku’ par. 55). Nonetheless, the restrained visualisations of the symbols, torture, and 
killing of the Communists seem to be influenced by the prevalence of the military 
power as well as the existence of two antagonistic groups with regard to the issue of 
the military and Communists. The liberal and left-wing organisations have long 
demanded that the military should take responsibility for the anti-communist 
campaign, and also stop interfering in civilian affairs. However, there are a 
considerable number of civilian groups, including some Islamist radicals, who would 
support the return of the anti-communist military to the leadership of the country. 
The film’s conciliatory tone helps the film secure the approval of both these camps. The 
left-wing groups welcome the marked expressions of political divisions in the film. 
Writing for the left-wing publication Indoprogress, Suluh Pamuji begins his critique 
by praising: ‘The Dancer by a young director Ifa Isfansyah should be considered a 
phenomenon in the Indonesian film industry, which dares to take on the love theme 
with a more serious frame: poverty and the Indonesian political tragedy of 1965’ 
(par. 1, my trans.). By contrast, the pro-military groups are pleased with the positive 
representations of Rasus. 
Unfortunately, the film failed in the market, attracting fewer than 300,000 
viewers and puzzling the critics. Yan Wijaya, a senior film observer, said the film 
should have easily garnered one million viewers and concluded: ‘there must be 
something wrong, but I don’t know where the problem is’ (Fahrul par. 7, my trans.). 
Despite the director’s effort to highlight the love story and tone down the politics, the 
film is still strongly associated with politics and considered a political film, a category 
that politically weary Indonesians despise. The fact that The Dancer contains much 
political ambivalence does not help. For too long Indonesian audiences have been denied 
the complexity of political history, and any representations of it in film, by external and 
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self-censorship. The audience, as a result, finds The Dancer with its ambivalences quite 
puzzling, if not confusing. As Sembiring reports: ‘some teenagers who were laughing 
and giggling at the beginning of the film left the theatre with a puzzled look’ (par. 15). 
This ‘puzzled look’ apparently precipitated the market failure of The Dancer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have shown that The Dancer is both politically progressive and 
conservative as opposed to the less ambivalent judgements of the early criticisms. The 
film represents the spirit of repoliticisation of the early post-Suharto Indonesia while 
concurrently offering a distinctive type of depoliticisation typical of the current post-
Suharto era. The adaptation displays a revolutionary vigour by politicising the 
depoliticised contents of the novel as well as the Suharto regime’s official narrative in 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. It hyperpoliticises all the parties (the villagers, the 
Communists, and the army) in the 1965 conflict by exposing their internal conflicts 
and ambivalences. Yet this very hyperpoliticisation results in a new depoliticisation of 
the same parties, as it shows that each party involved in the conflict is equally right and 
equally wrong. While the repoliticisation in the film signifies the situation in the early 
post-Suharto era, that is, when the public welcomed any kind of debate after 32 years 
of silence, the depoliticisation represents developments since, when people have become 
disillusioned with governmental and public debates. In addition to drawing attention 
away from Anglo- American adaptations and ‘the Anglocentrism of most post-colonial 
criticism’ (Huggan 20), this study offers a new outlook on the political dimension of 
adaptation studies as it reveals new principles, actors, arenas, tactics, and complexities in 
either an ostensibly political or apolitical discourse. 
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